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In the era of structural adjustment, the promise of Universal Social Protection, 
provided mainly through the state, was formally abandoned by most African 
governments. Those that retained the promise saw it made empty by the conse-
quent retrenchment in public services – not only in the social sector but also in 
agriculture, where most economic activity took place at this time.
In the 2010s, when economic growth eventually recovered to levels of the 
immediate post-independence era, the slogan of Universal Social Protection was 
once again embraced by African governments. In several cases, its (re-)imple-
mentation has even begun, particularly in the form of Universal Health Care.
Paradoxically, this occurred just as economic informalization reached new 
peaks across the continent. Surveys show that around 80 percent of employ-
ment across Sub-Saharan Africa is in the informal economy, driven primarily by 
de-agrarianization. Since most systems of Universal Social Protection are funded 
through taxes or other contributions collected via employers, and since a large 
majority of the African workforce lack a formal employer, this raises questions 
about financial viability. At the same time, where ‘self-contributory’ options to 
obtain coverage for Universal Health Care are offered, the lumpy and precarious 
character of most informal economy incomes means that take-up amongst their 
recipients is typically low.
On the other hand, a significant minority of participants in the informal 
economy are able to access one form or another of non-state social protection. 
Mostly, this takes place through collective organizations based on the informal 
sector itself. This is the subject of this important book, which by showing how 
they work, their benefits and their limitations, illuminates how Universal Social 
Protection might get nearer universality in reality and not merely in name.
Key to understanding this is to abandon for good the ‘heroic’ narrative of 
informality initiated in the 1990s by figures like Hernando do Soto and Naomi 
Chazan, which saw it as a bastion of rugged individualism and as the corner-
stone of a radically anti-collectivist civil society. As the research here shows, 
between a third and a half of informal workers surveyed belong to organizations 
anchored in and shaped by their branch of economic activity. Not only is pro-
vision of short-term social protection according to the rhythm of employment 
and unemployment in specific informal branches the main aim of many of these 
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organizations, but in a number of cases, they also provide a bridge between 
members’ and public self-contributory schemes. This can occur, for example, by 
channelling members’ savings into a schedule of payments for premiums.
For the authors of this work, recognizing the anchorage of informal work-
ers’ organizations and forms of social protection provision in the nitty-gritty 
of specific segments of the informal economy goes hand in hand with mapping 
the latter’s extreme heterogeneity of activities, entry barriers, pay and payment 
systems, working conditions, and relations with public authority. Unusually, it 
also allows them to map the primacy or subordination by sector and branch of 
the two faces of the informal worker – worker and business person. Linked to 
this are the nature of the non-social protection functions that collective organi-
zations may carry out, for example, whether they provide new business leads or 
act as informal employment exchanges.
In this way, Riisgaard, Mitullah, Torm, and their collaborators end some dis-
tance from their starting point in social policy. However, it is worth noting 
that their journey shares the same coordinates as that of William Beveridge, the 
founder of the Anglo-Saxon version of Universal Social Protection. The bedrock 
for Social Insurance and Allied Services (1942) was his earlier rigorous study of 
what was then called ‘manpower’ – and its distribution across sectors, occupa-
tions, classes, forms of employment, and income levels.
Peter Gibbon, May 2021
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Introduction
Lone Riisgaard, Nina Torm and Winnie Mitullah
Social protection policies and instruments have gained increasing attention 
amongst many developing countries and donors since the late 1980s. This is to 
such a degree that the social protection agenda is now commonly highlighted by 
development actors and governments alike as the preferred solution to issues of 
poverty in the Global South (Deacon, 2007; Hickey & Seekings, 2017; Hickey 
et  al., 2020). In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the last decade has witnessed an 
expansion of social protection schemes such as cash transfers, health insurance, 
and pensions. However, apart from a few exceptions (Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2012; 
Hickey et al., 2020), SSA remains largely absent in the growing body of litera-
ture on social protection.
The expansion of formal social protection in SSA happens in a context where 
informal labour markets constitute the norm and where most workers live uncer-
tain, precarious livelihoods with very limited access to official social protection. 
Dominant ideas about measures like health insurance and pensions or representa-
tion and voice have commonly been based on notions that the attainment of such 
social protection is linked to institutions and workers associated with formal sector 
employment (du Toit & Neve, 2014). Given that this has left most of the world’s 
workers (who are found in the informal economy) without formal social protec-
tion, recent years have seen an opening space for providing informal workers access 
to social protection schemes. Nonetheless, for a variety of reasons, most current 
social protection efforts are still largely beyond the reach of informal workers.
At the same time, a myriad of cases exists of informal workers forming collec-
tive initiatives, as a means of gaining better representation or for claiming rights 
to, or providing alternative forms of, social protection. Examples include informal 
micro-traders in Tanzania lobbying for inclusion of their collective associations 
in the national health insurance scheme; daladala1 driver associations pooling re-
sources to buy vehicles to use in times of unemployment or construction worker 
associations in Kenya providing welfare, training, and jobs for members.
The dominant social protection agenda and the literature on social protection 
come with an almost exclusive focus on donor and state programmes. Nonethe-
less, the coverage of the majority of these formal programmes is limited to small 
parts of the populations and in no way stands measure to the needs. In these cir-
cumstances, people elaborate other means of protection and cushioning against 
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risks and vulnerabilities through extended family ties and, importantly, through 
different forms of collective self-organizing. These latter collective, informal, 
bottom-up forms of social protection are notably absent from social protection 
discussions (for a rare exception, see Awortwi & Walter-Drop, 2018), and little is 
known about the extent or the format of these informal social protection mecha-
nisms. It is this soaring gap in policy and literary focus that we start to address in 
this book. Recognizing the very heterogeneous nature of the informal economy, 
we also note a gap in analyzing how formal social protection schemes interact 
with the realities and needs of particular groups of informal workers.
This edited volume presents the findings of a 5-year (2017–2021) research 
project on informal worker associations and social protection.2 The project has 
addressed the mentioned gaps by posing the following overall research question:
How are informal workers in the transport, construction, and micro-trade 
sectors in Kenya and Tanzania accessing formal and informal social protection 
and what (if any) is the role of their collective associations in facilitating this?
This overall question is specified into three more specific sub-questions:
a Do informal workers associations offer any kind of informal social protec-
tion, and if so, what characterizes the format of these services, who benefits 
from them, and how do they compare to formal social protection measures?
b In the formal social protection schemes, how are social protection needs, 
delivery, and beneficiaries qualified and to what extent do they cater for 
informal workers? What, if any, is the role of informal associations in pro-
viding access to formal social protection schemes?
c To which extent is representation of informal workers’ viewpoints and real-
ities institutionalized or promoted?
Overall, this book sets out to investigate how the global social protection agenda 
actually touches down in particular contexts and how it relates to the realities 
of informal workers. In examining and comparing the social protection mod-
els conceptualized and implemented ‘from above’ by the public authorities in 
 Tanzania and Kenya with what people actually do on the ground, we uncover 
the challenges faced by particular marginalized groups (urban informal work-
ers in three sectors prone to informality) and how their own collective associa-
tions seek to address these challenges with what could be called social protection 
mechanisms ‘from below’. With this comparison, we contribute analytically to 
essential ongoing discussions of social protection models in a Global South in-
formality context.
The research presented in this book is situated in the intersection between the 
literatures on social protection, on informality, and on collective organizing. Dis-
cussions within these bodies of literature have, however (apart from a few partial 
exceptions like Lindell (2010); du Toit & Neve (2014); Awortwi & Walter-Drop 
(2018); Alfers & Moussié (2019), largely been kept separate. As such, we seek to 
instigate conversations between these literatures in order to analytically address 
empirical issues, which remain largely unexplored in the academic literature.
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With regard to social protection, we adopt a broad understanding and more 
specifically we draw on the typology of social protection elaborated by Devereux 
and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) and distinguish between social protection classi-
fied as protective, preventive, promotive, and transformative measures. Preven-
tive measures encompass not only formal social insurance programmes such 
as pensions, health insurance, or maternity leave but also informal insurance 
and cushioning mechanisms. Promotive measures include, for example, access 
to micro- finance and vocational training, while transformative measures are in-
cluded primarily in the form of representation and voice. We do not, however, 
address protective measures such as narrowly targeted safety net measures (com-
monly known as social assistance), since that falls outside the common assistance 
of most informal associations. The typology allows us not only to order our 
empirical data but also to highlight how some social protection measures pre-
dominate over others.
From the informality literature, we draw on approaches that emphasize the 
deeply political implications of informality perspectives. Hence, in this book, 
we explore not only the actual practices, strategies, and struggles of informal 
workers (and their associations), but also how informality is understood and 
governed in Kenya and Tanzania, and in continuation, how informal workers are 
perceived and governed. This is important not only to understand the realities of 
informal lives but also for understanding social protection models, as informal-
ity perspectives influence how actors in the informal economy are envisioned to 
access social protection and what type of social protection is seen as relevant for 
informal versus formal workers.
Investigations into how informal workers are perceived as well as explorations 
of the actual practices, strategies, and struggles of informal workers and their 
associations necessarily touch upon the question of agency and what kind of 
collective capacities informal workers hold and are perceived to hold. Analyti-
cal approaches to analyzing the collective capacity of informal workers remain 
sparse, but, in this volume, we apply and adapt the power resources approach 
(PRA) (Wright, 2000; Silver, 2003; Schmalz, Ludwig & Webster, 2018). While 
the approach was developed to analyze the power resources available to trade 
unions, we argue that, if modified, it still has some explanatory power, particu-
larly in highlighting sectoral differences and especially with regard to issues of 
transformative social protection in the form of representation and voice.
A key contribution of this book is thus to combine relevant insights and 
adopted conceptual frameworks from three poorly connected literatures. We 
need this in order to explore how informal workers in different sectors access 
both formal and informal social protection in the light of dominant perspec-
tives on informality and social protection and keeping at the centre of attention 
the role played by informal workers’ own collective associations. In doing so, 
another key contribution of this book is the unravelling of the nexus between 
formal and informal social protection.
Empirically and methodologically, we contribute to filling a gap in the litera-
ture by focusing on three important sectors of informal work, namely transport, 
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construction, and micro-trade in Kenya and Tanzania. The study hence takes 
a comparative approach exploring three different sectors in two countries with 
different historical development orientations.
Based on our findings, we argue that there is a need to conceptually re-think 
and broaden both academic and policy discussions on social protection in order 
to recognize and address the restrictive formal/informal dichotomy and one-
sided focus on formalization as this renders most existing formal social protec-
tion measures starkly inappropriate for the majority of the working populations.
The immense importance of informal workers’ collective agency in meeting 
(even if inadequately) the social protection needs of association members needs 
to not only be recognized but also help inform efforts to reframe national social 
protection policies and systems. Of particular importance is the representational 
deficit we identify. Representation should be included in social protection dis-
courses as it is of key importance in terms of ensuring that informal workers have 
a say in the elaboration of social protection policies and more generally in issues 
affecting their work and living conditions.
This book is an edited volume where each chapter is authored by different 
constellations of researchers which all formed part of the research team and the 
chapters follow the same overall research design, although adapted slightly to 
fit sectoral and country differences (as discussed in more detail in the section 
“Book Contributions” at the end of this introduction).
In this introductory chapter, we start by reviewing how social protection, infor-
mality, and collective organizing in the informal economy have been approached 
in the literature while at the same time identifying and elaborating our concep-
tual framework. Thereafter, we provide a brief overview of the project meth-
odology including a snapshot of the informality phenomenon in our two case 
countries. Finally, we introduce the chapter contributions to this edited book.
Approaches to social protection
As mentioned, social protection policies and instruments have, since the late 
1980s, gained increasing attention amongst both donors and countries in the 
Global South where many countries have formulated national social protec-
tion policies and embraced different forms of social protection (Deacon, 2007; 
Hickey & Seekings, 2017; Awortwi & Walter-Drop, 2018; Hickey et al., 2020). 
In the 1990s, social protection instruments were seen as the preferred means to 
mitigate the adverse impact of structural adjustment (Adésínà, 2011, p. 454) and 
in the 2000s, following the Millennium Development Goals, the rise of both 
the post-Washington Consensus and some large Southern powers and the global 
economic crisis, social protection has been heavily pushed by international de-
velopment agencies as a tool for poverty reduction (Deacon, 2007; Devereux & 
Sabates-Wheeler, 2007; Hickey & Seekings, 2017).
Several international and regional policies and recommendations have so-
lidified this policy agenda such as the African Union’s 2009 Social Policy 
Framework, the UN’s Social Protection Floor Initiative from 2009, and the 
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International Labour Organization (ILO)’s Recommendation 202 on National 
Social Protection Floors launched in 2012. Along with the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals, which include targets on social protection, these add to the pressure 
on governments to expand provision (Lavers & Hickey, 2020).
The increased focus on social protection and the increased (although highly 
uneven) expansion in the Global South of particularly social assistance (in the 
form of cash-transfers), but also social protection more broadly, has been in-
terpreted in different ways (Lavers & Hickey, 2020). Hanlon, Barrientos, and 
Hulme (2010), for example, highlight the increased use of social assistance as 
South-South inspired, following innovative schemes implemented in Brazil, 
Mexico, and India during the 1990s. Others highlight the importance of inter-
national communities such as international organizations, donors, and NGOs 
in formulating the global social protection agenda and encouraging adoption 
in the global South (Deacon, 2013; Cherrier, 2016; Simpson, 2017; Ouma & 
Adésínà, 2018; Hickey et al., 2020). Finally, some authors (e.g. Seekings, 2012; 
Van de Walle, 2014; Brooks, 2015; Hickey et  al., 2020) add to this perspec-
tive the importance of local political factors – in particular, democratization 
 processes – in determining how social protection is implemented on the ground. 
Hickey et al. (2020), for example, focus on social assistance, which they con-
ceptualize as a resource that plays into broader political strategies employed by 
ruling elites to maintain power. Looking particularly at SSA, they note how the 
variegated adoption of social assistance needs to be seen in relation to processes 
of de- agrarianization along with uneven and contested processes of democra-
tization leading to growing political competition but also sometimes to more 
authoritarian forms of governance (Deacon, 2013; Cherrier, 2016, Ouma & 
Adésínà, 2018; Simpson, 2017; Hickey & Seekings, 2019). Finally, some authors 
(e.g. Brooks, 2015; Seekings, 2012; Van de Walle, 2014, Hickey et al 2019) 
add to this perspective, the importance of local political factors - in particu-
lar democratization processes - in determining how social protection is imple-
mented on the ground. Hickey et al (2019) for example focus on social assistance 
which they conceptualize as a resource that plays into broader political strategies 
employed by ruling elites to maintain power. Looking particularly at SSA, they 
note how the variegated adoption of social assistance needs to be seen in relation 
to processes of deagrarianization along with uneven and contested processes of 
democratization leading to growing political competition but also sometimes to 
more authoritarian forms of governance (Deacon, 2013; Cherrier, 2016, Ouma 
& Adésínà, 2018; Simpson, 2017; Hickey & Seekings, 2019). 
Despite the current near hegemonic status of the social protection agenda, dif-
ferent understandings of what social protection is and should be flourished, along 
with a few critical voices denouncing the agenda altogether (e.g. Adésínà, 2011). 
As noted by Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2007, p. 1), the social protection 
agenda “comes with a fresh array of conceptual frameworks, analytical tools, em-
pirical evidence, national policy processes, heavyweight agencies and big names in 
development studies aligned behind it”. Different agencies push particular under-
standings of social protection and, thus, for donor-dependent countries, adoption 
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of social protection policies has become somewhat of an imperative alongside the 
continued emphasis on neoliberal economic policies (Adésínà, 2011). Hence, in-
creasingly, governments in the developing world are elaborating and adopting 
national social protection strategies as a key feature of their poverty reduction 
strategies (Barrientos, 2010). Although heavily imposed from the outside, how 
social protection models have been embraced and adapted in particular national 
contexts needs to be seen in the context of how these align with the worldview 
and agendas of local elites (Hickey & Seekings, 2017; Jacob & Pedersen, 2018). 
In addition, as noted by Kramon (2019), actual implementation also needs to be 
seen in the context of bottom-up pressures and social norms.
In practice, much literature distinguishes between social insurance and social 
assistance, while conceptualizations like the rights approach of the ILO also 
include labour market regulation (Barrientos, 2010). In short, social insurance 
consists of protection against life contingencies such as maternity, old age, un-
employment, or sickness. Social assistance provides support for those in poverty, 
for example, through conditional and unconditional cash transfers, while labour 
market regulation refers to labour standards, including rights to organization 
and representation.
Trajectories on social protection can, however, also be viewed as falling on a 
continuum ranging from risk management to promoting social justice (Barrien-
tos, 2010; Adésínà, 2011; Gentilini & Omamo, 2011). At one end of the con-
tinuum are understandings of social protection as safety nets, as in the original 
World Bank framework or in its current social risk management approach. Along 
the continuum, we find broader understandings of social protection like the one 
promoted by the UK Department for International Development (DfID) which 
focuses on ‘social transfers’ and sees social protection from a poverty perspective. 
Here, we also find the ILO focus on social protection as rights (see Barrientos, 
2010; Hickey & Seekings, 2017). Both the ILO and DfID understandings can 
be characterized as being more along the lines of a European social model of 
universal provision as opposed to the more minimal approach endorsed by the 
World Bank (Deacon, 2007; Hickey & Seekings, 2017).
Towards the other end of the continuum, one can place frameworks which 
incorporate more transformative aims such as the ‘transformative social protec-
tion’ framework developed by Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) and the 
UN ‘basic needs’ approach. Both of these extend the role of social protection 
to encompass issues like education or representation (which can still be seen as 
working within a European social model). Although all the trajectories men-
tioned focus on extreme poverty and vulnerability, the more we move along the 
continuum, the more emphasis is placed on the broader developmental role of 
social protection in developing countries, whereas moving left on the contin-
uum, we see increasing trust in the ability of the market to deliver broad eco-
nomic (and as a result also social) progress.
Placing themselves outside (or beyond) the continuum are a few voices 
which criticize the current social protection agenda for “(i) excessive focus on 
the ultra-poor, (ii) the preference for means testing and targeting, and (iii) the 
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disconnection between the ‘social’ and the broader economic aspects of develop-
ment policy making” (Adésínà, 2011, p. 459). Particularly, the latter point finds 
resonance with critique of prevailing discourses on informality and on formaliz-
ing the informal as having a narrow focus and refusing “to engage the neoliberal 
economic framework as vulnerability-inducing” (Adésínà, 2011, p. 458; see also 
Bernards, 2017). Instead of a narrow focus on social protection, Adésínà (2011) 
advocates for a transformative social policy approach where attention is given to 
issues such as universal and publicly funded education, healthcare, and produc-
tion support for farmers (see also Mkandawire, 2007). Central to advocates of 
moving ‘beyond’ social protection is the need to link social and economic policy, 
to recognize structural conditions of poverty and vulnerability and a call for 
policies based on norms of equity and solidarity.
From a governmentality perspective, authors (Li, 2007; Hickey & Seek-
ings, 2017) have shown how international development actors have rendered 
social protection a technical solution to poverty and development challenges 
more broadly, while sustaining a particular world order based largely on post- 
Washington Consensus liberal ideas. The influential role that particular interna-
tional organizations have played in shaping the global policy agenda on social 
protection in their image has led to what some refer to as the production of “a 
fragmented and incomplete universalism” (von Gliszczynski & Leisering, 2016, 
p. 325). The result, as argued by Hickey and Seekings, “is a strategy for pro-
moting poverty reduction that responds to failures in market access and poor 
governance rather than an effort to fundamentally redistribute wealth and power 
through a new southern-based model of welfare capitalism” (Hickey & Seek-
ings, 2017, p. 23). In other words, the ‘practically feasible solution’ to poverty 
alleviation has been characterized by an absence of measures that go beyond the 
ameliorative to embrace more transformative forms of social protection.
But how do these conceptualizations relate to more practical operationali-
zations? To give examples from each end of the continuum, in a narrow sense, 
social protection can be perceived as public interventions “to assist individuals, 
households and communities in better managing income risks” (Holzmann & 
Jorgensen, 1999, p. 4, cited in Barrientos, 2010, p. 9). Whereas in a broader 
 understanding, social protection can be conceptualized as:
… all public and private initiatives that provide income or consumption 
transfers to the poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks, and 
enhance the social status and rights of the marginalised; with the overall ob-
jective of reducing the economic and social vulnerability of poor, vulnerable 
and marginalised groups.
(Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2004, p. iii)
The broader and more transformative understanding illustrated in the quote 
above by Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) came as a critical reaction 
to what they perceived as a narrow ‘economic’ and safety net focus of earlier 
policies. They proposed a new analytical framework moving beyond the focus 
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on ‘economic protection’, to incorporating a ‘transformative’ element, which 
recognizes the need for social equity and social rights, as well as protection 
against livelihood risks. This framework takes social protection beyond the con-
ventional, narrowly specified social insurance/assistance function to include a 
broader range of both economic and social protection targets/interventions (for-
mal or informal, public or private) classified as protective, preventive, promotive, 
and transformative measures. As mentioned, in this edited book, we adopt the 
above typology to structure our empirical data (see Box 1.1).
Historically, social protection policies and practice have undergone significant 
changes. Prior to the 1940s, ‘support to development’ was focused on infra-
structure, basic native education, and to a limited extent, health – in accord-
ance with the perceptions, interests, and needs of the colonial powers. Although 
Box 1.1  Typology of social protection measures as used in this 
book
Protective measures provide relief from deprivation: they include narrowly 
targeted safety net measures commonly known as social assistance. Not 
included in our research since it falls outside what informal associations 
are likely to assist with.
Preventive measures seek to avert deprivation: they include social insur-
ance for economically vulnerable groups such as formal systems of pen-
sions, health insurance, maternity benefit, and unemployment benefits. 
They also include informal mechanisms, such as savings clubs and funeral 
societies as well as strategies of risk diversification. In our project, preven-
tive measures include health and pension insurance systems and saving 
clubs/welfare associations (in terms of assistance with life contingencies 
such as sickness, marriage, and death).
Promotive measures aim to enhance real incomes and capabilities 
through a range of livelihood-enhancing programmes targeted at house-
holds and individuals and have income stabilization at least as one objec-
tive. In our project, promotive measures include micro-credit, as well as 
training (business-related) and saving clubs/welfare societies when they 
function to smoothen income via small loans or enhancing income by 
offering capital for business development.
Transformative measures seek to address concerns of social equity and 
exclusion such as collective action for workers’ rights or human rights for 
minority ethnic groups. Interventions include changes to the regulatory 
framework as well as sensitization campaigns to transform public attitudes 
and behaviour. In our project, transformative measures include representa-
tion, voice, and advocacy.
Source: Based on the framework by Devereux 
and Sabates-Wheeler (2004).
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during World War II, actors like the ILO had advocated for a broader vision of 
social protection, the single-minded concern with social insurance for the small 
number of workers in formal employment remained for decades. However, as a 
result of growing pressure not to ignore the poorer majority of the population 
in most developing countries, the 1970s saw the birth of the ‘basic needs’ de-
velopment strategy, by the ILO, other UN organizations, and the World Bank.3
In an African context, post-independence social protection often took the form 
of the provision of subsidies for education, health, and agriculture, coupled with 
emergency services (Oduro, 2010). The structural adjustment programmes of 
the 1980s removed many of these subsidies and introduced user charges for basic 
social services in health and education (Oduro, 2010). Recognizing the limits of 
market fundamentalist growth policies, ‘adjustment with a human face’ brought 
to the fore the safety nets agenda and targeting of subsidies to the poorest in 
order to manage risks and shocks (Oduro, 2010; Gentilini & Omamo, 2011).
However, during the late 1990s with the growing realization of the multi- 
dimensional nature of poverty, safety nets became increasingly criticized as 
residualist and paternalistic, and more sophisticated alternatives began to be 
proposed, based also on policy experiments emerging from the Global South, 
including the Latin American experience with cash transfers. The World Bank’s 
Social Protection and Labour Strategy in 2001 embraced the funding of ex-
perimental conditional cash transfer programmes, whilst the ILO launched its 
‘Global Campaign on Social Security and Coverage for All’ (2001), based on a 
recognition that its long-standing commitment to certain forms of social insur-
ance was of little relevance to poor people. In 2005, both the ILO and the World 
Bank published their first studies of the cost of social protection programmes 
in Africa (Kakwani & Subbarao, 2005; Pal et al., 2005), and DfID produced 
their first position paper on cash transfers (DFID, 2005). As discussed further 
in Hickey and Seekings (2017), DfID was the primary advocate of the form of 
social protection that would be ‘transferred’ to the African continent during the 
mid-2000s, largely in the form of unconditional cash transfers.
Hence, in more recent years, cash transfer (conditional and non-conditional) 
has received increased attention (Adésínà, 2011, p. 454; see also Barrientos, 
2010; Oduro, 2010; Hickey & Seekings, 2017; Kramon, 2019; Hickey et  al., 
2020), and the last decades have seen a rapid extension of particularly social as-
sistance programmes in developing countries, including in East Africa. Examples 
of such social assistance programmes include the Cash Transfer for Orphans and 
Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) programme in Kenya or the ‘Productive Social 
Safety Nets’ (PSSN) programme in Tanzania (Barrientos, 2010; Hickey & Seek-
ings, 2017; Kramon, 2019; Hickey et al., 2020).
Developments in understandings of social protection and social protection in-
struments have been described by some as a journey from universalism to safety 
nets (Mkandawire, 2004); however, one has to recognize a somewhat broaden-
ing of scope in the social protection policy frameworks developed during the 
2000s (e.g. by DfID and the ILO) as opposed to the more narrow and passive 
role played in the 1990s (Gentilini & Omamo, 2011). Recent years have also 
seen a return to universalistic understandings where some donors, for example, 
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push for universal health coverage. In practice, universal solutions have been 
implemented in a few African countries, for example, with regard to health in 
Rwanda. Kenya has recently introduced a universal old age pension scheme (Inua 
Jamii Senior Citizens) and a Universal Health Coverage pilot program, whilst, in 
Tanzania, universal health coverage has yet to move beyond being a major policy 
priority, though Zanzibar has universal old age pension.
As argued by Hickey et al. (2020), SSA remains largely absent in the growing 
body of literature on social protection. In addition, they note how the majority of 
research on social protection in Africa is donor-commissioned and hence focuses 
on technical issues, for example, measuring the impacts of particular programmes, 
assessing different financing models, or examining different targeting and deliv-
ery models. As such, Hickey et  al. (2020) offer an important contribution to 
this literature with their comparative examination of the key political drivers be-
hind the uneven expansion of social assistance in SSA. Along with other scholars 
(Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2012; Seekings, 2012; Lavers & Hickey, 2020), they have 
noted some distinctive features of African cases, for example, a historical emphasis 
on social protection, targeted at a predominantly rural population along with cur-
rent challenges of de-agrarianization such as declining access to agrarian-based 
community and family support mechanisms, and in general, a context of severe 
poverty challenges and labour markets which are predominantly informal.
It is in this context that we need to see how the global social protection agenda 
actually intersects with the realities of lived lives. Apart from the mentioned gap 
on social protection in SSA more generally, we also note a gap in the literature 
in seeking to understand how top-down-formulated social protection models 
interact with particular groups such as the sector-specific groups of informal 
workers included in our study. Relatedly, we seek to advance the very limited 
understanding of how such top-down social protection models compare to the 
myriad of existing coping/protection mechanisms already employed by groups 
of informal workers, what in this book is named ‘bottom-up social protection’. 
Individual components of ‘bottom-up social protection’, such as informal sav-
ings and loan groups or mutual support schemes, have been studied quite exten-
sively in the literature, but more holistic studies investigating the range, nature, 
and access to such informal mechanisms are largely absent and, as mentioned, 
they very rarely figure in the literature or discussions on social protection. The 
book by Awortwi and Walter-Drop (2018) presents a noteworthy exception in 
their recent edited volume where they map and analyze informal forms of social 
protection from a governance perspective to explore what they conceptualize as 
“governance in areas of limited statehood”. Our contribution is in many ways 
complementary to their book which also uses the framework of social protection 
elaborated by Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler; yet, it also goes beyond it in many 
ways. Most importantly, our book analyzes social protection models in light of 
the actual challenges faced by informal workers and in the context of specific in-
formal sectors – which enables a focus on the work dimension. Also important is 
that we compare responses from informal workers on social protection access in 
general – not just informal forms – and thus, we are able to compare formal and 
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informal models of social protection (although as mentioned we do not address 
social assistance).4 In addition, we use the PRA (as discussed below) to discuss 
the strategies and capacities of informal workers.
As mentioned, our research is situated at the intersection between social pro-
tection, informality, and collective organizing. Next, we turn our attention to-
wards the vast literature on informality.
Approaches to informality
Informality is a highly disputed concept whether approached as a theoretical 
concept, as defining a specific part of a population or labour market or as a policy 
approach. One can rightly argue that the mere use of the term is problematic as 
it normatively reimposes a dichotomist North/South hierarchy. Nonetheless, we 
deliberately utilize the terms ‘informal’ and ‘formal’, as understandings of and 
classifications of what is informal or formal have concrete political implications 
not least with regard to social protection policies and practices.
In the following, we focus mainly on the politics of informality and the links 
to different underlying logics about desired developments. Policy discourses 
about informality can be seen as instruments to address poverty, to ensure reg-
ulation and hence inclusion of the working population in the formal economy. 
While this might be the case, policy discourses on informality and the result-
ing policies implemented are far from just technical instruments. Inspired by a 
neo-Gramscian and post-development perspective, these discourses in addition 
can be seen to serve to either deepen or, conversely, aim to transcend existing 
forms of domination (Bernards, 2017).
One way to categorize different theoretical approaches to informality is to 
distinguish between neoliberal and structural traditions (Skinner, 2008). 
Neo-liberal positions have a celebratory view on informality which is perceived 
as a process of deregulation from below (amongst others, the de Soto inspired 
legalist approach would fall within this tradition), while structural positions un-
derstand informality as a crisis of capitalist development emphasizing the ex-
ploitive nature of relations between the formal and informal economies (Skinner, 
2008). Several authors have sought to integrate or reframe these two traditions 
(e.g. Nattrass, 1987; Lourenco-Lindell, 2002; Chen, 2012; Lindell, 2010) or 
transcend them altogether (e.g. Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur & Ostrom, 2007; du 
Toit & Neves, 2014) highlighting how both perspectives offer some explanatory 
power but also limited analytical value, as they propose what du Toit and Neves 
(2014) call totalizing teleological frameworks. Du Toit and Neve (2014) suggest 
instead that, rather than looking at what is not there (i.e. what we would norma-
tively like to be there), we should look at what people actually do and analyze the 
political terrain, the struggles and strategies employed “by people on the mar-
gins of the global economy” (du Toit & Neves, 2014). While we agree with this 
analytical strategy, policy discourses remain highly important influencers and 
often informed at least partly by theoretical perspectives. This becomes evident 
when looking at the discourses practiced and pushed by influential multilateral 
12 Lone Riisgaard et al.
institutions and donors and also when we look more closely at how informality 
is understood and governed in Kenya and Tanzania (see Chapter 2 and Chapters 
4–9 of this edited book). Thus, while we take up the glove by looking at the 
actual practices, strategies, and struggles of the very heterogeneous group called 
informal workers (and their associations), we also place our contribution within 
a broadly structuralist perspective in that we emphasize the political implications 
of informality perspectives and how these play into existing power dynamics.
Several authors highlight the very influential role of what they call residual ap-
proaches to informality (Bernards, 2017; Rizzo, 2017), in other words, approaches 
which treat the informal as residue. According to Bernards (2017), two residual 
understandings of informality have been particularly influential when it comes to 
the policies implemented in Tanzania and Kenya, namely the policy discourses 
pioneered by the ILO and Hernando de Soto/the World Bank, respectively.
The understanding of informality within the ILO has widened over time from 
a dualist perception of an informal sector consisting of unregulated business to an 
emphasis on unregulated work in an informal economy and a focus on social pro-
tection for all (Bernards, 2017). In 2015, the International Labour Conference 
adopted Recommendation No. 204: ‘The Transition from the Informal to the 
Formal Economy Recommendation’. This recommendation emphasizes the need 
to move out of informality in order to promote decent work for all (ILO, 2015). 
Current discussions at the ILO tend to emphasize the exclusion of workers in the 
informal economy from the opportunities in the formal economy and from social 
protection. The solution to this perceived exclusion is, on the one hand, to extend 
certain formal regulations and labour protections to the informal economy (this 
includes occupational health and safety, freedom from discrimination, forced la-
bour and child labour, as well as the freedom to organize collectively). On the 
other hand, coverage of social insurances like, for example, maternity protection, 
as well as decent working conditions, and a minimum wage is envisioned to follow 
from the transition to the formal economy (ILO, 2015, p. 25; Bernards, 2017).
Critics have highlighted how this approach ignores power relations and struc-
tural constraints (Selwyn, 2014; Bernards, 2017; Rizzo, 2017) and promotes 
what Selwyn (2014) has characterized as “‘elite-led’ development solutions in 
which the poor are framed as passive recipients of enlightened governance by 
states and major corporations” (Selwyn, cited in Bernards, 2017). One could 
argue that the ILO approach does encourage active participation, as they recom-
mend that employers’ and workers’ organizations extend membership to workers 
and economic units in the informal economy so that these can be represented 
and participate in social dialogue about the transition (ILO, 2015). Nonethe-
less, the focus is still on the goal of transitioning to formality (quite a few social 
protection provisions are tied to this transition) and representation through es-
tablished tripartite organs and not for example on transforming the tripartite 
structure to enable people working informally to represent themselves on an 
equal footing alongside formal enterprises and workers.
The other common global policy approach is heavily influenced by Hernando 
de Soto and presents a celebratory understanding of informality as a form of 
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poor people’s empowerment when faced with bureaucratic overregulation by 
the state (de Soto, 1989; de Soto, 2001). In this view, appropriate institutions 
need to be developed to promote the entrepreneurial instincts of the poor so 
that they can successfully engage in capitalist markets. Policy advice includes 
micro- enterprise development, particularly through access to credit, skills, and 
property rights and in general, regulatory reforms which decrease barriers to 
formalization (de Soto, 1989).
Critics have highlighted how the claim that
‘the poor already possess the assets they need to make a success of capi-
talism’ (de Soto, 2001, p. 6), sits at odds with evidence from a number of 
studies showing that it is precisely the lack of any asset other than their own 
labour that forces the very poor to sell their labour power, in precarious and 
vulnerable conditions, to asset owners.
(Rizzo, 2017, Chapter 1, p. 12)
Again, this approach lacks attention to structural barriers and, in addition, pre-
sents a very optimistic view on the ability of the market to deliver development 
for all.
As argued by Bernards (2017, p. 1834):
Residualist conceptions of the ‘informal’ serve to identify the interests of 
marginal urban workers with the deepening of markets or the extension of 
prevailing forms of labour regulation (rather than, say, with autonomous 
forms of political organization or the fundamental de-commodification of 
labour). Insofar as they are successfully institutionalized in practice, they 
thus serve to re-articulate the position of existing ‘ruling classes’.
Even though the two policy approaches differ in their view on how to achieve 
development, they both promote formalization by building on and improving 
existing institutions. In addition, they either endorse – or at least work within – a 
global market-driven development discourse. The key difference seems to consist 
in whether formalization is seen mainly as a matter of extending existing labour 
regulation or whether it is mainly the responsibility of individual workers or 
what Kamete (2018, p. 184) has described as the difference between a welfarist 
and a technicist regulatory legalistic form of integration (Kamete, 2018, cited in 
Steiler, 2018).
In this book, we explore not only the actual practices, strategies, and 
struggles of informal workers (and their associations), but we also explore 
popular discourses on informality and how they influence what type of social 
protection is seen as relevant for informal versus formal workers. This relates 
to the question of agency and what kind of collective capacities informal 
workers hold and are perceived to hold. Thus, in the following section, we 
briefly explore how the collective capacities of informal workers have been 
addressed in the literature.
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Collective capacities of informal workers
In general, earlier literature on informality has tended to assume that people 
operating within the informal economy lack agency (Lindell, 2010, p. 1). While 
structuralist approaches recognize the collective agency of workers, the recogni-
tion only extends to the formal economy, ignoring the potential agency of work-
ers in the informal economy and often portraying the marginalized urban poor 
as victims of capitalist development (Lindell, 2010; Egan, 2014). According to 
Lindell (2010), this widespread oversight of informal worker agency results from 
not recognizing informal workers as political actors, with the ability to organ-
ize collectively (Lindell, 2010, p. 2). This is in line with a critique of the social 
protection literature by Alfers and Moussié (2019), which argues that, while it 
might recognize the agency of people in the informal economy, it is as citizens, 
not as workers. Neoliberal approaches can likewise be criticized for having a one-
sided focus on entrepreneurial agency, or in other words, for not recognizing the 
agency of non-entrepreneurial actors like wage-workers nor the collective agency 
of informal actors more generally.
The academic critique has coincided with (and been inspired by) actual de-
velopments in collective organizing amongst informal workers, and lately, an 
increasing number of studies have focused more or less explicitly on the abil-
ity of informal workers to organize collectively (Chikarmane & Narayan, 2005; 
Lindell, 2010; Kinyanjui, 2012; Kumar & Singh, 2018; Medina & Schneider, 
2019). Kinyanjui (2012), for example, notes that often women in the informal 
economy belong to informal groups such as merry-go-rounds or women groups 
commonly known as ‘chamas’. Mitullah (2010) argues that such informal insti-
tutions are weak on their own but that some have partnered with transnational 
organizations in organizing and leveraging resources. Such partnerships have 
made informal workers visible to development actors, including governments, 
and, in some cases, enabled inclusion in local and national policy processes, which, 
in turn, have influenced their working environment and livelihoods. Some of the 
most prominent transnational examples are WIEGO (Women in the Informal 
Economy Globalizing and Organizing) and StreetNet International, while, at 
the national level, a coalition like the National Association of Street Vendors of 
India (NASVI) stands out in particular for the role it has played in the adoption 
of a national policy on urban street vendors and a street vendors’ act (see also the 
case of the Self Employed Women’s Union in South Africa).
As noted earlier in this introduction, discussions within the literature on in-
formality, social protection, and on collective organizing have (apart from a few 
partial exceptions like Lindell, 2010; du Toit & Neve, 2014; Alfers & Moussié, 
2019) largely been kept separate. Drawing on the discussions above, we argue 
that the common policy advice of formalization along with the widespread lack 
of recognition of people in the informal economy as political actors with the 
ability to organize collectively has implications for how actors in the informal 
economy are envisioned to access social protection. In short, in most of the policy- 
oriented literature, work-related social protection (like unemployment benefit, 
paid maternity leave, severance pay, work-injury compensation, etc.) as well as 
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social protection related to voice and recognition is most often closely associated 
with formal employment and only becomes available to informal actors once 
they formalize. Alongside policies of formalization, social protection tools like 
cash transfers and contributory insurances are being promoted to extend social 
protection coverage to the informal economy. But while formalization and an 
opening of social insurance schemes is offered in theory as a way to solve this is-
sue, it is less clear that this works in practice, as we shall illustrate with numerous 
examples throughout this book.
Meanwhile, as also highlighted by Alfers and Moussié (2019) and Hickey and 
King (2016), social protection approaches concerned with issues of poverty, de-
velopment, and social justice are mainly oriented towards social assistance and 
see the key relationship as being that between the citizen and the state. Here, 
the considerations around work and the relations between capital and labour are 
absent (Hickey & King, 2016; Alfers & Moussié, 2019). Initiatives along this 
trajectory include, for example, participatory governance initiatives and commu-
nity management committees (Hickey & King, 2016). Here, informal workers 
might have opportunity to participate – but in the capacity of citizens rather 
than as workers (Hickey & King, 2016; Alfers & Moussié, 2019).
Existing tripartite structures (where labour in the form of trade unions, em-
ployers, and the state negotiate labour and social protection policies), while vary-
ing in strength across countries (Carré, Horn & Bonner, 2018), largely represent 
the institutionalization of past social compromises based on the “golden years 
of prospering welfare capitalism” (Dörre, Holst & Nachtwey, 2009). Informal 
workers are most often excluded or have limited representation in such tripartite 
structures. Recent years, however, have shown signs towards some representa-
tion of informal workers as, for example, the Urban Areas and Cities Act of 
Kenya, which provides for informal workers to be represented in City/Municipal 
Boards. The Kenya Micro and Small Enterprise Authority also has a slot for 
informal workers. Nonetheless, there are still very few institutionalized spaces 
where informal workers can directly negotiate as equal social partners in the 
design of social protection policies (Alfers & Moussié, 2019) or other issues rel-
evant for their working life.
The lack of representation of informal workers in their own right also becomes 
noticeable when looking at the increasing number of examples of collaboration 
between informal workers associations and trade unions. Based on experiences 
from workshops held as part of the Rights Based Social Protection in Africa 
project, Alfers and Moussié (2019, p. 5) found that
organizations of informal workers have found collaborations with formal 
trade unions to be crucial in accessing tripartite fora, creating space for greater 
participation in social protection policy making and scheme oversight, and in 
terms of support for the extension of social protection to informal workers.
This has been the case, for example, in Ghana in the development of a new pen-
sion scheme and in Zambia where the Alliance of Zambian Informal Economy 
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Associations (AZEIA) has worked closely with the Zambian Congress of Trade 
Unions (ZCTU) on ensuring input into social protection policy processes (Alfers 
& Moussié, 2019). Interestingly, however, they mention how during these work-
shops, trade unions, and informal worker organizations expressed different per-
spectives on what have been the most problematic aspects of such collaborations. 
While trade unions emphasized difficulties in relation to membership fees and 
organizing meetings, informal worker organizations focused on the question 
of equal representation within the tripartite structures where social protection 
policies are discussed (Alfers & Moussié, 2019).
In this book, we contribute to these emerging discussions by investigating 
how and to which extent the representation of informal workers’ viewpoints and 
realities are institutionalized in Kenya and Tanzania and how this relates to the 
collective capacities of informal workers associations in the two countries.
How to conceptualize the collective capacity of informal workers
As mentioned earlier, analytical approaches to analyzing the collective capacity 
of informal workers remain sparse; yet, one approach which has recently been 
applied and which we also employ in this book is the PRA. The PRA stems 
from discussions on trade union renewal and has emerged as an analytical tool – 
often used in close collaboration between practitioners and academics.5 The 
PRA starts from the basic premise that, if organized, labour can successfully de-
fend its interests by collectively mobilizing different power resources (Schmalz, 
Ludwig & Webster, 2018).
The basic concepts on which the PRA built were created by Erik Olin Wright 
(2000) and Beverly Silver (2003), and they conceptualized the sources of labour 
power as deriving from both structural power (derived from workers position in 
the economic system) and associational power (derived from the formation of 
collective organizations of workers). In the following decade, conceptual addi-
tions have been developed by a range of scholars to form an overlapping analyti-
cal tool. Institutional power has been added as deriving from “laws, regulations, 
procedures, practices and other formal and informal rules that formalize the 
relationship between trade unions, employers and the state and thus secures 
rights for workers” (Kumar & Singh, 2018, p. 137). Societal power describes 
“the latitudes for action arising from viable cooperation contexts with other 
social groups and organizations, and society’s support for trade union demands” 
(Schmalz, Ludwig & Webster, 2018, p. 122). Societal power arises from two 
different sources, namely coalitional and discursive. ‘Coalitional power’ refers 
to alliances with other social actors such as civil society organizations which can 
be activated to mobilize or campaign, whereas ‘discursive power’ describes the 
power to successfully influence public discourses and public opinion (Kumar & 
Singh, 2018). Finally, Marslev (2019, p. 18) has recently added what he calls 
‘regime- disruptive power’ as a third form of structural power which derives from 
“the capacity to cause disruption to, and on that basis extract concessions from, 
political elites interested in regime-survival”.
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The PRA was developed to analyze the power resources available to trade 
unions – not informal workers. As such, there are several difficulties in transfer-
ring this typology to informal economy workers.6 For one, they typically have 
very low marketplace bargaining power (i.e. low entry barriers and a large pool 
of unemployed labour) and workplace bargaining power (although this differs 
between sectors). Nonetheless, as also mentioned by Kumar and Singh (2018, 
p. 137), despite informal workers’ weak structural power, “due to their vast 
numbers, they have the potential to harness significant associational power”. We 
would add that ‘regime-disruptive power’ is also highly relevant with regard to 
informal workers as they are recognized as important ‘vote banks’ and hence in 
theory should on that basis be able to extract concessions from political elites 
particularly during election times.
However, the conceptualization of power resources, as developed from the 
perspective of trade unions, omits sources of power, which we have found to 
be of relevance to informal workers’ associations, for example, controlling access 
to operate in particular locations or having personalized ties with more power-
ful actors. In addition, the conceptualization of power resources also rests on 
the assumption that the main purpose of collective organizing is representation. 
However, as we shall see in the contributions to this book, many informal work-
ers form collectives for other purposes – for example, to find work or to form 
informal bottom-up social cushioning/protection measures. Another factor is the 
multitude of different work and employment relations in the informal economy, 
which means that there is not always a ‘natural’ employer to be targeted or en-
gaged with in negotiations. Also, the lines between who constitute workers versus 
employers are often blurred and there are often quite distinct power hierarchies 
between workers within specific sectors (see also Rizzo, 2017). This means that 
one should not assume automatic solidarity within a collective of workers in a 
sector, sub-sector, or workplace.
This opens the question of how useful the power resource approach is to cast 
light on informal worker associations. We argue that if modified and employed 
with caution, the analytical typology still has some explanatory power, espe-
cially in emphasizing how sector- and country-specific groups of informal work-
ers have quite differing power resources available and different potentials which 
might be leveraged, in particular, with regard to issues of transformative social 
protection in the form of representation and voice. In this edited volume, we 
combine the PRA with the preventive, promotive, transformative framework 
thus adding a broader social protection dimension to the analysis, as summed up 
in the concluding chapter. Below, we highlight our understanding and use of the 
PRA concepts which should not be seen in isolation, but as partly overlapping 
and mutually reinforcing.
Typology of power resources as used in this book
In line with Silver (2003), structural power can be divided into workplace bar-
gaining power (the power that can be utilized from the strategic location of a 
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certain group of workers in a key sector) and marketplace power (relating to the 
tightness of the labour market). As mentioned, informal workers will, in general, 
command weak marketplace power, in addition, as many informal workers (like 
e.g. most micro-traders) are not wage earners but own-account workers, their 
ability to disrupt production processes are very limited. Nonetheless, strategic 
disruption abilities can be significant in some sectors and is of key importance 
for informal transport workers who if coordinated can bring the city to a halt 
(see e.g. Rizzo, 2017; as well as Chapters 4 and 5 of this volume). For informal 
construction workers, the disruption potential is limited to specific construction 
sites, whereas, for informal micro-traders, disruptive power is of less potential – 
save from the latent ability to physically block certain areas or, for example, storm 
city hall via demonstrations.
Strategic disruption abilities can, if coordinated and scaled, pose a real threat 
to regime survival and hence transform into ‘regime-disruptive power’. For in-
formal economy workers as an overall group, this is a potentially potent source 
of power, due to their strategic importance as ‘vote-banks’ during election times 
specifically. Lately, we have seen how bodaboda7 drivers have begun to play im-
portant roles in campaigning, for example, in Tanzania where the opposition 
leader would pose with bodaboda riders in the running up to the local elections 
in 2019 and bodaboda riders wear campaign slogans on their bikes. Interest-
ingly, bodaboda riders are also used strategically in the protests of other groups, 
as in Kenya, it is now common practice to hire bodabodas to boost street protests 
regardless of the topic of protest.
Associational power is derived from the formation of collective organizations 
of workers. Given the context of informal workers, we include all the different 
types of collective associations created or engaged in by informal workers to 
advance their own interests and conditions (see also Riisgaard & Okinda, 2018). 
We also caution to leave it an open empirical question who the relevant subject 
of workers’ strategies and possible counterpart in negotiations might be. As-
sociational power understood in this broad manner is potentially of immense 
importance for informal workers, as we shall explore throughout the contribu-
tions of this edited book. Other than numbers, the literature on PRA mentions 
how associational power also rests on infrastructural resources, organizational 
efficiency, member participation, and internal cohesion (Schmalz, Ludwig & 
Webster, 2018). These are of importance to informal associations as well, as are 
connections to people in power for some associations.
Institutional power is derived from laws, regulations, procedures, and prac-
tices that regulate the relationship between worker associations and employers/
authorities. In the context of informal workers, sources of institutional power 
could be tapping into established tripartite structures via affiliation with trade 
unions or employers’ associations (at government level) and more informally tap-
ping into the access to authorities that trade unions and employers’ associations 
have (at municipal and ward level). As will be illustrated in the later chapters, 
this has been the case for some micro-traders’ associations in Tanzania and for 
some transport workers in both Kenya and Tanzania. The case of micro-traders 
also illustrates how access to trading space – whether illegal, legal or simply 
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tolerated – is sometimes the context on which institutional power depends. In 
the case of informal transport workers in Kenya (see Chapter 5), we see another 
form of institutional influence in that the legal framework in place for matatu 
transport is very influential in regulating the relationship between the transport 
workers and the owners of the vehicles, although not always in ways intended.
Societal power arises from cooperation with other social groups and society’s 
support for worker demands (coalitional power and discursive power). In the 
context of informal workers, this relates to coalition-making with other infor-
mal associations, with formal worker associations, and with broader civil society 
organizations. In some examples of this book, we found coalitions with other 
actors, including NGOs and external donors, to be highly related to the ability 
of associations to advocate for rights and attempts at influencing the image of 
informal workers from derogatory to contributory.
In the following, we discuss the methodology adopted in the project and very 
briefly otline the scope of informality in Kenya and Tanzania.
Methodology
In this book, we adopt a broad definition of the informal economy, including 
self-employment in informal enterprises (i.e. unregistered business) as well as 
wage employment in informal jobs (i.e. without a written contract,8 but pos-
sibly working for a formally registered enterprise). This broad definition thus 
also encompasses agricultural employment (which we do not cover) and self- 
employment. The broader term ‘informal economy’ which was endorsed by the 
International Labour Conference (ILC) in 2002 is now commonly used instead 
of the older and narrower concept of the informal sector. At the same time, it 
should be clear from our discussion of different approaches to informality that 
the concept is at the same time highly politicized and in addition empirically 
unclear, as will be illustrated throughout this book. Hence, informality and for-
mality often come in degrees on a continuum and the formal and the informal 
intersects in numerous ways. Informal micro-traders might, for example, sell 
goods on commission for formal retailers while transport workers might be in-
formal but work in formal vehicles. For the purpose of this book, however, it 
does make sense to employ (with caution) the term informal because it is a signif-
icant delimitation in terms of social protection rights. For a brief outline of the 
scope of informality in Kenya and Tanzania, see Boxes 1.2 and 1.3.
The research presented in this book is based on a combination of qualitative 
and quantitative data covering informal workers across the sectors of construc-
tion, trade, and transport. As seen in Boxes 1.2 and 1.3, in both Tanzania and 
Kenya, micro-trade, transport, and construction represent some of the key activ-
ities in settings, where informality is the norm and shows no signs of decreasing. 
These two countries thus provide particularly relevant contexts for studying the 
access that people in the informal economy have to both formal and informal 
social protection mechanisms – insights that are essential in light of the ongoing 
expansion of social protection in both Tanzania and Kenya as well as in SSA 
more broadly.
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Box 1.3 The scope of informality in Tanzania
Turning to Tanzania, the share of informal employment in total employ-
ment is estimated at 90.6 percent (ILO, 2018) with a higher proportion 
of females (93.1 percent) than males (88.2 percent) (ILO, 2018). Exclud-
ing agriculture, the share of informal employment is around 69.3 percent, 
again with a significantly higher share of females (74.9 percent) compared 
with males (64.7 percent) (ILO, 2018). Measured by households, 42.5 
percent (out of 10.2 million households in Tanzania mainland) have at 
least one member engaged in informal business, and this represents a 
slight increase (by 3.0 percent) from 2006 to 2014. In urban areas, more 
than a half of households are engaged in informal business, accounting for 
64.6 percent in Dar es Salaam (up from 56.5 percent in 2006) and 56.9 
Box 1.2 The scope of informality in Kenya
In the case of Kenya, the informal economy was estimated to account for 
83.6 percent of total (non-agricultural) employment in 2018, an increase 
by 5.4 percent compared to 2017. Given that the total employment is 17.8 
million, and there is 14.9 million in informal employment, this leaves ap-
proximately 2.9 million to the formal part of the economy (KNBS, 2019). 
Furthermore, the informal economy is growing, accounting for 89.7 
percent of new jobs created in 2016 and more than 90 percent in 2018 
(out of the 840.6 thousand new jobs created in 2018, the informal sector 
created 762.1 thousand). Given the proportion of the labour force that 
works within the informal economy, its estimated contribution to GDP 
remains relatively low at between 20 percent and 24 percent, depending 
on the source (Medina & Schneider, 2019). Women make up the ma-
jority of workers in the informal economy, with men accounting for the 
larger share of employment in the formal sector (World Bank, 2016). In 
terms of the division between rural and urban informal economy employ-
ment, this was estimated at 9.6 and 5.3 million, respectively, with Nai-
robi alone accounting for nearly a quarter of total informal employment 
(KNBS, 2019). Regarding the different sectors, the figures are relatively 
stable over time with the wholesale, retail trade, hotels, and restaurants 
industry accounting for approximately 60 percent of total informal econ-
omy employment, the manufacturing industry making up an additional 
20 percent, and another 10 percent coming from construction, transport, 
and communication. The remaining industries in the informal economy 
are community, social, and personal services (together accounting for 10 
percent) (KNBS, 2019).
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Location-wise, data was sampled from two urban areas in each country: Nairobi 
and Kisumu in Kenya and Dar es Salaam and Dodoma in Tanzania. In each loca-
tion, three zones/districts were identified through transport hubs, and the same 
sites were used across the three sectors.9 In line with our broad definition of the 
informal economy, the survey covered wage-workers, own-account workers, and 
micro-businesses with max two employees at any given point in time. In terms of 
the qualitative data collection, we carried out a series of semi-structured interviews 
with leaders and members of informal worker associations, totalling 120 KII and 
24 FGDs (approximately 10 KII and 2 FGDs per sector per site).10 We also spoke 
to representatives from relevant government authorities, trade unions, and busi-
ness associations in order to assess the broader economic and institutional setting 
and its role in terms of access to social protection measures for informal workers.
Regarding the quantitative data, we undertook a survey of informal workers 
using a combination of purpose-based sampling and random selection. More 
specifically, the sampling was done so that 25 percent of workers were sam-
pled through the formal (registered) associations identified purposively for the 
project (associations/SACCOs/trade unions) where the target group were or-
dinary members and not leaders or members in an official position. The reason-
ing behind this was to ensure a broad coverage of different types of associations 
amongst our respondents, whilst being aware of the potential bias introduced 
by purposive-based sampling. The remaining 75 percent of the workers were 
sampled by geographical location to ensure a degree of randomness, bearing 
in mind that it is not possible to ensure a representative sample when there is 
no clearly defined population of informal workers (and hence the probability 
of selection cannot be specified). This random sampling was also intended to 
capture members of smaller, more informal worker associations. Nonetheless, 
due to the purposive-based sampling described above, we are likely to have 
an over-representation of registered associations as compared to unregistered 
ones. The final sample was 1,462 workers, which was well above the initial 
target of 1,200 workers (600 per country divided equally per sector per site).11
percent in other urban areas (NBS, 2014). Informal employment makes 
up 77.6 percent of total urban employment and 96.9 percent of rural em-
ployment (ILO, 2018). Regarding the informal economy’s contribution to 
the economy, this is estimated at 47 percent of GDP in Tanzania (Medina 
& Schneider, 2019). In terms of the different sectors, wholesale and retail 
trade are the dominant informal activities accounting for 47.9 percent, 
whilst the second most important activity is accommodation and food 
service with 14.5 percent, both of which have a higher share of women 
(NBS, 2014). Manufacturing comes third, corresponding to 9.8 percent, 
followed by construction activities, which account for 6.2 percent of em-
ployment, and finally, transportation (and storage) at 6 percent, with both 
construction and transportation being dominated by men (ILO, 2018).
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In terms of the sectors, for the transport sub-sample, we aimed for an equal 
division between bodaboda and daladala/matatus, and for the latter, both driv-
ers and conductors were sampled, whilst for the bodaboda, the riders (not pas-
sengers) were interviewed. For the micro-traders, the target group were mobile 
ones, whether on the street, at bus terminals, vacant lots, etc., and also less 
mobile ones, for example, mama lishe, but excluding traders with permanent 
structures such as kiosks or stalls in regular designated markets. In addition, the 
enumerators were instructed not to over-cover some commodities, but rather 
mix different types of traders and different types of commodities. For construc-
tion, the target groups were skilled and unskilled workers (wage-workers and 
own-account) employed directly by construction/site managers or indirectly via 
an intermediary such as gang-leaders. As for the actual construction sites, we 
covered large and medium building sites, and waiting sites (streets), yet excluded 
individual residential housing sites.
The research is comparative in that it explores three different sectors across 
two country settings. Tanzania has a socialist-oriented economic history with 
relatively lower inequality and earlier urbanization compared to Kenya. This 
might have an effect on both the structure of the informal economy and the 
informal and formal social protection systems. The comparison between Kenya 
and Tanzania also allows for exploring informal worker organization and social 
protection access in two different institutional contexts (regulation concerning 
informal workers is relatively more centralized in Kenya and recently somewhat 
more inclusive). By comparing a larger urban area (main city) with a smaller city 
in each country, we seek to address differences (if any exists) which might be 
related to the degree of urbanization.
In addition to a cross-sector-country comparison/overview, this edited book 
contains six in-depth cases on the basis of which we compare: (a) the same sec-
tors situated within different country contexts; (b) three different sectors within 
each country. The comparison of the three sectors within each country allows 
for uncovering sector specific differences like, for instance, the potentially high 
disruption ability of transport workers (structural power) or the existence of 
established umbrella associations of informal micro-traders such as KENASVIT 
in Kenya and VIBINDO in Tanzania (associational power). It also allows us to 
compare very different employment setups, where transport is dominated by 
wage employment, micro-trade by own-account workers, and construction by a 
combination of both.
The findings presented in this book are drawn from the data described above, 
with the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods allowing for both 
breadth and depth in understanding the collective organization and access to 
social protection amongst informal workers in both larger and smaller urban 
settings across the three sectors. As such, the book as a whole provides insights 
into how people in some of the most common and highly vulnerable informal 
occupations organize and how (if at all) they access formal or informal types of 
social protection.
In the following, we briefly introduce the contributory chapters of the book.
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Book contributions
Chapter 2. Formal social protection and informal workers in Kenya and Tanzania: 
From residual towards universal models? by Nina Torm, Godbertha Kinyondo, 
Winnie Mitullah, and Lone Riisgaard
This chapter provides an overview of the relevant formal social protection frame-
works in Kenya and Tanzania, focussing on how they relate (or not) to informal 
workers, including recent advances made in this regard. The chapter also positions 
the formal social protection schemes in relation to the social protection literature 
and shows that both countries are undergoing a gradual shift from the mostly re-
sidual towards the more universal end of the social protection spectrum, albeit at 
their own pace. For instance, whilst universal health coverage has become a major 
policy priority in Tanzania, progress is further ahead in Kenya where a universal 
health insurance pilot program was carried out in four counties during 2020. As 
for pensions, newer models range from being fully government funded to rely-
ing on informal worker contributions, the latter limiting the effectiveness of the 
schemes. Although social protection coverage has increased for the general pop-
ulation in both Kenya and Tanzania, when it comes to informal workers, uptake 
remains limited due to the factors like the cost burden, inflexible procedures, inad-
equate benefits, and lack of information on the different social protection options.
Chapter 3. The relationship between association membership and access to formal 
social protection: A cross-sector analysis of informal workers in Kenya and Tanza-
nia by Nina Torm
Using survey data of informal workers across the three different sectors (con-
struction, transport, trade) and four urban locations in Kenya and Tanzania, 
this chapter provides a mostly quantitative assessment of the extent to which 
informal worker associations facilitate access to both formal and informal social 
protection measures. Overall and when controlling for key worker characteris-
tics, the analysis shows that association members are significantly more likely to 
access formal social insurance. Moreover, across sectors and sites, the provision 
of loans appears to be the main direct mechanism through which this occurs. 
Finally, the results reveal a substantial earnings-gap between association mem-
bers and non-members, albeit with differences by sector and country. In sum, 
the findings suggest that informal worker associations play important roles both 
in terms of providing direct cushioning and indirectly through enabling partic-
ipation in formal social insurance schemes.
Chapters 4–9 are all organized in a similar way; however, each pursue in detail 
the specificities of each sector in their country context elaborating some of the 
issues raised in Chapters 1–3. The generic chapter content is as follows: First, a 
section on the context of how the sector is governed and, relatedly, how informal 
workers in the specific sector are organizing collectively. Second, based on em-
pirical data, the challenges faced by informal workers and their access to formal 
social protection mechanisms are explored. Third, how the workers in question 
are organized is discussed along with the services offered by their associations, 
the power resources available to them, as well as the access barriers. Fourth, the 
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survey data is used to compare informal workers who are association members to 
non-members and equally compare workers who enrol in formal social protec-
tion schemes to ones who do not enrol.
Chapter 4. Self-regulating informal transport workers and the quest for social 
protection in Tanzania by Godbertha Kinyondo
Chapter 4 explores the emerging collective forms of informal transport work-
ers and their potential for enabling access to social protection measures in Tan-
zania. Although their structural power is limited by a highly competitive sector, 
informal transportation workers have formed associations that self-regulate the 
industry and provide partial preventive and promotive social protection meas-
ures such as welfare services, savings groups, access to loans, short-term un-
employment insurance, and ad-hoc representation. Although these associations 
understand the needs, priorities, and contributory capabilities of their members 
better than formal social protection sector institutions, capacity-building is re-
quired to improve their effectiveness.
Chapter 5. Informal transport worker organizations and social protection provi-
sion in Kenya by Anne W. Kamau
Chapter 5 investigates the role of worker organizations in the provision of 
social protection for informal transport workers in the Kenyan paratransits and 
motorcycles sub-sectors. The findings reveal that a key benefit of both the par-
atransit and motorcycle associations is negotiating on behalf of workers when 
they get into problems with authorities. Further, despite legal provisions to pro-
tect workers in the sector, the legally mandated SACCOs largely serve the inter-
ests of owners of vehicles and SACCO management. Hence, the main challenge 
is not the absence of laws but lack of enforcement and supporting systems.
Chapter 6. Informal trader associations in Tanzania – providing limited but 
much-needed informal social protection by Lone Riisgaard
Chapter 6 reveals that even though the micro-trade sector in Tanzania is poorly 
coordinated, recently, a few attempts at broader coalitions and cooperation have 
taken place pointing towards a future strengthening of representational power. 
Whilst most informal traders lack access to social protection benefits, their own 
associations provide a range of social protection services ranging from savings 
and loans functions, cushioning in cases of sickness or death in the family and 
at times vocational training and joint business activities. These informal social 
protection systems are based on reciprocity and although they extend only lim-
ited coverage, they nonetheless provide services which, for most informal micro- 
traders, are difficult or impossible to access elsewhere.
Chapter 7. Access to social protection in Kenya: The role of micro-traders’ associ-
ations by Raphael Indimuli
Chapter 7 shows how micro-traders in Kenya access both formal and informal 
social protection services. The chapter reveals that most micro-traders still lack 
access to formal social insurance and attributes poor enrolment and retention in 
formal insurance schemes to socio-economic factors such as low and irregular 
incomes and service provision factors such as cost of premium and cumbersome 
procedures. Trader associations are revealed to have developed their own forms 
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of social protection to cushion themselves albeit not adequately in terms of meet-
ing all needs. Furthermore, informal micro-trader associations are represented 
in the government Micro and Small Enterprises Authority, an aspect which has 
potential of advancing the status of micro-traders in Kenya.
Chapter 8. Social protection and informal construction worker organizations in 
Tanzania: How informal worker organizations strive to provide social insurance to 
their members by Aloyce Gervas
Chapter 8 shows that, although not many informal construction workers in 
Tanzania have joined associations, members appreciate the services offered and 
acknowledge that associations act as cushioning mechanisms to assist workers in 
a flexible manner during their times of need. By contrast, formal social insurance 
schemes seem not to respond to construction workers’ specific challenges pointing 
to the need for a more inclusive approach in addressing the low enrolment rate.
Chapter 9. Construction workers in Kenya: Straddling with formal and infor-
mal social protection models by Winnie Mitullah
Chapter 9 delves into the construction sector in Kenya exploring how con-
struction workers are organized, how workers’ associations contribute to labour 
agency and social protection, and the role played by both formal and informal 
institutions in strengthening or undermining workers’ organizing for social pro-
tection. The findings reveal deficits in formal social protection and how workers’ 
associations and networks fill the deficit, albeit inadequately. Going forward, 
providing social protection for construction workers calls for a combination of 
bottom-up efforts of construction workers and top-down public models, nuanc-
ing the strategies of the latter with the former.
Chapter 10. Convergence and divergence of workers’ environment, asso-
ciations, and access to social protection: Sectoral and country comparisons 
by Winnie Mitullah, Lone Riisgaard, Nina Torm, Aloyce Gervas, Raphael 
Indimuli, Anne W. Kamau, and Godbertha Kinyondo
Drawing on the preceding chapters, Chapter 10 provides a comparative anal-
ysis of the construction, transport, and trade sectors across Kenya and Tanzania 
revealing many synergies in respect to the working environment and the impor-
tance of associations. The major differences which emerge between the sectors 
relate to the nature of organization, in which the trade and transport sectors 
manifest a higher level of organization compared to the construction sector. 
Also, in terms of power resources, worker challenges, and associational benefits, 
most of the differentiation manifests itself on a sectoral basis, underscoring the 
importance of adopting a sector-specific lens when analyzing the realities of in-
formal workers.
Chapter 11. Concluding reflections by Lone Riisgaard, Winnie Mitullah, and 
Nina Torm
The concluding chapter offers overall reflections on the research questions and 
highlights our contributions to the literature and ongoing discussions around so-
cial protection and informal workers. The chapter starts by teasing out key findings 
emerging from the comparison between the social protection models concep-
tualized and implemented ‘from above’ by public authorities with the models 
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implemented ‘from below’ by workers own collective associations. This is followed 
by reflections on the power resources available to informal workers associations 
and the applicability of using the PRA to analyse these. Finally, the chapter dis-
cusses how the findings in the book point to a need for expanding the social pro-
tection agenda in several ways including suggestions of areas for further research.
Notes
 1 Daladala are privately owned minibuses providing public transport.
 2 Funded by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
 3 The basic needs development strategy as defined in the ILO report for the 1976 
World Employment Conference to address ‘basic needs’ primarily through employ-
ment creation, targeted investments in health, education, shelter, access to water and 
sanitation, and the promotion of small-scale agricultural production grew out of the 
work of the ILO World Employment Program (WEP).
 4 Methodologically, our book also differs from Awortwi and Walter-Drop (2018). For 
instance, in the latter, the case selection criteria are based on locations (districts) 
where the demand for social protection is particularly high and statehood is weak, 
thus implying some bias towards higher need areas (which might reinforce their 
rather unconditional celebratory view of informal social protection), whilst we select 
districts on the basis of different, more objective criteria (e.g. transport hubs) rather 
than social protection demand and thus we would expect more nuanced findings.
 5 The PRA has its origins in the late 1960s and early 1970s where class became promi-
nent again as an analytical category and also as a mobilizing principle among activists 
and left leaning scholars (Schmalz, Ludwig & Webster, 2018).
 6 For examples of application of power resources to informal economy workers, see Ku-
mar and Singh (2018); Riisgaard and Okinda (2018); Selwyn (2009); and Rizzo (2013).
 7 Bodabodas are bicycle and motorcycle taxis commonly found in East Africa. In 
Kenya, they are more frequently called piki pikis.
 8 In relation to contracts, we asked potential interviewees to specify first whether they 
had a contract and if so whether it specifies pay and entitlement to benefits, and if 
so whether the details of the contract are implemented in practice. If the answer to 
the first two were yes, but the answer to the last one was no, we proceeded with the 
interview on the basis of this being an informal worker.
 9 In Tanzania, the construction sector sampling was also partly based on snowballing 
techniques in order to identify large and medium construction/building sites (see 
Chapter 3, Appendix B for the sampling method).
 10 Based on our knowledge of existing informal worker organizations and initial field-
work, approximately 30 informal worker organizations were sampled across all three 
sectors in both Kenya and Tanzania, covering different organization types (e.g. un-
ions, cooperatives, and trade-specific).
 11 After a thorough cleaning process, we ended up with a final sample of 1,385 observa-
tions. For further detail on the sampling method and data cleaning procedure, refer 
Chapter 3, Appendix B.
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Introduction
In Kenya, following independence in 1963, the government has with its na-
tional development plans supported social protection as a key response to pov-
erty through targeting the most vulnerable and desperate in society. However, 
the actual provision of social protection has taken many different forms and has 
generally been characterized by fragmented interventions, due in part to the 
various international agencies involved. In Tanzania, which gained independ-
ence in 1961 and has experienced a different economic history compared with 
Kenya, social protection has also consisted of fragmented efforts by a variety of 
actors, including international donors. As such, there is a lack of an overarching 
social protection policy framework that establishes clear institutional roles and 
responsibilities and lays out a concrete implementation plan from the central to 
local government levels. This compounded with a lack of financial resources and 
capacity both within government and civil society has until recently resulted in 
an inadequate provision of social protection for the general population.
However, in both countries, we are seeing a move towards more unified social 
protection approaches including the extension of coverage to informal workers. 
As already outlined in Chapter 1, this is partly a result of international recom-
mendations, including the ILO’s National Social Protection Floors (2012) and 
frameworks like the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) putting pressure on 
African governments to expand the provision of social protection. At the re-
gional level, social protection policy in both Kenya and Tanzania is governed by 
the African Union Social Policy framework which was endorsed by all Heads of 
States in 2009, and the wide-ranging provisions on the harmonization and coor-
dination of social security that guide the actions of the East African Community 
(EAC) Partner States. For the purpose of this chapter, we will not go into detail 
on the global and regional governance of social protection yet concentrate on 
the relevant national frameworks and their implication for informal workers in 
Kenya and Tanzania, respectively. The rest of the chapter is composed of a sec-
tion on Kenya’s social protection framework with sub-sections focusing on the 
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National Social Security Fund (NSSF) and National Health Insurance Fund 
(NHIF), followed by a similar section on Tanzania zooming in on NSSF and 
NHIF/Community Health Fund (CHF). A brief sum-up is provided at the end 
of the chapter.
Kenya’s social protection framework
In 2006, under the auspices of the African Union, the government of Kenya 
began the process of formulating a national social protection framework in 
consultation with representatives from government ministries, non-state actors 
including the private sector, community groups, voluntary organizations, and 
development partners, whilst also exploring international best practices in the 
provision and financing of social protection. The resulting National Social Pro-
tection Policy (NSPP, 2011) outlines how the consultations identified several key 
barriers that were preventing people from accessing social protection services, in-
cluding stigma and discrimination on account of gender, disability, age, national-
ity, area of residence, and poor wellbeing.1 Yet, among these barriers to accessing 
social protection services, informality is not explicitly spelled out.
The NSPP defines social protection as follows:
Policies and actions, including legislative measures that enhance the capabil-
ity of and opportunities for the poor and vulnerable to improve and sustain 
their lives, livelihoods, and welfare, that enable income-earners and their 
dependants to maintain a reasonable level of income through decent work, 
and that ensures access to affordable healthcare, social security, and social 
assistance.
(NSPP, 2011, p. v)
The NSPP is consistent with Kenya’s 2010 constitution which in article 43 
expressly guarantees all Kenyans their economic, social, and cultural (ESC) 
rights including basic rights to health, education, food, and decent livelihoods. 
It explicitly asserts the right “of every person… to social security” and binds 
the State in Article 43(3) to “provide appropriate social security to persons 
who are unable to support themselves and their dependants”.2 The right to 
social security, in both the wide and narrow sense, is closely interlinked with 
other social protection rights including the right to healthcare services, equal-
ity and freedom from discrimination, human dignity, freedom of movement 
and residence, reasonable working conditions, fair administrative actions, ac-
cess to justice, and the resolution of disputes in a fair manner and through 
public hearing before a court or independent and impartial tribunal or body 
(NSPP, 2011, p. 1). As such, social protection is geared towards improving 
human capabilities through social assistance (cash transfer programmes) and/
or social security (pensions and health insurance). In terms of the latter and in 
relation to informality, the NSPP states that
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The Government, working with all other stakeholders, shall:
i  Strengthen the existing social security regime and establish comprehen-
sive social security arrangements that will extend legal coverage to all 
workers, whether in the formal or informal sectors, and their depend-
ants (NSPP, 2011, p. vi).
ii  Undertake research into and consider viable options for extending cov-
erage to those who work informally and their dependants in consulta-
tion with key stakeholders, including those in affected communities 
and sectors (NSPP, 2011, p. vii).
Interestingly, in the first paragraph, the wording informal sector gives the im-
pression of a limited segment of informal workers, whilst the second paragraph 
refers to those who work informally which is a broader category of workers in the 
informal economy. Regardless of the subject, the cited objectives on extend-
ing social protection measures to the informal are clearly in line with the ILO 
agenda of “formalizing the informal” (ILO, 2015).
The NSPP is also in line with Kenya’s Vision 2030 which aims to provide a 
“high quality of life for all its citizens by the year 2030”. Built on three pillars – 
economic, social, and political, the social pillar of the Vision seeks to build “a 
just and cohesive society with social equity in a clean and secure environment”. 
Vision 2030 is the national long-term development policy which has provided an 
impetus for the government to increase investment in social protection to the lev-
els invested in comparable countries. For the first five-year period (2008–2012), 
the Vision’s goal was “to increase opportunities all-round among women, youth, 
and all disadvantaged groups”, and one of the actions proposed to achieve this 
was the establishment of a consolidated Social Protection Fund administered by 
the National Social Protection Council (NSPC). Whilst there has been limited 
progress in reforming the contributory schemes (KSPSR, 2017), progress has 
been made along other parameters, including the senior citizens “Inua Jamii 70 
years and above” programme which was introduced in January 2018, represent-
ing Kenya’s first universal social protection programme, guaranteeing a mini-
mum pension to all older persons aged above 70 years. The scheme is funded 
by the government and has been rolled out to around 533,000 senior citizens, 
expanding the Older Persons Cash Transfer programme (OPCT), which was 
targeted to poor and vulnerable households. If “Inua Jamii 70 years and above” 
attains full coverage, around 840,000 persons will be able to access the scheme 
and about 68,000 people aged 65–69 years will continue on the OPCT. In to-
tal, it is expected that the share of those aged 65 years and over who receive an 
old age pension should increase to 77 percent from around 31 percent (KSPSR, 
2017). Aside from being a response to the limitations of targeting, this more 
universalistic approach is portrayed as an effective solution to offering pensions 
for the informal economy.
The programme is expected to address many of the current challenges with 
pension coverage some of which are outlined later on in the NSSF section.
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With regard to the health insurance pillar of social protection, the NSPP does 
not explicitly mention informal workers but states that the government, in col-
laboration with partners, shall:
i  Re-establish the NHIF as a fully-fledged comprehensive national health 
insurance scheme, which covers all Kenyans, and to which those who 
can afford it must contribute (NSPP, 2011, p. vii).
ii  Establish a framework for enabling those who are not able to contribute to 
access a core package of essential health services, including maternity care 
and treatment for HIV/AIDS and related diseases (NSPP, 2011, p. vii).
Following the NSPP, there have been two Social Protection Sector Reviews 
(KSPSR, 2012, 2017), and during this period, both the NSSF and the NHIF 
have opened up to informal workers. The most recent KSPSR (2017) lists the pro-
gress made in this regard, and the key dimensions are summarized in Table 2.1.3
From the brief overview, it is thus clear that there has been limited progress in 
terms of extending both pensions and health insurance to informal workers, and 
as indicated earlier, the underlying discourse remains one of formalizing the in-
formal. More specifically, when relating the recommendations from the KSPSR 
(2012) to the different trajectories on social protection, as outlined in Chapter 1, 
Table 2.1  Summary of progress in implementing key recommendations from the 
KSPSR, 2012, related to the informal economy
Proposal Progress
To strengthen the existing social security 
regime and establish comprehensive 
social security arrangements that will 
extend legal coverage to all workers, 
whether in the formal or informal 
sectors, and their dependants.
Limited progress. However, the universal 
Inua Jamii Senior Citizens’ programme 
is considered as a more effective tool 
for offering workers in both formal 
and informal sectors a pension. It will 
need to be established in law for it to be 
considered as a legal coverage.
Determine the most appropriate role to 
be played by occupational schemes in 
extending social security coverage to 
those who can contribute to their own 
post-retirement welfare and security and 
risk mitigation.
There has been some expansion of 
contributory retirement schemes for 
those in the informal economy, but 
they still provide only lump sums so act 
more like savings schemes (see Box 2.1 
on the Mbao Pension Plan).
A national social health insurance scheme 
will be initiated that will protect both 
formal and informal sector workers 
as well as the unemployed from the 
economic liability of health shocks.
Limited progress. The focus is still 
on the NHIF, and a broader health 
insurance scheme has not been formally 
introduced. However, through the 
Universal Health Coverage (UHC) 
programme in four counties (Kisumu, 
Nyeri, Isiolo, and Machakos) the 
government is working on expanding 
social protection to informal workers.
Source: Adapted from KSPSR (2017).
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they can be viewed as being located somewhere between the left (beginning) of 
the continuum towards the middle of the continuum. Whilst the proposal on 
contributory retirement schemes for risk mitigation and health schemes to ad-
dress the economic liability of shocks are more in line with the residual approach 
of, for instance, the World Bank, the recommendation to “extend legal coverage 
to all workers, whether in the formal or informal sectors, and their dependants” 
resonates more with the perception of social protection as a right in accordance 
with universal models. In that sense, there is still very limited recognition of the 
broader transformative role of social protection as emphasized in the Devereux 
and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) framework, not to mention the plurality of informal 
social protection measures as revealed throughout this book. This disconnect 
between the official social protection policy stance, its implementation and the 
reality on the ground is where our research is situated. In what follows, and with 
the purpose of providing the context for the subsequent chapters, we provide an 
account of the two main public insurance schemes in Kenya and how they relate 
to informal workers.
National Social Security Fund
When the NSSF was established through an Act of Parliament in 1965, it only 
covered men that were formally employed; yet, in 1977, the scheme opened up to 
women and with the 2013 NSSF Act coverage was extended to workers in the in-
formal economy. Today, the NSSF covers all categories of employers and workers 
and is a mandatory retirement scheme whose main objective is to provide basic 
financial security benefits to Kenyans in both the formal and informal sectors 
(NSPP, 2011, p. 12). The NSSF has two tiers of contribution, namely the provi-
dent fund and the pension fund, and whilst the latter is obligatory for all formal 
employees from the age of 18–60, the former is voluntary and caters for self- 
employed and unemployed workers who fail to meet the minimum provisions. 
Prior to 2013 contributions amounted to 5 percent of earnings by each of the 
employee and employer, subject to a cap on earnings of Kenyan Shillings (KES) 
400 (USD 4) per month. Currently, contributions, which depend on minimum 
wages, amount to 6 percent payable by each of the employee and employer with 
the ‘cap’ having increased to KES 2,160 per month (USD 21) (KSPSR, 2017). 
In return, members receive benefits upon turning 60 years. Although NSSF an-
nual contributions and annual benefits increased by 5.2 percent and 2.6 percent, 
respectively, in 2018 (KNBS, 2019), the low monetary ceiling on contributions 
means that the current level of benefits is generally considered inadequate.
In terms of coverage, during 2014–2018, the number of registered employ-
ers and employees increased by 6.8 percent and 3.0 percent to 143,300 and 
4,068,400, respectively. During the same period, the number of registered 
women employees increased by 4.8 percent compared to 2.4 percent growth re-
corded for men employees (KNBS, 2019). Despite such increases and the fact that 
the NSSF has 60 branches and is accessible in each of the 47 counties through 
‘Huduma Centres’, effective coverage remains low. In terms of active members, it 
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is estimated that, for formal and informal workers, only 15 percent of those aged 
18–65 years have an employer contributing to NSSF pensions (KSPSR, 2017), 
which is nevertheless an increase from 2011 (NSPP, 2011, p. 12). The low level of 
benefits could be a factor dissuading especially informal workers from joining the 
scheme. Moreover, as discussed throughout this book, low enrolment of infor-
mal workers is attributed to challenges such as low wages, lack of contracts, high 
poverty, little awareness of NSSF, and the bureaucratic nature of the scheme. In 
addition, scant information on informal economy workers makes it difficult for 
government programmes to prioritize them; yet, in order to extend coverage 
further, the NSSF is working with informal worker organizations, examples of 
which are provided in the subsequent chapters of this edited volume.
Since 2013, NSSF members have the option of ‘contracting out’ of the man-
dated pension component if the individual worker has a pension through an 
alternative scheme. An example is the ‘Mbao’ scheme (Box 2.1) which is an 
initiative to extend private pensions to the informal sector; however, in line with 
existing literature (Kabare, 2018), our research shows that very few informal 
workers subscribe to Mbao. Moreover, it appears that the scheme is not well 
understood. For instance, the phrase “‘tupa’ (throw) twenty shillings” which 
was used by some workers when talking about the scheme revealed the suspicion 
of those throwing the 20 shillings.4 Observations also revealed that the Mbao 
Box 2.1  The ‘Mbao’ scheme: a flagship initiative of the 
Retirement Benefits Authority (RBA)
The Mbao Pension Plan was established in 2009 by the Kenya National 
Federation of Jua Kali Associations as a voluntary retirement savings 
scheme, geared towards supporting citizens engaged in the informal sec-
tor who are not accessing any social security support, although it is open 
to any citizen who would like to join. It is registered as a retirement benefit 
scheme, yet is managed privately in the same way as most of the ‘normal’ 
occupational schemes operating in the country. Mbao offers members to 
easily accumulate a low level of regular savings at minimal cost – typically 
though the money transfer schemes operated by the mobile phone com-
panies. In 2016, the total recorded membership was about 99,000, with 
an accumulated fund of about KES 110 million. Thus, while the scheme 
membership has, until now, reached only a rather limited proportion of 
the target population of informal economy workers, it has grown fairly 
steadily. However, since contributions can be – and typically appear to be – 
withdrawn after a required minimum period of three years, there is little 
evidence that Mbao will be able to contribute to old age income security. 
Thus, whilst being modestly attractive as a savings vehicle, it is unlikely 
to function as a reliable pension scheme for those working in the informal 
economy (KSPSR, 2017).
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scheme is ‘a child without a parent’, with many agencies claiming ownership 
including the Jua Kali Association, Kenya Commercial Bank, Kenya Retirement 
Benefits Authority, Eco Pension Plan, and the ILO. Thus, governance of the 
Mbao scheme seems not well consolidated. In January 2020, the NSSF in col-
laboration with the NHIF, Kenya Commercial Bank, Safaricom, and Proto En-
ergy launched a new pension scheme for informal workers named ‘Haba Haba’, 
seeking to address the immediate and medium term needs of present and future 
NSSF members, initially targeting informal worker in the transport sector. The 
scheme gives members of the informal economy a chance to save a minimum of 
KES 25 (USD 0.25) a day with the option of withdrawing 50 percent of their 
contributions after consistently contributing for a minimum of five years. This 
differs from NSSF offers in the formal sector where members have to retire or 
attain the age of 50 years to access their savings. At the time of writing, it is, 
however, unclear how or whether the ‘Haba Haba’ scheme relates to the Mbao 
scheme and whether the latter still remains in operation.
National Hospital Insurance Fund
The NHIF was established in 1966 as a department under the Ministry of 
Health, and like NSSF, it was part of the government’s efforts to cushion workers 
against future vulnerabilities. Although several schemes in Kenya offer health-
care, the NHIF is the primary one covering more than 90 percent of the insured 
population. In 1972, the NHIF extended coverage to self-employed/informal 
workers on a voluntary basis, and later on, outpatient coverage for both formal 
and informal sector workers was introduced in addition to in-patient services 
(NSPP, 2011, p. 13). In 2012, the NHIF established a health insurance package 
for informal workers providing beneficiaries with access to a range of treatments 
and services for a monthly premium contribution of KES 500 (USD 4.6) per 
family paid by the individual worker. Moreover, everyone who receives the “Inua 
Jamii 70 years and above” pension is also accepted as members of the NHIF, 
with their contributions paid by the government (KNBS, 2019).5
In terms of the number of NHIF registered members, this has increased 
gradually from 4.5 million in 2013/2014 to 7.7 million in 2017/2018 (KNBS, 
2019) and 9 million in 2019/2020 (KII, Nairobi).6 Since the NHIF also pro-
vides for immediate family members, the total number of people benefiting was 
around 18.4 million in 2017, equivalent to around 39 percent of the population 
(KSPSR, 2017).7 The rate of membership expansion has been particularly high 
among informal workers who saw a 23 percent rise for the period 2013/2014 to 
2017/2018 compared with a formal sector increase of 4 percent (KNBS, 2019). 
In terms of numbers, informal workers made up around 700,000 contributing 
members in 2011 increasing to an estimated 2.5 million in 2015/2016 (KSPSR, 
2017) and 3.2 million in 2019/2020 (KII, Nairobi). Thus, around 41 percent 
of total members come from the informal economy; yet, considering that there 
are around 14 million informal workers, the coverage gap among this group 
remains substantial.
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As indicated in Table 2.1, the UHC programme, which was launched at the 
end of 2018, presents an attempt to further expand social protection to informal 
workers.8 The programme was supposed to operate for one year after which 
a review would assess how to roll it out to the rest of the 46 counties; yet, 
it was extended for three months with no extra resources. During this time, 
40 other counties had signed the Intergovernmental Participation Agreement 
(IPA) with the national government. Further commitment was made through 
an inter-governmental relations agreement in October 2020, with provisions for 
developing a UHC policy and review of the NHIF to provide for UHC, in-
cluding establishment of a UHC Fund (ROK, 2020). All these commitments 
are in progress as the government intensifies provision of primary health care, 
viewed as a foundation for UHC. However, public observations indicate that the 
programme has been underfunded with some pilot counties not even receiving 
half of the budgeted amount. Moreover, even if/when the programme is rolled 
out  country-wide, it seems likely that, given the low sustainability and predict-
ability of informal workers’ income, the majority of premium contributors will 
not be consistent in their payment and will likely require subsidies (Okungu & 
McIntyre, 2019). In fact, the inconsistency of informal sector contributions has 
prompted the NHIF to put in place a two-month restriction on usage of the 
NHIF card for self-employed contributors to avoid people only enrolling when 
they are seeking service.
The research presented in this book reveals that some of the reasons for poor 
enrolment/inactiveness of informal workers include cost of premium, registra-
tion problems, lack of information, and informal associational cushioning. In 
order to better reach informal economy workers, the NHIF has started to en-
gage them through their associations, something which will be discussed in the 
sector-specific chapters. Although, the number of informal economy workers 
that have joined the NHIF remains relatively low, the NHIF has, until now, 
been more successful than the NSSF.
Tanzania’s social protection framework
Tanzania’s Development Vision 2025, the National Social Security Policy NSPP 
(2003), the National Ageing Policy (2003), and the Health Sector Strategic Plan 
2015–2020 all envisage social protection for every citizen in Tanzania. Towards 
this purpose and following the publication of the NSPP in 2003, the Tanzanian 
government has enacted a number of legislations to address social security issues, 
leading to the establishment of the Social Security Regulatory Authority (SSRA) 
in 2008, with the mandate to govern and regulate the pensions and health in-
surance schemes. In 2010, from an initial draft in 2000, Tanzania published its 
National Social Protection Framework (NSPF).
NSPF (the National Social Protection Framework) is part of national efforts 
to reduce poverty and its primary aim is to reach the most vulnerable and 
ensure their protection. It is also a means of building the capabilities of the 
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poor to engage in production so that they become effective participants in 
and beneficiaries of the growth process.
(United Republic of Tanzania, 2008, p. 2)
The wording in this statement is very much along the lines of the residual risk 
management approach to social protection, where the latter is not seen to play 
a developmental role in itself, but rather, there is a general trust in the ability of 
the market to deliver broad economic and social progress. Following the NSPF, 
in 2012, the social security law (SSL) was amended, and coverage extended to 
“apply to any person employed in the formal or informal sector or self-employed 
within mainland Tanzania” (SSL, 2012, p. 50). The amended SSL also defined 
the informal sector as “the sector which includes workers who work informally 
and who do not work in terms of an employment contract or any other contract 
contemplated in the definition of employee” (SSL, 2012, p. 51). Initially, the 
2012 SSL banned the withdrawal of benefits before retirement age; yet, after 
public outcry, the parliament lifted the ban later that year. However, with the 
passing of the Social Security Fund Act in 2018, the ban is back so as to preserve 
the meaning of pensions, and a member who resigns will have to wait until they 
reach the age of 55–60 to get their benefits.9
Despite their wording, neither the 2003 policy nor the 2010 social protection 
framework sufficiently addressed issues of informal workers and participation of 
poor households, and neither define clearly how different actors could implement 
social assistance programs and voluntary schemes. These shortfalls in design, im-
plementation, coordination, monitoring, and evaluation processes for linking up 
and ensuring national coverage in the implementation are still under discussion. 
Since April 2018, a new NSPP has been proposed consisting of three pillars: 
social assistance, social insurance (health and pension), and voluntary schemes.10 
The latter would cover associations of informal workers for instance. Whilst the 
revised NSPP is still to be approved, three public insurance schemes – the NSSF, 
the NHIF, and the CHF – are all open to informal workers and in what follows 
we consider the relevance and potential accessibility of each of these.
National Social Security Fund
The NSSF caters for employees in the private sector, the self-employed, foreign-
ers employed in Mainland Tanzania, and employees in international organi-
zations based in Mainland Tanzania. Any category of temporary employee is 
registrable under the NSSF, and the “The National Informal Sector Scheme” 
applies specifically to informal workers. The informal membership figures have 
varied substantially year-on-year and, in 2017/2018, registered informal worker 
members represented 18,631 down from 47,780 in 2014/2015 (NSSF, 2018).11 
One explanation for the sharp fall in informal members is that whilst workers are 
initially attracted to joining the scheme in order to receive loans and other short-
term benefits, in the longer run, they drop out and/or join informal groups 
for the reasons discussed in the sector specific chapters. In addition to social 
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security, the NSSF offers health and medical coverage, however this benefit is 
seemingly on hold due to the high administrative expenditure at around 22 
percent of the Fund’s income. In early 2018, the Public Service Social Security 
fund (PSSSF) was signed into Law including a Voluntary Savings Retirement 
Scheme (VSRS) for the employed, self-employed, informal sector workers, and 
all other categories of people such as farmers, fishermen, drivers, micro- traders, 
food venders, organized groups such as VIBINDO (an association of small 
businesses), Saving Associations and Credit Co-operative Societies (SACCOS), 
women groups, and professionals.12 Under the VSRS, contributors were eligible 
for pension and health insurance upon payment of TZS 20,000 per month dur-
ing three consecutive months; however, the health insurance part was deemed 
too costly and was not renewed after the end of 2019.
Despite these openings, informal sector workers are largely excluded from the 
ambit of the social security legislative framework, due to a number of challenges 
outlined by Ackson & Masabo (2013). First, all the schemes (except CHF) re-
quire contributions from both the employer and the employee, and workers in 
the informal sector may be unable to contribute “double” portions on behalf 
of their “non-existent” employer and themselves. Even when informal workers 
do have employers, in the absence of a regulatory framework, employers may be 
unwilling to make contributions to a social security fund because this increases 
their labour costs. Similarly, in cases where employer contributions are not man-
dated by law, informal workers may be reluctant to allow their employer to de-
duct contributions to the social security scheme as they would receive lower pay. 
Moreover, the benefits of the schemes are not deemed to be substantial enough 
to warrant contributions, whilst uncertainty and unreliability of income may 
impair informal sector membership, contributions, and qualifications for bene-
fits. For instance, for a member to qualify for invalidity pension and maternity 
benefits under the NSSF, workers must have contributed for a minimum of 36 
months out of which 12 months contributions must have been made within the 
immediate past 36 months before the occurrence of the social risk.13 Finally, 
workers in the informal sector are unaware of the core functions and operations 
of social security schemes. In order to address some of these issues, the NSSF has 
been providing short-term benefits to informal sector contributors as a motivat-
ing factor for them to continue their membership. For example, each year, upon 
satisfactory contribution from an informal sector member, the NSSF will issue 
that member with an appropriate asset – i.e. fuel or tyres for bodaboda workers, 
or cooking utensils, chairs, etc., for informal food vendors.
National Health Insurance Fund and Community Health Fund
The largest health insurance schemes are the NHIF and the CHF/iCHF. From 
the early 1990s, the Tanzanian government adopted reforms that changed the 
health financing system from free services to mixed financing; yet, health in-
surances were only formally introduced in 2000, as part of larger health re-
forms aimed at improving access to health services. By then, it was becoming 
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increasingly difficult for ruling politicians to defend the inconsistency between 
the promise of universal access to social services heralded under African socialism 
and the reality of limited access (Pedersen & Jacob, 2018).14 Whilst the NHIF 
was initially meant for civil servants, employees in executive agencies and gov-
ernment parastatals, coverage was later on extended to private-sector employees 
and the self-employed plus family members. Following the health-sector reforms 
in the early 1990s, the CHF was introduced in 1996 as part of the endeavours 
to make health care affordable and available to the rural population and workers 
in the informal sector on a voluntary basis. In 2001, the government passed 
the CHF Act (supported by the World Bank), formally institutionalizing it as a 
voluntary insurance-based hybrid scheme, administered at the district level and 
co-financed by the community (household) and the government. In practice, 
this means that the CHF members must first seek care at a dispensary or health 
centre in their districts which then submits the claims to the central govern-
ment that then matches the collected membership fees. In 2009, the NHIF was 
contracted to oversee operations of the CHF which targets the rural informal 
population and its counterpart TIKA which covers the informal sector in urban 
areas (Mbekeani, 2009; Rwegoshora, 2016; Pedersen & Jacob, 2018).
The CHF has encountered challenges including poor enrolment and poor 
health services offered to members. Since 2014, the CHF has been under replace-
ment by an improved CHF system (iCHF), permitting members to access health 
services outside of their districts and providing a more comprehensive pack-
age of services. Thus, the iCHF was introduced as a voluntary, district-owned 
health insurance scheme, built on a strong partnership between the NHIF, the 
district councils, public and private health care facilities, and PharmAccess. By 
September 2016, more than 100,000 people had enrolled in the iCHF, and the 
aim is to enrol at least 30 percent of the population in each of the districts of 
the Northern Zone’s Kilimanjaro, Arusha, and Manyara regions by 2021. The 
government has also successfully tested the iCHF in the regions of Dodoma, 
Kilimanjaro, and Mbeya. In 2019, after assuming oversight of the CHF/TIKA 
schemes, the Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly 
and Children (MOHCDGEC) assessed lessons learned and has taken initial 
steps to consolidate and rename the schemes referring now to all former CHF/
TIKA schemes collectively as the iCHF scheme. THE MOHCDGEC has also 
begun to pool funds at the regional level to enable greater cross subsidization of 
health costs. The new standard benefit package for the iCHF centres on the pro-
visions of primary care; yet, benefits are more limited than those offered by the 
NHIF and most private health insurance schemes. The iCHF charges a single 
per- beneficiary premium of TZS 40,000 (USD 20) annually in Dar es Salaam 
or TZS 150,000 (USD 65) per household of six and TZS 30,000 (USD 13) in 
all other urban areas. In rural areas, premiums range from TZS 10,000–30,000 
with the latter being for a household of six, and for all locations, the government 
matches the contribution (Lee, Tarimo & Dutta, 2018). The parliament is ex-
pected to pass legislation in late 2020/early 2021 that will authorize the national 
rollout of iCHF as preparation for the Universal Health Care policy.
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As for the NHIF, individual households from the informal sector can volun-
tarily enrol for an annual premium of approximately USD 672, which is well 
above the iCHF and beyond the means of many informal workers.15 In terms 
of membership, the NHIF recorded an increase in their membership base from 
164,708 in 2001/2002 to 468,611 in 2010/2011 up to around 750,000 in 
2017 (Prabhakaran & Dutta, 2017). Since up to six family members can be 
added to the employee’s membership, this means that the total number of ben-
eficiaries might be about 3.5 million, equivalent to around 7 percent of the 
population (Wang et al., 2018).
This is in line with estimates provided by Pedersen and Jacob (2018) according 
to whom existing insurance schemes covered approximately 22 percent of the pop-
ulation (7 percent by the NHIF, 12 percent covered by the voluntary CHF, 1 per-
cent by private insurances, 1 percent by community-based health insurances and 1 
percent by the NSSF).16 According to NHIFs own data, coverage has been steady 
around 7 percent of the population in the period from 2012/2013 to 2017/2018, 
whereas a large increase is reported for CHF for the same period (Riisgaard, 
2020). Thus, as of 2018, it is estimated that around 34 percent of Tanzanians have 
some form of health insurance with 25 percent (13.5 million beneficiaries) covered 
by the CHF, 7 percent by the NHIF with private health insurance accounting for 
2 percent (NHIF Factsheet for FY2017/18).17 This rise in CHF enrolment is also 
reported by other sources (Wang et al., 2018) citing an increase in the membership 
base from around 7.4 percent of the population in 2011 to 19.8 percent in 2015. In 
actual numbers, this means that, as of June 2017, more than 2 million households 
were enrolled in the CHF serving over 12 million beneficiaries.
In 2015/2016, several new schemes were introduced under the NHIF 
 attempting to broaden the uptake. This included a scheme for the elderly (‘ Wazee 
Kwanza’) for children under 18 years (‘Toto Afya Kadi’) and for expectant moth-
ers (‘Mama na Mwana’) and the NHIF mutual plan, known as the KIKOA 
scheme which is a health insurance scheme for groups in the informal sector 
e.g. VIBINDO, SACCOS, AMCOS, VIKOBA and special groups of registered 
entrepreneurs like motor cycle drivers (boda boda), food vendors or any other 
entrepreneurial group of members not less than 20.
The KIKOA scheme extended informal sector access to the NHIF through 
allowing members of registered associations in the informal economy with a 
minimum of 20 members (who had been together for a minimum of six months) 
to sign up for TZS 76,800 (USD 35) annually per person. In addition, members 
can add up to six dependents for an additional annual fee of TZS 76,800 per 
head, thus substantially above the CHF cost. According to 2017/2018 figures 
from the NHIF, the KIKOA scheme reached 33,057 members, equivalent to 
3.85 percent of the total NHIF membership. Although, in theory, such a group-
based insurance NHIF scheme seemed well-suited and affordable, it appears, 
from the research presented in this book, that the membership cost has been 
a significant burden for many. In addition, for the more insecure and weaker 
groups, the NHIF does not even appear to be on their radar. These findings 
are echoed in the literature (Mushi & Millanzi, 2019), and many of the issues 
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are similar to those of informal workers in Kenya, as seen earlier. For reasons re-
lated to adverse selection issues, the KIKOA program was terminated by NHIF 
towards the end of 2019, and instead, the NHIF has other models such as the 
bodaboda Afya (health) which costs TZS 100,000 per head.
Private institutions such as the Jubilee Insurance have previously had health 
insurance schemes targeting informal workers, and other smaller private-sector 
health insurance providers also exist, along with various informal micro-health 
insurance schemes provided by, for instance, churches and cooperatives mostly 
operating on a very small scale (Mills et al., 2012; Pedersen & Jacob, 2018). To 
this should be added the myriad of different formal and informal associations 
which, as will be shown in later chapters, offer a one-off amount in case of 
health-related challenges. Given that only 3 percent of total health financing 
is covered by official insurance schemes (Pedersen & Jacob, 2018) with the re-
mainder being out of pocket, the importance of such informal health insurance 
schemes should not be underestimated. This is particularly relevant for poorer 
sections of the population as, according to Wang et al. (2018), demographic and 
health survey data from the period 2015–2016 shows that NHIF covers mostly 
the top 40 percent of the income distribution.
As in other SSA countries, the influence of international development part-
ners in the adoption of health insurances is undeniable and largely mirrors the 
international trends described earlier. However, as shown by Pedersen & Jacob 
(2018), major reforms (in both social assistance and in healthcare) were typically 
introduced with some very Tanzanian characteristics. For health insurances, a 
characteristic feature
was the way in which a policy coalition of bureaucrats and development 
partners framed reforms as a way for the ruling party to live up to one 
of its core priorities since independence, namely improved and, eventually, 
universal access to health services, while at the same time improving the 
efficiency of the sector through the introduction of fees and insurances. 
The latter were also seen as a way to mobilise additional funds for the sector.
(Pedersen & Jacob, 2018, p. 4)
In general, the idea of universal access to social services – a prominent feature of 
the Ujamaa ideology has re-emerged among ruling politicians in the 2000s, es-
pecially in the wake of the hardship brought about by the liberalizing economic 
reforms of the 1980s. This can be seen in the Vision 2025 development pro-
gramme, which heralded the reintroduction of universal primary and secondary 
school education which has also spread to the health sector (Pedersen & Jacob, 
2018, p. 12). The National Health Finance Strategy for the period 2015–2020 
proposes a single national health insurance (SNHI) program to be managed by 
the NHIF, which will be tasked with strengthening the iCHF/TIKA in order to 
reach low-income people and the informal sector. The Parliament was expected 
to pass SNHI legislation in 2017 (Wang et al., 2018); however, the law has not 
yet been approved. The interim plan while waiting for the SNHI is to have 
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two coexisting schemes: the NHIF aimed at covering the formal sector and the 
iCHF intended to cover the informal sector and rural households (Lee, Tarimo 
& Dutta, 2018). According to Pedersen and Jacob (2018), so far, however, the 
route taken by the ruling party has been focused more on improving public 
health infrastructure than health insurances. In addition, even though reforms 
in health insurance have been pursued, the single mandatory national health 
insurance heavily pushed by development agencies has so far not materialized.
In summing up, despite their different economic histories, it is clear that, 
when it comes to social protection, Kenya and Tanzania have similar experiences 
and trajectories, with both countries currently seeing a very gradual shift from 
the more residual end towards the more universal end of the social protection 
spectrum. In both countries, the limited informal worker uptake of formal social 
protection schemes is linked to issues such as the cost burden and lack of infor-
mation on the different options. In Tanzania, the iCHF, which is a step towards 
the roll-out of Universal health insurance, is carried out at the local government 
level in order to acclimatize the population to the importance of having health 
insurance. Eventually, after merging the NHIF, iCHF, and NSSF, Tanzania will 
have a SNHI managed by the NHIF. Thus, although universal health coverage 
has become a major policy priority in Tanzania, progress on this key aspect of 
the SDGs is further ahead in Kenya where 2020 saw universal health insurance 
pilot programs being carried out in four counties. Similarly, Kenya’s universal 
pension scheme Inua Jamii Senior Citizens launched in 2018 is fully government 
funded, whereas Tanzania’s VSRS, also from 2018, as the name indicates relies 
on contributions from informal workers and their (often non-existent) employer, 
as such limiting its effectiveness and sustainability. In both countries, it remains 
to be seen whether the progress towards more universal models of social protec-
tion will be stalled or even reversed with the ongoing COVID-19 crisis.
Notes
 1 At the time of writing (end of 2020), the Kenyan government was reviewing the NSPP.
 2 Wanyama and McCord (2017) look at the role of Kenya’s political settlement in the 
adoption and promotion of social protection.
 3 The KSPSR (2017) calls for further analysis to determine how the contributory 
schemes can include a higher proportion of people working in the informal economy 
and whether this would require further changes in legislation.
 4 The concept of tupa’ is an abstraction of the word ‘usitupe’ which means “do not 
throw away”.
 5 As for salaried employees, contributions are compulsory, with premiums calculated 
on a graduated scale (between KES 150–1,700/USD 1–16) based on the employees’ 
income and subtracted directly from the payroll.
 6 However, it is estimated that only around 4 million NHIF members (out of the 6.2 
million) are consistent with their payments (Waweru, 2017). Aside from inactive 
membership, the NHIF faces a number of other challenges, including reimbursement 
policies, which have encouraged longer stays in hospitals, the increase in the value of 
claims, an uneven distribution of payments in different categories of hospitals, and 
reimbursements that are skewed in favour of private hospitals and nursing homes 
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rather than government or mission facilities. Finally, there are also administrative 
inefficiencies that have contributed to high overhead costs.
 7 Mwaura et al. (2015) estimate that private, microfinance and community-based health 
insurance cover 2 percent of the population.
 8 Another strategy for reaching informal workers is the Health Insurance Subsidy Pro-
gramme (HISP) which is enabling the members of the CT-OVC (Cash Transfer for 
Orphans and Vulnerable Children) and OPCT schemes to access the NHIF. A ‘block’ 
premium is paid by the government to the NHIF corresponding to that payable by 
the minimum-rate voluntary contributors. This arrangement has been pre-trialled for 
a limited number of households, with external donor support. However, no informa-
tion is available on whether assessments have been made of the long-term financial 
sustainability of this arrangement.
 9 If a member loses his/her job either by being fired or retrenched, then that person 
receives 33 percent of the equivalent of the last salary for a period of six months (‘un-
employment benefit’) and waits for up to two years during a probation period after 
which it is possible to request withdrawing the benefits and be shifted from the man-
datory to a voluntary-based scheme where the applicant pays his or her own benefits.
 10 The proposed new policy has, at the time of writing (early 2021), not yet been submit-
ted to cabinet for approval, and there is no official explanation from the government. 
Matters have been complicated by the movement of government staff from Dar es 
Salaam to the new capital Dodoma and the dissolving of the SSRA. Whilst official 
government sources (directorate of social protection in the Ministry of labour) in-
formed that the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA) was involved in the 
formulation of the policy, TUCTA claims that their inputs were sought after the 
formulation of the document thus questioning whether their opinions really mattered 
at that juncture (interview with the former Secretary General of TUCTA).
 11 The total registered number of NSSF members was 247,000 in 2020 yet counting 
only 11,000 active members.
 12 Besides the NSSF, the public pensions schemes included the Parastatal Pensions Fund 
(PPF), the Public Service Pensions Fund (PSPF), the Government Employees’ Provi-
dent Fund (GEPF), and the Local Authorities’ Pensions Fund (LAPF); however, with 
the PSSSF Act in 2018, all of these were dissolved and combined into one general 
fund to cater for the public sector.
 13 The criteria that one has to contribute for 180 consecutive months (15 years) to be 
eligible for pension under the current NSSF pension scheme makes it a very poor fit 
with the reality of most informal traders (Riisgaard, 2020).
 14 See Pedersen and Jacob (2018) for a detailed account and analysis of the introduction 
and expansion of health insurance schemes in Tanzania.
 15 As for NHIF contribution rates by formal sector workers, these are fixed at 6 percent 
of the total salary, split equally between the employer and employee.
 16 Pedersen and Jacob (2018) also note that figures on health insurance coverage are 
uncertain as they vary for similar time-periods in different documents. For instance, 
Lee, Tarimo, and Dutta (2016) report 20 percent coverage for 2014/2015.
 17 While 60 percent of health insurance schemes belong to private commercial compa-
nies, they cover a very small part of the population. Among the most prominent are 
AAR, Jubilee, Resolution, and Strategis.
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3 The relationship between 
association membership 
and access to formal social 
protection
A cross-sector analysis of informal 
workers in Kenya and Tanzania
Nina Torm
Introduction and literature
Based on survey data of informal workers gathered across the sectors of con-
struction, trade, and transport, this chapter analyzes the extent to which infor-
mal worker associations facilitate access to formal social protection measures in 
Kenya and Tanzania. Drawing on the Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) 
framework, which is outlined in Chapter 1 of this volume, the focus in this 
chapter is on preventive and promotive-type social protection measures. Protec-
tive measures1 are largely left aside as they fall outside the immediate scope of 
what informal associations might assist with, and transformative measures are 
looked at in more detail in the sector-specific chapters of this book. The chapter 
finds inspiration in the Power Resources Approach (PRA) developed by Wright 
(2000) and Silver (2003) within which the notion of associational power is par-
ticularly interesting to engage with since it is derived from the formation of 
collective organizations of workers at various levels.2 Traditionally applied in the 
context of the Global North and formal workplaces, such organizations include 
grass-roots work groups, work councils, and shop-steward bodies as well as trade 
unions at the industry level (Schmalz, Ludwig & Webster, 2018). In relation to 
informal workers, associational power may derive from different types of collec-
tive associations, institutions, and alliances created or engaged in by workers to 
advance their own interests and conditions.
For instance, in the case of transport workers in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 
Rizzo (2017) provides a detailed ethnographic account and portrays the rise and 
decline of a number of worker organizations over a period of almost 20 years. He 
shows that associations as collective attempts try to address the everyday chal-
lenges of daladala workers, such as paying the fines of those charged with traffic 
offences and supporting burial costs of immediate family. Thus, associations may 
enable their members to manage the precariousness of their employment (pro-
motive measures) but not to challenge or reform it (through more transformative 
approaches). Despite the persistence of the necessity for ‘agency’ and ‘voice’ to 
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bring workers together, Rizzo (ibid.) also shows the limitations and vulnerability 
of worker organizations to assert robust collective action. For instance, chal-
lenges arise from the bus owners being small-scale capitalists with little visible 
movement towards accumulation and growth due to their isolated work situ-
ation and low level of skills. In Rizzo (2011), he shows that, by reorganizing, 
daladala workers in Dar es Salaam created a welfare fund and additional income; 
yet, “from the outset there existed a structural imbalance between members’ 
needs for support and the association’s capacity to provide it” (p. 1196).
Moving to the construction sector in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Wells and 
Jason (2010) find that some of the driving forces and motivations behind the 
UNDP-funded formation of the umbrella organization TAICO (Tanzanian As-
sociation of Informal Construction Workers) in 2006 included the urgent need 
to increase opportunities for employment and income as well as attaining legal 
recognition, empowerment, and facilitating access to markets. Amongst some 
of the achievements, TAICO successfully lobbied the Tanzanian Government 
to reserve a share of public-sector contracts for informal groups of workers and 
campaigned for the greater adoption of labour-based construction technologies 
(ibid.). However, after the UNDP project ended, TAICO collapsed.3 In the case 
of Kenya’s (informal) construction sector, Mitullah and Wachira (2003) find that 
umbrella associations, such as the National Federation of Jua Kali Associations 
of Kenya, which are well-placed for advocacy and policy influence on behalf of 
informal/small-scale enterprises, have generally performed poorly due to leader-
ship issues. By contrast, KENASVIT has demonstrated more success in organ-
izing and empowering street vendors and informal traders in order to improve 
their business through training, access to credit, dialogue with local authorities, 
and other relevant organizations (Mitullah, 2010). Whilst the significance of 
transnational networks for local struggles is demonstrated through the KENAS-
VIT case, Mitullah (2010) emphasizes the importance of local engagement and 
capacity-building for sustainable organizing.
Studies of traders from other regions of the Global South also provide positive 
examples. For instance, focusing on informal street vendors in India, Kumar and 
Singh (2018) demonstrate the emergence of associational power. In particular, 
and in response to the growing numbers of street vendors facing harassment, 
confiscations, and sudden evictions since the 1990s, the National Association of 
Street Vendors of India (NASVI) was formed as an association of trade unions, 
community-based organizations, NGOs, and individual members to successfully 
advocate for street vendors’ rights and policy changes. In the transport sector, 
Spooner and Mwanika (2018) look at how the Amalgamated Transport and 
General Workers’ Union (ATGWU) in Uganda built informal transport work-
ers’ associational power through the affiliation of mass-membership associations 
of informal workers, notably representing minibus taxi workers and motorcycle 
taxi riders. This strategy of building a hybrid organization has assisted the union 
in bridging the divide between formal and informal workers, achieving substan-
tial gains for informal workers, and reducing their vulnerability.
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Taken together, the studies show that informal self-employed workers, across 
different sectors, who have low structural power may, with varying degrees of 
success, create new forms of associational power that diverge from traditional 
trade union constellations. In addition to member numbers, associational power 
also depends on infrastructural resources, organizational efficiency, member 
participation, and internal cohesion, factors which of course vary across differ-
ent association types and locations. Moreover, associations must optimize their 
structures so that associational action can be reconciled with the underlying 
structural conditions and the interests of the members (Schmalz, Ludwig & 
Webster, 2018). In the current chapter, member interests/needs include differ-
ent aspects of social protection as captured by preventive and promotive-type 
measures.
The above brief review shows that existing literature consists mostly of in-
depth sector-specific accounts of workers coming together to claim social pro-
tection, whilst cross-sector (and cross-country) evidence on such initiatives is 
scarce. Thus, this chapter provides an empirical contribution to a relatively small 
but growing literature, by comparing across sectors and locations, the extent to 
which informal worker associations are able to facilitate member access to for-
mal social protection measures. Additional interpretations and in-depth sector- 
specific discussions of the extent to which this is related to associational- or other 
types of power (or the lack thereof) are unwrapped further in the subsequent 
chapters of the book. The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: the next 
section briefly introduces the data and method used, along with a summary of 
selected informal worker characteristics. The subsequent section consists of the 
analysis and discussion of the main results, followed by a brief conclusion.
Who are the informal workers?
Data and method
This paper uses survey data of informal workers gathered in Tanzania and Kenya 
during 2018 under the collaborative Danida-funded project as described in 
Chapter 1. The data was collected for workers engaged in construction, trade, 
and transport – sectors which are all highly prone to informality. Location-wise, 
data was sampled from two urban areas in each country: Nairobi and Kisumu 
in Kenya and Dar es Salaam and Dodoma in Tanzania. In each location, three 
zones/districts were identified through transport hubs, and the same sites were 
used across the three sectors. The survey covered wage-workers, own-account 
workers, and micro-businesses with maximum two employees at any given point 
in time, thus a broad segment of informal worker types. The sampling was done 
so that 25 percent of workers were sampled through (registered) associations 
identified purposively for the project. The reasoning behind this was to ensure a 
broad coverage of different types of associations amongst our respondents, whilst 
being aware of the potential bias that this introduces to the sample. The remain-
ing 75 percent were sampled by geography to ensure a degree of randomness, 
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bearing in mind that it is not possible to ensure a representative sample when 
there is no clearly defined population of informal workers (and hence the proba-
bility of selection cannot be specified). This random sampling was also intended 
to capture members of smaller more unestablished worker associations. The ini-
tial aim was to interview 1,200 workers in total – 600 per country (100 workers 
per sector, per site); yet, due to oversampling, the total sample counted 1,462 
workers, which, after a thorough cleaning process, resulted in a final sample of 
1,385 observations.4
Main characteristics
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for selected variables based on the full 
data sample including the 25 percent of workers that were purposively sam-
pled through associations. In order to check whether the pattern differs for the 
Table 3.1  Key summary statistics
All Kenya Tanzania
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Association member* 0.41 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.34 0.48
Formal social insurance enrolment 
(health/pension)
0.26 0.44 0.34 0.48 0.18 0.39
Health insurance coverage 0.29 0.45 0.41 0.49 0.19 0.39
Nairobi 0.26 0.44 0.57 0.50 0.00 0.00
Kisumu 0.20 0.40 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.00
Dodoma 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.50
Dar 0.24 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.50
Gender (male = 1) 0.77 0.42 0.77 0.42 0.78 0.42
Age 35.23 9.89 36.20 9.80 34.38 9.89
Married 0.66 0.47 0.76 0.43 0.58 0.49
Locally born 0.37 0.48 0.26 0.44 0.46 0.50
Mean daily earnings (current USD)** 10.54 14.22 10.74 9.19 10.36 17.45
Assets (house and/or land) 0.35 0.48 0.27 0.44 0.43 0.50
Primary incomplete 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.32 0.09 0.28
Primary complete 0.53 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.62 0.48
Secondary or above 0.37 0.48 0.47 0.50 0.29 0.45
Professional training course 0.22 0.42 0.27 0.45 0.18 0.39
Training on job 0.25 0.43 0.32 0.47 0.18 0.39
Self-taught 0.53 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.64 0.48
Construction 0.31 0.46 0.34 0.48 0.28 0.45
Trade 0.37 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.39 0.49
Transport 0.32 0.47 0.31 0.46 0.34 0.47
Wage-worker 0.37 0.48 0.55 0.50 0.22 0.41
Own-account 0.52 0.50 0.38 0.49 0.64 0.48
Micro-business 0.11 0.31 0.07 0.26 0.14 0.35
Observations 1,385 644 741
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the survey data.
Notes: Summary statistics based on the full sample. * Association member figures are from the ran-
dom sample consisting of 979 workers (see also Table A1). ** Median earnings are USD 7.6 for the 
full sample, USD 6.5 for Tanzania, and USD 8.7 for Kenya.
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75 percent of workers sampled randomly, we present the summary statistics for 
those in Appendix Table A1. With the obvious exception of the association mem-
ber variable, there are no significant differences between the two samples. Thus, 
the stratification of part of the sample does not seem to impose any bias, at least 
in terms of the variables chosen, and I therefore proceed using the full sample in 
the analysis. The association member share (based on the random sample) shows 
that, overall, 41 percent of workers belong to some type of association with the 
share being higher in Kenya at 48 percent compared with 34 percent in Tan-
zania.5 However, the incidence of association membership varies substantially 
across the three sectors and by country.6
Proceeding to the other variables, Table 3.1 indicates that 26 percent of work-
ers contribute to a formal social insurance (SI) scheme, and the share is almost 
double in Kenya (34 percent) compared with Tanzania (18 percent).7 Reassur-
ingly, these figures are in accordance with the official estimates, as indicated in 
Chapter 2. Across both countries, the vast majority of workers referred to health 
insurance specifically; in fact, out of the 358 workers that answered positively 
to contributing to some type of SI, 78 percent reported health insurance, 16 
percent pension fund, and 7 percent other insurance. The low pension share 
is not surprising, given that, in Kenya, only about 250,000 of the 14 million 
informal workers are registered with the National Social Security Fund8 (NSSF, 
2017), with Tanzania having an even lower share, as outlined in Chapter 2. 
The reasons provided for not being part of any official social insurance scheme 
include that it is too expensive, and workers have a lack of knowledge about the 
schemes.9 In Kenya, for those that do contribute to health insurance, almost 80 
percent of workers contribute directly to the provider and 20 percent through 
an association, compared with the division being 53 percent and 47 percent in 
Tanzania, a difference which is likely due to the group-based KIKOA scheme 
in Tanzania, which is explained in more detail in Chapter 2. In both countries, 
individual National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) enrolment also covers im-
mediate family members, and thus, we include health insurance coverage as a 
variable in Table 3.1.10 Logically, the coverage rate is higher than enrolment, at 
29 percent on average and especially for Kenya at 41 percent compared with 19 
percent for Tanzania. Reassuringly, these figures are consistent with the national 
coverage rates estimated at 39 percent in Kenya (KSPSR, 2017) and 22 percent 
for Tanzania (Jacob & Pedersen, 2018b).
In terms of location, the largest share of workers is based in Dodoma followed 
by Nairobi, Dar, and Kisumu. The variable “local” indicates that, in Kenya, 26 
percent of workers were born in the city where they work; yet, for Tanzania, the 
share is 46 percent, pointing to a lower incidence of internal migration in the 
latter, related to a higher level of urbanization in Tanzania compared to Kenya. 
As for gender, 77 percent of the sample are men, and the mean age is 35 years. 
Regarding education, 10 percent have below the primary level, whilst 53 percent 
have completed primary education and 37 percent have completed secondary 
school. In Kenya, a higher share of workers have secondary education compared 
with Tanzania; but, in general, workers are well-educated. In terms of training, 
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the vast majority of workers are self-taught at 53 percent overall and as high as 
64 percent in Tanzania compared with 41 percent in Kenya. Around 25 percent 
have had on-the-job training, and 22 percent have attended a professional train-
ing school, with both shares being slightly higher in Kenya. In terms of worker 
types, own-account represent the vast majority with 52 percent on average and 
as high as 64 percent in Tanzania, whereas, in Kenya, wage-workers make up 
the largest share with 55 percent, whilst 38 percent are own-account workers.11 
Micro-businesses constitute only around 11 percent of the sample. As for the 
sectors, the distribution is relatively even, although with a slightly higher share 
of trade and transport in Tanzania and a somewhat higher share of construction 
in Kenya.
With regard to the mean daily earnings across all workers, this is around 
USD 11, only slightly higher in Kenya compared with Tanzania.12 Interestingly, 
in the case of Tanzania, earnings are comparable to the 2016 monthly earnings 
estimate reported for workers in the formal sector of TZS 448,462 (USD 196). 
When looking at Tanzania earnings in more detail, there seems to be some quite 
high figures reported, especially in construction, which is also related to the 
higher share of piece-rate and contractual workers, whereas, in Kenya, the most 
common form of payment in construction is time-rate.13 In the case of Kenya, 
the official monthly earnings estimate from 2017 was KES 57,008 (USD 563), 
so substantially above the informal earnings from the survey. Thus, the differ-
ence in official earnings data between Kenya and Tanzania does not seem to be 
reflected among informal workers. However, between the three sectors, there is 
substantial variation in earnings especially in Tanzania, where traders earn well 
below the formal sector average, whilst construction workers earn above, and 
transport workers somewhere in the middle. By contrast, in Kenya, the sector- 
specific earnings distributions are more homogenous.14 Keeping in mind that 
informal workers are generally in a less predictable work situation compared with 
formal workers, this nevertheless seems to suggest that working in the informal 
construction sector in Tanzania may not always be a last resort option.15 The 
large variation in earnings among informal workers in Tanzania is shown by 
the SD being above the mean in Table 3.1. Thus, for accuracy, we also report 
the median earnings (in the note of the table) which are well below their respec-
tive means due to the right skew of the distribution, whereby the bulk of the 
sample are relatively low earners, with a few heavy earners at the top pulling up 
the mean. Due to this skewed earnings distribution in the analysis that follows, 
the log transformation is used, which makes the distribution appear more sym-
metric (more normal). Finally, 35 percent of workers own assets, with the share 
being substantially higher in Tanzania at 43 percent, compared with 25 percent 
in Kenya. This difference could be related to the finding that Tanzanian workers 
have a higher likelihood of working where they were born, which means that 
they are more likely to own property either by inheritance or having bought land 
(which is generally cheaper in Tanzania compared to Kenya).
Turning to Table 3.2, which displays summary statistics for association mem-
bers only, in terms of social insurance enrolment, the share is 30 percent, which is 
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higher than that for all workers (Table 3.1), and again, enrolment incidence is 
the double in Kenya compared with Tanzania. As expected, health insurance 
coverage is also higher for members at 34 percent (compared with 29 percent 
for all), and for Kenya, the 47 percent coverage is quite a bit above the national 
average. As for the various types of associations, more than 50 percent report 
belonging to a sacco/vicoba/chama, which is obviously a rather broad catego-
rization that may encapsulate a variety of types of associations and services/
functions. As with social insurance enrolment, there is also substantial variation 
by country, in that the incidence of sacco/vicoba/chama is significantly higher 
in Kenya at 64 percent compared with 39 percent in Tanzania. Overall, 44 per-
cent belong to a worker association, and here, the pattern is the opposite with 
a higher share in Tanzania at 58 percent compared with 29 percent in Kenya. 
Finally, around 5 percent of workers belong to either women or youth-specific or 
other types of association.
Another way of categorizing associations is to look at the different kinds of 
benefits that they provide, and here, 46 percent of workers report that the main 
benefit is the opportunity to save and receive loans, whilst 37 percent state that 
it is work-related.16 Another 13 percent answer that the main benefit is social 
cushioning, which includes access to formal health (and pension) insurance as 
well as informal support for children’s education, funerals, weddings, etc.17 Fi-
nally, 5 percent answer protection against harassment, eviction, or confiscation 
of goods, which may be interpreted as voice and representation. As for the types 
of associations, the distribution of variables varies somewhat by country with a 
Table 3.2  Key worker characteristics, association members
All Kenya Tanzania
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Formal social insurance enrolment (health/
pension)
0.30 0.46 0.40 0.49 0.21 0.41
Health insurance coverage 0.34 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.22 0.41
Association type
Sacco/vicoba/chama 0.51 0.50 0.64 0.48 0.39 0.49
Work-related association 0.44 0.50 0.29 0.45 0.58 0.49
Women/youth/religious 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.25 0.04 0.19
Benefit type
Work-related 0.37 0.48 0.34 0.47 0.40 0.49
Social cushioning 0.13 0.33 0.05 0.21 0.20 0.40
Voice and representation 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.22
Loans 0.46 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.35 0.48
Barriers (yes = 1) 0.64 0.48 0.62 0.49 0.66 0.48
Association fee (yes = 1) 0.73 0.44 0.77 0.42 0.69 0.46
Observations 800 388 412
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the survey data.
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higher than average work-related and social cushioning share in Tanzania, and 
a higher than average loans share in Kenya. Finally, the majority of respondents 
(64 percent) answer that there are barriers to enter associations and 73 percent 
report paying an association fee, the latter being higher in Kenya (77 percent) 
compared with Tanzania (69 percent).18 Such differences in terms of associ-
ations’ services and access across countries and between sectors are explored 
further in the sector-specific chapters of this volume.19
Association members versus non-members
Since this paper looks at the extent to which association membership is associated 
with formal SI, it is of interest to look at any significant differences across the rel-
evant variables when comparing members with non-members. First, as expected, 
Table 3.3 shows that association members are significantly more likely to be 
enrolled in a social insurance scheme, which, as indicated earlier, covers mostly 
health-related protection. In fact, 30 percent of members contribute to social 
insurance compared to 20 percent of non-members. When health insurance cov-
erage is considered, the shares are 34 percent and 22 percent, respectively. As for 




Formal social insurance enrolment 
(health/pension)
0.30 0.20 0.11 4.53***
Health insurance coverage 0.34 0.22 0.12 4.85
Nairobi 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.02
Kisumu 0.22 0.17 0.05 2.15**
Dodoma 0.30 0.29 0.01 0.51
Dar 0.21 0.27 −0.06 −2.61**
Gender (male = 1) 0.72 0.84 −0.12 −5.19***
Married 0.72 0.59 0.12 4.83***
Local 0.39 0.35 0.04 1.48
Age 36.56 33.40 3.16 5.95***
Mean daily earnings (current USD)* 10.84 10.48 0.36 0.46
Assets (house and/or land) 0.38 0.32 0.06 2.21**
Primary incomplete 0.09 0.11 −0.02 −1.30
Primary complete 0.54 0.51 0.03 1.26
Secondary or above 0.37 0.38 −0.01 −0.50
Training course 0.25 0.19 0.05 2.21**
Training on job 0.23 0.26 −0.03 −1.31
Self-taught 0.52 0.54 −0.02 −0.71
Construction 0.24 0.40 −0.17 −6.71***
Trade 0.38 0.35 0.02 0.90
Transport 0.39 0.24 0.14 5.64***
Wage-worker 0.34 0.42 −0.08 −3.15***
Own-account 0.53 0.51 0.02 0.62
Micro-business 0.14 0.07 0.06 3.82***
Observations 1,385
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the survey data.
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locations, Kisumu workers are more likely to be association members, whereas, 
in Dar, workers are more likely not to be members. There is a higher share of 
men amongst non-members than among members, which matches the fact that 
construction workers are significantly more likely to be non-members.20 By con-
trast, in the transport sector, workers are more likely to be association members, 
whereas, in trade, there is no significant difference. Association members are 
older, more likely to be married and have assets, and they are also more likely to 
have attended a professional training course, but, otherwise, educational back-
ground does not differ by membership. Finally, micro-businesses are more likely 
to be association members and the opposite for wage-workers, whilst for own- 
account workers – the vast majority – the distribution is more or less equal.
Table 3.3 reveals that earnings do not differ significantly between members 
and non-members; yet, interestingly, when looking only at Kenya, association 
members have higher average incomes than non-members, whereas, in Tanza-
nia, the opposite is the case.21 Recalling from Table 3.2 that Kenyan workers 
have a relatively higher membership share in associations where receiving loans 
is reported as the main benefit, it is perhaps not surprising that these workers, 
on average, have higher earnings than non-association members. On the other 
hand, Tanzanian workers have a higher share of members in worker associations 
that report social cushioning and work-related benefits as being the most impor-
tant. Following on, from this, I turn to look at what distinguishes workers that 
are enrolled in formal protection schemes from those that are not.
Social insurance enrolment versus non-enrolment
In Table 3.3, we saw that there was a relation between being association member 
and contributing to formal SI, and this is supported by Table 3.4 which shows 
that 68 percent of those enrolled in formal SI are also association members, 
whereas members constitute a lower share of those that are not enrolled (54 per-
cent).22 In terms of the types of associations, there is a significantly higher share 
of those workers in SI enrolment that are sacco/vicoba/chama members com-
pared with those that are not enrolled. Correspondingly, enrolled workers are 
more likely to be receiving loans from their associations, possess assets, and have 
higher earnings compared with those not enrolled. SI receivers are older than 
non-receivers, and they are also more likely to be married. Nairobi has the larg-
est share of workers enrolled in formal SI schemes, whereas Dar es Salaam has 
a higher proportion of non-enrolled workers, compared to Dodoma which has 
a relatively high share of enrolled workers, likely due to the community health 
fund scheme. In terms of education, those enrolled are significantly better edu-
cated, and non-enrollers are more likely to be self-taught. As for the sectors, only 
transport workers differ by being more represented amongst those enrolled and 
the same for wage-workers and micro-businesses, whilst own-account workers 
have a higher likelihood of not contributing to SI. Having uncovered significant 
differences by association membership status and SI enrolment along a variety 
of worker characteristics, we now turn to examining the extent to which being 
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member of an informal worker association is related to participation in a formal 
social insurance scheme.
Association membership, earnings, and access to formal 
social security
In order to examine the correlation between being member of an informal 
worker association and access to formal SI, I use a standard probit model, where 
SI is the outcome (dependent) variable taking a binary form and the same for the 
main variable of interest which is association membership.23 Table 3.5 column 1 
reports the correlation between association membership and contributing to SI 
when key worker characteristics are controlled for. The results show that mem-
bers are 27 percent more likely to contribute to SI compared with non-members, 






Association member 0.68 0.54 0.14 4.53***
Sacco/vicoba/chama 0.40 0.26 0.14 5.20***
Work-related association 0.24 0.26 −0.02 −0.59
Women/youth/religious 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.77
Work-related 0.24 0.21 0.03 1.27
Loans 0.35 0.23 0.12 4.54***
Voice and representation 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.17
Social cushioning 0.06 0.08 −0.02 −1.03
Nairobi 0.37 0.22 0.15 5.58***
Kisumu 0.25 0.19 0.06 2.43**
Dodoma 0.28 0.31 −0.03 −0.97
Dar 0.10 0.28 −0.18 −7.10***
Gender (male = 1) 0.78 0.77 0.01 0.32
Married 0.79 0.62 0.17 6.08***
Local 0.38 0.37 0.01 0.27
Age 37.05 34.59 2.46 4.08***
Mean daily earnings (current 
USD)
12.77 9.96 2.80 3.19***
Assets (house and/or land) 0.40 0.34 0.06 1.94*
Primary incomplete 0.06 0.11 −0.05 −2.97**
Primary complete 0.44 0.56 −0.11 −3.76***
Secondary or above 0.50 0.33 0.17 5.76***
Training course 0.32 0.19 0.12 4.88***
Training on job 0.25 0.24 0.00 0.16
Self-taught 0.44 0.56 −0.13 −4.20***
Construction 0.29 0.31 −0.03 −0.95
Trade 0.33 0.38 −0.05 −1.73
Transport 0.38 0.30 0.08 2.72**
Wage-worker 0.44 0.35 0.09 3.08***
Own-account 0.41 0.56 −0.15 −5.06***
Micro-business 0.16 0.09 0.06 3.35***
Observations 1,385
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the survey data.
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ceteris paribus. In column 2, location and sector dummies are added which re-
duces the likelihood of association members participating in SI to 20 percent. 
In terms of the various control variables, I note that married and more educated 
workers that are classified as wage-workers or micro-businesses in the transport 
sector (as compared with construction and micro-trade) are more likely to con-
tribute to SI. The reason that transport workers are significantly more likely to 
participate in SI is due to the specific set-up for informal transport workers in 
Kenya, whereby matatu workers are legally required to belong to a Sacco/trans-
port management company, and these may commission certain savings to pay 
for the workers’ NHIF (and NSSF) coverage. In terms of location, workers in 
Nairobi, Kisumu, or Dodoma have a higher chance of being part of a formal SI 
scheme compared with those based in Dar. Across locations, individuals that are 
working in the city in which they were also born have a higher chance of formal 
SI enrolment which is probably related to them having more knowledge of dif-
ferent schemes. The significance of the earnings variable in column 1 disappears 
when the location and sector dummies are added in column 2, indicating that 
earnings vary by location and/or sector, as discussed previously.24
Table 3.5  Association membership and formal social insurance
(1) (2) (3)
Member 0.265*** (0.080) 0.198** (0.083)
Male −0.105 (0.098) −0.049 (0.120) −0.029 (0.122)
Age −0.010 (0.024) −0.001 (0.024) −0.000 (0.024)
Age^2 0.021 (0.029) 0.012 (0.030) 0.011 (0.030)
Married 0.357*** (0.090) 0.295*** (0.093) 0.307*** (0.093)
Assets 0.018 (0.080) 0.108 (0.084) 0.111 (0.084)
Local 0.113 (0.079) 0.145* (0.086) 0.153* (0.087)
Secondary education+ 0.426*** (0.121) 0.471*** (0.123) 0.471*** (0.123)
Training course 0.168 (0.105) 0.095 (0.110) 0.096 (0.110)
Training on job 0.036 (0.097) −0.009 (0.103) −0.009 (0.103)
Mean daily earnings 
(USD)
0.076* (0.046) 0.056 (0.048) 0.055 (0.048)
Micro-business 0.318*** (0.122) 0.372*** (0.126) 0.386*** (0.126)
Wage-worker 0.274*** (0.089) 0.214** (0.106) 0.240** (0.107)
Nairobi 0.801*** (0.125) 0.747*** (0.128)
Kisumu 0.546*** (0.131) 0.498*** (0.134)
Dodoma 0.444*** (0.123) 0.435*** (0.124)
Trade 0.189 (0.137) 0.177 (0.138)
Transport 0.307*** (0.105) 0.314*** (0.105)
Work-related 0.156 (0.105)
Social cushioning −0.013 (0.161)
Voice and representation 0.059 (0.241)
Loans 0.318*** (0.099)
N 1,385 1,385 1,385
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the survey data.
Notes: Marginal effects for the probit estimations. Dep. variable: worker contributes to formal 
health/social insurance. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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In column 3, the membership variable is split into different types of associ-
ations as proxied by the key benefits they provide, revealing that the loan-type 
associations (whether saccos/vicobas/chamas or other informal groups) are 
driving the results.25 Since one of the key functions of Saccos is loan provision 
either directly or indirectly via establishing agreements with banks, one inter-
pretation could be that members use the loans to pay for SI contributions. Yet, 
that would suggest that SI participation is also determined by earnings or assets, 
which Table 3.5 shows is not the case as neither determine SI participation when 
other factors are taken into account. The variable for social cushioning-type 
associations is not well-determined; yet, the negative sign indicates that work-
ers already receiving social support (preventative social protection measures) 
from their associations are less likely to be in a formal SI scheme, as would 
be expected.26 Members of loan-type associations (promotive social protection 
measures) are substantially (around 32 percent) more likely to have access to SI 
compared with non-members. Hence, these kinds of associations are likely to 
serve a dual purpose of (a) ensuring some sort of financial cushioning for their 
members and (b) facilitating access to public insurance schemes. In relation to 
(a), one might then expect to find a correlation between association membership 
and earnings, which I examine further on, whilst (b) seems to be the result of 
a particular type of associational setup or purpose, potentially suggesting the 
presence of a degree of ‘associational power’.
For instance, many of the bodaboda workers in Kenya belong to self-governed 
motorcycle associations like the Bodaboda Association of Kenya (BAK) which 
is characterized by strong associational power and works to further workers 
interests:
Many members have NHIF at individual level as compared to NSSF. BAK is 
working to have the members make contribution daily so that they cater for 
hospital bills, funeral expenses and in case of accident to the rider, the family 
members can continue earning something. There are plans to link members 
to insurance schemes. There is already an insurance agency in place.
(KII, Nairobi)
As for micro-traders, the data reveal that around half of the workers have come 
to know about the NHIF scheme from their social network, including their 
associations (mostly chamas), and some of these play a crucial role in terms of 
registering members with the NHIF:
…All members of my group are registered for NHIF and are contributing 
KES 200 every month through the group. Every week, the group takes a 
sum of KES 7000 to the NHIF. If a member is unable to pay the KES 200 
the group takes the money from the members’ savings and pays for him or 
her. The member who is being paid for is considered to have a debt of the 
group which he or she must pay.
(FGD, Kisumu)
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Thus, in addition to facilitating enrolment, this particular group also prevents 
default among their members, although this is not common practice and gen-
erally SI payments are made individually. In the case of construction, where 
participation in formal social insurance schemes is less common, an association 
member in Kenya points out:
People are different. Not all members of the group have NHIF. There are 
those that are being pushed to have insurance. We live from hand to mouth 
and it also makes it hard for us to pay the NHIF.
(FGD, Nairobi)
For the particular association referred to here, members have NHIF on an indi-
vidual basis (or as a family), and the members mentioned that it is very difficult 
to have insurance as a group. However, the association is encouraging members 
to have NHIF.
In Tanzania, the link between membership and formal SI relates partly to the 
“KIKOA” scheme which under the NHIF Mutual Plan provided health pack-
ages tailored to groups of informal workers with 20 or more members. Due to 
the relatively affordable premium, different types of worker associations (includ-
ing saccos, vicobas, bodaboda, and daladala group) were motivated to register, 
in turn, receiving SI for their members. The scheme began in 2015, yet was 
terminated at the end of 2019 due to issues of adverse selection (see Chapter 2 in 
this volume for more detail).
In combination with the survey data, such insights explain the observed positive 
relation between membership and SI, whilst pointing to sector (and location)- 
specific differences which are explored further in the other chapters of the book.
Turning to the earnings analysis, Table 3.6 presents the OLS results when 
the dependent variable is the log of mean earnings (in USD), and again, our 
main variable of interest is association membership. Following a standard Mincer 
earnings function (Mincer, 1974), we control for education and training of the 
worker and use worker age as a proxy for experience.27 In addition, we add job 
function, sector, and location as these are also expected to account for some of 
the variation in earnings. In column 1, when worker-specific controls are in-
cluded, association members have earnings that are 12 percent higher compared 
with non-members, and in column 2, when location and sector dummies are 
added, they fall slightly to 11.6 percent. As for the controls, men earn between 
36 percent and 49 percent more than women, which is higher than in much of 
the gender pay gap literature.28 Earnings increase with age (albeit at a diminish-
ing rate) and assets, whereas workers living in the city they were born have lower 
earnings. In line with the literature, workers that have a post-secondary edu-
cation and have undergone training have higher earnings (see Bjerge, Torm & 
Trifković, 2021). Wage-workers earn substantially below own-account workers, 
who, in turn, earn less than micro-businesses, and workers in Kenya have higher 
earnings compared with Dar, whilst Dodoma is at the bottom.
As for the different sectors, transport workers earn more than micro- 
traders; yet, construction workers are the highest earners on average (especially 
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in Tanzania). In column 3, the association membership variable is again split 
into the association/benefit types revealing that the membership “effect” is 
driven by workers in loan-type associations. This indeed suggests that one 
mechanism through which loan-type associations enable their members’ access 
to public insurance schemes is through the provision of loans. However, it 
might also be that high earning workers chose to be association members and 
are able to pay for social insurance regardless of membership, using the loans 
for expanding their business, etc. (in turn, leading to even higher earnings). 
In addition to loans, work-related benefit-type associations are close to being 
well-determined and associated with higher earnings, which is not surprising 
given that this category includes a more secure job contract and higher or more 
stable income, etc.
The general finding that members earn more than non-members is supported 
by one of the KII from the transport sector in Kenya, which reveals that Sacco 
members, in this case, earn more than workers in the formal sector:
We want the boda-boda job to be respected as we have seen that even the 
kind of money we get is even more than that of those in formal employment, 
Table 3.6  Association membership and earnings
(1) (2) (3)
Member 0.125*** (0.047) 0.116** (0.046)
Male 0.485*** (0.066) 0.355*** (0.074) 0.358*** (0.074)
Age 0.059*** (0.015) 0.048*** (0.014) 0.048*** (0.014)
Age^2 −0.075*** (0.019) −0.064*** (0.018) −0.064*** (0.018)
Married 0.055 (0.055) 0.004 (0.055) 0.005 (0.055)
Assets 0.058 (0.049) 0.114** (0.050) 0.115** (0.050)
Local −0.193*** (0.049) −0.107** (0.053) −0.106** (0.053)
Secondary education+ 0.293*** (0.074) 0.256*** (0.075) 0.256*** (0.075)
Training course 0.275*** (0.068) 0.183*** (0.071) 0.183*** (0.071)
Training on job 0.244*** (0.059) 0.124** (0.060) 0.125** (0.060)
Micro-firm 0.215** (0.086) 0.231*** (0.084) 0.233*** (0.085)
Wage-worker −0.169*** (0.052) −0.403*** (0.057) −0.399*** (0.058)
Nairobi 0.309*** (0.065) 0.302*** (0.066)
Kisumu 0.260*** (0.075) 0.251*** (0.075)
Dodoma −0.135* (0.070) −0.139** (0.070)
Construction 0.129** (0.054) 0.128** (0.054)
Trade −0.301*** (0.071) −0.305*** (0.071)
Work-related 0.093 (0.058)
Social cushioning 0.113 (0.080)
Voice and representation 0.103 (0.143)
Loans 0.137** (0.059)
Constant 0.329 (0.284) 0.753*** (0.279) 0.755*** (0.279)
N 1,385 1,385 1,385
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the survey data.
Notes: Marginal effects for the OLS estimations. Dep. variable: worker earnings (log mean in USD). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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some of our members are getting more than even teachers in the govern-
ment employment.
(KII, Kisumu)
When splitting by country, differences across the two countries are revealed in 
terms of the kinds of workers associations attract and what workers use their 
associations for. For instance, in Kenya, associations mostly facilitate access to 
formal systems of health insurance (preventive measures) and play a promotive 
role such as providing micro-credit/loans, as also discussed in other chapters of 
the book. By contrast, in Tanzania, workers seem to use associations more as 
cushioning mechanisms and for other more transformative types of social pro-
tection protection (e.g. voice and representation).
In the survey, earnings are reported as current and so is membership status; 
thus, there is a possibility that the observed positive relation between association 
membership and earnings is driven by reverse causality if high earners self-select 
into associations rather than higher earnings being an outcome of membership. 
This possibility is investigated further in Torm (2020), and the preliminary find-
ings indicate that earnings are indeed an outcome of association membership 
and not vice versa.
To sum up, the results show that association members, in particular, those that 
are members of loan-type associations are substantially more likely to be enrolled 
in formal SI schemes. Second, and relatedly, association members have earnings 
that are significantly higher than non-members, when other relevant factors are 
controlled for. These findings hold in general, yet the underlying mechanism 
through which social protection coverage occurs via associations differs by sec-
tor and country, as does the extent to which this is explained by associational 
power or other types of power resources. These relations are explored further in 
other chapters of this edited book.
Conclusion
Against the background of an increasing global drive towards universal social 
protection, this paper has set out to analyze the extent to which informal work-
ers, through association membership, are able to access formal social protection 
schemes in urban areas of Kenya and Tanzania. In both countries, existing formal 
SI schemes are open to informal workers, yet uptake is generally limited due to 
various factors including lack of information and limited efforts in reaching out 
to informal workers. In this context, informal worker associations, in a variety of 
constellations, may act to bridge the divide, in addition to potentially providing 
direct social support to their members. For instance, initiatives like saving clubs 
and representation of members towards authorities and/or employers also fall 
within the broader conceptualization of social protection, acknowledging the 
fact that informal worker associations often are engaged in numerous activities.
In order to understand the motivations behind workers coming together in as-
sociations, this chapter draws on the PRA, the premise of which is that organized 
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labour can successfully defend its interests by collective mobilization of power, 
be it structural, associational, symbolic, logistical, or institutional power. In the 
current chapter, associational power provides a particularly interesting analytical 
concept as it emerges from different types of collective organizations, institu-
tions, and alliances created or engaged in by informal workers to advance their 
own interests and conditions. In fact, work from across the Global South has 
shown that informal workers have, in some cases, been quite successful in cre-
ating new forms of associational power, which diverge from traditional power 
constellations.
Whereas previous studies mostly consist of sector-specific in-depth cases void 
of a comparative aspect, the current contribution makes use of cross-sectoral 
survey data from four urban locations in Kenya and Tanzania, thus adding new 
insight on informal workers and the outcomes of associational belonging. The 
results reveal that association members are significantly more likely to access for-
mal social insurance, controlling for key worker characteristics. Moreover, across 
sectors and sites, the provision of loans appears to be the main direct mechanism 
through which this occurs. In addition, the analysis reveals a substantial earnings- 
gap between association members and non-members, and this gap seems to vary 
substantially from Kenya to Tanzania. This suggests that workers may use asso-
ciations for different purposes ranging from basic welfare cushioning to preven-
tive, promotive, and/or more transformative types of social protection, which is 
discussed further in the other chapters of the book. Overall, the findings suggest 
a potentially important role for informal worker initiatives both in terms of pro-
viding direct social cushioning and indirectly through enabling participation in 
existing SI schemes.
Appendix A
Table A1  Summary statistics, random sample
All Kenya Tanzania
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Member 0.41 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.34 0.48
Social protection 
enrolment
0.24 0.43 0.31 0.46 0.17 0.38
Health insurance 
coverage
0.26 0.44 0.37 0.48 0.16 0.37
Nairobi 0.28 0.45 0.57 0.49 0.00 0.00
Kisumu 0.21 0.41 0.43 0.49 0.00 0.00
Dodoma 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.50
Dar 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.50
Gender (male 
= 1)
0.80 0.40 0.78 0.42 0.82 0.38
Age 34.02 9.72 35.24 10.07 32.81 9.23
Married 0.64 0.48 0.73 0.45 0.55 0.50




10.36 14.15 10.18 8.44 10.53 18.10
Assets 0.33 0.47 0.27 0.44 0.39 0.49
Primary 
incomplete
0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.29
Primary complete 0.52 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.62 0.49
Secondary or 
above
0.38 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.29 0.45
Training course 0.21 0.41 0.26 0.44 0.16 0.37
Training on job 0.24 0.43 0.30 0.46 0.18 0.39
Self-taught 0.55 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.66 0.48
Construction 0.33 0.47 0.35 0.48 0.31 0.46
Trade 0.35 0.48 0.34 0.47 0.36 0.48
Transport 0.32 0.47 0.31 0.46 0.33 0.47
Wage-worker 0.40 0.49 0.56 0.50 0.25 0.44
Own-account 0.50 0.50 0.39 0.49 0.62 0.49
Micro-business 0.09 0.29 0.05 0.23 0.13 0.34
Observations 979 486 493
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Table A2  Summary statistics, association members only, random sample
All Kenya Tanzania








0.32 0.47 0.42 0.49 0.18 0.39
Sacco/vicoba/
chama
0.63 0.48 0.80 0.40 0.41 0.49
Work-related 
association
0.29 0.46 0.13 0.33 0.52 0.50
Other 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.25
Work-related 0.33 0.47 0.30 0.46 0.38 0.49
Social 
cushioning
0.12 0.33 0.03 0.17 0.25 0.44
Voice and 
representation
0.03 0.18 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.17
Loans 0.51 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.34 0.48
Barriers (yes 
= 1)
0.56 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.61 0.49
Association fee 
(yes = 1)
0.68 0.47 0.70 0.46 0.66 0.47
Observations 405 235 170
Appendix B
a Sampling method
Throughout the book, I adopt a broad definition of informal employment, in-
cluding own-account/self-employment in informal enterprises (i.e. unregistered 
micro-business) as well as wage employment in informal jobs (i.e. without a 
written contract but possibly working for a formally registered enterprise). The 
broader term “informal economy”, which also encompasses agricultural employ-
ment (not covered in this volume), was endorsed by the International Labour 
Conference (ILC) in 2002 (ILO, 2002; Chen, 2005) and is now commonly 
used instead of the older and narrower concept of the informal sector. In accord-
ance with this broader definition of the informal economy, the survey targeted 
wage-workers, own-account workers, and micro-business owners with a maxi-
mum of two employees. For wage employment in informal jobs and in relation 
to contracts, I asked potential interviews to specify first whether they had a con-
tract, if so whether it specifies pay and entitlement to benefits, and if so whether 
the details of the contract are implemented in practice. If the answer to the first 
two were yes, but the answer to the last one was no, I proceed with the interview 
on the basis of this being an informal worker.
In terms of the sectors, first, for transport, the aim was to divide the sub- sample 
equally between bodaboda and daladala/matatu and to sample both drivers and 
conductors and riders. For micro-traders, the target group were traders that were 
mobile (on the street, at bus terminals, vacant lots, etc.) and also less mobile 
ones, for example, mama lishe, but excluding those with permanent structures 
such as kiosks or regular designated markets. In addition, the enumerators were 
instructed not to over cover some commodities but rather to mix different types 
of traders, different types of commodities without distinguishing between what 
workers sold. For construction, the target groups were skilled and unskilled 
workers (wage-workers and own-account) employed directly by construction/
site managers or indirectly via an intermediary, for example, gang-leaders. As for 
the construction sites, I covered large and medium construction/building sites, 
waiting sites, for example, streets, buildings, and excluded individual residential 
housing sites.
The aim was to cover 1,200 workers in total (600 per country) 200 workers 
per sector (100 per sector per site), where 25 percent were sampled through 
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associations and 75 percent by geography. For those workers sampled from 
associations, the target group were ordinary members and not leaders or mem-
bers in an official position. Associations covered formal associations/SAC-
COs/trade unions (i.e. registered associations). For the geographical/random 
part of the sample, in each country, two urban locations were selected (Kenya: 
Nairobi and Kisumu; Tanzania: Dar es Salaam and Dodoma) and three zones/
districts per site were identified through transport hubs. The same sites were 
used across the three sectors. In Tanzania, the construction sector sampling 
was also partly based on snowballing techniques in order to identify large 
and medium construction/building sites. The data gathering began in June 
2018, and in the first phase, 75 percent of the targeted workers were surveyed 
(by geography) using the Survey-to-Go software hosted by the Institute for 
Development Studies (IDS) of the University of Nairobi. Subsequently, infor-
mation on associations that informal sector workers belonged to was obtained 
and extracted in preparation for the second survey data collection phase which 
was undertaken in November and December 2018. This phase targeted 25 
percent of workers drawn from the associations covered in phase one of data 
collection.
b Cleaning the data
After merging the two datasets from Kenya and Tanzania, I had a total sample 
of 1,462 workers, yet were left with a final sample of 1,385 observations after a 
couple of cleaning steps as listed below:
 i Removing workers that were not in the target group, including tuk-tuk 
drivers and bicycles;
 ii Dropping workers that did not provide earnings or provided earnings above 
the 99th and below the 1st percentile (outliers) by country and sector;
 iii Dropping workers that indicated association contributions above the 99th 
and below the first percentile (outliers) by country and sector.
Notes
 1 Protective measures in the form of cash transfers are usually state-level interventions. 
See, for instance, Jacob and Pedersen (2018a) for a case study of productive social 
safety nets in the case of Tanzania. For Kenya, the NSPP (2011) provides a summary 
of formal social assistance programmes going back to 2010. Moreover, Hickey and 
Seekings (2017) provide a historical and conceptual account of the promotion of cash 
transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa, in general.
 2 See Chapter 1 for a detailed description of the PRA.
 3 Talks of TAICO becoming a member of the official Tanzania Mines and Construc-
tion Workers Union (TAMICO) stalled for a number of reasons including TAMICO’s 
reluctance to welcoming members with irregular incomes and changing employers 
(Wells & Jason, 2010).
 4 For further detail on the sampling strategy and cleaning procedure, refer to Appendix B.
 5 The full sample obviously has a higher membership share with 58 percent overall and 
60 percent/56 percent for Kenya and Tanzania, respectively.
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 6 In Kenya, the association membership share is 33 percent, 47 percent, and 57 percent 
for construction, trade, and transport, respectively, and for Tanzania, the equivalent 
figures are 19 percent, 34 percent, and 50 percent.
 7 The question asked was “Do you contribute to an insurance scheme, for example, 
NHIF, national pension fund, or another insurance?”
 8 NSSF presentation by Nancy Mwangi on ‘practical perspective of the NSSF scheme’ 
(Nairobi, 2017).
 9 In Tanzania, out of the 80 percent that do not contribute any official social insurance 
scheme, 24 percent say it is too expensive; 23 percent say they have no knowledge 
about insurance and 12 percent say that they have no time/were never given NHIF 
registration. In Kenya, the major reason is that it is too expensive reported by 30 per-
cent followed by 9 percent saying that they have no time/were never given NHIF reg-
istration. Hence, a lack of knowledge about insurance schemes is more pre- dominant 
in Tanzania than in Kenya. Across the countries, of the 74 percent that do not con-
tribute around half are association members. Out of those workers that contribute, in 
terms of health insurance specifically, 38 percent in Kenya indicate that they receive 
this from a public insurance scheme, whilst 21 percent get it from a private provider. 
In Tanzania, the vast majority (66 percent) get it from a public insurance scheme, 
whilst 6 percent get it from a private provider.
 10 Coverage is defined as when either the worker him/herself, the spouse, children, or 
another relative is the primary NHIF contributor. In the vast majority of cases and 
across both countries, the contribution comes mostly from the worker him/herself.
 11 This discrepancy between the two countries relates partly to the groupings of espe-
cially construction workers which more often have been classified as wage-workers in 
Kenya and own-account workers in Tanzania (the latter is in line with the Tanzanian 
2000/2001 Integrated Labor Force Survey (ILFS) where 60 percent of construction 
workers in Tanzania are self-employed).
 12 Daily earnings are converted into the sample median of six days a week and 11 
hours per day. Reported working hours are slightly longer in Tanzania than Kenya. 
Throughout the chapter, the average USD rate from June 2018 to December 2018 is 
used (101.2 for Kenya and 2,284.5 for Tanzania, per USD).
 13 According to the Tanzania ILFS (NBS, 2014), (formal) workers in the construction 
and transport sector earn around 320,000 TZS monthly (USD 140).
 14 Interestingly, in Kenya, construction is the sector with the lowest earnings and trade 
the highest, whilst it is the reverse in Tanzania. In relation to construction, this can 
be explained by the fact that the Tanzania sample includes more masons, who are 
ranked higher compared with the helpers (wage workers hired by the masons) who 
constituted the majority of the Kenya construction sample.
 15 This is also supported by 19 percent of Tanzania workers responding “money being 
good” to the question of why they chose their job whilst 16 percent respond increased 
income/profit and 49 percent answer able to care for my family. In Kenya, as many as 
31 percent respond the “money being good” and 78 percent respond that the main 
benefit of their current job is financial benefits/income.
 16 Work-related benefits include, for instance, a more secure job contract, higher or 
more stable income, enhanced information that helps to earn more in the job, safety, 
better information about alternative job offers, access to services, etc. Those workers 
that report loans as the main association benefit also report receiving bereavement 
payment. Important also to note that what workers report as the main benefit of asso-
ciation membership is most often not the sole benefit, as the majority of associations 
have multiples purposes/offer a range of services.
 17 Note that the access to formal health (and pension) insurance component included in 
the category of social cushioning represents a rather small share of 3 percent across 
both countries (slightly higher for Kenya). If workers self-select into associations to 
gain access to for instance health insurance, then the correlation between association 
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membership and official insurance schemes would be biased. Thus, for the purpose 
of the forthcoming analysis, it is reassuring that workers do not appear to select into 
associations with the purpose of gaining access to official social security schemes.
 18 As with Table 3.1, the random sample equivalent is presented in Appendix A Table 
A2, showing that the share of SACCO members is higher whilst the worker associa-
tion representation is lower, especially in Kenya. Correspondingly, the benefit types 
show that the incidence of loans is higher in the random sample, whereas the work- 
related measure is lower. This difference is the result of the purpose-based sampling 
of 25 percent of workers allowing for a broader representation of different types of 
associations, even if the random landscape looks different.
 19 Further analysis using multinomial regressions to examine the challenges that in-
formal workers face and the key benefits they receive from their associations reveal 
that both challenges and benefits are quite sector and country-specific and also vary 
substantially by worker-types. Interestingly, however, neither challenges nor benefits 
differ much by gender, income, education, or age of the workers.
 20 Nevertheless, 23 percent of the members are construction workers, which although a 
lower share than the other two sectors seems to be a rise compared with Mitullah and 
Wachira (2003) which in the case of Nairobi found that most construction workers 
did not belong to any association.
 21 The difference in wages between members and non-members is statistically signifi-
cant in the case of Kenya as revealed when performing t-tests by membership status 
split by country location, whereas, in Tanzania, the difference is not statistically sig-
nificant (results not reported).
 22 Reassuringly, no significant differences emerge when health insurance coverage is 
used instead of social protection enrolment.
 23 When health insurance coverage is used as the outcome instead of SI, the results re-
main qualitatively very similar.
 24 As recalled from Table 3.4, workers in formal SI enrolment have significantly higher 
earnings; yet, Table 3.5 shows that earnings do not seem to be a determinant of social 
security participation, when other factors are taken into account.
 25 Where workers have classified that the main benefit is receiving loans, this could rep-
resent either a sacco/vicoba/chama-type association or a work-related association, but 
the defining characteristics is that the association provides loans.
 26 The fact that the work-related and voice and representation-type associations do not 
show any statistical significance in terms of enabling SI access for their members does 
not exclude the possibility that these association types provide important social pro-
tection measures and act as potential mechanisms for workers to voice concern. For 
instance, in Tanzania, 43 percent of association members have contacted their associa-
tions on issues related to representation, and 40 percent of workers say that this helped 
resolve the issue. In Kenya, 30 percent of workers have made contact on issues related 
to representation, and out of those, 30 percent say that it helped resolve the issue.
 27 I include age squared to allow for a diminishing marginal effect regarding the earn-
ings returns to experience.
 28 I also note that the gender pay gap is substantially higher in Tanzania (results not 
reported).
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4 Self-regulating informal 
transport workers and the 




In Tanzania, 90 percent of the cars, trucks, and buses are privately owned, and 
most people rely on affordable informal sector transportation such as motorcy-
cles (bodaboda), rickshaws (bajaji), and minibuses (daladala).1 These informal 
transportation modes provide an important source of livelihood for operators 
(Cervero, 2000). The transportation sector accounts for 6 percent of total in-
formal sector employment in the country and is male-dominated (ILFS, 2014; 
NBS, 2014a). In 2014/2015, the transportation and storage industry employed 
2.6 percent of the 20 million working population in Tanzania. Workers in the 
transportation sector work up to 14 hours per day almost seven days a week, 
which violates labour laws. The Employment and Labour Law Act of 2004 
(URT, 2004; PDL, 2014) stipulates that an employee may work six days a week, 
nine hours per day, or a total of 45 hours in a week.
The informal transport sector is prone to injuries and fatalities. In November 
2018, the Deputy Minister for Home Affairs reported 8,237 deaths and 37,521 
cases of lost-limb injuries involving motorcycle accidents between 2008 and 
2018 (Vanguard, 2018). From 2016 to 2018, 3,719 motorcycle riders were in-
jured in 4,624 road accidents (AllAfrica, 2019). Amidst such high levels of risks, 
the majority have no access to social health insurance. Often, informal transpor-
tation workers are the main family breadwinners, and their deaths and lifetime 
injuries can be a cause of poverty for the family (Mbegu & Mjema, 2019).
Poor access to Social protection for informal transport workers mirrors the 
inadequate provision of social protection for the general population. Tanzania 
spends only 2 percent of its GDP on income security needs of older people, one 
of the lowest ratios in the world (ILO, 2018). In terms of health, in 2018, only 34 
percent of the population was covered by health insurance. The largest insurance 
schemes are the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) and the Community 
Health Fund (CHF). NHIF is mandatory for civil servants and covers only 7 
percent of the population (Wang et al., 2018; UNICEF, 2018). CHF, which is a 
public scheme meant to serve the rural and poor, covers 25 percent of the pop-
ulation, and private insurance covers 2 percent. In 2018, Tanzania merged the 
five duplicative pension schemes into two schemes: Public Service Social Security 
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Fund (PSSSF) and the National Social Security Fund (NSSF). The new PSSSF 
serves the public sector2 while the NSSF caters for the informal sector3 and private- 
sector workers. Significantly, informal transport workers rely on their associa-
tions for their social protection.
Against the backdrop of the inadequacy of social protection for informal work-
ers in Tanzania, this chapter employs the Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) 
social protection framework and utilizes the Power Resource Approach (PRA) to 
assess the relevance of transportation associations in meeting the social protection 
needs of daladala and bodaboda operators. It explores worker characteristics, social 
protection opportunities and challenges, forms of organizing, and how informal 
transport associations assist members in acquiring social protection. The chapter 
draws on survey data, focus group discussions (FGD), and Key informant Interviews 
(KII) conducted between August 2018 and February 2019 in Dar es Salaam and 
Dodoma. The survey covered 250 bodaboda and daladala drivers and conductors. 
The KII included association leaders and stakeholders in the governance of the in-
formal transport sector, while FGDs included only members of selected associations.
The chapter is divided into nine sections. The following section looks at 
governance of the transport sector. The third section gives three examples 
of transportation associations followed by an analysis in section four based 
on the PRA. The fifth section presents the profile of the surveyed informal 
transportation workers, and section six looks at the key work-related threats 
and challenges facing informal transport workers. Section seven utilizes the 
Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) framework to describe the measures 
that informal associations take in regard to social protection and section eight 
discusses pertinent issues related to informal transport workers, their associa-
tions and SP, while section nine concludes and makes recommendations. 
Governance of the transportation sector
This section describes how, in the face of the government’s inability to effectively 
govern the informal transportation sector, informal sector workers take it upon 
themselves to coordinate their own operations.
Government transportation institutions, policies, and regulations
The Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications (MOWTC) is respon-
sible for establishing transportation policy and has a broad mandate of overall 
planning and investment in roads, rail, waterways, and marine and air corridors. 
The National Transportation Policy of 2003 “allows private sector participation 
and market competition” but also calls for government oversight and regula-
tion so that “workers and customers are protected against abuse” (URT, 2003). 
While MOWTC collects statistics related to motorcycles, bajaji, and minibuses, 
it does not exercise direct oversight of the informal transport sector. The Tanza-
nian National Roads Agency (TANROADS), a semi-autonomous agency within 
MOWTC, is responsible for the maintenance and development of trunk and 
regional road networks and undertakes road safety audits.
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The Land Transport Regulatory Authority (LATRA) was established by 
the Land Transport Regulatory Authority Act No. 3 of 2019 to regulate 
movement of goods and passengers by commuter buses, intercity buses, 
goods-carrying vehicles, taxi, motorcycles, and tricycles. LATRA replaced 
the Surface and Marine Transport Regulatory Authority (SUMATRA). In 
collaboration with the Dar es Salaam Commuter Bus Owners Association 
(DARCOBOA), LATRA allocates routes and fee structures for buses moving 
between urban areas.
The Ministry of Labour and Ministry of Health’s are responsible for policies, 
that is, Social Security and Health Sector Strategic Plan, respectively, which en-
visage social protection for all but, unfortunately, lacks an implementation plan 
for the informal sector.
At the local level, the Local government authorities (LGAs) are responsible 
for the development and management of the public transport infrastructure like 
roads, terminals, and bus stops. LGAs issue vehicle licenses for bodaboda and 
daladala and establish passenger collection points and parking areas. The Police 
issue driving licenses and are responsible for enforcing safe driving behaviour 
and ensuring roadworthiness of vehicles. Further, they provide safety and secu-
rity training for transportation workers and conduct rider awareness campaigns 
through print and broadcast media.
Effectiveness of government transportation institutions
Because LATRA does not have the broad scope of SUMATRA, it is hoped 
that its transportation oversight will be more effective. For example, at one 
point, SUMATRA required daladala owners to show legal contracts between 
them and licensed drivers before their mini-buses could be registered to 
operate for business. The frequency of submitting manipulated documents 
was so high that SUMATRA eventually abandoned the requirement. Also, 
SUMATRA sometimes assigned routes that had few customers. Drivers 
were thus tempted to drive on non-designed routes or cut the trip short. 
 SUMATRA’s defence was that it had insufficient staff and means for con-
ducting adequate review and surveillance. Hopefully, LATRA will not have 
the same constraints.
LATRA’s delegation of authority to LGAs to issue vehicle licenses and to 
set up parking and passenger collection points is meant to inspire local solu-
tions to problems and to enhance enforcement of regulations and surveillance 
of bodaboda and daladala behaviour. However, LGAs are often stretched for 
resources and capacity to conduct these functions. Also, they may unwisely use 
their authority. For instance, the Regional Commissioner (RC) of Dar es Salaam 
ordered daladala to transport teachers without payment of bus fare on top of 
onboarding school children at a concessionary rate. This caused conductors to 
fill buses quickly with other passengers, drivers to skip pickup points where there 
were many students, and teachers to hide their IDs until after taking their seats. 
This unnecessary conflict and undue economic pressure could have been avoided 
by consulting local stakeholders first.
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Bodaboda disreputably move in and out of traffic lanes in disregard of traffic 
regulations and respect for other road users. Police rarely stop them for crossing 
intersections on red lights because it is a common behaviour. Bodaboda are 
keenly aware of the threat of having an accident due to their reckless behaviour, 
but this does not deter them from engaging in risky driving to accumulate ade-
quate money for the day. Many passengers refuse to wear helmets because they 
are considered uncomfortable and dirty, and again enforcement is lax.
This section indicates fragmented strategies, lacking vertical and horizontal 
coordination, amongst echelons of government agencies, regarding the need, 
requirement, and regulation of the informal transport sector. Furthermore, 
agencies have limited financial and human resources to relate to informal trans-
portation workers.
Self-governance and collective organizing among 
informal transportation workers
Over the years, daladala and bodaboda groups have arisen progressively, bound to-
gether by the social obligation to assist each other in need or under threat. They as-
semble in parking areas and around passenger collection points where they naturally 
share common problems in dealing with authorities or employers, as noted below:
our group came together to assist ourselves when one of us get involved in 
an accident, death, sickness of himself and or close family members; harass-
ment by authority, conflict with bosses; we have a constitution that explain 
member’s benefits depending on the situation…
(FGD participant DSM)
One of the common strategies of informal transport groups to gain negotiation 
leverage is to associate with a formal union. For example, Umoja wa Madereva na 
Dar es Salaam (UWAMADAR) was established by 42 drivers and conductors on 
12 July 1997. In order to have an audience with the authorities, they were com-
pelled to be affiliated with a trade union, COTWU-T. COTWU-T requested 
that UWAMADAR increase its membership to be a more legitimate entity, and 
by 2003, the association had over 5,236 members (Rizzo, 2020).
However, UWAMADAR subsequently was weakened by leaders, who failed 
to call regular meetings because they, like their members, were on the road 
most of the time as fulltime drivers. Furthermore, UWAMADAR did not meet 
the requirements of legal representation, which is why it became an affiliate of 
COTWU-T. Eventually, UWAMADAR leaders left to form the Tanzania Road 
Transport Workers Union (TAROTWU), which represents drivers, conductors, 
and others working on buses. COTWU-T faced sector-specific factions4 as well, 
that is, Umoja wa Madereva Tanzania (UWAMATA), which represents only 
drivers who operate on upcountry routes; CHAWAMATA, representing drivers 
of lorries, and Tanzania Association of Drivers Union (TADU) that represents 
bodaboda workers and those that operate smaller vehicles like bajaji.
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Participation in transportation associations carries some risk. Elected officers, 
who may not be versed in financial management, can be duped. In some in-
stances, a leader, who has personal needs or ambitions, may embezzle funds, 
which may go undetected for a long period. These leadership problems often 
result in the dissolution of associations and later re-establishment with a new 
leadership.
Generally, most informal transportation associations lack sufficient and du-
rable power to negotiate with the authorities on their own. Furthermore, the 
constant fragmentation and disintegration of their associations only strengthen 
the hand of the authorities, who will continue to favour negotiating with unions 
which represent the formal transportation sector.
Despite internal weakness and external constraints under which informal 
transportation associations operate, several have demonstrated that it is possible 
for bodaboda and daladala to organize and become effective representative bod-
ies. As the three examples below show, enlightened and able leadership is one of 
the key ingredients of success.
Communications Transportation Workers Union of Tanzania5
COTWU-T is an affiliate of the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA), 
which is the apex trade union in the country. It has nearly 6,000 members from 
the transport and telecommunication sectors. It operates through democratic 
structures of elected members to executive committees at national and branch 
levels and conducts a quadrennial conference. It has a woman’s officer on its 
national executive committee.
The union mainly organizes formally employed workers in the transport and 
communication sector. However, faced with dwindling membership and encour-
aged by TUCTA, the union created an informal economy desk (IEDO) for the 
purpose of organizing informal transport workers. The IEDO participates in 
international fora to discuss key issues facing informal transport workers (KII, 
IEDO, Secretary General). TUCTA developed a draft policy that would mobi-
lize the informal sector to form associations that would, in turn, link to larger 
associations and affiliate unions (TUCTA 2015). 
COTWU-T has been proactive in reaching out to the informal transportation 
sector. They routinely invite leaders of informal transportation groups to their 
seminars and workshops. Facilitators include representatives from national gov-
ernment, such as NHIF, NSSF, and the police, which gives association leaders 
opportunity to not only learn but also nurture critical contacts at higher levels. 
These trainings also address matters such as social security, health insurance, 
and other support schemes.
When COTWU-T learned that the Matangini Michungwani King’ongo 
(MMK) association with 250 bodaboda members was having difficulties in reg-
istering as a formal association, COTWU-T intervened, which resulted in MMK 
gaining legal status as an affiliate branch of COTWU-T in April 2019. Prior to 
that, MMK existed as an informal self-help group of workers with the aim of 
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welfare supporting one another. Despite COTWU-T reaching out to informal 
transportation worker groups, MMK has been one of the few associations tak-
ing advantage of what COTWU-T offers. On several occasions, COTWU-T has 
made legal services available to MMK, mostly disputes between bodaboda and 
the owners of motorcycles. MMK members credit COTWU-T for the member-
ship ID card which protects them from harassment by authorities (FGD with 
MMK, 2019). MMK members of COTWU-T pay a monthly fee of TZS 1,000 
or any amount dimmable, while formal members pay 2 percent of their salaries. 
MMK gained prominence after COTWU-T invited them to participate in the 
‘Labour Day parade’, and their placard read: “Bodaboda is like any other job”.
Chama cha Madereva wa PikiPiki Dar-es-Salaam6
Chama cha Madereva wa PikiPiki Dar-es-Salaam (CMPD) is an umbrella associ-
ation of bodaboda drivers, boasting a total of 45,000 members in Dar es Salaam 
and was registered formally in September 2016. The association was established 
as a result of a meeting in April 2016 with the RC for Dar es Salaam. The RC, a 
young activist political leader, listened to their grievances about strenuous work-
ing conditions, abuse by owners, and harassment by traffic police. This resulted 
in forming a committee that included representatives of SUMATRA, police, and 
officials from the five districts.
The RC’s request was that bodabodas form one single group with which he 
and the committee could continue discussions. At the time, there were three 
registered district-level bodaboda associations: from Ilala District, Chama Cha 
Waendesha Pikipiki Ilala (CHAWAPILA), from Kinondoni District, Chama Cha 
Bodaboda Wilaya ya Kinondoni (CHABOWIKI), and Temeke District, Umoja 
Wa Waendesha Pikipiki Temeke (UWAPITE). There were also various informal 
groups in Kigamboni and Ubungo districts.
With this high-level political support, CMPD negotiated with district author-
ities to reduce the area of the city centre that was prohibited entry by bodaboda. 
CMPD have since mediated several disputes between bodaboda drivers and mo-
torcycle owners, who are more open to discussion, knowing that CMPD enjoys 
political support. CMPD also mediate disputes between bodaboda, daladala, 
and private drivers over access to different parking areas and over harassment of 
bodaboda as noted by a bodaboda respondent, “Drivers of big vehicles contrib-
ute towards bodaboda accidents as they do not respect bodaboda drivers when 
driving. They sometimes push bodaboda drivers deliberately to compel them to 
clear the way”.
CMPD conducts trainings on safety and health issues and credits itself for 
reducing accidents and drivers’ deaths. Other trainings have included topics on 
businesses management and customer service. The association has intervened to 
help members get driving licenses. CMPD established a SACCO for bodaboda 
drivers, which, in turn, has enabled an agreement with Equity Bank to pro-
vide loans to help members purchase their own motorbikes (conversation with 
CMPD Deputy Secretary, 2019).
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CMPD succeeded in recruiting three women who are bodaboda operators. 
Given dearth of women in the sector, this has greatly enhanced the reputation 
of the association. A less-favourable reputational aspect occurred in 2019 when 
the secretary of the association was accused of embezzlement of funds and was 
suspended from the association pending court hearing. However, this has not 
endangered the association, which is currently being guided by a popular and 
progressive leader.
Umoja wa Madereva na Makondakta Tegeta Nyuki, Bunju
Umoja wa Madereva na Makondakta Tegeta Nyuki, Bunju (UWAMATEBU) 
began as an informal group of daladala drivers and conductors in 2006 and was 
registered in 2014 in Kinondoni District of Dar es Salaam with 100 members. 
The group was formed in response to abuse by police and passengers and to 
support members injured in road crashes and funeral expenses. The association 
has a Board of Directors, which includes a leader from the local government of 
Kinondoni.
UWAMATEBU has purchased eight daladala registered to the association. 
This allows the association to provide temporary employment to members who 
find themselves with no jobs. They are expected to seek employment on other 
daladala within a specified period. In addition, UWAMATEBU helps conduc-
tors who lose their jobs to find temporary jobs as ‘wapiga debe’ (‘drum beater’) 
who help direct passengers to daladala and as fees collectors.
The constitution of the association establishes different levels of social insurance 
(SI). For example, TZS 100,000 (USD 43.78) is provided to support members, 
who have death in the immediate family. Upon death in a family, it is culturally 
required to leave work to care for a surviving parent, parent-in-law, or other close 
relative during the mourning period. Similarly, the constitution stipulates pay-
ment for those who fall ill or are involved in a crash. These funds include profits 
earned by the eight UWAMATEBU buses and the fees collected at bus stands.
The association has registered with the NHIF so that members can purchase 
health plans. However, only few members have been able to make payments 
to acquire the health insurance cards. UMAWATEBU has entered into agree-
ments with local banks to give positive consideration in providing loans to their 
members and the association itself. In August 2017 and 2018, the association 
received loans from Akiba Commercial Bank (ACB) worth TZS 50 million and 
TZS 80 million, respectively, using as collateral land title deeds of the Chairman 
of the association and the local political supporter on the Board. The loans were 
used to purchase more buses for the association.
The key to the success of UWAMATEBU has been unusually open-minded 
male leaders. They actively recruited eight women conductors to become mem-
bers. One of them is attending driving school, partially at the association’s ex-
pense. The association promotes the notion that women are skilled individuals 
who should be proud to be working in daladala. These messages of worth convey 
upon members a strong sense of agency.
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The RC of Dar es Salaam and a local politician recognized UWAMATE-
BU’s work and facilitated their promotion from being a route association to a 
daladala association representing the District of Kinondoni. The association is 
currently known as ‘Umoja wa Madereva Wilaya ya Kinondoni’ (UWAMAW-
IKI).7 UWAMAWIKI is registered at the District Executive Directorate and is 
responsible for putting in place an orderly queuing system, collection of daily 
dues, and welfare schemes on a district basis. Furthermore, through training, 
UWAMAWIKI make members aware of the laws and regulations pertaining to 
vehicle operation and nurture pride in occupation, which has always been looked 
down upon. The improved discipline enhanced the image of their members and 
enabled UWAMAWIKI to acquire a tender from the District to transport over 
5,000 visitors from SADC countries, who gathered in Dar es Salaam for the 
SADC Industrialization Week, 5–9 August 2019. Although UWAMAWIKI is 
not fully institutionalized within the District structures,8 there exists a rule-
based governance system, which, among others, enables smooth collection of 
government taxes.
The power resources of informal transportation 
associations
This section borrows from the power resources approach (PRA), which is 
founded on the basic premise that the workforce can successfully defend its 
interests by collective mobilization of power. The three examples above illus-
trate how informal transportation associations demonstrate varying degrees of 
associational, societal, and institutional power (Schmalz, Ludwig & Webster, 
2018). In comparison with the vehicle owners and business interests, drivers and 
conductors are generally at a disadvantage with respect to power resources, but 
through their capacity for collective action, the extent of their disadvantage can 
vary over time.
Associational power
According to Schmalz, Ludwig, and Webster (2018), associational power arises 
from the action of workers uniting to create collective political power as an 
entity such as trade union or as a worker association. The strength of associa-
tional power is associated with a number of factors such as effective organiza-
tional structure, number of members, member willingness to take action such 
as participating in campaigns, willingness to pay dues, and a strong collective 
identity.
Daladala and bodaboda groups are organized into different types of associa-
tions, whether registered or not registered with authorities. Some are organized 
for the purposes of mediating with police, for example, when a member runs 
afoul of traffic regulations or when they collectively meet with authorities to 
establish parking spaces. Many other associations are created mainly for the pur-
poses of social welfare and protection.
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Most informal transport associations are not able to attract a large and stable 
membership. This is particularly true of bodaboda, who are in constant search 
of areas where there are more customers. Daladala drivers and conductors can 
be dismissed by their employers and are forced to go to other areas of the city. 
Sometimes, members cannot pay membership fees regularly as required, which 
limits resources available to the association leaders to network and advocate on 
behalf of the members. The fragmentation caused by groups breaking away from 
existing association to form their own association and the lack of able or trust-
worthy leaders further reduces the power of associations. However, information 
gathered through FGDs and the survey reveals that members valued being part 
of their small associations, as noted by members:
… in case of unfair dismissal by owner of vehicles, leaders of association 
accommodate one as “DAY WORKER” and contacts other associations till 
you find a vehicle.
(Daladala respondent, Dodoma)
…We are small, our leaders come from within us, with low education, they 
don’t know much, and government does not listen to us…but these associ-
ations assist us to collect money when someone is sick or have an accident, 
but least in big issues that need solutions.
(Daladala respondent, Dar es Salaam)
Societal power
Schmalz, Ludwig, and Webster (2018) define societal power as society’s support 
for worker demands (i.e. discursive power) and cooperation between associations 
and other social groups and organizations (i.e. coalitional power). An example 
of discursive power in Tanzania occurred on May Day in 2019 when a group of 
bodaboda and COTWU-T marched in Dar es Salaam with banners that read: “A 
Bodaboda job is like any other job”. This was reported positively by the media 
with citizens giving testimony on how much they relied on bodaboda. This got 
the attention of the Dar es Salaam RC, and the Mayor of the city and bodaboda 
representatives were invited to their respective offices for consultation regard-
ing their work. This “May Day” event also demonstrated coalition power of 
COWTU-T extending its reputation and influence to the bodaboda drivers. This 
had spill-over effects with police offering to provide safety and security training, 
banks willing to discuss provision of loans, and the NHIF making presentations 
on health insurance packages.
Institutional power
Schmalz, Ludwig, and Webster (2018) refer to institutional power as legally fixed 
rights of organized labour. At the national level, this is found in the constitution 
and legislation. The constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 
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establishes the right of association. The National Employment Promotion Act of 
1999 gives a seat to a representative of an informal association on the National 
Employment Advisory Committee. This legislation was in response to massive 
retrenchments in the 1990s under Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and 
the explosive growth of the informal sector, which became the refugee home of 
many former civil servants. There is little evidence of the committee currently 
being active on informal sector matters. According to the Labour Officer, the 
Act is currently being amended. The Employment and Labour Relations Act of 
2004 under Sub-Part D: Freedom of Association gives employees the right to 
form and join a trade union (URT, 2004; ILO, 2004). The Act makes provision 
for amalgamation of registered trade unions. It prohibits the amalgamation of an 
unregistered unions with a registered union. Informal associations could affiliate 
with a registered union to gain access to its institutional power.
The Tanzania Union of Industrial and Commercial Workers (TUICO) is a no-
table example of a trade union extending its institutional power to the informal 
transportation sector. TUICO has formed coalition with bodaboda that park 
along the Mchikichini market, near Kariakoo in Dar es Salaam.
In addition, although short-lived, the coalition with COTWU-T enabled 
UWAMADAR to access COTWU-T’s institutional power, and MMK is currently 
a branch of COTWU-T leaping on its institution power, such as representation.
The two independent transportation unions, TAROTWU, TADU, and 
UWAMATA (association), recognizing that they have insufficient institutional 
power as separate entities, are attempting to form a federation of informal trans-
portation workers. It is uncertain as to whether their federation will attain suf-
ficient institutional power without the support of the formal sector federations, 
most notably TUCTA. Unions lobby for formalization via a legal requirement 
that would bring ‘dispersed ownership’ of vehicles under a ‘company’, thus es-
tablishing employer–employee relationship, hence legal rights, and rights to so-
cial protection.
Apart from trade unions, some associations of informal transport workers – 
like in the example of UWAMAWIKI above – do participate in district-level 
rule-based governance system related to land planning and taxation issues even 
if these are not formally institutionalized.
Structural power
The existence of many registered and unregistered informal transportation 
groups is well-known to public officials, and it is recognized that they pose a 
formidable mass-membership that could create considerable disturbance if 
provoked.
Structural power derives from the status of workers in their relationship to 
the economy. According to Rizzo & Atzeni (2020), workers in the informal 
transportation sector in Tanzania have potential workplace structural power be-
cause of their large numbers and how widely their services are used. Bodaboda 
have been so hard to regulate because they “possess a certain collective power 
related to their large number and the service they provide: when they go on 
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strike, urban transport is thrown into chaos since most of the city population 
depend on them” (Goodfellow & Titeca, 2012, p.14). However, the structure 
of the economy, with oversupply of available labour, coupled with ease of entry 
requirements in the sector erodes workers’ structural power as they compete in 
the marketplace for employment.
The competition for jobs even creates mistrust among those already working 
in the informal transportation sector. This was conveyed poignantly by one of 
the drivers of daladala in Dodoma:
…with this type of work, you learn not to trust, even your co-workers, be-
cause our jobs are not guaranteed, your co-worker knowing that he might 
lose his job, he can go to your “Boss” and inform him that you are not work-
ing hard enough, and that if he gets the vehicle he can bring in more money 
than you do, … then abruptly, you are terminated, and the co-worker takes 
over the vehicle—this is common practise in our line of work.
Profile of informal transportation sector respondents
Based on the random sample survey, 50 percent of informal transport workers 
are association members, with the share being substantially higher in Dar es 
Salaam compared with Dodoma (Table 4.1). As for individual SI enrolment, the 
share is 17 percent overall and about double in Dodoma compared with Dar es 
Table 4.1  Key worker characteristics
All Dar Dodoma
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Association member* 0.50 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.46 0.50
Social insurance enrolment 0.17 0.37 0.11 0.31 0.21 0.41
Health insurance coverage 0.16 0.36 0.07 0.25 0.22 0.41
Gender (male = 1) 0.99 0.11 0.97 0.17 1.00 0.00
Age 32.21 8.16 33.50 8.75 31.32 7.62
Married 0.52 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.51 0.50
Locally born 0.51 0.50 0.31 0.47 0.64 0.48
Mean daily earnings (current USD)** 9.86 16.45 11.71 19.26 8.59 14.12
Assets (house and/or land) 0.39 0.49 0.37 0.49 0.41 0.49
Primary incomplete 0.04 0.21 0.01 0.10 0.07 0.25
Primary complete 0.66 0.48 0.70 0.46 0.63 0.48
Secondary or above 0.30 0.46 0.29 0.46 0.30 0.46
Professional training course 0.25 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.26 0.44
Training on job 0.16 0.36 0.21 0.41 0.12 0.33
Self-taught 0.60 0.49 0.57 0.50 0.61 0.49
Wage-worker 0.32 0.47 0.27 0.45 0.34 0.48
Own-account 0.60 0.49 0.60 0.49 0.60 0.49
Micro-business 0.08 0.28 0.13 0.34 0.05 0.23
Observations 250 102 148
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the project survey data.
Notes: * Association member figures are from the random sample. **Median earnings are USD 7 for 
the full sample, 7.7 USD for Dar, and USD 6.6 for Dodoma.
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Salaam. The health insurance coverage is also substantially higher in Dodoma, 
which is likely due to the availability of CHF, currently known as iCHF (im-
proved CHF). The sector is young and male-dominated (99 percent) with an 
average age of 32 years, whilst around 50 percent are married. Nearly one-
third (31 percent) and two-thirds (64 percent) were born in Dar es Salaam and 
Dodoma, respectively, a notable difference between these groups. The high 
migration rate among Dar es Salaam respondents mirrors the survey of ILFS 
(2014), which recorded 55.9 percent of residents of Dar es Salaam having mi-
grated from other parts of the country to earn a living in a commercial city.
Mean daily earnings are around 10 USD and somewhat higher in Dar es Sa-
laam compared with Dodoma, and this geographical difference is also reflected 
among bodaboda operators who negotiate rates directly with their customers.9 
Dar es Salaam bodaboda earned an average of TZS 37,758 (USD 16.53) per 
day, while the average earning of Dodoma bodaboda was substantially lower 
at TZS 19,274 (USD 8.44) per day. As indicated in the footnote of Table 4.1, 
the median wage is USD 7 which is lower than the mean, as heavy earners at 
the top of the wage distribution pull up the mean. About 40 percent of the 
sample of workers owned a plot or a house with the share being slightly higher 
in Dodoma.
All respondents had some education with two-thirds (66 percent) having com-
pleted primary school and 30 percent having completed secondary school (Form 
IV), across locations. The relatively high level of education among transport 
workers was noted by a police constable in Dodoma who commented:
Given the dearth of employment for the youth, parents have opted to buy 
motorcycles for their Secondary School graduates to use them for business 
purposes, mostly, while waiting to go for further studies. But most of them 
end up making it their full-time jobs…
One Form IV graduate confirmed this, “… I have been here for about 3 years… 
when I graduated, I anticipated getting an office jobs, that dream had long van-
ished; bodaboda is my bread and butter”.
In terms of further training, around 60 percent of the workers were self-
taught,10 while 25 percent had attended a professional training course, and 16 
percent had done training on the job, with the latter making up a substantially 
higher share in Dar. In terms of worker types, whilst a significant proportion 
were wage-workers (32 percent), with the share being higher in Dodoma (34 
percent), the majority (60 percent) of both the Dar es Salaam and Dodoma 
respondents were own-account workers, and 8 percent considered themselves 
as micro-businesses, slightly higher in Dar. Most of the own-account workers 
were bodaboda (86.8 percent), with only few daladala drivers (10.3 percent) and 
conductors (2.9 percent) indicating own-account status, even though they do 
not own vehicles. The reasoning provided by these respondents is very revealing. 
“We are the ones who bring in the money for the bosses, therefore, we are the 
business men and not workers” (FGD, Dodoma). Another offered:
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…look here, we only hire the Boss’s car to do ‘our business’, we handle all 
the logistics, make negotiations with traffic officers, and handle vehicle’s 
technical problems for the day, while hassling to obtain enough money for 
the Boss, and for ourselves; without extra work and effort, you go empty 
handed at home.
(FGD, Dar es Salaam)
Whereas daladala workers do not generally own the vehicles, a sizable number of 
bodaboda own their motorcycles partially due to government initiatives (i.e. LGA 
Act, 1982, amended 2018)11 and often have the option of leasing the motorcycle 
for a specified time, usually a year, after which the bodaboda owns the motorcycle.
Looking at association members only, Table 4.2 shows that SI enrolment and 
health insurance coverage are only slightly higher than for the full sample, in-
dicating that membership to associations is not a panacea to enhance formal 
social protection. In terms of the different types of associations, the majority (77 
percent) belong to worker-type associations, followed by 22 percent being in a 
Saccos and Vicoba/chama. Whilst the incidence of the latter is almost double in 
Dodoma, the worker associations share is higher in Dar.
In Dar es Salaam, in order to access resources, training, and services such as 
loans, transport workers are required to form associations, and these are also 
encouraged as a means to facilitate taxation and self-regulation of the industry 
including identification of individual workers. Workers in Dodoma prefer Saccos 
and Vicoba as they avail funds for school fees and enable access to capital for 
business and daily assistance to meet consumption.
Table 4.2  Key worker characteristics, association members
All Dar Dodoma
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Social insurance enrolment 0.18 0.39 0.15 0.36 0.21 0.41
Health insurance coverage 0.17 0.37 0.09 0.29 0.22 0.42
Association type
Sacco/vicoba/chama 0.22 0.42 0.15 0.36 0.27 0.45
Worker association 0.77 0.42 0.82 0.39 0.73 0.45
Other association 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00
Benefit type
Work-related 0.42 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.35 0.48
Social cushioning 0.26 0.44 0.18 0.39 0.31 0.47
Voice and representation 0.07 0.25 0.12 0.33 0.03 0.17
Loans 0.25 0.44 0.18 0.39 0.30 0.46
Barriers 0.80 0.40 0.79 0.41 0.80 0.40
Fee 0.68 0.47 0.69 0.47 0.68 0.47
Observations 163 67 96
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the project survey data.
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Key work-related threats and challenges
Harassment/arrest/corruption
The survey data (see Figure 4.1) and qualitative information gathered in FGDs 
indicate that the greatest perceived threat faced by the workers is harassment by 
the authorities, most notably traffic police, who look for problems and might 
create them in order to extract bribes. This induces some drivers to violate traffic 
rules as noted below:
You have work stress, thinking of earning sufficient money, then the police 
stop you for no apparent reason. We, Bodaboda, have learnt to move on, 
even if its red lights, if police stop you, run, otherwise, they’ll create a false 
claim to exert money from you. Imagine, this goes on the whole day.
(FGD-bodaboda, DSM)
Bodaboda particularly complain of harassment by the special police task force 
commonly referred to as ‘Tigo’12 who monitor bodaboda in areas that the nor-
mal traffic officers do not frequent. They do not wear uniforms, move about on 
motorcycles, and search for thieves and criminals, including bodaboda engaged 
in criminal activities.
The Police are our worst enemy. They have what they call ‘TIGO’ who are 
there to catch us, this is not fair. Imagine – it’s hard enough to get money 
for oneself, submission to boss, and then pay bribes to police.
(FGD, Bodaboda – Dar es Salaam)
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Figure 4.1 Challenges and threats facing informal transportation workers.
Informal transport workers in Tanzania 85
Harassment allegations by authorities are documented (Cervero, 2000; Rizzo, 
2011; SID, 2012; James, 2014), but police accuse the informal transport workers 
of failure to adhere to rules and regulations.
Conflicts with clients/passengers/colleagues
As seen in Figure 4.1, getting into conflict with passengers is the second most 
cited challenge. Some passengers complain of poor language, reckless driving, 
etc., but some mistreat workers, especially women conductors, for example, some 
men will refuse to pay the full fare or will flirt with them.
At times, the drivers will intervene to support their female conductors. Women 
also face threats of sexual harassment by drivers, who demand sexual favours be-
fore they can get and retain jobs as conductors.
…as women we face many challenges coming from unwanted sexual har-
assment. I have been forced to move almost five times [for refusing] drivers 
who wanted me…I find myself being kicked out, and sometimes they don’t 
inform you, but you come to work, you find the driver has another conduc-
tor. There is nothing you can do; therefore, you go to look for another job.
(FGD, Daladala, DSM)
The prevailing perception of women obtaining jobs as conductors through sex-
ual favours presents a challenge to well-intended drivers.
…many drivers would like to hire more women conductors, because women 
are trusted with the day collection. However, it’s a problem with our wives, 
they forbid us from having women conductors. You face so much during the 
day, the only thing you need is to be confronted with your angry wife about 
your conductor, a woman. Almost all drivers avoid this, and those who hire 
women, are hard hearted.
(FGD, Dodoma)
Lack of clients/lack of earnings
When combining the two survey questions that pertain to daily earnings (“Few 
clients/competition/price fluctuation” and “Payment delays/non-payment/
some days we get nothing”), a number of respondents cite financial concerns as 
an important challenge. The issue of financial survival permeates and is interwo-
ven throughout the testimony in FGDs.
Sometimes you see that it’s getting late and that you have not gathered 
enough money to submit to the Boss and for your family, therefore, you do 
“whatever” it takes to obtain enough money for the day, there is no way out.
(FGD, Daladala Dodoma)
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Social protection services facilitated by transportation 
associations
This section discusses social protection as provided by the informal transpor-
tation sector associations. It borrows from the Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 
(2004) framework, which conceptualizes different social protection measures as 
being “economic” (protective, preventive, promotive) and “social” (transform-
ative). Protective measures, that is, cash transfers, are not covered in this study, 
as this is generally not something that informal associations engage with and 
are deemed costly. Many policy-makers promote preventive measures (i.e. health 
insurance), promotive measures (access to micro-finance, vocational training), 
and transformative (legal, institutional, social, and cultural changes that counter 
exploitation, discrimination, and abuse) social protection measures.
As seen in Table 4.2, the majority of workers mentioned work-related benefits, 
such as safety measures and higher/more stable income (promotive measures), 
as being the most important benefit. Bodaboda particularly appreciated safety 
and security because they are more prone to theft of motorcycle and their parts, 
kidnappings, and abductions. Daladala cited higher income as a major benefit. 
The second-ranked benefit by both groups is how associations provide emer-
gency financial cushioning for education, social, and medical needs (preventive 
measures). The third benefit was obtaining loans (promotive measures), for ex-
ample, association guarantee purchases of motorcycles on credit. Finally, voice 
and representation (transformative), as associations become consultative forum 
for members to dialogue and negotiate with authorities and other stakeholders.
Generally, both groups (daladala and bodaboda) mentioned the same associ-
ation benefits, though with some differences between daladala conductors and 
drivers. Conductors usually depend on the goodwill from the drivers to hire and 
retain them, so membership in an association offers a chance to appeal to the 
association if a driver intends to dismiss them. Owners of buses, unless it is a 
family business, do not recognize conductors.
Conversely, associations are viewed as being ineffective in providing adequate 
support for health coverage and pensions and access to services such as water and 
toilets.
Preventive measures
Preventive measures aim to avert future situations that could lead to deprivation, 
for example, retired workers lacking sufficient savings and income, and a worker 
who falls ill, but cannot afford healthcare. In Tanzania, informal workers may 
contribute to the NSSF, NHIF, CHF, and private insurance companies such as 
Jubilee, AAR, etc.
As seen in Table 4.1, only 17 percent of bodaboda and daladala workers re-
ported having formal social protection, out of which the majority were enrolled 
in iCHF, followed by NHIF, NSSF, and private insurance, which is more or less 
in line with the enrolment pattern by the general population. Most of the formal 
social protection schemes are financed through the contribution of employees 
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and employers, a challenge for daladala and bodaboda operators. Most owners 
of vehicles do not consider daladala and bodaboda operators as their employees 
and therefore are not legally compelled to make mandatory contributions. Those 
who do have formal social protection either pay for it from their own resources or 
have willing employers. Out of those surveyed, 38 percent pay out-of-pocket for 
health services and medicines, again a reflection of the out-of-pocket payments 
made by the general population (Ministry of Health, 2015; World Bank,2020).
There are various reasons why informal transportation workers do not con-
tribute to health insurances with minor variation across bodaboda and daladala 
operators as seen in Table 4.3. First, the vast majority (90 percent) have paid no 
attention to health insurance and how it works, due to several reasons, but mainly, 
they had never encountered serious health threats. Further reasons mentioned 
were enrolment procedures that were too complicated and too expensive.13
Under the NHIF Mutual Plan, also known as ‘KIKOA’, packages were tai-
lored to “mutual groups” such as SACCOs, VICOBA, and bodaboda groups 
with 20 or more members. The more affordable annual premium of TZS 76,800 
(USD 33.63) per person motivated several associations to try to register. How-
ever, daladala FGD informants recounted how difficult it was to apply under 
the ‘KIKOA’ program because NHIF considered them to be employees of the 
bus owners. They took their case to the higher authorities and were granted 
permission by the minister of health to enrol in the scheme. Due to adverse se-
lection, the KIKOA program was terminated by NHIF towards the end of 2019. 
Instead, individual households can voluntarily enrol in NHIF for an average 
annual premium of approximately (USD 357–972), per family of six, which is 
beyond the means of informal transportation workers who, as seen in Table 4.1, 
earn an average of USD 10 per day.
The premium for iCHF is far more affordable than that of NHIF. A single pre-
mium for a household of six members is TZS 150,000 (USD 17.38) in Dar es Sa-
laam, and elsewhere, in the country, it is TZS 30,000 (USD 13.13). Informants 
complained that the CHF does not always provide the services anticipated, often 
requires members to pay out of pocket for some expenses, and medicines are 
often not available. The limited services are also a problem as observed in FGD:
Table 4.3  Reasons for not contributing to health insurance
Bodaboda Daladala Total
Never paid attention 90.0% 85% 89.6%
It is too expensive 1.1% 7.1% 1.2%
I prefer to save up myself 1.1% 0.0% 0.6%
Low quality of the insurance services 1.1% 0.0% 0.6%
Procedures too complicated 6.7% 9.8% 6.7%
No knowledge about insurance 0.0% 3.4% 1.2%
Total 100%
Association members 90 73 163
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the project survey data.
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You can go with CHF card and think that they will assist you, but you are 
told that it does not cover certain services, and thus required to pay for such 
services, so what is the need of the card? Imagine time lost with long ques 
in hospital with the card. With cash, services move fast and you get time to 
go back to work….
(Daladala FGD, Dar es Salaam)
Daladala and bodaboda groups and associations have arisen naturally, joining 
together by the social obligation to help people like themselves in need or un-
der threat. Through these groups, money often is raised spontaneously to help 
a colleague in need. This is a unique cultural characteristic in Tanzania. The 
amount of informal fund-raising to support family, friends, and acquaintances in 
Tanzania is substantial. Many informal transportation worker groups put aside 
money in anticipation of serious illness or death of a member or close family 
member. This becomes an informal source of social wage and welfare protection 
for informal transportation workers, which helps manage the effects of precar-
ious employment. The constitutions of many associations establish rules and 
regulations governing such savings.
The social dynamics among members make associations a far stronger means 
of SI than government sponsored programs, as observed in FGDs:
—there are different types of accidents, many of them which are common, 
but in case of serious injuries, which requires exorbitant medical expenses, 
then our leaders will pass with the Daftari—Booklet—to other associations 
… for contributions. Under such circumstances, you don’t think twice, but 
to contribute …We have solidarity as far as such issues are concerned…
(FGD Bodaboda, DSM)
The assistance we receive from the association is fast and immediate, which 
give us motivation to make contributions and pay fees as required because 
you know when it hits, you are covered. I tell you — being in this group 
gives me peace of mind as you know no matter what happened, you have 
someone behind your back to pick you up when you fall…
(FGD, Daladala, Kijitonyama, Dar es Salaam)
Promotive measures
Promotive measures include training, strengthening human abilities, and house-
hold assets, which establish a basic foundation for households to persevere and 
grow. Recall from Table 4.1 that training on the job is more prominent in Dar es 
Salaam when compared to Dodoma because Dar es Salaam has a vast number of 
mainly bodaboda groups where one can start learning on the job as ‘DAIWEKA’ 
(read: day-worker). Informants during bodaboda FGDs often testified that they 
acquired their driving knowledge and skills by riding someone’s motorcycle on 
parking lots. The lack of formal training on road signage, safe driving, and traffic 
Informal transport workers in Tanzania 89
laws and regulations may explain the high number of motorcycle accidents (Al-
lAfrica, 2019; KII, Police, DSM).
The Vocational Education Training (VETA) and the National Institute of 
Transportation (NIT) are the main transportation training institutions. How-
ever, the training fees (tuition fees for the two weeks Driving Course is TZS 
405,000 (USD 177.32) per participant) are relatively high; therefore, many driv-
ers do not attend formal education courses. Even if the fees were lower, many 
informal transportation workers do not have adequate basic education to follow 
in the form of classroom-based theory, as noted by one FGD participant:
You know it’s difficult for us sometimes to go to such schools, because we 
are not educated, and then they start teaching you things that are not easy 
to understand, why don’t they only teach us how to drive? Alright, they 
teach a little bit of driving towards the end, thus we pick up the real knowl-
edge of riding from our colleagues.
Transaid (2015) reports theory-based driving school’s curriculum in Tanzania. 
Workers also need financial literacy to manage personal finance and to monitor 
the financial affairs of their associations. There have been several cases of associ-
ation leaders embezzling funds. One association member observed:
…Our association keep on changing over time, as we group then we dis-
mantle the group, and in most cases is due to poor financial management 
issues. How come other associations have reached a point of buying their 
own Daladala, but our association leaders do not even call general meetings 
as are afraid people will ask about money and we will vote them out…
(FDG, Daladala, DSM)
Associations have assisted in other promotive measures such as encouraging com-
panies to establish lease and buy agreements with members. Also, as already high-
lighted, some associations were able to obtain loans to purchase buses. Motorcycle 
companies seek registered associations and offer members an opportunity to make 
a down payment and establish a schedule of weekly or monthly payments until the 
motorcycle is paid in full. Membership to an association provides motorcycle com-
panies a degree of confidence that group support will ensure that payments are 
made as scheduled (FGD and KII,Daladala and Bodaboda, DSM and Dodoma). 
Some bodaboda and daladala associations have approached banks to create loan 
opportunities for their members (see CMPD, UWAMATEBU stories).
Transformative measures
Transformative measures aim to promote legal, institutional, social, and cultural 
changes that counter exploitation, discrimination, and abuse. In general, asso-
ciations are involved in representation of their members as discussed in various 
sections in this chapter.
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Informal transportation worker associations address abuse such as police har-
assment and lack of contracts from the employers, but their representational 
power is limited. Proactively, association leaders invite police to attend associa-
tion meetings to build a positive relationship. They negotiate on behalf of indi-
viduals who have been harassed. However, leaders, who themselves are on the 
road earning a living, must handle the cases carefully not to expose themselves to 
retaliation. During FGDs, the efforts of associations were appreciated by mem-
bers. Both daladala workers and bodaboda operators unanimously agreed that 
associations effectively represent them. Associations engage with police and au-
thorities to settle members’ problems, but generally provide limited services be-
cause they are too small and weak to influence authorities. The chairman of one 
of the larger daladala associations provided some insights as to why the contract 
issue is so difficult to resolve:
…there is no will on the side of the government. This is because most of 
the policy makers are owners of the vehicles and thus are not interested in 
listening to the grievances of the drivers. We have been talking for years, but 
it falls on deaf ears.
Some FGD participants expressed concerns that the push for contracts might 
backfire. If owners were required to pay salaries and benefits, this would upset 
the current arrangement that allows drivers to earn additional money after pay-
ing the set daily target, as noted by a daladala driver:
I don’t think that a Daladala owners can sincerely agree to pay salaries to 
drivers. If so, it’ll pose a big problem for drivers. If you enter an agreement for 
a salary, the boss will raise the daily rate and impose stringent measures till 
you’re left with nothing. If you don’t comply, he can fire you by just saying – 
just park a vehicle. So, you can say this is not a formal job, unless they are 
forced to do so, and monitored for compliance, it won’t work on our favour.
Discussion
The associations are important for workers in terms of provisions of social 
protection to members, albeit to a limited extent. This section reviews associ-
ation entry conditions, makes comparisons between association members and 
non-members, and explores similarities between workers that are enrolled in 
formal SI versus those that are not.
Access to informal transportation sector associations
In order to be a member of an informal transportation worker association, one 
must have access to a vehicle14 registered for business and a driving license. As 
shown in Table 4.2, 80 percent of respondents admit that there are barriers to 
enter the association. There may also be a probationary period, which daladala 
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associations use to determine if a prospective member is a reliable business 
operator.
…when the driver wants to join our association, leaders welcome you, then 
they monitor you, for 3 or 6 months, if they see you as not troublesome, and 
that you can contribute up to TZS 4,000 (USD 1.75), for the total trips you 
make per day, they accept you and then they register you as member.
(FGD Daladala, DSM)
The observation time also takes into account that a prospective member might 
not stay for long, “… you can register your bus to a route, but after four days, 
you may decide to change the route” (FGD, Daladala DSM).
Bodabodas are associated with reckless driving, crime, accidents (James, 2013; 
Xinhua, 2018) operating without licenses, but, in general, bodaboda associa-
tions use the initial period to observe behaviour.
…we started our association with a group of 18 members, but we found 
that other members are misbehaving, which was tainting our group. Then 
we changed our constitution and imposed tougher measures. We required 
IDs, set dress code, orderly parking of motorcycle to avoid competition for 
passengers. Such measures forced 10 members to drop out of the associa-
tion; we are currently 8 only. Our business is booming, as we have created a 
good reputation in the community. We have consistent clientele, i.e. school 
children, elderly and grocery shopping for clients etc.
(FGD, Bodaboda, Dodoma)
Most associations (68 percent) require payment of entry fees, which varies de-
pending on the size of the association. Entry fees can be a deterrent to enter cer-
tain associations, especially for daladala drivers. One FGD informant observed, 
“…to join UWAMASTEBU you should have at least Tsh 250,000 (USD109.46), 
an exorbitant amount for many people to afford” (FGD, Daladala).
Other associations charge an entry admission fee of TZS 50,000 or more, 
while some association deter charging fees until a member has started earning 
money. Each driver pays to the association TZS 500–1,000 (USD 0.22–0.45) 
per trip. The monthly membership contribution varies between TZS 2,000 and 
5,000 (USD 0.90–2.19).
Comparison between association members versus non-members
According to Pieterse (2008), collective action provides avenues for articu-
lating group interests and agendas and for claiming rights. Some associations 
offer members access to group health care benefits and other perks that non- 
members lack. Table 4.4 shows the comparison between members of associations 
and non-members along a number of characteristics and other factors based on 
the survey data. As recalled from Table 4.2, SI enrolment and health insurance 
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coverage were only slightly higher for members than for the full sample, indi-
cating that membership is only marginally conducive to enhanced insurance, 
which is confirmed in Table 4.4 indicating no significant difference along that 
dimension.
Across most dimensions, association members do not differ significantly from 
non-members. They have similar educational profiles, the majority are Primary 
School leavers, but FGD discussions indicated that more educated workers are 
joining associations with the intentions of taking over leadership roles (FGD, 
Dodoma, and Dar es Salaam), in order to raise their visibility in leadership, and 
eventually run for political offices.
In terms of worker types, wage-workers are equally likely to be association 
members as well as non-members, but own-account workers are more likely not 
to be association members. This is because they often have their own means 
to obtain the kind of support that associations provide. Oppositely, micro- 
businesses (47.6 percent daladala, 4.8 percent conductors; 47.6 percent boda-
boda) might join associations because they provide a new business owner with 
contact to other local businesses that facilitates integrating into the community 
and access to financial services, that is, SACCOs. Schleifer and Nakagaki (2018) 
report that, as entrepreneurs grow, they seek larger, commercial bank loans. 
One of the requirements for micro-businesses to access loans from the financial 
institutions in Tanzania is to belong to registered associations.
Table 4.4  Differences in key workers characteristics by association member status
Member Not Member Difference t-Value
Social insurance enrolment 0.18 0.14 0.05 0.93
Health insurance coverage 0.17 0.14 0.03 0.57
Dar 0.41 0.40 0.01 0.13
Dodoma 0.59 0.60 −0.01 −0.13
Gender (male = 1) 0.98 1.00 −0.02 −1.27
Married 0.54 0.48 0.06 0.86
Local 0.48 0.55 −0.07 −1.01
Age 32.61 31.45 1.17 1.08
Mean daily earnings (current USD) 10.25 9.12 1.13 0.52
Assets (house and/or land) 0.42 0.34 0.07 1.11
Primary incomplete 0.04 0.06 −0.02 −0.76
Primary complete 0.67 0.63 0.04 0.58
Secondary or above 0.29 0.31 −0.02 −0.26
Training course 0.26 0.23 0.03 0.48
Training on job 0.15 0.16 −0.01 −0.16
Self-taught 0.59 0.61 −0.02 −0.31
Wage-worker 0.33 0.30 0.03 0.42
Own-account 0.55 0.69 −0.14 −2.12**
Micro-business 0.12 0.01 0.11 3.06***
Observations 250
Notes: <0.01***, <0.05**, <0.1*.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the project survey data.
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Despite the statistical insignificance, members of associations tend to earn 
slightly more than non-members. Members noted that associations help them 
be more financially disciplined. One FGD informant commented, “The money 
discipline put within our associations enable us to earn, and utilize fund prop-
erly. At the end of the day, you have more money than the guys who owns their 
motorcycles as they lax because have no submissions” (FGD Bodaboda). This 
was further illustrated by an FGD participant:
…associations teach financial prudence, but people belittle us, even my own 
brother refers my work in a derogatory manner. [wewe Bodaboda tu], and 
yet I earn more than he does, despite working for the government. Ironi-
cally, he borrows money from me.
(FDG, Bodaboda, Dar es Salaam)
Comparison between formal social insurance of association 
members versus non-members
Table 4.5 compares respondents in the informal transportation sector who are 
enrolled in formal SI (including health insurance and pension) with those who 
are not enrolled. Again, whilst association members are more likely to have so-
cial insurance (SI) than not, the difference is not significant. Workers in Dar are 
significantly more likely not to have formal insurance, whereas the opposite is 
the case in Dodoma. One reason is that SI schemes are more expensive in Dar 
es Salaam than in Dodoma. In Dar es Salaam, iCHF costs TZS 150,000 (USD 
65.67) per household of six/year; the same size household pays TZS 30,000 
(USD 13.13) in Dodoma and other areas of the country. The reason is that gen-
eral earnings and costs are higher in Dar es Salaam because of high population 
density (1,786 per km2) (NBS, 2014b; NBS, 2016), which poses health risk, 
raising higher health seeking behaviour. Furthermore, iCHF objective includes 
access and coverage of the poor and vulnerable.
The results also show that the completion of Secondary school or above in-
creases the likelihood of enrolment, while those who only attended primary 
school lag behind in enrolment. This supports the observation by Zajacova and 
Lawrence (2018) that more education increases the ability to comprehend the 
preventive value of health insurance.
Finally, own-account owners are more likely not to have formal social insur-
ance because they have resources to provide alternative. Also, poor member-
ship to associations excludes own-account workers from access to affordable 
health schemes tailored to associations members, for example, KIKOA, whilst 
wage-workers who have a comparatively higher associations membership share 
are able to benefit more from group health schemes.
To improve overall enrolment rates, formal SI packages must include appro-
priate contribution methods, acceptability measures, and benefit packages that 
befit the needs of informal transport sector workers. This ought to consider 
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the fragility of the associations and thus the need for capacity-building of such 
associations.
Conclusion
This chapter assessed the relevance of informal transport associations for the 
provision of social protection to daladala and bodaboda workers. Despite poor 
regulatory environment, these workers are required by law to comply with for-
mal regulatory requirements, such as obtaining drivers’ licenses, paying vehicle 
insurance, parking in designated areas, wearing helmets, and plying specified 
routes. The vehicle owners require the drivers of daladala and bodaboda to pay a 
specified daily amount. Vehicle owners provide no social protection and do not 
comply with labour laws, and the government does not consider the informal 
transportation workers as parties under employer–labour relations regulations. 
Therefore, informal transportation workers view themselves as operating a busi-
ness. Generally, informal transportation workers in Tanzania operate in both a 
world of formal and informality.






Association member 0.71 0.64 0.07 0.93
Sacco/vicoba/chama 0.19 0.13 0.06 0.94
Work-related association 0.52 0.50 0.03 0.34
Women/youth/religious 0.00 0.01 −0.01 −0.64
Work-related 0.33 0.26 0.07 0.91
Loans 0.24 0.15 0.09 1.42
Voice and representation 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.12
Social cushioning 0.10 0.18 −0.09 −1.38
Dar 0.26 0.44 −0.18 −2.12**
Dodoma 0.74 0.56 0.18 2.12**
Gender (male = 1) 0.98 0.99 −0.01 −0.77
Married 0.57 0.51 0.06 0.73
Local 0.55 0.50 0.05 0.56
Age 33.98 31.85 2.13 1.54
Mean daily earnings (current 
USD)
10.91 9.65 1.27 0.46
Assets (house and/or land) 0.43 0.38 0.04 0.53
Primary incomplete 0.00 0.05 −0.05 −1.53
Primary complete 0.52 0.68 −0.16 −1.98**
Secondary or above 0.48 0.26 0.21 2.76***
Training course 0.33 0.23 0.10 1.40
Training on job 0.12 0.16 −0.04 −0.72
Self-taught 0.55 0.61 −0.06 −0.70
Wage-worker 0.48 0.28 0.19 2.47**
Own-account 0.40 0.64 −0.23 −2.87***
Micro-business 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.90
Observations 250
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the project survey data.
Notes: <0.01***, <0.05**, <0.1*.
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Informal transportation worker associations have emerged as a means of 
self-regulation in the face of government inability to regulate the sector, and 
members realize social protection benefits that derive from organizing them-
selves in associations. Power resource analysis shows that informal transport as-
sociations in Tanzania have inadequate structural power due to an oversupply 
of workers that gives vehicle owners the ability to set the terms of employment. 
The inability and unwillingness of the government to intervene strengthen the 
negotiation position of the owners of vehicles.
The workers demonstrate associational power by voluntarily forming informal 
sector associations. These associations provide preventive and promotive services 
such as provision of partial financial support to members who fall ill or victim 
to accidents, educating members about formal health insurance and pension 
schemes, spearheading driver’s trainings that facilitate getting licenses for those 
who don’t have them, assisting access to loans from banks, and providing short-
term unemployment opportunities. Despite shortfall, informal transportation 
workers enjoy strong support from customers along their routes, and the workers 
on occasion have used this societal power to gain the attention of political lead-
ers. But informal transport worker association lacks adequate institutional power 
to force government agencies to provide relevant social welfare programmes and 
schemes.
Generally, associations have a better comprehension of the felt needs, priori-
ties, and contributing capabilities of the informal transport workers when com-
pared with the formal sector institutions. The formal SI schemes offered by the 
government, that is, KIKOA, have not been consistent and successful in their 
outreach to the informal sector. The NHIF offers packages that are costly, and 
the CHF packages are deemed ineffective, as they fail to meet the needs of work-
ers. The capacity of informal transportation associations must be enhanced in 
order to provide them the strength to be included in the policy-making process.
Notes
 1 More than 70 percent of Dar es Salaam residents reside in unplanned areas with no 
convenient access to formal transportation and therefore rely on the informal trans-
portation system (Ka’bange et al., 2014).
 2 The terminated funds were the Local Authority Pension Fund (LAPF), Public Ser-
vices Pension Fund (PSPF), Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF), Public 
Pension Fund (PPF), and the National Social Security Fund (NSSF).
 3 Poor coverage. According to Jacob and Pedersen (2018), only 1 percent of the popu-
lation is covered by the NSSF.
 4 Teachers, Hotels, Doctors, etc. left COTWU to form their sector-specific unions.
 5 Interviews with COTWU-T IEDO, Training Manager, and Secretary General.
 6 Source: Interviews with the association Chairman, and FGD Discussions, DSM.
 7 UWAMAWIKI is composed of three routes associations UWAMASTEBU, 
UWAMAMAPO, and UWAMATEBU.
 8 While they are not included in formal structures of the District, a representative from 
their group is involved in meetings and workshops pertaining to issues relevant to 
them, including land planning and taxation.
 9 For daladala operators, LATRA sets the rates.
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 10 High level of self taught, contributes to poor adherence of rules and regulations of 
road safety thus contributing to higher rates of road traffic crashes.
 11 Requires each LGA to set aside 4 percent of its revenue collection as a no-interest loan 
to youth.
 12 Referring to the first mobile cellular network in Tanzania.
 13 The same sentiments were echoed during FGDs in both DSM and Dodoma.
 14 Vehicle refers both to motorcycles and daladala buses.
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Kenya’s transport sector is dominated by road transport which accounts for over 
80 percent of total passenger traffic and 76 percent of freight. The informal 
road transport modes include public service modes such as the paratransits com-
monly known as ‘matatu’ and the motorcyclists commonly known as bodaboda. 
The two are common modes of passenger transport in Kenya (Behrens et al., 
2017; Mutongi, 2017). Paratransits or matatus are also referred to as public ser-
vice vehicles (PSVs) and are often used interchangeably, even though the term 
PSV includes other modes like passenger transport motorcycles. This chapter 
focuses on paratransit and motorcycle sub-sectors workers in the urban areas 
of Nairobi and Kisumu cities in Kenya. The two modes employ a large pool of 
informal workers who directly and indirectly depend on the sector. The matatus 
sub-sector direct beneficiaries include the vehicle owners, drivers, conductors, 
fleet managers, stage managers, callers, and loaders, while the indirect workers 
include mechanics, painters, graffiti artists, and cleaners (Wright, 2018). For the 
motorcycles sub-sector, the key actors are the riders and owners. Despite many 
players in the transport sector, there is no reliable data on number of work-
ers. Spooner and Whelligan (2017) estimated that, in 2017, over 100,000 PSVs 
had been registered, while Opondo and Kiprop (2018) estimated that about 
1,393,390 motorcycles were registered in 2018.
This chapter focuses on informal transport workers in the paratransits and mo-
torcycles sub-sectors in Kenya, their social protection coverage, and the role of 
associations. The chapter is based on data obtained through research undertaken 
in Nairobi and Kisumu between June and December 2018. The collaborative 
study used quantitative and qualitative methods in data collection that included 
a survey of 200 informal public transport workers, focus group discussions with 
workers and vehicle owners, and key informant interviews with representatives of 
government organizations, workers’ associations, and unions. The chapter starts 
with a reflection on governance of the sector, followed by a discussion on for-
mality and informality. It then reflects on workers’ associations and an analysis 
of the study findings on workers characteristics and associations’ membership. 
The chapter uses the power resources analytical framework to discuss the role of 
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associations in promoting workers access to social protection and concludes with 
reflections on the two sub-sectors.
Transport sector governance
The public transport sector in Kenya is privately organized and governed through 
a top-down structure. The sector is regulated through complex multi-layered 
and multi-agency systems that have formal and informal regulations and con-
trols. Different agencies regulate different aspects of the sector, albeit sometimes 
with overlapping and conflicting roles (World Bank, 2019). The most prominent 
agency is the National Transport and Safety Authority (NTSA). Its mandate is to 
develop and implement traffic regulations, registration, and issuance of motor ve-
hicle licenses, inspection and certification, and advising government on national 
road transport sector policy issues. NTSA also requires PSVs to be installed with 
digital speed governors, seat belts to enhance passenger safety, fleet monitoring 
system for vehicles travelling at night, and to undergo annual inspection (ROK, 
2012a, 2012b). Enforcement of these regulations is undertaken jointly by the 
NTSA, the National Police Service (NPS), and the motor-vehicles inspection 
units. Other government agencies that play crucial roles in the sector operations 
include the State Department for Co-operatives of the Ministry of Industry, 
Trade and Co-operative, and the Criminal Investigation Department (CID).
An example of multi-agency sector regulation is the implementation of the 
NTSA Legal Notice 161 of 2012 that requires all PSVs to join transport Savings 
and Credit Co-operative Societies (SACCOs) or transport management compa-
nies (TMCs). The SACCOs and TMCs are registered by the State Department 
for Co-operatives and are expected to manage vehicles registered under them 
and clear workers for licensing by NTSA and issuance of Certificate of Good 
Conduct by the CID (NTSA, 2014). This chapter uses the term SACCOs to 
refer to both the SACCOs and TCMs as there is no clear conceptual difference 
between the two terms. Initially, most operators had registered companies which 
were later transformed into SACCOs in order to comply with the NTSA require-
ments. There is no reliable data on the number of transport SACCOs and com-
panies registered in Kenya. Estimates suggest that Nairobi alone has about 692 
registered SACCOs, but only about 272 are registered with the NTSA to operate 
(Omulo, 2020; Mwanza, 2021), suggesting that about 420 SACCOs that are in 
government records as registered are not licensed by the NTSA to operate.
Formality versus informality in the transport sector
The question of formality and informality generates varying views. The ‘formal’ 
perspective asserts that the sector has formal structures and regulations that 
govern its operations. The formalization process, according to this view, begins 
when operators and workers engage with the formal systems involved in inspec-
tion, licensing and certification of vehicles, and licensing of operating routes 
and workers. An example is the formal registration process that requires matatu 
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operators to join SACCOs to be licensed by NTSA and the workers to get clear-
ance from the CID so as to be licensed to work in the sector. Informality starts 
at the level of operations which are mainly informal, according to this view. As 
argued, operators enter the sector through formal systems but become informal 
once they begin to work. The view that considers the sector as ‘informal’ bases 
its arguments on the precarious working conditions that characterize the sector 
such as job insecurity, lack of formal contracts, irregular and unreliable incomes 
based on targets, lack of leave days or official retirement, limited or no access to 
credit, and generally, weak representation. This is despite existence of legislation 
that would enhance formalization of the sector, for instance, the requirement 
to provide formal work contracts to drivers and conductors in the matatu sub- 
sector. There is thus a contradiction between the existing legal frameworks and 
the practice. Hence, the challenge in Kenya is not the absence of laws to protect 
workers but lack of enforcement and supporting systems, and this makes the 
sector prone to remain being informal.
Services offered by transport associations
Kenya’s transport sector is largely association-based, and for the matatu’s 
sub-sector, it is mandatory for PSV operators to join transport SACCOs. This 
is, however, not required of the motorcycle (bodaboda) operators. Nonetheless, 
they also belong to sub-sector-based associations. The informal transport work-
ers’ SACCOs and associations can play a role in ensuring workers’ access to 
formal social protection. However, evidence suggests that most of these workers, 
like other informal sector workers, lack access to formal social protection, for 
instance, health insurance. Even when enrolled in social security schemes, they 
also depend on informal networks to meet their welfare needs. This chapter 
explores the role of transport associations in enhancing workers access to for-
mal and informal social protection in line with the preventive, promotive, and 
transformative framework elaborated by Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004).
Preventive
Preventive measures seek to avert deprivation or destitution, with a focus on risk 
mitigation and diversification, for instance, by providing or promoting access 
to social insurance. The transport sector is a high-risk sector that is prone to 
accidents, and workers are exposed to continuous risks. They face health and 
social challenges that include exposure to noise and air pollution, eye problems, 
fatigue, and exhaustion due to working for long hours and sometimes working 
in a hostile environment. To avert possible occupational hazards and the possible 
poor health, it is important for the sector’s actors to invest in preventive meas-
ures. This investment could include enrolment of workers in social insurance 
schemes and improvement of the working environment. Examples of preven-
tive measures include the NTSA Act of 2014 which requires SACCOs to em-
ploy workers on formal work contracts, provide them with leave days, and make 
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statutory contributions to health and pension schemes. Employers are also ex-
pected to ensure health and safety of the workplace and comply with the Work 
Injuries Benefits Act (WIBA) No. 13 of 2011 (ILO, 2020). Also, the Kenya 
subsidiary legislation of 2020 requires drivers to undergo medical examination 
before being issued with driving licences to assess their fitness (ROK, 2020).
The National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) and the National Social Security 
Fund (NSSF) are examples of social security programmes that transport workers 
can enrol in. Survey findings in this study showed that 47 percent of workers had 
formal insurance (slightly higher for health insurance coverage), with the vast 
majority referring to the NHIF, followed by the NSSF and other types including 
the one-year universal health pilot programme rolled out in 2018. Discussions 
with key informants revealed that some workers enrol in insurance programmes, 
especially the NHIF, voluntarily without influence from the SACCOs. In some 
cases, though not common, SACCOs like the Kangemi Matatu Owners (KMO) 
in Nairobi, Kihomi Sacco in Kisumu and Kisumu Ahero Mowouk Transport 
Company encourage workers to enrol in health insurance programmes. Further, 
some SACCOs make daily deductions from the workers’ wages and remit the 
pooled savings to the schemes on monthly basis on behalf of workers. In this 
case, the employer enables the workers to pay for social security coverage but 
do not pay for the workers’ coverage. Nonetheless, most workers are reluctant 
to join employer-linked social security programmes due to fear that their job 
mobility might be restricted. Low awareness about social protection schemes 
and superstition that taking health insurance is a bad omen leaves many workers 
without coverage. Results also indicate that most workers belong to associations 
that cater for their welfare needs like bereavement, sickness, and school fees sup-
port. Such support is often limited and may not cover full costs, for instance, in 
case of hospitalization as would be the case with NHIF.
Promotive
Promotive measurers are aimed at enhancing real incomes and the productive 
capacity of workers. In this study, such measures include training and capacity- 
building of workers, and those that enhance workers’ financial investments 
and savings. Examples of promotive measures were evident in the study, for in-
stance, where SACCOs facilitated workers training on financial literacy, road 
safety, and investment in social protection. Some support workers’ access to 
credit from financial institutions like the Kenya Union of Savings and Credit 
Cooperatives (KUSCCO), and banks like Equity and Family banks. There are 
also those that promote workers’ investment through savings, share-holding, 
or contributions. The money is used to purchase SACCO or company vehicles, 
individual, or association motorcycles or to access loans. Most associations and 
some SACCOs pay annual dividends to members from these investments. In 
most cases, even with informal associations, the annual sharing of dividends is 
common, and members are free to use their money in the way they prefer, like 
paying school fees and meeting festivities cost. However, hardly is the money 
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used to pay for social security. Hence, some key informants emphasized the 
need to sensitize workers about investing in their own social security. As noted 
by Kamau et al. (2019), informal sector workers have different peak seasons that 
social security schemes could target to expand coverage. In the case of the trans-
port sector, the peak season is in December, and agencies like the NHIF and 
NSSF could engage workers during this period to encourage them to pay for 
social security.
Transformative measures
A transformative social protection approach addresses issues of social equity and 
inclusion by focusing on policies and legislations as well as taking measures that 
include collective action for workers’ rights. Results showed weaknesses in the 
transformative role of associations, especially in enabling workers’ access to so-
cial protection. In the survey, only 9 percent of association members reported 
representation and voice as a key benefit, and this was mainly about engagement 
with authorities to address challenges facing workers like harassment by author-
ities, petitioning the government to rescind decisions considered a threat to the 
sector such as removal of 14-seater matatus from the sector, or lobbying the 
government to undertake interventions to improve the sector operators such as 
improving roads. Some SACCOs also intervene to discourage the rent-seeking 
behaviour which involved payment of bribes to police and cartels, as noted by 
61.4 percent of surveyed workers. Some SACCOs instruct workers not to pay 
bribes and instead to contact them if they have problems with authorities. On 
the extreme side like in Kisumu, some SACCOs encourage workers not to wear 
uniforms to avoid being easily identified by authorities. Despite this, the work-
ers rarely contact their associations on policy, regulatory, or work-related issues 
affecting them. From the survey, 23.5 percent of workers had contacted their 
SACCOs to get welfare support, 6.5 percent for associations to negotiate with 
the authorities, and 4.5 percent to get help on work-related issues like better 
terms of employment and salary payment, increase, or promotion.
There is no common bargaining agreement on workers’ rights, and labour 
issues are hardly pursued. Formal work contracts are hardly provided to workers 
despite being in the sector for long. In the survey, only 1.5 percent of workers 
had written contracts, 18.5 percent had verbal contracts, 23 percent day con-
tracts, and the rest (23 percent) had no contracts at all. Hence, workers have no 
legal protection and can easily lose jobs if they fail to meet targets or disagree 
with their employers. Nonetheless, some SACCOs such as Kihomi in Kisumu 
and Kisumu Ahero Mowouk Transport Company (KAMTCO) employ workers 
on formal work contracts if they work for the vehicles that are franchised to the 
SACCOs. As observed:
There is no employee protection from the employer in case of a dispute. The 
employee has no job security since there is no contract. They also do not en-
joy benefits such as leave allowance. The income in this sector is unreliable. 
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Among the boda-boda group the sector is informal and they depend on 
chamas in case of illness or accidents. There are those who have NHIF cards 
through individual arrangements.
(FGD, Nairobi)
Workers’ representation is weak, and most SACCOs and vehicle owners are re-
luctant to support workers to join unions. The common trend among the work-
ers is to change or quit their jobs if they are dissatisfied as opposed to contacting 
their employers to voice their concerns. This results in high workers turn-over 
and the consequent low social security coverage. The exit option is a weaker 
strategy as it does not help to create stable work environments. McClean, Burris, 
and Detert (2013) noted that “voice and exit are directly inversely related” and 
that often employees have two distinct choices which entail (i) choosing voice 
or silence and (ii) choosing to stay or exit their organization. This, according to 
McClean et al., implies that “employees may sometimes speak up and remain in 
their organization irrespective of how much or how quickly things change”, or 
they “may speak up and subsequently exit the organization because of what hap-
pens (or fails to) in response to voice”. The fact that workers can be dispensed at 
any time by their employers makes them opt for the exit option. This resonates 
with McClean et al.’s view that voice does not automatically make things better 
or worse for those who speak up or anyone else, and as noted by FGD partici-
pants in Kisumu,
Jobs in the sector are insecure and a driver considers himself as working 
by having the key. It is common for the owner of the vehicle to inform the 
driver that he is using it for other things like travel, only for the driver to 
find it on the road with another driver.
(FGD, Kisumu)
Transport workers’ characteristics
This study covered matatus workers – drivers and conductors – who comprised 
58 percent of the survey sample and motorcycle operators (bodaboda) who made 
up 42 percent. Transport workers are generally young with a mean age of 36 
years and most are married (86 percent). Around 29 percent were born in the 
city where they work, though this is much lower for Nairobi at 13 percent, indi-
cating the high extent of urban migration which is most likely work related. As 
seen in Table 5.1, membership in associations is 67 percent and is substantially 
higher in Kisumu compared with Nairobi. By contrast, formal social insurance 
enrolment, which is 47 percent overall, is higher in Nairobi compared with Ki-
sumu, and for health insurance coverage, the difference between the two cities is 
even larger, with Nairobi having a coverage rate of 59 percent.
The vast majority of transport workers are men, though with 7 percent 
women in Kisumu. In the survey, all drivers and motorcycle riders were men. 
The absence of women is linked to the nature of the transport sector work which 
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involves a lot of shoving and jostling among operators and riders and is char-
acterized by negative public perception and unfavourable working conditions 
(Wright, 2018). Other reasons for low participation of women in the sector in-
clude harassment and intimidation as well as historical and cultural reasons that 
discourage women from entering such ‘risky’ jobs (Kamau & Mitullah, forth-
coming). This also mirrors the global trend where men dominate the sector 
(Wright, 2018). Nonetheless, women are increasingly taking up public transport 
jobs mostly as conductors.
The average daily income is about USD 11 and is around 25 percent higher 
in Nairobi compared with Kisumu. As expected, the median wage is lower than 
the mean (at USD 9.6 overall) due to the right skew of the distribution with a 
few heavy earners at the top pulling up the mean. For this reason, the median is 
often a more accurate measure of the general wage level. As for assets, only 28 
percent own a house or land. In terms of education, 42 percent have attained 
secondary education or above (substantially higher in Nairobi), and 45 percent 
have attended a professional training course, whilst 27 percent have received 
training on the job. Most transport workers are wage-workers (66 percent), with 
the incidence being especially high in Kisumu at 73 percent. By contrast, the 
incidence of own-account workers is slightly higher in Nairobi (31 percent) than 
in Kisumu (25 percent). Finally, micro-businesses make up only 6 percent of the 
Table 5.1  Key worker characteristics
All Nairobi Kisumu
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Association membership* 0.67 0.47 0.60 0.49 0.78 0.42
Social insurance enrolment 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.42 0.50
Health insurance coverage 0.50 0.50 0.59 0.49 0.37 0.49
Male 0.97 0.17 1.00 0.00 0.93 0.26
Age 36.16 8.89 35.75 9.52 36.73 7.97
Married 0.86 0.34 0.84 0.37 0.90 0.30
Born in local city/town 0.29 0.45 0.13 0.34 0.51 0.50
Mean wage in USD 10.95 7.09 12.42 7.98 8.93 5.00
Assets ownership (house, land) 0.28 0.45 0.27 0.44 0.29 0.45
Primary education incomplete 0.11 0.31 0.07 0.25 0.15 0.36
Primary education completed 0.47 0.50 0.42 0.50 0.55 0.50
Secondary education completed 0.42 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.30 0.46
Professional training course 0.45 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.43 0.50
Training on job 0.27 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.25 0.44
Self-taught 0.28 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.32 0.47
Wage-worker 0.66 0.47 0.61 0.49 0.73 0.45
Own-account 0.28 0.45 0.31 0.46 0.25 0.44
Micro-business (with 1–2 employees) 0.06 0.23 0.08 0.27 0.02 0.15
Observations  200  116   84
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the project survey data.
Notes: Summary statistics based on the full sample. * Association member figures are from the 
random sample consisting of 152 workers. ** The median wage is USD 9.6 overall, USD 9.9 for 
Nairobi, and USD 7.4 for Kisumu.
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sampled workers. In the survey, the own-account operators were mostly mo-
torcycle riders while the matatu operators had a higher representation among 
wageworkers. The relatively high rate of motorcycle ownership is attributed to 
low purchasing capital required for motorcycles ranging between KES 65,000 
and 80,000 (Mwobobia, 2011). In contrast, owning a PSV requires high capital 
investment on top of which comes the cost of vehicle importation, registration, 
insurance, and general maintenance.
Associational landscape
Transport workers belong to different sub-sector-specific associations, for in-
stance, matatu SACCOs or motorcycle associations, and even smaller informal 
welfare groups known as chamas (Kamau et al. 2018). There are also umbrella 
associations that represent the SACCOs, owners, and workers. Examples include 
the Matatu Owners Association (MOA)1 in which own-account operators be-
long to Matatu Workers Association (MWA), Matatu Crew Workers Association 
(MaCREW), and the Boda-boda Association of Kenya (BAK). Together, these 
SACCOs and the associations account for the vast majority of members who 
belong to associations (80 percent), followed by the worker, trade, and business- 
specific associations and unions (17 percent), and others like women and youth 
organizations and unions (3 percent). Interestingly, whilst the incidence of 
worker, trade, and business associations is higher in Kisumu, that of MOA, SAC-
COS, and chamas is substantially higher in Nairobi, thus indicating a difference 
in the type of and preference for associations across locations. There are also 
unions representing workers in the sector, and these include the Kenya Trans-
port Workers’ Union (TAWU), Matatu Workers Union (MWU), and the Public 
Transport Operators Union (PUTON). TAWU has representation in Nairobi 
and Kisumu, while MWU and PUTON are mainly in Nairobi. These unions are 
also allied to the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF).
As mentioned earlier, the survey data revealed that workers’ membership in 
transport associations is relatively high at 67 percent, with 33 percent of work-
ers not belonging to an association. Membership in transport associations in 
Kisumu is higher (78 percent) compared with 60 percent in Nairobi. The asso-
ciation enrolment-gap was associated with workers’ reluctance to join SACCOs 
that could restrict their job mobility, failure by NTSA to involve operators in 
decisions relating to SACCOs formation and to set regulations that bind workers 
to remain for a specified period in SACCOs that facilitate their entry to jobs in 
the sector. As noted in the discussions, most workers perceive SACCOs merely as 
enablers for getting NTSA clearance and accessing jobs in the sector. Hence, as 
noted by a key informant, “PSV workers are not concerned about having social 
insurance and they comply with SACCO rules to get jobs”.
Transport associations vary in membership size and structure and have formal 
and informal elements. The matatu associations, mainly the SACCOs, have a 
simple structure and are mainly geographical and route-based. The motorcy-
clist associations are largely multi-layered and hierarchy-based, with leadership 
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structure being at the ‘bases’ or zonal levels, with further linkage to county and 
national levels. An example is the Boda-boda Association of Kenya (BAK) which 
is an umbrella association and has representation across the country including 
in Nairobi and Kisumu. In both Nairobi and Kisumu, bodaboda associations 
comprised ‘base-groups’ that had designated parking points. Each base has a 
leader and is represented at the zonal, county, and, in some cases, in the umbrella 
associations. For the motorcyclist, their associations are need-based, self-driven, 
and self-governed. Unlike matatu SACCOs, motorcycle grassroots associations 
create synergy among members. However, the PSV SACCOs are mostly formal 
and stable while motorcycle associations have greater flexibility but are shakier. 
Due to the high membership numbers, bodaboda associations are less stable and 
are occasionally marred by internal conflicts and splinter groups. They are also 
easily infiltrated by politicians who use them to get political mileage.
Table 5.2 presents selected summary statistics based on association members 
only. First, the table shows that association members have a slightly higher in-
cidence of social insurance enrolment (49 percent) and health insurance cov-
erage (52 percent) compared with the full sample of workers in Table 5.1 (47 
percent and 50 percent, respectively). Again, both rates are significantly higher 
in Nairobi compared with Kisumu. In terms of association types, 80 percent of 
workers report being in SACCOs with close to 90 percent of workers in Nairobi. 
Regarding benefits, the majority of workers (46 percent) report loans as the main 
association benefit (especially in Nairobi) followed by work-related benefits (41 
percent), voice and representation (9 percent), and finally, social cushioning (4 
percent). Voice and representation are cited as more important among workers in 
Table 5.2  Key worker characteristics, association members
All Nairobi Kisumu
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Social insurance enrolment 0.49 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.38 0.49
Health insurance coverage 0.52 0.50 0.65 0.48 0.35 0.48
Association type
Sacco 0.80 0.40 0.88 0.33 0.71 0.46
Work-related association 0.17 0.37 0.13 0.33 0.22 0.41
Other association 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.27
Benefit type
Work-related 0.41 0.49 0.44 0.50 0.37 0.49
Social cushioning 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.16 0.06 0.24
Voice and representation 0.09 0.29 0.04 0.19 0.15 0.36
Loans 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.42 0.50
Barriers (yes = 1) 0.58 0.50 0.65 0.48 0.49 0.50
Association fee (yes = 1) 0.83 0.38 0.74 0.44 0.94 0.24
Observations 145 80 65
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the project survey data.
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Kisumu (15 percent) which could be related to the activities of traders generally 
being more regulated in Kisumu, and hence more issues on which associations 
may intervene.
Table 5.2 also shows that most transport associations (58 percent) have entry 
conditions, particularly, in Nairobi. In most cases, membership in SACCOs is 
vehicle-based, and except in a few cases like Kisumu Ahero Mowouk Transport 
Company in Kisumu, workers are not direct beneficiaries. Instead, they are in 
the SACCOs merely to get jobs, since this is a requirement by the NTSA. The 
vast majority of associations (83 percent) require payment of a one-off entry fee, 
ranging between USD 500 and 1,000. For the motorcycle associations, the en-
try fee is in the hundreds. In addition, vehicle owners are required to pay daily 
contributions for SACCO management. The owners and workers also contrib-
ute daily savings that range from about 1.5 to 2 USD for PSVs and about 0.2 
to 2 USD for motorcycles. This money is used to cater for welfare issues and 
loans provision to members and in some SACCOs to cover social security. Some 
 SACCOs like the Lakebelt and BAK require owners and also encourage workers 
to make investments savings through share capital contributions that are pooled 
to buy assets like vehicles or motorcycles. In most cases, investment in shares 
is voluntary.
Highlights on selected transport associations
Matatu Welfare Association (MWA)
MWA was formed in 1996 and formally registered in 2000. It grew out of pro-
test against a proposal by the minister for transport in 1996 to introduce instal-
lation of ‘technographic black boxes’ in PSVs in order to capture road crash data 
in the event of an accident. The workers protested the high cost of the gadget 
estimated as USD 700 (KES 70,000) per piece. MWA is SACCO-based, and its 
vision is to protect workers in the matatu industry. Membership entails payment 
of a one-off fee of USD 100 (KES 10,000) and a monthly fee of USD 50 (KES 
5,000) per SACCO. Since formation, MWA has played a key role in transform-
ing the industry through lobbying, advocacy, and engagement with government, 
policy-makers, and key stakeholders as well as addressing the challenges facing 
the industry.
The association has, over time, engaged with the government on issues related 
to organization of the sector and compliance with regulations and has devel-
oped initiatives to support workers. In 2004, for instance, with the introduction 
of new matatu rules, MWA organized a benchmarking trip for its members to 
travel to Uganda to learn about maintaining workers discipline, vehicle brand-
ing, and speed governor installation. MWA was also involved in the development 
of the Integrated Public Transport Policy. Despite this, discussions revealed that 
MWA has not done much to address labour issues affecting workers. The asso-
ciation does not provide or support members’ access to formal social insurance 
nor labour protection as the individual SACCOs are expected to facilitate this. 
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Nonetheless, MWA supports members’ welfare when need arises for instance in 
case of workers arrest or harassment by authorities on work-related issues (but 
not due to obstruction or overloading). The issue of supporting workers training 
and credit provision is also left to the SACCOs.
Kisumu Ahero Mowouk Transport Company, Kisumu
Kisumu Ahero Mowouk Transport Company (KAMTCO) is a limited company 
started in 2010 and is registered with the Ministry of Co-operatives. The com-
pany has 11 directors (all men). To become an official, one must have a vehicle 
in the company. At the time of the interview, the company had 114 PSVs that 
belonged to members and an additional seven that belonged to the company. 
The company has four women investors while the rest are men. Membership 
benefits include protection against harassment by authorities and negotiation 
with authorities in case of an accident or other problem. As noted by an official, 
“it is the face of the company that is seen not that of the individual investors”.
In terms of fleet management, vehicle owners are required to sign franchis-
ing contracts with the company. However, not all vehicles are managed by the 
company. At the time of the interview, only 30 vehicles had been franchised to 
the company for management, while the rest were managed by the owners. The 
company had employed 89 workers who included drivers, conductors, and stage 
managers. About half of them (41), mainly from the franchised vehicles, had 
formal work contracts. Once employed, the drivers and conductors are put on 
a three months’ probation. If confirmed, they get formal contracts and have a 
regular monthly salary of USD 300 and 200 (KES 30,000 and 21,000), respec-
tively. Each vehicle is assigned three off-board workers (Callers) and is charged 
KES 450 maintenance fee daily of which 300 is used to pay the three Callers 
and 150 is for office management. In addition, each vehicle contributes KES 200 
daily (about USD 2), from which KES 100 is for SACCO management and KES 
100 for vehicle owner savings.
The company makes regular contributions to NHIF to cover enrolled work-
ers, even though few are enrolled. Out of the 89 workers, only 13 drivers and 6 
conductors had enrolled in NHIF.
The vehicle owners are responsible for paying for workers social security, but 
most are reluctant due to high staff turnover. The workers thus pay for their 
NHIF and NSSF contributions, but their enrolment is low due to fear among 
most workers of being tied to employer-linked schemes. The drivers and conduc-
tors also get paid maternity and paternity leave. The company has a burial and 
benevolent fund which covers the 89 employees who contribute KES 20 daily. 
In addition, the company has a welfare and investment SACCO whose mem-
bership is open to non-vehicle owners, including the workers so long as they are 
based in Kisumu. Not all the 89 members are members of the welfare SACCO 
even though data on the number of workers who belonged to the SACCO were 
not obtained. In the SACCO, members contribute a minimum of KES 2,000 
monthly for shares. In some cases, the money is used to purchase a SACCO 
110 Anne W. Kamau
vehicle from whose profits the members get annual dividends. In addition, the 
SACCO caters for members’ welfare issues like medical expenses of drivers and 
conductors who belong to the SACCO, bereavement, and children’s education 
support through school fee loans. This means that workers who are on contract 
and are members of the SACCO can benefit both from the company and the 
SACCO.
Discussions with the company officials revealed that despite having a savings 
and investment SACCO, the workers and members have a poor saving culture. 
To address the challenge, the company organizes training for the members. For 
instance, it engaged the British-American Insurance Company (BRITAM) to 
educate members on importance of joining social insurance schemes, and the 
National Industrial Training Institute (NITA) to train members on financial 
literacy among other aspects. In addition, the company organizes exchange vis-
its for workers so as to learn from successful SACCOs in Central Kenya like the 
2NK.2 Whereas the company is considered to be a success, it faces challenges 
like interference by politicians especially during political campaigns, worker har-
assment by authorities, and high staff turn-over. The refusal by some owners to 
franchise their vehicles to the company also weakens the company’s management 
and control of workers.
Kaloleni Shauri Moyo Boda-boda SACCO
The SACCO was formed in September 2018 with about 120 members from 
seven bases. The number had grown to about 56 bases with over 1,000 mem-
bers at the time of the interview. The idea to form the SACCO arose after some 
members visited Rwanda for a benchmarking trip sponsored by the County Gov-
ernment. Upon returning to Kenya, they formed the SACCO to implement the 
good practices that they had learnt, for instance, on riders’ discipline, traffic 
regulations on passenger carrying capacity, having driving licenses, and keeping 
the work areas clean.
The SACCO has an open membership, and at the time of the interview, it 
also admitted members who did not own motorcycles. The SACCO was organ-
ized around zone groups (community-based) and below them were the ‘bases’ 
with the leadership structure having representation from different zones and 
bases. Each base is self-governing with own rules and regulations, that include 
determining the members’ registration fee, although the minimum is KES 200. 
Some bases require members to pay up to KES 2,000 to join. Membership re-
quirements include being over 18 years old and being registered with a base. At 
the time of the interview, the SACCO had about 40 women members, some of 
whom were not riders. Some owned motorcycles and had employed riders and 
some had businesses near the bases.
Registration is also required at the SACCO level. Here, members pay KES 
200 registration fee, KES 100 daily to the SACCO, and KES 50 daily contri-
bution. Once collected, the money is banked by the SACCO under its savings 
portfolio. Each group (base) contributes KES 750 per week of which KES 50 is 
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for supporting office operations, KES 200 is put in members’ savings, and KES 
500 is for merry-go-round contributions that are used to give members loans. 
The officials estimated that, every month, the SACCO advances loans of up to 
KES 72,500 to members. From the onset, the SACCO aimed at empowering 
members to own motorcycles so as to stop being employed (kodesha). Within one 
year of formation, 67 members had received loans to purchase motorcycles. Ad-
ditional financial support is sought from banks and cooperatives. For instance, 
the SACCO had acquired a loan from Equity Bank to purchase 10 motorcycles 
and from UNAITAS Savings and Credit Cooperative Society Limited to pur-
chase 20 motorcycles.
The SACCO provides other benefits to members. For instance, supporting 
training on financial management, driving, and road safety as well as getting 
third-party motorcycle insurance through a local insurance company at a cost 
of KES 5,800, but the riders were not covered. Instead, they contributed KES 
80 daily to cover for eventualities like accidents. At the time of interview, the 
SACCO had a welfare fund that catered for bereavement in case of death of 
a member or a family member, with each member contributing an additional 
KES 200 if a member was bereaved. In addition, each base was required to give 
matching contributions of KES 200. The funds covered funeral expenses like 
coffin, transport, and mortuary fees. The SACCO also had a school fees kitty 
which supported children of members who joined secondary schools.
A key challenge facing the SACCO as discussed with the officials is internal 
conflicts that sometimes lead to the formation of splinter groups. There is also 
interference by politicians, and this affects the SACCO management. As noted, 
officials and members who have close ties with political leaders approach them to 
get support to benefit themselves, and not necessarily, the workers. This under-
mines the SACCO leadership and causes conflict among the members.
The power resources framework
This chapter, like the rest of the book, is guided by the power resources approach 
(PRA) analytical framework which is based on the premise that, if organized, 
labour can successfully defend its interests by collectively mobilizing differ-
ent power resources. Put differently, and as implied by Lund (2009), informal 
workers’ organizations can be a gateway to the realization of informal workers’ 
rights. The workers thus need not only to have rights but they also need to be 
aware about their rights and be able to claim, protect, and maintain them. These 
‘rights stages’ can be achieved through use of different forms of power that in-
clude structural, associational, institutional, and societal power. In the transport 
sector, the workers’ exercise of these powers varies by sub-sector. This chapter 
explores the different forms of PRA that are used by transport workers and 
examines whether belonging to associations enhances workers’ ability to claim 
and defend their interests. For instance, the fact that matatu workers are mostly 
employed and belong to SACCOs, while the bodaboda workers are mainly own- 
account operators, means that different PRAs are used to protect their interests.
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Structural power
As a form of labour power, structural power includes the marketplace, work-
place, and regime-disruptive powers. The position of informal transport workers 
in the work- and marketplaces is weak mainly because the sector is under-valued, 
and workers are still to a large extent perceived as rogue workers. The large pool 
of available workers also means that workers are easily replaceable. However, the 
workplace bargaining power is stronger due to the large number of workers that 
increases their ability to disrupt operations. From the onset, workers enter into a 
sector that is not fully appreciated or recognized, and one that does not have sys-
tems that enable workers to easily access or claim their labour rights. The sector, 
being informal and without supportive structures, weakens the workers bargain-
ing position. Most transport workers, especially the matatu workers and some 
bodaboda operators, are employed, and their work compensation and benefits 
are pegged on informal contracts. Except in a few cases, mainly for bodaboda 
operators who own the motorcycles, transport workers do not own the vehicles, 
and even though they control the income from the vehicles, their job security is 
not guaranteed. Equally, the SACCOs they belong to largely serve the interests 
of vehicle owners, even though, in a few cases, some SACCOs facilitate work-
ers’ access to social protection. The lack of work- and marketplace power means 
that workers’ negotiation space is limited even for demanding for their right to 
social security. Thus, other than pushing for better working environment, most 
workers, especially in the matatu sub-sector, prefer to change jobs or employers, 
and this contributes to some workers’ unwillingness to have employer-linked 
social security provision. In the discussions in Kisumu, some matatu workers 
indicated that they avoided enrolling in schemes initiated by their employers 
due to fear that this could curtail their job mobility. Hence, as shown later in 
Table 5.3, there is not much difference between the association and non- 
association members regarding social insurance enrolment and health insurance 
coverage among the sector workers.
Transport workers in both the matatu and motorcycle sub-sectors have strong 
disruptive power which they exercise collectively as workers at different levels to 
disrupt the economy and demand for their rights. Though not formally docu-
mented, the informal transport sector contributes greatly to Kenya’s economy 
and is a key employer. Matatu and bodaboda operators are many and have strong 
power which they use from time to time to make demands on issues that affect 
them. For instance, they use blockages, strikes, threats, and traffic disruptions to 
demand for action from government and authorities. There have been instances 
where matatu or bodaboda workers collectively, but separately, use regime- 
disruptive power to resist government directives, demand for leniency, or push 
the government to retract decisions that threaten their jobs or sector operations. 
Recent examples include paralyzing of transport operations in Nairobi due to 
poor state of roads, introduction of the bus-rapid transit (BRT), intended re-
moval of matatus from the central business district, increased fuel prices, or 
police harassment and crackdowns. The bodaboda operators also block streets to 
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demand for release of arrested peers and to be allowed access to the CBD. Com-
pared to matatu workers, the motorcycle workers have less recognition but have 
higher disruptive power. They are perceived more negatively by the public com-
pared to the matatu workers. Hence, their disruptive power is targeted not only 
to the authorities but also to the public, for instance, when accidents involving 
one of their own occurs. Incidences of burning of vehicles involved in accidents 
with bodabodas have been common across the country forcing the government 
to issue stern warning to the operators.
Associational power
The informal sector is known to have strong associational power which has, 
over the years, been leveraged by various agencies to economically empower and 
organize workers in the sector. In Kenya, the matatu sector workers belong to 
transport SACCOs that are regulated by government and to informal groups 
commonly known as chamas. Bodaboda operators also belong to self-regulating 
associations and informal groups. The SACCOs, associations, and chamas pro-
vide varying support to advance owners’ and workers’ interests, and this depends 
on the reasons for formation. In the case of matatu SACCOs, workers join them 
to be registered with NTSA and to access jobs. In some cases, the SACCOs, 
the bodaboda associations, and even some chamas facilitate workers’ access to 
Table 5.3  Differences in key workers characteristics by association member status
Member Not Member Difference t-Value
Social insurance enrolment 0.49 0.44 0.05 0.67
Health insurance coverage 0.52 0.45 0.06 0.79
Nairobi 0.55 0.65 −0.10 −1.31
Kisumu 0.45 0.35 0.10 1.31
Gender (male = 1) 0.96 1.00 −0.04 −1.53
Married 0.88 0.82 0.06 1.19
Local 0.30 0.27 0.02 0.33
Age 36.28 35.85 0.42 0.30
Mean daily earnings (current 
USD)
10.88 11.16 −0.28 −0.25
Assets (house and/or land) 0.21 0.44 −0.22 −3.21***
Primary incomplete 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.40
Primary complete 0.47 0.49 −0.02 −0.28
Secondary or above 0.42 0.42 0.00 0.03
Training course 0.43 0.49 0.06 −0.80
Training on job 0.27 0.27 0.00 0.05
Self-taught 0.30 0.24 −0.07 −0.94
Wage-worker 0.63 0.75 0.12 1.57
Own-account 0.30 0.24 −0.07 −0.94
Micro-business 0.07 0.02 −0.05 −1.41
Observations   200
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the project survey data.
Notes: <0.01***, <0.05**, <0.1*.
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saving facilities and access to loans. Some also support workers’ welfare needs. 
All-in-all, the intentions and reasons for joining the associations vary. Joining 
the SACCOs is mandatory for matatu workers, but this is not a requirement for 
bodaboda operators. Also, unlike the bodaboda associations that are formed 
voluntarily by sub-sector operators, matatu SACCOs are formed mainly by ve-
hicle owners, and the workers fit in and are not involved in governance of the 
SACCOs. Hence matatu workers have little allegiance to their SACCOs and 
doubt the SACCOs’ willingness to protect workers’ interests. This is unlike the 
bodaboda operators who have greater attachment to their associations but, as 
noted earlier, are shakier due to internal and external interference.
Institutional power
Institutional power has to do with laws, regulations, procedures, and practices 
that regulate relationships between workers, employers, and authorities. In 
Kenya, institutional power exercised over the matatu sector is strong and is often 
used to regulate operators. There are formal institutions that regulate the sector, 
like the NTSA and the NPS, but these do not necessarily translate into power 
for the workers. This chapter maps the larger institutional framework and fur-
ther reflects on the position of the workers within this framework. Results show 
that, to work in the sector, one must belong to a registered transport SACCO. 
Therefore, by default, joining of SACCOs is institutionally pre-determined. The 
NTSA requires SACCOs and employers to hire workers on formal contracts and 
provide them with social security. In practice, though, this does not happen, 
and as noted earlier, most matatu workers are hired by vehicles owners and not 
the SACCOs, mainly on individually negotiated verbal work contracts. A few 
SACCOs like KMO and Olokise SACCOs in Nairobi and Kihomi SACCO in 
Kisumu provide work contracts and social security for workers. However, most 
SACCOs do not engage workers formally partly due to reluctance by vehicle 
owners to fully release the vehicles to SACCOs to manage them. Thus, whereas 
there are legal provisions for employment of workers, in practice, these provi-
sions are not enforced. Hence, the institutional power is exercised at the level of 
control by the government over the sector, and by SACCOs, over the workers 
while serving the interests of vehicle owners.
The situation is however different for motorcycle operators. First, it is not 
mandatory for them to belong to SACCOs. The government has also not pro-
vided regulations for hiring bodaboda workers, even though a higher number 
are own-account operators. Nonetheless, most of them belong to work-related 
associations that are registered under the Associations Act. Once registered, the 
associations can enrol workers and also decide on the kind of support to provide 
to them.
The issuance of PSV licenses by NTSA to SACCOs and badges to workers is a 
form of control and regulation of the sector. Only licensed vehicles and workers 
can work in the sector, even though there are some workers who find their way 
into the sector even when not licensed like the reliever drivers, known as squad 
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drivers, who work on mutually agreed terms with the regular drivers towards the 
end of trips. The licensing requirement nonetheless has protective benefits for 
matatu workers as only authorized persons can work in the sector. The benefits 
are even greater for the drivers given that only those having Class A driving 
license are permitted to drive PSVs. This raises their competitive value (a form 
of marketplace bargaining power) and makes them more difficult to replace, 
thus increasing their marketplace bargaining power discussed above. Discussions 
with the workers revealed that Class A drivers are highly sought after. There is 
nonetheless a negative effect associated with high staff turn-over due to the com-
mon practice of poaching drivers, especially by new vehicle owners. This further 
weakens the SACCOs ability to contain workers and to negotiate their access to 
social security. An official of Kihomi SACCO noted that, annually, about 12 out 
of 52 drivers and 20 out of 30 conductors leave their jobs despite having formal 
work contracts and regular salary. In general, SACCOs cannot restrict workers’ 
job mobility unless they have unpaid SACCO loans or pending criminal cases 
that hold SACCOs accountable.
Figure 5.1 summarizes the authors’ interpretation of the relationships be-
tween the government, SACCOs, vehicle owners, and workers in the matatu 
sub-sector. The relationships, though co-dependent especially between SAC-
COs, owners, and workers, are also based on a power hierarchy where the gov-
ernment wields overall power, whereas the SACCOs and owners have power over 
workers. However, even in this arrangement, the workers hold some financial 






Figure 5.1 Power relations in the matatu sub-sector.
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The scenario within the matatu sector is one of mutual dependency. SACCOs 
depend on owners to give them vehicles, so as to be registered with NTSA. The 
SACCOs support the owners in registration and licensing of vehicles and the 
workers by NTSA. Vehicle owners are the employers, even though, ideally, it is 
the SACCOs that should employ workers. Few vehicle owners agree to franchise 
their vehicles to SACCOs to manage them, and this reduces the SACCOs au-
thority over workers. In practice, the SACCOs largely favour the interest of ve-
hicle owners and pay little attention to workers’ issues. Hence, there are tensions 
between SACCOs and workers. Associations like MOA and KMO mainly protect 
vehicle owners’ interests. Others like MWA, MaCREW, and Kisumu Boda-boda 
Association engage with the government and authorities to pursue the SACCOs, 
associations, and workers’ interests and long-term policy changes in the sector. 
For example, MWA successfully lobbied for reduction of insurance premiums for 
14-seater matatus, and this benefited the entire sector. Also, in 2018, 31 SAC-
COs petitioned the government to suspend the removal of 14-seater PSVs from 
operating in Kenya (ROK, 2018). There are also transport unions like TAWU, 
MWU, and PUTON3 that cater for workers’ interests. However, none of the 
workers in the survey belonged to a union, but other studies in Kenya have cov-
ered them (Wright, 2018; Spooner & Manga, 2019). The low participation in 
union activities is linked to limited time among workers to participate in union 
activities due to nature of their work, or their SACCOs and employers dissap-
roval of their joining unions. Some of the unions like TAWU were established 
to cater for formally employed workers, and it has only very recently begun to 
recruit informal workers, whereas the independent union MWU was established 
specifically to cater for informal workers.
Societal power
Societal power includes coalitions that involve forming alliances with actors and 
other social groups as well as the discursive power which is about influencing 
the public. Transport workers have higher coalition power through their as-
sociations. Some SACCOs partner with state and non-state organizations like 
NTSA, NITA, KUSCCO, the police, and insurance companies to support and 
benefit workers. Examples include KAMTCO which formed coalitions with the 
BRITAM and NITA to train workers. The Kisumu Boda-boda association also 
partnered with a local insurance company to facilitate members’ access to train-
ing and insurance cover. Others like KMO in Nairobi supported workers to 
access health insurance, while Kihomi organized workers exchange visits with 
successful transport SACCOs in other regions and also facilitated workers access 
to savings and credit through organizations like KUSCCO.
Regarding discursive power, transport workers and their associations have not 
achieved much in changing public perception and opinion towards the sector. 
The only time that the public supports transport workers is when they are di-
rectly affected, for instance, when PSVs are barred from accessing the CBD. 
Often, the public is on the receiving end when transport workers conflict with 
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authorities, for instance, when fuel costs are increased leading to increase in 
fares. The perception is even worse with regard to motorcycle operators due to 
poor accident ratings, and their tendency to mob and harass motorists involved 
in accidents with one of their own. Thus, even when workers are disadvantaged 
or denied their right to social protection, public opinion is unlikely to tilt in 
favour of workers.
Discussion
Comparison between members and non-members
Table 5.3 shows that there are no significant differences along a variety of di-
mensions between association members and non-members, except for asset own-
ership which is higher among the non-members. Non-members also have higher 
earnings and are more likely to be in Nairobi (although the differences are not 
statistically significant). Members consist of a relatively higher proportion of 
own-account operators and a lower proportion of wage-workers compared to 
non-members. This is likely due to the more insecure nature of the former work 
type, in turn, increasing the need for associational belonging.
Access to formal social insurance
Despite the government requirement that transport workers should have social 
insurance, around 50 percent of workers remain uncovered as seen in Tables 
5.1 and 5.2. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 reveal that, although association members 
in general are more likely to have coverage, the difference is not statistically 
significant, with the exception of SACCO members, as discussed further on. 
This could be due to the fact that, on the whole, the vehicle owners expect 
the workers to pay for their own coverage due to the notion that they control 
the daily incomes. In the matatu sector, fare payment is largely cash and is 
often handled by workers. Alternative cashless payment options are not com-
mon, and this makes the owners suspicious that the workers do not remit the 
entire daily earnings. To deal with this fear, workers are put on a set daily 
target (Spooner & Manga, 2019) and are left to cater for their social security 
needs. Unlike the formal sector, where part of the contributions, for instance, 
to pension coverage, is paid by the employer, this is not the case in the infor-
mal  sector – including even those who have formal work contracts from SAC-
COs. As noted earlier, workers who are enrolled in social security programmes 
through the SACCOs still pay for their own coverage. Table 5.4 also shows 
that male and self-taught workers are less likely to have formal social insurance; 
yet, the sector is male-dominated.
Factors that contribute to workers’ low social insurance include employers’ 
refusal to pay for workers’ coverage, high worker turn-over, workers’ unwill-
ingness to enrol in employer-linked schemes, low awareness, and high cost of 
premiums. A few SACCOs comply with NTSA requirements to enrol workers 
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in social insurance while others encourage the workers to enrol voluntarily. This 
could explain the finding that SACCO members are more likely to be enrolled 
in social insurance (Table 5.4). However, the reluctance among vehicle owners 
to allow SACCOs to fully manage their vehicles including employing workers 
weakens the SACCOs ability to ensure workers’ provision of social insurance. 
Hence, the workers’ access to social insurance is not dependent on association 
membership but on whether the SACCOs they belong to have full mandate to 
manage worker issues.
The co-dependence between SACCOs and vehicle owners and lack of struc-
tures to ensure compliance with government directives compromises workers’ 
access to social protection. The lack of full control of incomes from the vehicles 
by the owners makes them reluctant to use their earnings, which they consider to 
be low, to provide for workers’ social insurance. The owners’ perspective is that 
workers control the earnings from the vehicles and that they can afford to pay for 
their own social security coverage. Hence, many employers do not consider pro-
vision of workers’ social protection as their responsibility. The workers on their 






Association member 0.75 0.70 0.04 0.67
Sacco/vicoba/chama 0.65 0.51 0.14 1.99**
Work-related association 0.08 0.15 −0.07 −1.48
Women/youth/religious 0.01 0.04 −0.03 −1.25
Work-related 0.29 0.30 0.00 0.01
Loans 0.36 0.31 0.04 0.65
Voice and representation 0.05 0.08 −0.02 −0.67
Social cushioning 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.95
Kisumu 0.63 0.53 0.10 1.41
Nairobi 0.37 0.47 −0.10 −1.41
Gender (male = 1) 0.95 0.99 −0.04 −1.79*
Married 0.89 0.84 0.06 1.17
Local 0.27 0.30 −0.03 −0.48
Age 36.99 35.41 1.58 1.26
Mean daily earnings (current 
USD)
11.02 10.90 0.12 0.12
Assets (house and/or land) 0.22 0.32 −0.10 −1.63
Primary incomplete 0.08 0.12 −0.04 −0.91
Primary complete 0.46 0.49 −0.02 −0.32
Secondary or above 0.45 0.39 0.06 0.89
Training course 0.47 0.42 0.05 0.77
Training on job 0.31 0.24 0.07 1.07
Self-taught 0.22 0.34 −0.12 −1.91*
Wage-worker 0.64 0.68 −0.03 −0.51
Own-account 0.29 0.28 0.02 0.29
Micro-business 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.48
Observations   200
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the project survey data.
Notes: <0.01***, <0.05**, <0.1*.
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part argue that their net incomes are low and that they have competing personal 
and family demands and therefore not in a position to pay for social security. In 
Kisumu, the vehicle owners observed that:
The workers are our bosses; they employ us because they control the amount 
that the vehicles earn. They determine how much money the vehicle owners 
get at the end of the day, after they have paid themselves. They have a lot of 
money and they can afford to pay for their social protection coverage. The 
vehicle owners have little control of the vehicle operations and there are no 




The informal public transport sector is one of the largest in Kenya. It includes 
matatu and motorcycle sub-sectors. The sector is highly regulated by govern-
ment. For instance, it is mandatory for matatu workers to belong to SACCOs. 
This is, however, not mandatory for motorcycle operators, even though most of 
them belong to sector-based associations. Transport SACCOs and associations 
benefit workers by engaging with and lobbying authorities on behalf of work-
ers on operations-related issues. However, they hardly address workers’ social 
protection issues like social insurance provision, even when this is required by 
NTSA in the case of matatus. The sector is beset with many challenges that 
affect workers’ social protection provision, like lack of formal work contracts. 
Consequently, most workers depend on informal systems and networks when 
faced with shocks. The reluctance by vehicle owners to franchise vehicles to 
SACCOs for management, lack of enforcement to compel employers to provide 
workers with formal contracts and social security, and workers’ fear of joining 
labour unions contribute to the low social security coverage among workers. 
This also denies workers their right to work in favourable and decent work 
environments.
Whereas transport SACCOs and associations exist, they mainly protect the 
interests of vehicle owners and not of workers. Hence, the workers fear to voice 
their concerns or to approach their associations whenever they have work- 
related challenges, except when they require the SACCOs and associations to 
engage with authorities on their behalf. Some SACCOs support workers by 
providing training, access to credit, or catering for welfare needs. There is, 
however, little variation in social protection coverage between workers who 
belong to associations and those who do not. This chapter thus concludes that 
having government social protection policies and regulations in place is im-
portant. However, this does not guarantee workers access to social protection. 
The role of transport SACCOs and associations needs to be re-examined with 
a view to compelling them to focus on workers’ issues including their right to 
social insurance.
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Notes
 1 Workers in Kisumu indicated that MOA was inactive there and that not all owners 
are members.
 2 https://www.2nksacco.co.ke/.
 3 PUTON is an independent democratic registered trade union in Kenya which is af-
filiated to the International Transport Workers Federation. It draws membership and 
represents workers in transport-oriented occupations.
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6 Informal trader associations 
in Tanzania – providing 




Micro-trade is a dominant activity in the informal economy in most urban 
areas of the global south. In Tanzania, it provides a very relevant context for 
studying the access that people in the informal economy have to both formal 
and informal social protection mechanisms – insights that are essential in light 
of the ongoing expansion of formal social protection in Tanzania and Sub- 
Saharan Africa more broadly. As described in more detail in the introduction 
to this edited volume, social protection policies and instruments have gained 
increasing attention among many countries, including Tanzania. Many part-
ners, including donors, have since the late 1980 viewed social protection as 
the preferred solution to issues of poverty in the global South (Deacon, 2013; 
Hickey & Seekings, 2017; Hickey et al., 2019).
In Tanzania, recent years have seen attempts at expanding informal workers’ ac-
cess to social protection such as pension and insurance schemes. Nonetheless, as 
illustrated in this chapter, formal social protection is still largely beyond the reach of 
informal traders, a gap which informal traders’ associations seek to fill with a variety 
of different services. They, for example, cushion members in cases of death or med-
ical problems in the family and represent members’ interests towards authorities.
In this chapter, we investigate the access that informal micro-traders in 
Tanzania have to formal and informal social protection measures. The key 
challenges they face and how (and if) these challenges are addressed by formal 
social protection measures and by the informal social protection measures 
employed by their own collective associations are discussed. Consequently, 
the chapter provides insights into how micro-traders – who work in one of 
the most common and vulnerable informal occupations – organize and how 
(if at all) they access social protection. By comparing Dodoma’s setting with 
Dar es Salaam, which is predominantly urban, we also seek to address dif-
ferences (if any exist) which might be related to the degree of urbanization.
A broad understanding of social protection is adopted, encompassing for-
mal social insurance programmes such as health insurance or maternity leave as 
well as informal cushioning mechanisms, access to micro-finance and training, 
and representation and voice. However, narrowly targeted safety net measures 
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(commonly known as social assistance) are not covered since they are mostly not 
offered by informal associations.
The chapter employs a broad understanding of the informal economy, in-
cluding self-employment in informal enterprises (i.e. unregistered or un-
licenced business), as well as wage employment in informal jobs without a 
written contract. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 1 of this edited vol-
ume, informality is a highly politicized concept which often appears in degrees 
while intersecting with formality in various ways. Informal traders might, 
for example, sell goods on commission for formally registered retailers while 
working either in formally designated vending areas or in informal ones. None-
theless, informality remains an essential concept in terms of delimitating social 
protection rights for workers.
The chapter draws on Nvivo-processed data from focused group discussions 
(FDGs) and key informant interviews (KIIs) with micro-traders and their asso-
ciations carried out between April 2018 and January 2019.1 Four FGDs were 
conducted, representing a total of 13 different associations in Dodoma and 16 in 
 Dar es Salaam. Furthermore, nine KIIs were conducted with association leaders 
in Dodoma and 12 in Dar es Salaam. In total, more than 40 different associa-
tions were represented. The paper also draws on survey data on micro-traders in 
Dodoma and Dar es Salaam. The survey was carried out in 2018 and used a com-
bination of purpose-based sampling and random selection. Of the 286 survey 
interviews conducted with micro-traders, 62 percent were sampled geographi-
cally while 38 percent were sampled via a variety of informal worker associations 
(where the target group were ordinary members) to ensure a broad coverage of 
different types of associations.2
The findings are indicative of the collective organization and access to social 
protection amongst micro-traders in urban areas and, in particular, the more 
vulnerable segment of micro-traders. We focused on traders who were mobile 
and/or working in a space without a fixed structure even though a few KII and 
FGD participants did come from established markets. Most often, their work 
is characterized by low entry barriers, high competition, and low and irregular 
incomes. They generally have no officially recognized space of work and face 
frequent harassment in environments which lack essential facilities such as clean 
water, waste disposal, and storage facilities.
In the remainder of this chapter, we start by examining how informal trade 
is governed in Tanzania, and relatedly, how informal traders are organizing 
collectively; we then explore the challenges faced by micro-traders and their 
access to formal social protection mechanisms; followed by discussion of how 
micro-traders are organized and the services associations offer to their mem-
bers. Using the Power Resource Approach (PRA; Schmalz, Ludwig & Web-
ster, 2018), the power resources available to associations are analyzed along 
with their access barriers. We then compare traders who enrol in informal 
associations to those who do not belong to any associations. The final section 
concludes on the findings and the overall comparison between informal social 
protection mechanisms and official ones.
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Collective organization and the governance of 
micro-traders
Attitudes and policies towards informal micro-traders have varied over time. 
In Dar es Salaam, local by-laws from the 1960s and 1970s made micro-trading 
illegal, but the 1980s economic crisis resulted in some accommodation such 
as the establishment of municipal licences for mobile traders in 1983 (Brown, 
Lyons & Dankoco, 2009; Brown et al., 2015). In general, a more participatory 
approach to city planning was initiated where the local government in Dar es 
Salaam encouraged representation of informal workers’ associations at the ward 
level, and by 1997, some 240 self-help groups had been formed (Brown, Lyons 
& Dankoco, 2009).
Since 2003, however, the participatory line has been reversed. In 2003, the 
peddlers’ licence was cancelled, rendering street traders illegal (Lyons & Msoka, 
2010), and in 2006, the Prime Minister instructed local authorities to move 
street traders from busy areas, leading to widespread clearances (Lyons & Msoka, 
2010). Evictions have been and still are common, although often relocation has 
been unsuccessful as the new localities have failed to attract customers.
Tanzania has a long tradition of traders’ associations and other informal net-
works which was intensified by the post-independence norms of socialism and 
self-reliance (Brown, Lyons & Dankoco, 2009). Associations are commonly 
known by the Swahili word kikundi (plural: vikundi) and are often welfare- 
oriented, multi-ethnic, run by contributions from members and have elected 
officers (Tsuruta, 2006).
In addition to trade associations are the trade unions, which historically have 
been relatively weak in Tanzania, as the ruling party has sought to control in-
dependent sources of power (Tripp, 2000). The autonomy of the trade unions 
increased with the reintroduction of a multi-party system in the early 1990s; 
nonetheless, trade unions in Tanzania are still swaying between continued con-
trol by the ruling party and efforts to establish themselves as autonomous organ-
izations (Fisher, 2011).
The trade union movement in Tanzania has only within the last decade or 
so begun to show an interest in organizing informal workers (Fisher, 2011). In 
a context of declining trade union membership, trade unions in Tanzania are 
taking new measures to include people in the informal economy as part of the 
trade union constituency. Lacking any strategy on the matter from the federa-
tion level, very few unions are yet to succeed in recruiting substantial numbers 
of informal members. Only the unions representing transport workers, domestic 
workers, and commercial workers are actively pursuing membership of informal 
workers. This is often in cooperation with labour-oriented NGOs and interna-
tional or developed country unions which now have inclusion of the informal 
economy as a top priority.
Since the late 1990s, governments have tried to formalize informal activities 
with the aim of enabling small informal enterprises to participate in and ben-
efit from the market economy (Brown, Lyons & Dankoco, 2009). An example 
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is the 2006 World Bank-supported ‘Doing Business’ programme. It assumed 
that micro-entrepreneurs such as informal traders would benefit from reduced 
bureaucracy and in particular to property and business rights and increased ac-
cess to credit (Lyons, Brown & Msoka, 2014). However, as shown by Lyons, 
Brown, and Msoka (2014), very few licence categories have been available for 
micro-traders and to obtain a business licence, one needs to have a fixed and 
legal address. Hence, the requirements demanded to formalize cannot be met 
by most micro-traders.
The strong focus on formalization gives the impression that informal activi-
ties are undesired and something to be overcome in order to achieve a modern 
market-driven economy. Discourses, however, change, and the late president 
Magufuli advocated a stop to harassment of informal traders. Hence, many small 
traders were able to paraphrase the president as illustrated by one street vendor: 
“The president said no eviction of these people. Leave them to work. You should 
make arrangement of how they will work in the streets” (FGD, Dar es Salaam). 
The more positive attitude expressed by the president has gone together with a 
massive effort of registration of individual traders, along with what resembles a 
new form of taxation.
Since December 2017, a total of 670,000 IDs (popularly called Magufuli 
cards) have been distributed to micro-traders with business capital not exceeding 
four million TZS (1,769 USD) per annum (Tanzania Daily News 02.01.2018, 
The East African 15.12.2018). The total value of the IDs (at 20,000 TZS each/9 
USD) is 13.4 billion TZS (6.03 million USD).3 All revenue from the new ID 
cards goes to the central government, and hence they have been criticized for 
diverting revenue away from the local governments who are still responsible for 
servicing the areas where the micro-traders work – but are no longer supposed 
to collect trading fees.4 The new ID so far seems to have been generally well 
received by micro-traders, although it is somewhat unclear what they get from 
having this card.
In sum, authorities have had, and still have, an ambivalent relation with in-
formal traders. Approaches alternate between tolerance and evictions, often fol-
lowing election cycles, as politicians ask local authorities to go easy on informal 
traders until the election is over (see e.g. Babere, 2013). Despite the new IDs, 
micro-traders have very few rights in public space, and if found guilty of trading 
in unsanctioned areas, they face a fine of TZS 50,000 (USD 21.90).5 Mean-
while, efforts at formalizing the informal economy – at the moment predomi-
nantly via registration and relocation – continue.
Characteristics of micro-traders
The micro-traders in Dar es Salaam and Dodoma form a heterogeneous group. 
They all provide cheap goods and service but occupy very different positions in 
the economy depending on what they sell and whether they work in designated 
or undesignated areas. Of the 286 micro-traders participating in the survey, 
the average age was 35 years, and 56 percent were female. The educational level 
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varies quite a lot but, perhaps tellingly, less than a quarter had above primary 
level education (Table 6.1). These figures are in line with those reported for the 
informal economy in the 2014 Labour Force Survey (ILFS, 2015).
The heterogeneity of informal traders is illustrated in the assets they own. As 
seen in Table 6.1, 42 percent of the survey respondents (or their spouse) own a 
plot of land or property while 15 percent own other assets.6 An equal amount 
(43 percent), however, do not possess any assets. The median daily wage listed in 
Table 6.1 also hides large differences. As seen in Table 6.2 below, there is a large 
difference between the 10th and the 90th percentiles (1 USD versus 17.5 USD 
daily); however, 75 percent earn 7.66 USD or less per day.
Table 6.1  Key worker characteristics
Tanzania N = 286 Dar es Salaam N 
= 134
Dodoma N = 152













57 0.20 0.40 0.09 0.29 0.30 0.46
Health insurance 
coverage
64 0.22 0.42 0.13 0.33 0.31 0.46
Gender (male 
= 1)
127 0.44 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.37 0.48
Age 34.85 11.19 36.04 11.82 33.8 10.53
Married 162 0.57 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.58 0.50





7.87 13.83 8.46 12.15 7.36 15.06
Assets (house 
and/or land)
119 0.42 0.50 0.34 0.48 0.48 0.50
Primary 
incomplete
38 0.13 0.34 0.1 0.30 0.16 0.37
Primary 
complete
183 0.64 0.48 0.69 0.47 0.6 0.49
Secondary or 
above
65 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.41 0.24 0.43
Wage-worker 16 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.24
Own-account 223 0.78 0.42 0.82 0.39 0.74 0.44
Micro-business 46 0.16 0.37 0.13 0.33 0.19 0.39
Source: Author’s elaboration based on project survey data.
Notes: Summary statistics based on the full sample. * Association member figures are from the 
random sample where N = 179, N = 89, and N = 90 respectively. ** Due to the large standard devi-
ation and the large difference between the mean and median values, the median value 3.72 USD is 
thought to be a more accurate indication of the ‘general’ earning level. The median value for Dar es 
Salaam is USD 5.38 and for Dodoma it is USD 3.28.
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Additionally, large differences between “highest” and “lowest” take-home 
earnings indicate highly fluctuating incomes.7
Micro-trade was the main source of income for the vast majority (94 percent), 
although 29 percent had a secondary occupation. The largest group (40 percent) 
were street vendors selling different items such as magazines or sweets, 35 per-
cent were selling cooked foods or snacks, and 15 percent different food items 
such as fruits or grains. The remaining 10 percent were involved in different 
service activities such as car washing or shoe shining.
Employment-related benefits like paid maternity leave or work-injury compen-
sation were practically non-existent. This is not surprising, as most micro-traders 
have no direct employers – only 6 percent consider themselves wage-workers. 
The majority are own-account workers (78 percent) or micro-enterprise owners 
with one or two helpers (16 percent). Even though some traders work on com-
mission for larger retailers, they are not in any standard employment relation-
ship. In Tanzanian labour legislation, employment-related social protection is 
linked to a standard employment relationship and hence does not cover micro- 
traders. This means that micro-traders have to sign up voluntarily and make the 
full contribution out of their own pockets. Relatedly, as seen from Table 6.1, 
social insurance enrolment and coverage in the areas of health and pension only 
cover 20 percent and 22 percent, respectively.
For most of the key characteristics illustrated in Table 6.1, differences between 
Dar es Salaam and Dodoma were minor, indicating consistency across locations 
for issues such as educational level or age. The gender profile, however, differed 
slightly as the sample consisted of 47 percent females in Dar es Salaam but 69 
percent in Dodoma. Median wages were lower in Dodoma (3.28 USD) com-
pared to Dar es Salaam (5.38 USD), and similarly, a larger proportion of traders 
in Dar es Salaam were immigrants to the city (75 percent), whereas, in Dodoma, 
66 percent were locally born. This might explain why more traders in Dodoma 
held key assets (land or property) in their family than in Dar es Salaam (48 per-
cent versus 34 percent). Finally, social insurance coverage was markedly higher 
in Dodoma (31 percent) compared to Dar es Salaam (13 percent) which can be 
explained by the prevalence of the Community Health Fund (CHF) outside the 
capital as discussed below.
Access to formal insurance schemes
Tanzania has three public insurance schemes potentially encompassing infor-
mal operators. That is the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), the National 
Table 6.2  Percentiles for daily earnings
10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
USD 0.99 USD 1.97 USD 3.72 USD 7.66 USD 17.51
TZS 2,262 TZS 4,500 TZS 8,500 TZS 17,500 TZS 40,000
Source: Author’s elaboration based on project survey data.
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Health Insurance Fund (NHIF), and the CHF which has recently been re-
launched as the improved Community health fund (iCHF) under the NHIF 
(and co-financed by the government) which targets rural populations and people 
without formal employment.
The survey shows that enrolment in pension schemes is very rare amongst 
micro-traders as only 1 percent reported participation. This was substantiated by 
interviews where respondents considered pensions to be out of their reach. The 
criteria that one has to contribute for 15 years to be eligible for pension under 
the current NSSF scheme makes it fit poorly with most informal traders who 
tend to focus more on short term needs.
A total of 19 percent of the micro-traders contributed to official health insur-
ance divided between CHF (12 percent), NHIF (5 percent), NSSF (1 percent), 
and other insurance (1 percent). Actual coverage (including cases where a spouse 
or relative is the primary contributor) shows 22 percent coverage with a similar 
division between the different schemes. This corresponds to the national cover-
age of 22 percent estimated in Jacob and Pedersen (2018).
Thirteen percent of the respondents who were not currently contributing to an 
NHIF scheme had previously done so. Common reasons given for exiting were 
related to leaving a formal job, the quality of the service or the cost. Amongst 
the 229 persons from the survey who did not contribute, the most common 
answer was “it is too expensive”, followed by “no knowledge about insurance” 
and “procedures are too complicated”. Hence, problems related to costs, proce-
dures, information flows, and retainment inhibit coverage of micro-traders in 
the existing schemes.
What characterizes micro-traders enrolled in formal insurance 
schemes compared to non-enrolled traders?
In order to examine the relations between formal social insurance enrolment 
and key worker characteristics, we elaborate a test of means (see Table 6.3). 
Table 6.3 indicates that enrolled traders are more likely than non-enrolled to 
be members of an association, to live in Dodoma, be female, married, own key 
assets, have higher education, and to be either own-account or micro-businesses. 
Nonetheless, when testing these relations using a standard probit model, only 
the variables assets, secondary education, and location remain significant (see 
Riisgaard, 2020).
This leads to the conclusion that traders living in Dodoma are more likely 
than traders living in Dar es Salaam to enrol in formal insurance schemes and 
that, on average, traders with a house or a piece of land in the family are also 
more likely to enrol compared to ones without these assets. Finally, traders with 
secondary education or above are much more likely to enrol compared to traders 
who have not completed primary education. These findings seem to indicate 
that official health insurance mainly caters for the segment of informal traders 
who are already more resilient (in that they are more likely to have assets in the 
family and have higher education) but also that access to formal health insurance 
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is more widespread in Dodoma which is most likely related to the cheaper CHF 
option available there.
During discussions, little interest was expressed in the CHF scheme or its 
urban counterpart TIKA as the quality of the service offered was considered 
poor. Of much more interest was the newly introduced KIKOA scheme. In 
2015/2016, the government diversified NHIF to engage the informal econ-
omy through the MUTUAL (commonly known as KIKOA) scheme. Under 
this scheme, members of registered associations in the informal economy with 
a minimum of 20 members can join (if a minimum of 10 members sign up) for 
76,800 TZS per year per person. Dependents can be signed up at the cost of an 
additional 76,800 TZS per person (NHIF, 2018). Several associations had pro-
vided access to this scheme for their members, as discussed later in in the section 
on association services.
Perception of key challenges
When asked during interviews what was perceived to be key challenges, problems 
with authorities which include evictions, confiscation of goods, fines, harass-
ment, and insecurity of trading spaces were the most mentioned. Lack of access 








Association member 0.68 0.55 0.13 1.78*
Sacco/vicoba/kikundi 0.53 0.33 0.20 2.82***
Work-related association 0.11 0.19 −0.09 −1.55
Women/youth/religious 0.05 0.03 0.012 0.62
Work-related benefit 0.19 0.17 0.023 0.48
Social cushioning 0.14 0.08 0.06 1.45
Voice and representation 0.02 0.04 −0.02 −0.80
Loans 0.33 0.27 0.06 0.94
Dar es Salaam 0.21 0.53 −0.32 −4.50***
Dodoma 0.79 0.47 0.32 4.50***
Gender (male = 1) 0.26 0.49 −0.22 −3.11***
Married 0.68 0.54 0.15 2.01**
Local born 0.56 0.45 0.12 1.57
Age 36.98 34.32 2.66 1.61
Mean daily earnings (current 
USD)
9.90 7.37 2.53 1.24
Assets (house and/or land) 0.61 0.37 0.245 3.45***
Primary incomplete 0.07 0.15 −0.08 −1.56
Primary complete 0.53 0.67 −0.14 −2.00**
Secondary or above 0.4 0.18 0.22 3.62***
Wage-worker 0.04 0.06 −0.03 −0.76
Own-account 0.67 0.81 −0.14 −2.32**
Micro-business 0.3 0.13 0.17 3.20***
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the project survey data.
Notes: N for enrolled = 57, N for non-enrolled = 229. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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to health insurance, lack of capital, access to credit, and lack of training on busi-
ness skills were also mentioned as problems.
In the survey, respondents were asked to “Describe the two key challenges/
threats/problems you face in your work”. As seen in Figure 6.1, a variety of 
challenges emerged. Issues related to problems with authorities again come out 
as important although fluctuations in income was the challenge mentioned most 
often followed by exposure to the environment.
Survey responses and the qualitative interviews indicate a range of work- 
related challenges affecting informal traders, with the most pertinent challenge 
varying between individual traders. Of particular importance seems to be lim-
ited or fluctuating income (which is also evident in the wide differences between 
low and high daily income estimates reported), exposure to physical conditions, 
and problems with authorities as well as lack of access to health insurances. As 
problems with authorities were perceived as an important challenge in both the 
qualitative and quantitative data, and since this is also related to many of the 
other challenges the traders face, below, we elaborate on this aspect based on 
the qualitative interviews.
Relation to the authorities
Although harassment from authorities was commonly mentioned as a ma-














Figure 6.1 Key work-related challenges.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on project survey data.
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That the president had publicly made statements in favour of street traders, was 
noted mainly as a welcome sign of appreciation and a shift from being regarded 
as a nuisance more than it seemed to have actually changed their daily interac-
tions with local authorities. In addition, trust in the longevity of the current, 
more positive, climate is limited as noted below:
Although we are out of that mess now since our president Magufuli gave 
the street vendors the right to perform their activities in Kariakoo market, 
some of us still do not think that it will be maintained for long so we think 
maybe someday the system will change and we will go back to the old ways 
when street vendors were being mistreated and harassed at their business 
premises.
(KII, Dar es Salaam)
Government actions like evictions can have detrimental effects not just for the 
individual traders (Skinner, 2008) but also for their associations, as exemplified 
in the following quote:
Ok as I said before that when we started our group we used to have a lot 
of good planning but as I said we didn’t survive long since the government 
come to remove us from there so that action destroy a lot of our planning.
(FGD, Dar es Salaam)
Some associations would seek to assist members in case of problems with au-
thorities though most saw themselves as powerless and incapable of helping 
their members with what they considered harassment by authorities. As noted 
by Babere (2013), representation towards authorities is furthermore challenged 
by the fact that numerous different entities are in charge of governing different 
aspects of informal trade. In the following, we explore in more detail how asso-
ciations assist their members.
Micro-traders’ associations
Most associations were registered with a constitution guiding their operations. 
Registration appears to relay a degree of legitimacy in relation to the authorities 
and in organizing collective support for members such as loans or training. Gov-
ernment promises of loans was frequently mentioned, but rarely materialized. 
Below, we briefly look at three associations to illustrate some of the variety in 
terms of organizational set-up and purpose.
VIBINDO society8
Adversarial relations between micro-traders and authorities spurred the estab-
lishment of VIBINDO in 1995 when 19 associations formed an umbrella or-
ganization to represent their interests and negotiate with authorities in attempts 
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to secure trading spaces. VIBINDO has since then offered financial services 
and training for members, established their own private micro-health insurance 
scheme, and later negotiated the KIKOA scheme with NHIF.
VIBINDO is organized at the national regional and district level and reports 
more than 60,000 members organized via 630 groups of small businesses. Their 
mission is “to assist its members in transforming, formalize and grow their 
micro-businesses and industries in order to enhance opportunities for access 
to markets, social security, conducive business premises, financial services …” 
(Workshop, Dar es Salaam, May 2018).
The membership is predominantly male (80 percent), and while not limited 
to micro-traders, this group forms the vast majority. Of the micro-traders, the 
largest part is own-account, although a few have employees. Hence, VIBINDO 
has more of a private-sector perspective as compared to, for example, the trade 
unions that focus on the relationships of employment. They are, for instance, 
members of Tanzania private-sector foundation (TPSF), a private organization 
lobbying to promote business interest in national policy platforms such as the 
Tanzania National Business Council (a public private partnership). In addition, 
VIBINDO focuses on small enterprises rather than wage-workers.
VIBINDO is a well-known name amongst authorities as well as donors and 
has had several projects with the ILO. In addition to externally funded projects, 
their source of funding is membership contributions, in addition to offering 
commercial services like training and assistance in registration of associations.
TUICO9
TUICO has around 80,000 members and is considered one of the better organ-
ized and resourced trade unions. In their membership are around 4,000 infor-
mal micro-traders and TUICO is an affiliate member of StreetNet International. 
Their engagement in the informal economy started around 2010 and has been 
supported by various NGOs.
The branches of informal micro-traders are based in designated markets, as 
the union has found these informal workers easier to approach. Hence, for prac-
tical reasons, access to a somewhat secure vending space is a key consideration 
for the union when they reach out to informal workers. The implication of this 
is, however, that they reach the comparatively more secure traders.
A newer initiative from TUICO, originating in an externally funded pro-
gramme they had with StreetNet International, has been to establish a bargain-
ing committee with two members from each of the market-based branches they 
have in Dar es Salaam. As noted by a KII in Dar es Salaam, with this initiative, 
TUICO is seeking to provide a bridge between the municipal authority and 
traders. This innovative initiative deserves further research, but based on com-
munication with three branch leaders and a handful of branch members, expe-
riences with the committee (as with TUICO more generally) vary from lack of 
knowledge about the existence of the committee to enthusiasm – as illustrated 
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in the quote below by an ordinary member of the Mchikichini branch. TU-
ICO representatives acknowledge the varied receptions of the initiative amongst 
branches and note that it has been hard to coordinate meetings where more than 
a handful of representatives show up.
We used to send our problems to local leaders for further steps to be taken 
because the government start with them but what we came to understand 
they took our claims to nowhere, so TUICO educated us, we had a com-
mittee there because there are some things the government directs but it 
cannot perform them, so you as business people on your own you need to 
come together and solve your problems otherwise if you go to market man-
agement nothing will be solved, so it needs your committee that will go and 
discuss the matter with the district director or anyone there.
(FGD, Dar es Salaam)
The quote illustrates what could be argued to potentially be a particular strength 
of the trade unions, namely the ability to go – and experience with going – 
beyond the particular local market setting. Apart from the issue of representa-
tion, TUICO also offered collateral for some of their branches to enable them 
to secure bank loans and training and seminars on different issues including on 
entrepreneurial skills.
The approach of TUICO to enrolling members from the informal economy 
is to incorporate already existing groups of informal workers as union branches. 
KAVIMCO, for example – a group of traders selling kanga and vitenge in Mchi-
kichini market – became incorporated as a TUICO branch, and all the mem-
bers enrolled as individual union members under the KAVIMCO branch, with 
around 60 active members. TUICO leaves it up to the branches to decide how 
much informal members contribute to the union, as the traditional 2 percent sal-
ary deduction is not an option for them. Although the informal economy mem-
bers do not contribute equally, all union members have equal rights in terms of 
voting and possibility to be elected to official posts.
Uhindin Street Machinga Association in Dodoma10
This association is quite illustrative of an association where members do not 
work in a designated trading space. It consists of around 70 micro-traders who 
work in the same area. There is no membership fee, but a system of contribution 
where members contribute TZS 2,000 when a member faces problems related to 
health or death in the family.
The group members previously conducted their business at the Jamatini bus 
stand where the association was also involved in dividing workspaces amongst 
the members. Some months back, they were forced to move to a new location, 
where they were still facing problems with the authorities as stated in the fol-
lowing quote:
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we have a lot of trouble from city guard who come to chase us… because 
this area is not for machinga so we are supposed to leave. For example last 
week they came to run that operation so during the whole exercise most of 
our properties are destructed.
(KII, Dodoma)
This experience illustrates common challenges for traders who work in non- 
designated spaces. Even if association leaders try to defend their members, they 
often stand powerless when facing confiscations or forced evictions.
Association focus, rules and entry barriers
The trader associations encountered in this research appear as a continuum rang-
ing from traders working in a similar location, to those which are larger and 
more robust organizations based around representation or designated trading 
locations to those belonging to a larger umbrella structure. Their focus varies 
from savings and loans over joint business activities to empowerment of women 
or on representing members towards local authorities.
Although associations vary, in general, limited size and financial resources 
means that most are vulnerable towards disruptions such as members defaulting. 
Depending on the accumulated capital and the size and general robustness of 
the association and its members, defaults might cause the association to collapse. 
Other challenges are relocation of members and mismanagement of funds by 
association leaders.
Some groups accept any member who will abide by the association rules, but 
most are either area or trade-specific. Some groups allowed women only, and 
most groups had only informal members, although a few like VIBINDO also 
had members with registered businesses.
Typically, the more financially oriented groups will require the ability to pay a 
lump-sum entry fee and the ability to save a certain amount weekly or monthly. 
Other groups focus more on reciprocal participation and contribution, for ex-
ample, to funerals, marriages, and participation in group meetings. Finally, po-
tential members must often be recommended by an existing member and are 
assessed for their financial capability and personal qualities like being trustwor-
thy and god-fearing. Hence, it is not always an option for informal traders to 
become members of a well-functioning group, as noted in the quote below:
I am currently not a member of any group because I have tried to approach 
some groups but as you know each and every group has not only its specific 
criteria for an ideal member but also specific established rules and principles 
so I failed to meet and sometimes to cope with some of those rules and 
principles.
(FGD, Dodoma)
Groups have rules for excluding members who continually fail to contribute, 
attend meetings, or repay loans on time although the criteria for exclusion will 
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vary between groups. Skinner (2008) when looking at informal traders’ organi-
zations has raised concerns about internal group dynamics and about representa-
tion by different segments. Although an in-depth analysis of internal dynamics 
within associations lies outside the scope of our research, we concur that these 
might not only be guided by the rules laid down in a constitution. Furthermore, 
the entry barriers to well-functioning groups can well make them out of reach 
for many traders, something that is important when considering access to social 
protection through associations.
Below, we discuss micro-traders’ associations using the concepts elaborated 
in the PRA which builds onto the concepts originally conceptualized by Erik 
Olin Wright of structural power (derived from a worker’s position in the eco-
nomic system) and associational power (derived from the formation of collective 
organizations of workers) (Schmalz, Ludwig & Webster, 2018). The PRA was 
conceptualized to analyse the resources available to formal workers and starts 
from the basic premise that organized labour can successfully defend its inter-
ests by collectively mobilizing different power resources (Schmalz, Ludwig & 
Webster, 2018). Nonetheless, a broad reading of the different power resources 
(as discussed in more detail in Chapter 1) provides a useful tool in comparing 
and discussing both the actual and potential extent of different forms of power 
among associations of informal micro-traders.
Associational power
Based on the sheer magnitude of micro-traders and the rich variety of associa-
tional life among them, associational power seems to be potentially highly rele-
vant. Here, the two largest associations TUICO and VIBINDO stand out with 
regard to their capabilities in representing member interest.
Brown et al. (2015), looking at the large evictions taking place in 2007, found 
VIBINDO and TUICO to have been co-opted by the establishment result-
ing in restricted ability to protect traders from eviction. Our research adds to 
this view a more varied image, where viewpoints among members range from 
seeing membership of the umbrella organizations as very useful to seeing it as 
irrelevant. Hence, our data indicate some potential in umbrella structures as 
VIBINDO and TUICO have been able to offer support to their affiliated groups 
such as access to training and representation towards the authorities. In fact, 
in most cases, where associations were found to have facilitated access for their 
members to external services (loans, training, health insurance) they were in an 
umbrella structure. However, in general, most associations worked on their own.
Institutional power
Within the PRA, institutional power derives from laws, regulations, procedures, 
and practices that regulate the relationship between worker associations and em-
ployers to facilitate social dialogue (Schmalz, Ludwig & Webster, 2018). In the 
case of informal traders, the relationship between associations and authorities 
is of key importance. Besides a few designated markets, the institutional set-up 
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at local and national level does not include representation of informal traders 
except in an ad-hoc manner. Thus, in the context of micro-trade, sources of 
institutional power could potentially be advanced by tapping into established 
tripartite structures via affiliation with trade unions (at government level) and 
more informally tapping into the access to authorities that trade unions have at 
more local levels as was the case with the bargaining committee mentioned ear-
lier. A similar potential to access the political and administrative system seemed 
to be in place for VIBINDO-affiliated associations, as observed by the leader of 
an association of coconut sellers:
Sometimes if you have a problem or any kind of challenge with the munici-
pal the leaders they (VIBINDO) can go there to present us …If you face the 
big problem you can call the VIBINDO, or come to the office to tell them 
this is too big for us please support us.
(KII, Dar es Salaam)
VIBINDO was also the only informal economy counterpart to NHIF in nego-
tiating the KIKOA scheme and hence seem to have at least some access to au-
thorities at the national level even if this is largely ad-hoc and based on personal 
connections.
Another form of institutional power is available to associations of members 
who trade in a local government-sanctioned location. Organizations which have 
control over their spaces and official government recognition for managing that 
space have legitimacy and procedures to represent their members towards market 
management (whether public or private). Registered associations, where mem-
bers do not have a sanctioned location of trading on the other hand, are threat-
ened by harassment and eviction. However, the power that comes with control 
over space is potentially time limited as a sanctioned trading place might not 
continue to be sanctioned under changing political leadership.
Societal power
Societal power arises from cooperation with other social groups and organiza-
tions (coalitional power) and from society’s support for the demands put forward 
by workers (discursive power). Among micro-traders, coalitional power is seen in 
alliances with organizations of other types of informal workers, with trade un-
ions, other civil society organizations, and with foreign or international NGOs 
and development actors. For both TUICO and VIBINDO, support from exter-
nal organizations such as foreign NGOs figured prominently.
Although the informal economy, in general, and the micro-trade sector, in 
specific, is poorly coordinated, recently, a few attempts at broader coalitions and 
cooperation between different types of associations have taken place – albeit with 
limited success (see Riisgaard, 2020). In other countries where micro-trader as-
sociations have succeeded in influencing legislative changes towards rights and 
inclusion, this has most often come about either through a change in urban 
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planning policies towards decentralization and participation (Skinner, 2008) 
or through extensive mobilization, coordination, and organization of micro- 
traders (Kumar & Singh, 2018). However, currently decentralized and inclusive 
planning has little political clout in Tanzania. Furthermore, the potential power 
that could be harnessed through the second strategy of mass-mobilization is so far 
left largely unexploited. A cause for some optimism is perhaps that the two largest 
associations TUICO and VIBINDO have signed an MOU which outlines possi-
ble areas of cooperation, although, in practice, it is yet to be implemented (KII, 
Dar es Salaam). This illustrates the recent tendency of trade unions proactively 
seeking to extend cooperation with associations of informal workers and at the 
same time extend their constituency. TUICO has, for example, joined StreetNet 
International in order to advance their representation of informal micro-traders.
Discursive power, which describes the power to successfully influence public 
discourses and public opinion, is not very strong in Tanzania as micro-traders 
are still widely seen as a nuisance and in need of formalization. However, some 
interesting processes can be observed relating to discursive power if understood 
broadly as different framings of informal traders. The favourable utterances by 
president Magufuli, for example, have, in a top-down manner, been shaping 
public discourses on micro-traders in Tanzania and might, if continued, result 
in increased societal power.
Another process relates to how the associations representing informal traders 
frame their constituency. The associations studied as part of this research ranged 
from viewing their members as workers – this was most prominent among the 
trade unions – to identifying their members as small entrepreneurs. The latter 
was prominent in VIBINDO which sees itself as a business association.
The framing has consequences for the kind of services and social protection 
that is deemed relevant for micro-traders. When framed as small businesses like 
VIBINDO does, emphasis is on issues like skill training, access to finance, and 
a conducive business environment. With regard to social insurance, emphasis 
is on tailor-made contributory schemes like the KIKOA. Social protection is 
framed largely as risk management coupled with services aimed at the business 
challenges of informal traders.
Another framing of micro-traders is as workers, as done by TUICO, in line 
with the ILO focus on decent work for all. The trade union approach in Tanza-
nia is still uncoordinated. Thus, there is no consolidated pressure from the union 
federation on the government to guarantee decent work for informal workers. At 
the individual union level, TUICO is framing informal traders as sector-specific 
workers in need of representation towards the authorities.
The micro-traders commonly considered themselves as small entrepreneurs 
or as small business owners, while across public policies, they are commonly 
considered self-employed business owners. This is in line with a focus on a 
modern market-driven economy and frames social protection in quite a mini-
malist or risk management related way. Hence focus is on contributory schemes 
and business facilitation (via formalization) and not on employment-related 
rights or union representation.
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Services offered by micro-traders’ associations
As seen from Table 6.4, the majority (63 percent) of traders belonged to an 
association that they would categorize as Sacco/Vicoba/Kikundi which means 
that it is either related to savings and loans or support for death or health-related 
issues in the family.11 About one third (30 percent) belonged to what they clas-
sify as work-related associations. As the Sacco/Vicoba/Kikundi category is not 
very differentiated, we also characterized association types based on what mem-
bers thought was the key benefit they received from being a member. As seen in 
Table 6.4, this showed a similar pattern, although 49 percent mentioned loans 
as the main benefit, whereas 16 percent mentioned social cushioning. Voice and 
representation was mentioned as one of the most important benefits in Dar es 
Salaam only.
Roever (2014), studying street traders in 10 cities, identified three issues which 
membership-based organizations help with: (1) mediation with local authorities; 
(2) information and training; and (3) resolving conflicts among traders (Roever, 
2014, p. 43). Skinner (2008), in her literature review, finds informal traders asso-
ciations to focus mainly on financial services, lobbying, and advocacy. Our find-
ings indicate that informal social insurance in case of health-related problems or 
death in the family should be added to the list.
Table 6.4  Key worker characteristics, association members
Tanzania N = 166 Dar es Salaam N 
= 74
Dodoma N = 92













105 0.63 0.48 0.54 0.50 0.71 0.46
Work-related 50 0.30 0.46 0.41 0.49 0.22 0.42
Women/youth/
religious
11 0.07 0.25 0.05 0.23 0.08 0.27
Benefit type
Work-related 49 0.30 0.46 0.34 0.48 0.26 0.44
Social cushioning 26 0.16 0.37 0.14 0.34 0.17 0.38
Voice and 
representation
10 0.06 0.24 0.14 0.34 0.00 0.00
Loans 81 0.49 0.50 0.39 0.49 0.57 0.50
Barriers (yes = 1) 83 0.5 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.50
Association fee  
(yes = 1)
124 0.75 0.44 0.77 0.42 0.73 0.45
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the project survey data.
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Table 6.4, however, shows that about half of the associations were reported to have 
barriers for joining the association. While the other half were reported not to have 
any entry barriers, nonetheless, they might still require regular cash contributions. 
In fact, 75 percent of association members had to pay a membership fee to their 
association and 40 percent were required to pay additional regular contributions.12
Most of the services offered by associations can be seen as a form of informal 
social protection. Based on the qualitative interviews, a few particular services 
stand out as being very common. Most frequently mentioned was some form of 
informal social insurance, which almost all groups offered. This was followed by 
provisions of small loans, training/knowledge sharing, and representation and 
voice. In addition to delivering actual services, some associations also provide 
access to external services such as loans, training, or health insurance.
Members had most often contacted their association for help with negotiat-
ing with authorities (see Figure 6.2). This was followed by questions regarding 
loans, savings, or contributions and help with better terms of employment or 
for work-related challenges. Asked whether contacting the association helped 
to resolve the issue, 75 percent said yes and 19 percent answered that it partly 
helped resolve the issue.
In the following, we organize our discussion of the specific services offered 
by associations via a typology of social protection elaborated by Devereux and 
Sabates-Wheeler (2004). They distinguish between four main social protection 
types: protective, preventive, promotive, and transformative. Protective meas-
ures largely overlap with social assistance and, as mentioned, are not covered 
here. Preventive measures include both formal social insurance programmes’ 
pensions, health insurance and maternity leave, and informal insurance. Promo-
tive measures function to enhance or stabilize income, consumption, and capa-
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Figure 6.2 What specific issues have you mostly contacted your association about?
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the project survey data.
Notes: N = 59.
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Contributions to cushion against unforeseen needs are very common in Tanza-
nia through different forms of collective association. All participating associa-
tions offered some form of social insurance. This ranged from one-off responses 
to specific problems to more specific insurance schemes. One FGD participant, 
for example, mentioned that their association paid an amount of money for a cae-
sarean birth but not a ‘normal’ one, while another group was noted to support 
celebratory events and minor problems. The extent of such schemes may reflect 
the financial capability of members as well as the size and robustness of the as-
sociation. Often, the constitution would detail how much was to be received for 
what. One group, for example, contributed TZS 100,000 for the death of a fa-
ther, mother, husband, wife, and children and TZS 50,000 for a niece, nephew, 
dependent, or brother-in-law (KII, Dodoma). Many groups in addition provide 
support by showing up for major events or by helping to host them.
No groups provided financial assistance for maternity unless it required hos-
pitalization, but some groups gave three-month maternity leave from group re-
sponsibilities and subscription fees.
Associations facilitating access to formal social insurance
Three of the groups from Dar es Salaam had signed up to the KIKOA scheme, 
although not all members had subsequently enrolled. Two other groups reported 
to be in the process of registration, while three associations narrated how they 
had tried to facilitate access but failed. Several participants had been told that the 
scheme was about to be reorganized, and at the time of interviews, it was unclear 
whether the KIKOA scheme was still open for registrations or even functioning. 
It later became clear that the scheme has since ceased to exist. A representative 
from the NHIF explained that the KIKOA scheme was challenged by adverse 
selection, as mainly members with medical needs enrol. This seems to have ham-
pered the roll out of the KIKOA scheme. Nonetheless, the level of interest in 
and engagement with the KIKOA scheme indicate potential in formal health 
insurance which works through informal workers associations.
Promotive measures
Loans for life contingencies or for capital
The majority of the associations offer some kind of revolving saving and loan 
function. Hence, 25 percent of the survey sample had received a loan within 
Informal traders in Tanzania 141
the last 12 months. Of these traders, 70 percent had gotten the loan from their 
associations, whereas 22 percent had received the loan from private financial 
institutions such as a bank.13
Some of the loans from associations are from the pooled monthly membership 
contributions and, in other cases, from stock buying. Depending on how much 
stock a member has bought, the member can borrow three to four times the 
value of the stocks at a small interest (5–10 percent). While association interest 
rates were considered very low, the funds available were considered insufficient 
to meet members’ demand.
In sum, it seems that loans obtained via associations are mainly used to 
smoothen income and cover life contingencies. Access to finance is arguably an 
important component of the growth of informal micro enterprises – in our sur-
vey, 92 percent of the own-account workers expressed interest in growing their 
business. However, as also noted by Brown et al. (2015), access to finance is only 
one out of many factors which inhibits growth and thus should not be seen in 
isolation from other issues such as harassment, conflict over the use of public 
space, and other insecurities.
Training, knowledge sharing, bulk buying for members, and income 
generating activities organized through the associations
Members from nine associations had participated in training provided or facili-
tated by their associations. Training was mostly on business skills such as train-
ing on business management, on how to handle a loan or practical skills such as 
how to produce items for sale such as batik fabrics or soap.
…for example tomorrow on 29th there’s a seminar. We will do it as Uwamata 
and will give trainings to entrepreneurs for those who will be willing. We 
will train on how to make handbags, peanuts and soaps making.
(KII, Dar es Salaam)
Knowledge sharing would sometimes turn into joint income-generating activi-
ties as was the case with the Amani group in Dodoma which had started out as 
a group of women helping each other with life contingencies but which had over 
time developed into undertaking various joint business activities:
So we make the batik fabrics all together and each member gets the end 
product as batik fabrics to go sell to other people. The member gets to keep 
the profit but maintains the capital for business until when we meet the 
following month is when we will make other items.
(KII, Dodoma)
Other promotive measures included associations engaging in bulk buying for 




About one out of every four associations was involved in some kind of rep-
resentation of members. The scope and limitations with regard to representation 
have already been discussed in relation to associational power above, so suffice 
to emphasize here the importance of this social protection measure for micro- 
traders, as many of the challenges they face are related to problems with the au-
thorities and the lack of recognition, representation, and voice.
One quarter of the associations was for women only. Although this in itself 
does not guarantee empowerment, sometimes, empowerment of women was an 
explicit aim. Quite often, helping women, in particular, was part of the reason 
for forming the groups in the first place. The quote below from a member of 
a women’s only group in Dodoma illustrates how participation can lessen the 
dependence on husbands:
before we use to depend on our husbands on getting money but they would 
just leave money for necessary domestic needs, if you get a very little amount 
of money that’s how you’re not able of reaching your goals, but now we have 
groups that we use to support each other, we have started our businesses, 
you can take-up a loan for business. So far now we don’t have too many 
challenges because at least we get something from our groups, unlike before 
when we depended on our husbands.
(FGD, Dodoma)
What characterizes members of associations compared to 
non-members?
Bromley (2000, p. 14, cited in Skinner, 2008) claims that street trader associ-
ations “typically represent older, established and licenced traders”. Our results 
differ somewhat, in part, because the traders we sampled were very unlikely to 
have a business licence.14 In order to examine the relations between association 
membership and key worker characteristics, we elaborate a test of means (see 
Table 6.5).
Table 6.5 indicates that association members compared to non-members are 
more likely to enrol in formal social insurance schemes, to be married, to be 
older, to be female, not to be wage-workers but have higher education, higher 
earnings, and own key assets. We note, however, that when testing these rela-
tions using a standard probit model (Riisgaard, 2020), only the variables gen-
der, marriage status, age, and earnings remain significant. Hence, we conclude 
that women are more likely than men to seek out associations, that, on average, 
members are slightly older than non-members, and married traders are more 
likely to be members. It could be that the cushioning offered by associations 
is considered more necessary by traders with family responsibilities. The aver-
age higher earnings could point towards members being slightly better off than 
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non-members although we can only speculate as to which way the causality runs. 
Along with the entry barriers discussed above, these differences should be taken 
into account when considering access to social protection through associations.
Conclusion
Public understandings of informal traders as consisting of micro-entrepreneurs, 
who should be assisted to graduate to formal businesses, have implications for 
how their access to social protection is perceived. The conceptualization of micro- 
traders as small businesses and not as workers is in sync with the understanding 
that work-related social protection does not pertain to them, even if they formal-
ize. Micro-traders and other small entrepreneurs are instead envisioned to access 
social insurance such as health insurance and pensions via contributory schemes.
While enrolment in pension schemes was almost non-existent, public health 
insurance had become more accessible with the KIKOA scheme which worked 
through informal workers own associations. Despite adverse selection problems, 
the interest in and engagement with this scheme points to potential in health 
insurance schemes tailored to informal workers associations. Our findings in-
dicated that enrolment of micro-traders in public health insurance schemes 
was not only inhibited by the cost but also lack of knowledge and complicated 
procedures. The findings furthermore indicate that formal health insurance 
mainly caters for the segment of informal traders who are already relatively 
more resilient (i.e. enrolled traders are more likely to have assets and higher 








SI enrolment 0.23 0.150 0.085 1.778*
Dar es Salaam 0.45 0.50 −0.054 −0.905
Dodoma 0.55 0.50 0.054 0.905
Gender (male = 1) 0.31 0.63 −0.326 −5.769***
Married 0.69 0.39 0.301 5.297***
Local born 0.47 0.47 0.003 0.054
Age 38.02 30.46 7.566 5.976***
Daily earnings (log mean in 
USD)*
1.49 1.26 0.230 1.775*
Assets (house and/or land) 0.53 0.26 0.272 4.765***
Primary incomplete 0.11 0.16 −0.044 −1.077
Primary complete 0.62 0.67 −0.046 −0.801
Secondary or above 0.27 0.18 0.09 1.797*
Wage-worker 0.02 0.1 −0.076 −2.784***
Own-account 0.77 0.79 −0.021 −0.413
Micro-business 0.2 0.11 0.09 2.063**
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the project survey data.
Notes: N for members = 166, N for non-members = 120. * Mean daily earnings (current USD) for 
members equals 8.7599 and 6.4969 for non-members. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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education levels). In sum, existing contributory schemes are out of reach for the 
majority of micro-traders who have low fluctuating incomes.
The understanding of informality as a transitionary state on the way to for-
malization also contributes to a general lack of recognition of micro-traders as 
a group who should have access to representation in their own right. The per-
spective of people in the informal economy is sometimes addressed in an ad-hoc 
manner, like, for example, VIBINDO being consulted on the KIKOA scheme. 
However, there are very few institutionalized spaces where informal traders can 
directly negotiate as equal social partners, for example, in the design of social 
protection policies. Hence, when President Magufuli advocated allocation of 
trading spaces and a stop to harassment of informal traders, this is a benevolent 
act of the state recognizing their economic contribution and not a result of ne-
gotiations between informal traders and authorities.
Although the informal economy, in general, and the micro-trade sector, in 
particular, is poorly coordinated, the findings show potential in greater coordi-
nation to enhance associational power. In most cases, where associations pro-
vided representation of members or facilitated access to external services such 
as loans, training, or health insurance, they were in an umbrella structure. In 
addition, a few recent attempts at broader coalitions and cooperation between 
different types of associations have taken place, perhaps pointing towards a future 
strengthening of associational power. The increasing (although still very limited) 
incorporation of associations of informal traders into trade unions has to some 
degree opened up an institutionalized space for representation and voice for in-
formal traders, albeit as part of the trade union movement in the established insti-
tutional model, and not as a group who should be represented in their own right. 
Finally, favourable statements by president Magufuli have in a top-down manner 
shaped public discourses towards a more favourable view on micro-traders, which 
could potentially be harnessed by associations to achieve increased societal power.
In general, informal trader associations in Tanzania do not have articulated 
policies on how informal traders should be represented in social dialogues or 
what a comprehensive social protection system should look like. Nonetheless, 
they all in their own way seek to answer to the challenges experienced by their 
members and provide social protection services which their members cannot 
access through the formal system.
It is clear from the discussion that informal trader associations offer a wider 
range of social protection measures than public schemes, most notably, some 
offer the much-needed transformative measure of voice and representation. In 
addition, they offer preventive measures in the form of social insurance tailored 
to the short-term cushioning needs of their members and promotive measures 
such as savings, loans, training, and joint business activities. While these meas-
ures extend only limited coverage, they nonetheless provide services which for 
most people in the informal economy are difficult or impossible to access else-
where. In addition to being based on reciprocity, informal social protection 
among micro-traders is further characterized by being personalized, trust-based, 
and timely – although also exclusionary in different ways, as entry barriers to 
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well-functioning groups can take them out of reach for more vulnerable seg-
ments of informal traders.
Overall, the findings underline the importance of taking into account the di-
versity of informal traders. Not only does their ability to contribute vary widely 
as seen by the higher occurrence of formal social insurance among traders who 
have assets and higher education – but so do social protection preferences which 
differ as women traders, for example, are more likely to prioritize membership 
of associations as compared to male traders. Along with the entry barriers dis-
cussed above, such differences should be taken into account when considering 
access to social protection through associations.
Notes
 1 The majorety of the micro-traders included in the study were own-account, but 
wage-workers and micro-enterprise owners with one or two helpers were also included.
 2 It is part of a larger research project covering informal transport, construction, and 
trade in Kenya and Tanzania.
 3 Conversion rate = 2221.58 as of 1 December 2017.
 4 See http://udadisi.blogspot.com/2018/12/is-machinga-identification-equal-to.html 
[Accessed 7 February 2019].
 5 Unless otherwise noted, the average USD rate from June 2018 to December 2018 is 
used throughout the paper. The rate was 2,284.5 TZS per USD.
 6 Note that 31 percent of all respondents possessed at least two assets, 13 percent pos-
sessed at least three assets, and 2 percent possessed at least four assets.
 7 Highest/lowest mean = 25,127/10,852; median = 10,000/5,000.
 8 Based on two interviews with VIBINDO chairman, with the chairmen of two 
VIBINDO member groups and with members participating in FGDs as well as sec-
ondary literature.
 9 Based on interviews with two TUICO officials, a former TUICO representative, rep-
resentatives from two TUICO branches and several branch members participating in 
FGDs.
 10 Based on interview with deputy chairperson.
 11 While Saccos and Vicobas are savings and loan associations registered in a specific 
way, Vikundi might offer some kind of savings and/or loan function or they might 
just offer support in case of funerals and hospitalization.
 12 The maximum amount reported was 100,000 TZS (44 USD), while the mean was 
TZS 12,210 (5 USD) and the median TZS 3,000 (1.30 USD).
 13 The remainder had received the loan from friends/relatives or from a public institution.
 14 Of the own-account and micro-firms participating in the survey, 5 percent had reg-
istered their business, 1 percent had a business licence, and 1 percent had both a 
registration and business licence.
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7 Access to social protection 
in Kenya




In Sub-Saharan Africa, micro-trading1 is the most visible form of occupation 
(Brown, 2006), accounting for an estimated 43 percent of all informal non- 
agricultural employment (Skinner, 2008). It is a source of livelihoods dominated by 
women traders (Chen, Roever & Skinner, 2016). In Kenya, the sector falls under the 
Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), a sector comprising of licensed 
and unlicensed businesses. The vast majority (93.3 percent) of the unlicensed busi-
nesses are micro, engaging less than ten employees and having an annual turnover 
of less than Kenya Shilling (KES) 50,000 or an equivalent of US dollar (USD) 
494.1.2 Of the 18 sub-sectors within the MSME sector, wholesale and retail trade 
is the largest sub-sector (62.9 percent) due to low entry barriers. The sub-sector 
accounts for more than half (53 percent) of informal employment and contributes 
about 22.8 percent to Kenya’s Gross Domestic Product (KNBS, 2016).
Despite the contribution of IWs to Kenya’s economy and to employment cre-
ation across much of SSA, research on social protection reveals that most IWs 
in Africa lack social protection (ILO, 2017). The micro-traders who are the 
focus of this chapter work under deplorable conditions (Mitullah, 2003) with-
out sanitation, social protection such as sick leave, paid leave, and maternity 
benefits. They work long hours, and their incomes are low and irregular. Their 
environment makes them vulnerable to ill health while inadequate incomes limit 
their ability to accumulate savings (and invest in assets) and to take up formal 
social protection products such as health insurance and pensions (Skinner, 2008; 
Chen, Roever & Skinner, 2016).
Recent research also reveals that micro-traders in developing cities are sub-
jected to endless harassment from city officials (Chen, Roever & Skinner, 2016). 
Scholars (Lindell, 2010) point out that several IW associations have emerged to 
articulate their grievances and claim rights to work in public spaces. However, 
the literature on IWs and on social protection gives little attention on the possible 
link between social protection and IWs associations. Social protection include all 
measures, formal and informal that seek to provide relief from deprivation such 
as resource transfers in cash or in kind (protective measures); measures that seek 
to avert deprivation such as health insurance and pensions (preventive measures); 
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measures that seek to improve real incomes and enhance capabilities such as 
credit schemes (promotive measures); and measures that seek to address issues 
of social equity and exclusion such as collective action (transformative measures) 
(Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2004). This chapter adopts Devereux and Sabates 
Wheelers (2004) framework to generate new knowledge on informal trader as-
sociations and their potential for enabling access to both formal and informal 
social protection measures in Kenya. However, it does not address protective 
measures since most IW associations do not offer this form of social protection.
This chapter uses empirical data collected from a combination of quantitative 
and qualitative methods, notably: a survey, Focus Group Discussions (FGD) and 
Key Informant Interviews (KIIs). It draws data from a survey that was conducted 
between April 2018 and December 2018 which interviewed 231 micro-traders 
in Nairobi and Kisumu. Three quarters (73.5 percent) of the survey interviews 
were sampled geographically, while the remaining quarter (26.5 percent) was 
sampled through a variety of traders’ associations. The survey covered vulnera-
ble groups of micro-traders, including traders who do not have fixed locations 
(mobile traders) and those traders without permanent or fixed structures such as 
stalls. Three types of micro-traders were identified: paid workers, own-account 
workers, and micro-enterprise owners with a maximum of two employees. The 
KIIs and FGDs were conducted between October 2018 and December 2019. A 
total of five FGDs were conducted with members of associations, while a total of 
11 KIIs were conducted with leaders of those associations.
All economic activities in Kenya, including those of IWs, are governed by 
the state. The Kenyan Constitution provides for two levels of governance: the 
national level and the county level. At the national level, national policies and 
legislation recognize the contribution of IWs to the economy. This recognition 
dates back to 1972 when the International Labour Organization (ILO) con-
ducted a study on employment and incomes in Kenya (ILO, 1972). Since 1972 
to date, several policies have been introduced to address challenges associated 
with informality. These policies use terms like ‘jua kali’3 sector, informal sector, 
small-scale sector, and SME sector to denote ‘informality’. Sessional Paper No. 
2 of 1992 on “Small Enterprise and Jua-kali Development” was a pioneer policy 
exclusive to the sector. The policy defined “small enterprise” as an enterprise 
employing between 1 and 50 employees (ROK, 1992). Later, the Sessional Paper 
No. 2 of 2005 on “Development of Micro and Small enterprises for wealth and 
employment creation” was developed to address issues that prevent micro and 
small businesses from formalizing – such as registration, taxation, and licensing 
(ROK, 2005).
The MSE Act of 2012 is the first comprehensive law that is specific on informal 
actors. It provides for MSEs and establishes structures like the Micro and Small 
Enterprise Authority (MSEA) whose main function is to govern informal actors 
as well as the MSE Fund aimed at offering affordable finance to SMEs. Informal 
workers are represented on the board of MSEA, and its structures4 provide a plat-
form for IWs to participate in the making of decisions that affect their work sites. 
Furthermore, a draft bill on Street Vendors Protection of Livelihood Bill (ROK, 
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2019) was at the Senate with the object of granting rights to traders to engage 
in micro-trading in designated areas without harassment from city officials. It 
proposes the creation of a Hawkers and Street Vendors Authority (HSVA) whose 
task will be to manage the affairs of hawkers and street traders in Kenya.
Governance of micro-trading falls directly under city authorities (Skinner, 
2008). The cities of Nairobi and Kisumu covered in this analysis are major cities 
in Kenya. Nairobi is the capital and largest city, while Kisumu, which is an inland 
port city, is the third largest urban centre. Cities, under the Urban Areas and 
Cities (UAC) Act of 2011, are to be governed and managed by County Gov-
ernments with the help of Urban Boards (NCLR, 2019). County Governments 
require all micro-traders under their jurisdiction to apply for licenses or permits 
(KNBS, 2016). Application for licenses requires micro-traders to indicate trade 
location and indicate physical address, which is not possible for mobile trad-
ers. City authorities also expect traders to renew their license every year. Yet, 
most traders operate without it (KNBS, 2016). Some scholars (Racaud, Kago & 
Owuor, 2018) argue that the policy environment in Kenya discourages traders 
from acquiring licenses because acquisition of a license does not guarantee that 
city authorities will not evict them. Racaud, Kago, and Owuor further argue 
that ambiguity in policy and practices leads to conflict between city authorities 
and traders. However, in the past few years, County Governments of Nairobi 
and Kisumu have shown more tolerance for micro-traders’ activities. For in-
stance, in Nairobi, the County government permits micro-traders to transact 
business without licenses in the Central Business District (CBD) on specific days 
or times (i.e. evenings) or at designated locations. The more tolerant atmosphere 
in Nairobi stems from the public statement issued by County Governor of Nai-
robi in 2017 abolishing collection of fees from ‘mama mbogas’ (Swahili term for 
female vegetable vendors) (DN, 2017). The Governor argued that abolishing the 
fee was a fulfilment of one of his campaign promises. In Kisumu, micro-traders 
are permitted to transact businesses on designated streets within the CBD, and 
most pay a trading fee to city officials as discussed later.
How informal workers are treated can be linked to perceptions of informal 
work by stakeholders, including the state. While there is no universally accepted 
definition or description of informality, the ILO, a global body that promotes 
the decent work agenda which includes right to social protection, describes in-
formality as all economic activities by workers and economic units that are not 
covered, or not adequately covered, by formal arrangements in law or in practice 
(ILO, 2002). In Kenya, informality tends to be understood from an enterprise 
point of view, as unlicensed or unregistered enterprises (KNBS, 2016). Infor-
mality in policy documents is referred to by terms such as informal sector, jua 
kali sector, and the SME sector (ROK, 1992, 2005). Amidst these interpreta-
tions, it was necessary to find out from micro-traders how they perceive them-
selves. Discussions with micro-traders revealed that most perceived themselves 
as informal using various phrases like “we are ‘jua kali’”, “we are harassed by 
city officials”, “we do not have a salary”, “we do not have contracts”, “we lack 
formal benefits e.g. health insurance and pensions”, among others. Evidently, 
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these quotes illustrate that the view of informality relates to location of opera-
tion, taxation, registration, condition of work, and the lack of social and legal 
protection. While the term ‘workers’ is used, it is important to note that most 
micro-traders did not perceive themselves as workers per se but as entrepreneurs 
or businesspersons. This view is also reflected in national policies that interpret 
informal traders as the self- employed and as people operating or employed in 
unlicensed or unregistered enterprises (KNBS, 2016).
The remainder of this chapter is organized in the following way: it com-
mences by a section on ‘socio-economic characteristics’ which provides a de-
tailed description of Kenyan micro-traders by focusing on demographic, social 
and economic features, and discusses key features of their work. It is followed 
by a section on ‘micro-trader challenges’ which briefly outlines the challenges 
in micro-trade to establish the need for social protection, and a section outlin-
ing the role and challenges of trader associations and provides a link between 
trader associations and formal insurance. Thereafter, a discussion section follows 
which compares members of associations with non-members and micro-traders 
enrolled in formal insurance schemes with the non-enrolled. Last, concluding 
remarks are made in conclusion section.
Socio-economic characteristics of micro-traders
Demographic characteristics have an influence on the uptake of formal insurance 
and/or enrolment in associations. Table 7.1 presents a set of worker character-
istics relevant for understanding such relations. The full sample count is 223 
workers, out of which 57 percent were sampled in Nairobi and 43 percent from 
Kisumu.
Demographic characteristics
Table 7.1 shows that almost half of micro-traders belong to an association, al-
though some belong to more than one. Region-wise, more than half of sampled 
traders in Kisumu are members of associations compared to 43 percent in Nai-
robi. In terms of formal health insurance coverage, 39 percent of micro-traders 
have either their own cover or through their spouse. Interestingly, this is higher 
than the 2015/2016 Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS), 
where 19 percent of the population, at the national level, had health insurance 
(KNBS, 2018). The dominant health insurance (93.3 percent) identified in the 
KIHBS report (also in our study as we shall see later) is the National Health 
Insurance Fund (NHIF) cover. The KIHBS report reveals urban populations as 
having a higher share of health insurance (29.2 percent) than rural populations 
(13.3 percent): the share of population with health insurance cover is even higher 
for Nairobi (40.7 percent) compared to Kisumu (27 percent). This finding seems 
to be in line with our finding on Nairobi (41 percent), but, for Kisumu, our 
findings are much lower (36 percent).
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Table 7.1 also reveals that only 27 percent are making individual contribu-
tions to formal social insurance schemes, that is, health insurance and pension, 
slightly higher in Kisumu (29 percent) compared to Nairobi (26 percent). The 
differences in contribution patterns are partly tied to incomes as discussed later. 
Women constitute 55 percent of the micro-traders, which is consistent with na-
tional results showing that a large share (60.7 percent) of unlicensed enterprises 
in wholesale and retail are owned by females (KNBS, 2016).
The average age of micro-traders is 37, most of them are married (63 per-
cent), and the majority have obtained formal education with 43 percent having 
completed secondary education. These findings are consistent with the national 
findings showing that a higher share of business operators (59.7 percent) under 
wholesale and retail had completed secondary education, followed by 30.7 per-
cent who had primary education, and 9.6 percent who had no education (KNBS, 
2016). With respect to skills, a large segment of micro-traders (75 percent) are 
self-taught, 20 percent learnt the skills while on the job, and the remaining 5 
percent attended a training course. These findings illustrate that micro-trading 
requires no specific vocational training or only a brief initiation.
Table 7.1  Key worker characteristics
All Nairobi Kisumu
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Association membership* 0.47 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.53 0.50
Formal SI (health/pension) 
enrolment
0.27 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.29 0.46
Heath insurance coverage 0.39 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.36 0.48
Gender (male = 1) 0.45 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.43 0.50
Age 36.65 10.92 36.33 11.76 37.05 9.76
Married 0.63 0.48 0.56 0.50 0.72 0.45
Local born 0.28 0.45 0.18 0.39 0.41 0.49
Mean daily earnings** (USD) 11.12 11.61 8.70 7.05 14.27 15.14
Assets (house and/or land) 0.23 0.42 0.17 0.37 0.32 0.47
Primary incomplete 0.16 0.37 0.12 0.33 0.22 0.41
Primary complete 0.40 0.49 0.44 0.50 0.35 0.48
Secondary and above 0.43 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.43 0.50
Training course 0.04 0.21 0.06 0.23 0.03 0.17
Training on-job 0.20 0.40 0.25 0.43 0.14 0.35
Training self-taught 0.75 0.43 0.70 0.46 0.82 0.38
Wageworker 0.05 0.23 0.07 0.26 0.03 0.17
Own-account 0.81 0.40 0.81 0.39 0.80 0.40
Micro-enterprise 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.33 0.16 0.37
Observations 223 126 97
Source: Author’s elaboration based on project survey data.
Notes: * figures are from the random sample where N = 164, n (Nairobi) is 96 and n (Kisumu) is 68 
** median daily earning is USD 7.4 which is often a more accurate measure of income than mean 
when SD is high. Median daily earning is USD 6.7 for Nairobi and USD 7.9 for Kisumu.
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Income and assets
Table 7.1 shows that the average daily earnings of micro-traders is USD 11; how-
ever, the median value (USD 7.4) offers a fairer representation due to some high 
earners in the sample pulling up the mean. In terms of region, Kisumu traders 
have higher incomes than Nairobi traders, and this difference is statistically sig-
nificant. Likely explanations for this difference are: (i) some food products sold 
in Kisumu such as fish are likely to fetch high returns, (ii) as mentioned earlier, 
Kisumu county government permits traders to transact businesses in designated 
commercial streets, including moving where there is human traffic (near bus 
terminus) after 5 pm and this is likely to improve profits, and (iii) the Kisumu 
sample composed of fewer wage-workers who have lower mean earnings (USD 
3.36) compared to micro-enterprise owners (USD 19.89). This difference in 
income may partly explain why the proportion of those making contributions 
to formal insurance schemes was higher in Kisumu (29 percent) than in Nairobi 
(26 percent).
In terms of assets, Table 7.1 reveals that 23 percent of workers owned a plot 
of land and/or a house. Region-wise, a higher share of Kisumu traders (32 per-
cent) own assets compared to Nairobi traders (17 percent), and this difference is 
statistically significant at the 99-percent confidence level. This is in accordance 
with Kisumu traders having higher incomes, and since assets may be used as 
collateral for loan applications, that explains the observed higher share of Ki-
sumu traders (40 percent) applying for loans compared to Nairobi traders (33 
percent).
Work-related characteristics
Table 7.1 reveals that most micro-traders (81 percent) are own-account workers, 
14 percent are micro-enterprise owners, and only 5 percent are wage-workers. 
Since access to formal insurance benefits is tied to an employment relationship 
under ILO Convention No. 102 (WIEGO, 2019), our findings suggest the need 
to rethink the design of employment-related protection since most traders are 
not in a standard employment relationship. Most traders operate informally since 
they are neither registered nor licensed. The rest of businesses are partly infor-
mal, that is, registered only or licensed, supporting the view of informality as a 
continuum and not a dualistic sector.
While Kenya seeks to formalize the informal economy through registration 
and licensing, our findings show that an overwhelming majority of the micro- 
traders (97 percent) have not applied for business registration. Since the law 
prohibits one from operating without a license, many pay a fee ranging from 
between KES 30 and KES 50 to urban authority officials to occupy their trading 
locations (54 percent), to prevent harassment (33 percent) or eviction (9 percent) 
from those locations.
In terms of region, most Kisumu traders pay official fees compared to 10 
percent of Nairobi traders as shown in Figure 7.1. Thus, the activities of traders 
are more regulated in Kisumu, whereas most of the Nairobi traders (60 percent) 
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do not pay any fees which can perhaps be partly explained by the Nairobi City 
County Government’s decision to abolish fees charged on small-scale traders as 
was noted earlier.
Reasons for engagement in micro-trade
Most micro-traders (73 percent) operated close to their homes at a distance of 
under 5 km. Analysis of distance covered by gender revealed that a higher share 
of women (79 percent) lived closer to their homes than men (65 percent). This 
indicates that women are more likely to take up jobs closer to their homes due to 
their reproductive roles, which also explains why a larger share of micro-traders 
are women.
Table 7.1 shows that Kisumu has a higher share of micro-traders who are 
locally born (41 percent) compared to Nairobi with 18 percent indicating that 
a large share of micro-traders migrated to the capital in search of employment 
opportunities. In contrast, since Kisumu city is a smaller city (with fewer em-
ployment opportunities compared to Nairobi), it is likely that those traders that 
were not born in Kisumu city migrated from rural parts of Kisumu county or 
nearby counties.
Dualists (Hart, 1973) argue that people migrating to urban areas but do not 
find formal work are likely to find employment in the informal economy. Our 
finding partly confirms this claim as noted by many micro-traders. Figure 7.2 
shows that the two main reasons were “money is good” and “I could not find 
anything to do”. On the second response, the top two reasons were “I prefer 





















Yes, official fees Yes, unofficial fees No, never
Figure 7.1 Distribution on payment of fee by city.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on project survey data.
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“I could not find anything to do” is evidence that people are getting into micro- 
trading due to lack of employment opportunities in the formal economy. The 
reasons “money is good” and “I prefer to be my own boss” lend support to 
the voluntarist school of thought (e.g. Maloney, 2004) who argue that some 
people willingly choose to work in the informal economy because they per-
ceive opportunities such as higher incomes but not because they are forced 
by circumstances. The share of those who indicated that ‘money is good’ was 
higher among micro-enterprise owners (48 percent) than own-account workers 
(31 percent) and paid workers (17 percent). This finding suggests that job satis-
faction is positively correlated with earnings since micro-enterprise owners tend 
to have higher incomes compared to own-account workers and paid workers. 
The next section outlines the challenges faced by micro-traders to establish the 
need for social protection.
Micro-traders’ challenges
Micro-traders face many challenges, which include harassment by city officials 
(24 percent), lack of shelter (22 percent), inadequate capital or high prices of raw 
materials (14 percent), reduced customers or sales (11 percent), among others 
as shown in Table 7.2. On the second challenge, problems tied to lack of shelter 
topped the list as shown in second column in Table 7.2. The harassment com-
plaint confirms the conflict between traders and city authorities highlighting 
the need for voice and representation. The challenges of heat and weather con-
ditions are tied to the nature of trading locations and legislative requirements. 
Micro-traders are prohibited from making permanent shelters forcing some to 
operate from open spaces and others to move with their wares from place to 
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0
Other
Able to earn a living
Ease of entry
Allows me to manage my households as well
little competition
It's what i trained for
I could not find work for a registered company,
with a regis
It is a good place to work
I prefer to be my own boss
It's family business
Good benefits
It's close to my home
The hours suit me
I could not find anything else to do
The money is good
1st Response 2nd Response
Figure 7.2 Why did you choose this line of business?
Source: Author’s elaboration based on project survey data.
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place. Those located along roads are predisposed to vehicle emissions which 
negatively impact on their health. These findings reveal that micro-traders are 
operating in harsh conditions, and their challenges require policy attention and 
support in terms of access to social protection.
The goal of OHS is to foster a safe work environment. However, this frame-
work has traditionally been applied to formal employment, with marginal 
attention to IWs. Most micro-traders (76 percent) have never been injured 
at their workplace or suffered from a work-related illness, while 24 percent 
reported having suffered from work-related injury or sickness, and of those, 
the majority (65 percent) were from the Nairobi region. This suggests that 
micro-trading carries little risk of personal injury from use of tools at work. 
However, some of their trade locations are prone to harassment, crime, and 
air pollution. Harassment which emanates from the conflict between traders 
and city authority officials is often violent, especially within the CBD (Racaud, 
Kago & Owuor, 2018).
Our results show that most of those who suffered from work-related injury/
sickness incurred medical expenses (42 out of 54) and of those the majority paid 
from out of pocket (28 out of 54). The rest were paid for by relatives, employer, 
and colleagues. Only a few of those who reported having suffered from work- 
related injury/sickness used health insurance cover.
Slightly above half (28 of 54) continued working despite injury or work- 
related illness. The rest stayed away from work for less than a month and only a 
few for more than a month. This finding suggests that micro-trading does not 
present serious OHS risks forcing micro-traders to abandon work, while others 
are forced to work because of lack of options.





Reduced customers/low sales 11.2 9.4
Harassment from city officials 23.8 3.6
customer debts 2.7 1.8
High prices of goods/lack of raw materials/inadequate 
capital
13.9 8.5
Competition from other vendors 5.4 3.1
Harsh weather, for example, rain, cold/no shelter 22.0 14.3
Losses due to perishable/seasonal products 10.8 4.9
Forced to close shop due to parental obligation/
sickness
1.3 –
Lack of storage facilities/no business location 1.8 4.0
No challenge 4.9 47.1
Insecurity/theft 0.4 1.8
Air pollution 0.9 0.9
Waste disposal 0.9 –
Lack/inadequate clean water – 0.9
Total (N = 223) 100.0 100.0
Source: Author’s elaboration based on project survey data.
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Micro-trader associations
This section focuses on associations formed by micro-traders with a view to 
showing if they enable access to formal and informal social protection measures.
Association landscape
Although there are many types of associations, the dominant associations 
among micro-traders are chama5 (67 percent), worker associations (22 percent), 
and others (11 percent) as shown in Table 7.3. In terms of region, Nairobi has 
a higher share of chamas (79 percent) compared to Kisumu (54 percent), and a 
significant share of worker associations are in Kisumu (31 percent) compared to 
Nairobi (14 percent).
Table 7.3 reveals that the share of association members having formal health 
insurance is higher (49 percent) compared to the sample average (39 percent in 
Table 7.1). It also reveals a higher share of association members as contributors 
to formal insurance schemes (35 percent) compared to the sample mean of 29 
percent indicating a link between belonging to associations and access to formal 
insurance. In terms of region, health insurance coverage is higher in Nairobi 
(54 percent) than in Kisumu (45 percent), and this is tied to the fact that 16.7 
percent of Nairobi traders indicated that they were under their spouse’s cover 
compared to only 9.3 percent Kisumu traders.
Table 7.3  Key worker characteristics, association members
All Nairobi Kisumu
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Formal insurance 
enrolment
0.35 0.48 0.31 0.47 0.40 0.49
Health Insurance 
coverage
0.49 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.45 0.50
Association type
Sacco/vicoba/chama 0.67 0.47 0.79 0.41 0.54 0.50
Worker association 0.22 0.42 0.14 0.35 0.31 0.47
Other association 0.11 0.31 0.07 0.26 0.15 0.36
Benefit type
Work-related 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36
Social cushioning 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.12
Voice 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.17
Loans 0.83 0.38 0.86 0.35 0.80 0.40
Barriers 0.65 0.48 0.65 0.48 0.65 0.48
Fee 0.74 0.44 0.63 0.49 0.86 0.35
Observations 136 71 65
Source: Author’s elaboration based on project survey data.
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Trader associations in Kenya can be categorized into two: grassroot level as-
sociations and umbrella associations which function either at the national or 
county level. Grassroot associations are quite small comprising at least 10 mem-
bers and mainly address issues relating to welfare of members such as sickness, 
funerals, school fee payment, and purchase of household goods and offer oppor-
tunities for savings and access to loans. On the other hand, umbrella associations 
have large membership comprising a network of grassroot associations, whose 
main role is advocacy and representation.
The next section provides brief histories of three cases of associations. The 
first case is an example of a national umbrella association playing a unique role 
of voice and representation, while the second is an example of an association 
focusing on asset creation as the basis for organizing. The last case is an example 
of a grassroot association.
Association histories
The Kenya National Alliance of Street Vendors and Informal Traders 
(KENASVIT)6 is an umbrella association formed in 2005 to represent and 
voice concerns of street vendors, hawkers, and market traders in Kenya. It brings 
together 20 urban affiliates from across the country. Its activities are guided by 
a constitution which outlines leadership structure and objects of the association. 
Its leaders are drawn from the chapters and elected for a term of four years.
The KENASVIT Chairperson sits as a member of MSEA as illustrated in 
the following quote: “…my role in the board is to advise the government on 
issues pertaining to MSE and to ‘encourage Kenyans to be entrepreneurs’” (KII, 
Nairobi).
KENASVIT has about 400,000 mostly female members. Registration for 
groups is KES 5,000, and individual members pay monthly subscription fees 
of KES 20 through their groups. KENASVIT advocates for rights of traders to 
use public space. This role is more pronounced due to regular conflicts between 
traders and city authorities. In 2014, for example, when traders in Kisumu were 
evicted from Oile market, KENASVIT leaders engaged Kisumu County offi-
cials, but their efforts did not prevent the eviction. KENSAVIT Chair noted that 
there are many competing associations of traders preventing them from having 
a unified voice. Traders tend to be more united during crises such as evictions. 
In the absence of conflict, support of umbrella associations declines as expressed 
in this quote: “…when members are being harassed, that is when they look for 
me. They will call you at any time when their businesses are being threatened. 
However, when things go back to normal, they relax”.
While protest is a common approach to defending rights, KENASVIT em-
ploys other strategies such as negotiation, as observed in this quote, “…negotia-
tion allows for give and take. You do not stand your ground”. Although traders, 
through this approach, have obtained rights to use public spaces, trading loca-
tions are not allocated to them permanently but temporary as they might be 
required to vacate if need be.
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Through networking with other trader associations, KENASVIT has been able 
to prevent eviction of traders in other areas of Kisumu. Some of KENAVIT part-
ners are local grassroot organizations (e.g. Muungano wa Wana vijiji), national 
NGOs (Pamoja Trust and Kenya Land Alliance), public agencies, for example, the 
Institute for Development Studies (IDS), MSEA, and transnational organizations, 
for example, StreetNet International, Women in Informal Employment Globaliz-
ing and Organizing (WIEGO), and Unitarian Universalist Service Committee 
(UUSC), and other international development partners (e.g. DFID and Oxfam). 
These partners play a crucial role providing financial and technical support.
Micro and Small Enterprise Leaders’ Summit (MSEL)7 was registered in 
2013 and has over 60,000 members but only 30,000 are active. Most active 
members were noted to be female (20,000). Half of MSEL members are infor-
mal traders. To become a member, a group must pay a registration fee of KES 
3,000, while an individual must pay a fee of KES 1,000. The association has 
members in all the 17 constituencies of Nairobi City County and holds election 
yearly. The term of elected officials is renewable every year. However, there is no 
limit to the number of years an official can serve in MSEL.
Prior to registration, MSEL existed as a movement. Currently, it is an umbrella 
association of groups and Community Based Organizations (CBOs). Member-
ship is open not only to groups and CBOs but also to individuals. MSEL not 
only performs the role of voice and representation but also empowers members 
economically and socially. Members comprise self-employed workers. In terms of 
gender, most of the MSEL members are women. Age-wise, MSEL is dominated 
by youth.
MSEL operates Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs)8 in each constit-
uency of Nairobi. To become a SACCO member, one must register with KES 
500. However, membership to the SACCOs is voluntary. According to MSEL 
Chairperson, the purpose of establishing SACCOs was to encourage members 
to save regularly and own assets, hence be able to access loans from financial 
institutions. Members of SACCOs contribute weekly as subscription fee to ser-
vice loans. The association had saved up to KES 30 million, which enabled it 
to access a loan of KES 25 million to buy land for building houses for SACCO 
members.
MSEL is working with other institutions at the local, national, and inter-
national level. At the international level, MSEL in collaboration with county 
government participated in one of the United Nation (UN) meetings on green 
economy to promote tree planting. At the national level, cage fish farmers partic-
ipated in the blue economy conference which took place early 2019.
MSEL also advocates for the rights of traders. It advocated for mobile traders 
to trade in Eastleigh after the business community of Eastleigh had opposed 
trade in front of their premises. This resulted in a policy providing space on 
the third floor of a commercial building for mobile traders. In addition, MSEL 
spearheaded the establishment of Eastleigh Hawkers Association (EHA).
Apindi Smart Friends (ASF)9 is a grassroot association based in Kisumu, 
established in 2013, and is registered with the Ministry of Gender, Children and 
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Social Development which registered chamas. It comprises 30 members but only 
half are active and committed to making regular contributions to the group. 
In terms of gender distribution, eight of the active members are males, while 
seven are females. The group is open to all, as expressed by the Chairperson, “…
anyone can join. We have street traders, teachers, transport workers, family and 
friends joining the group. But majority of members operate from the street and 
contribute daily fees to the County government”. The group mobilizes resources 
through savings and issues loans to members at a small interest rate. It also has 
an emergency fund which members contribute KES 50 daily and an income 
generating activity involving hiring of chairs to other groups for meetings. The 
group cushions members in case a member falls sick and is admitted to hospital 
through contributions. Each member is required to contribute KES 300, and 
very few members of the group have access to formal social protection services.
Social protection services
This section uses Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) classification of social 
protection measures as an analytical framework for understanding services of-
fered by associations and formal insurance schemes.
Preventive measures
According to Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, preventive social protection meas-
ures are measures which seek to avert deprivation. Examples of such measures 
include health insurance and pension. Services offered by the state or by associa-
tions that seek to avert financial stress attributed to eventualities such as sickness, 
death, or loss of employment fall within this category.
Access to formal social insurance:
The two main avenues for accessing health insurance and pension services of-
fered by the state are through the NHIF and the NSSF schemes. Participation of 
IWs in these schemes is voluntary, whereas, for formal workers, it is mandatory. 
In the absence of an employer, IWs must self-enrol and make monthly contri-
butions to the schemes to access services. As earlier mentioned, only 27 percent 
contributed regularly to a formal scheme and of these most contributed to a 
health insurance scheme (50 out of 61), but only a few contributed to a pension 
scheme (6 out of 61) and other insurance schemes (5 out of 61); a clear indication 
that health is a priority for traders rather than saving for retirement.
Figure 7.3 shows that the two top causes for low enrolment in formal in-
surance schemes are cost and lack of interest. This finding suggest that most 
micro-traders find it difficult to pay monthly premiums because of irregular, low 
incomes and the premium cost which is considered too high.
A probe of poor enrolment in formal insurance schemes with association 
members revealed that, for the NSSF scheme, inadequate, or lack of, informa-
tion is the main reason for poor enrolment. Most participants mistook the NSSF 
scheme to be a product for formal workers. Others noted that they had lost trust 
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in the NSSF scheme due to corruption. One informant indicated that pension 
was not a priority for them as quoted, “…we are businesspeople. We find it diffi-
cult to save for retirement when you still have stock to buy” (KII, Nairobi). This 
quote shows the pension schemes as unattractive and unsuited to micro-traders’ 
needs.
Regarding the NHIF, some indicated that the monthly premium of KES 500 
was too high, while others found the registration processes as cumbersome be-
cause it requires them to take time off from work to register which means loss 
of income. The perception of insurance as a ‘bad omen’ was also an obstacle to 
enrolment as is noted in the following quote:
…some people do not join because they believe insurance comes with a bad 
omen. There is Deputy Commissioner who is my friend who believes that 
having an insurance brings bad omen. I know a number of people who share 
the same belief.
(KII, Nairobi)
Almost all micro-traders (95 percent) knew about the NHIF scheme but not 
necessarily how it works. Interestingly, almost half (48 percent) came to know 
about the scheme from their social networks such as family, friends, and from 
their associations. This shows that social networks are a crucial channel in the 
spread of information. The rest knew about the NHIF from media (29 percent), 
interaction with NHIF officials (10 percent), or interaction with hospital staff (5 
percent) or from previous employment (8 percent).
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0 45.0
I am healthy
Low quality of the social insurance service
I have coverage through my association
Lack of Stable job/income
I prefer to save up myself
No particular reason
In the process of the registering
Procedures too complicated
No knowledge about insurance
Benefit from spouse insurance
No time / never given NHIF registration 
attention
It is too expensive
Figure 7.3 Reasons for not enrolling.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on project survey data.
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Of the 39 percent in Table 7.1 that are members of the NHIF scheme, many 
(42 out of 87) registered themselves, some (30 out of 87) registered through 
their spouse, and others (15 out of 87) registered themselves and their spouses. 
This finding shows that enrolment is not only an individual decision but also a 
social decision.
Among the non-members of NHIF scheme, a few (25 out of 136) had previ-
ously been members of the scheme. When these were asked to give reasons for 
leaving the scheme, their reasons were ‘it was too expensive’ (60 percent), ‘loss 
of formal employment’ (20 percent), disappointed with the scheme benefit (12 
percent), benefit from spouse (4 percent), and no reason (4 percent). During 
discussion with micro-traders and KIIs, this issue was probed. Box 7.1 confirms 
the above reasons:
The above quotes reveal that default decisions are influenced by factors related 
to socio-economic characteristics such as low and irregular incomes and factors 
related to service provision such as cost of premium and cumbersome proce-
dures. This suggests the need to redesign the NHIF scheme to make it attractive 
Box 7.1 Reasons for default
…I had an accident and could not pay for NHIF. I paid the fine. The 
payment of the fine of KES 250 is a problem (FGD, Kisumu).
…sometimes we wonder, what is the use of having the card? I am 
forced to pay for medicine that is worth more than KES 700, yet I 
have a card (FGD Nairobi).
…the deadline for remitting the money is 9th of every month…try 
paying (via m-pesa) on 7th or 8th, and it will not reflect in the system 
(FGD, Nairobi).
…there is no client service in public hospitals. They mistreat us. 
Nurses are very bad. The services are poor. The machines are some-
times not working. However, the private hospitals (where we pay cash) 
treat us very well (FGD, Nairobi).
…I work in town, but I have registered to access hospital where I 
live. If something happens to me in town, I must go to where I regis-
tered to receive services. If I am sick in the rural areas, I must travel to 
Nairobi to receive services (KII, Nairobi).
…it is difficult for NHIF members to change hospitals. Changes can 
only be made on the months of June and December (FGD, Nairobi).
…if you are sick and you want approval from NHIF, the process 
is hard. They take you to and fro. For MRI clearance you are sent to 
headquarters (at Upperhill) to get approval (FGD, Nairobi).
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in terms of cost and to adjust the premium payment plan to the realities of infor-
mal work characterized by low and irregular incomes and long working hours.
Informal social protection measures:
Discussions with association members revealed that most associations had set up 
structures (e.g. rules and social funds) to cushion members from risks associated 
to sickness, death, and loss of employment as is noted:
…we contribute towards welfare. If you are sick or have any problem such 
as funeral, lacking school fees. The group discusses and agrees to give you 
some money.
(FGD, Kisumu)
Members mobilized resources in forms of savings on a daily, weekly, or monthly 
basis. This practice was anchored in a group constitution and members who 
defied it were subject to some form of sanctions. Almost half of association mem-
bers (45 percent) in the survey contacted their associations to access the ser-
vices offered by the associations, mostly services related to welfare and benefits 
(92 percent). Some groups offered some form of ‘maternity leave’ to nursing 
mothers as noted by this quote, “…new mothers are given 2 months maternity 
leave which entails not attending meetings” (FGD, Kisumu). Other groups assist 
women in managing their businesses while on maternity to ensure that they have 
an income and are consistent in payment of contributions to the group. Some 
other groups of women contribute a given amount of money to take care of ex-
penses of the nursing mothers.
Although groups cushioned members during sickness, it was noted that not all 
kinds of illness were covered by groups but only those that lead to hospital admis-
sion or those that prevent members from working. Some groups could visit sick 
member at home or in hospital while others contribute to offset hospital bills on 
admission of their member. However, the assistance given to members was noted to 
be one-off hence most groups had no provision for prolonged hospital admission.
Promotive measures
Promotive social protection measures are those measures which seek to enhance 
incomes (Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2004). One can argue that services of-
fered by groups such as loans and training fall under promotive measures. Most 
of those belonging to associations (83 percent) reported savings and loans as 
the most important benefit of being in an association as shown in Table 7.3. 
The ability to issue emergency loans and flexible payment plans are some of the 
features of associations as is noted:
Recently a member lost goods and had a loan which was to be paid next 
Friday, but we extended and allowed him to pay later.
(FGD, Kisumu)
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Associations can provide loans to their members through regular savings. It is 
from this pool of savings that members can access loans at a small interest rate, 
often at 10 percent compared to Kenya bank lending rate which stood at aver-
agely 13.1 percent in 2018 (TradingEconomics, 2020). However, unlike banks 
or any other formal financial institutions which issue loans, the interest from 
loans offered by some associations is shared between members at the end of a 
certain period, as observed: “…we give loans but interest will be divided later” 
(FGD, Kisumu).
Yet, like formal institutions, late payment of loans attracts penalty or fines. 
This requirement does not discourage members from taking loans because 
income from fines is also shared amongst members. Some associations guard 
against defaulting by requiring a member requesting a loan to have a certain 
number of other members guarantee the loan.
Transformative measures
Using the Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler framework, one can argue that grass-
root associations are structured to offer preventive and promotive social protec-
tion, while umbrella associations tend to offer transformative social protection 
which relate to representation and voice. In Table 7.3, a small proportion (1.5 
percent) mentioned voice and representation as an important benefit of belong-
ing to an association. This is because association members were largely sampled 
from grassroot type of associations.
The importance of voice and representation can be seen in the context of 
conflicts between city authorities and traders. As mentioned earlier, many of 
the umbrella associations have emerged to express grievances of traders as high-
lighted below:
NISCOF was formed to reduce harassment and eviction of micro traders by 
city authorities. The Association negotiated for establishment of Muthurwa 
market for micro traders.
(FGD, Nairobi)
Although strikes are a common way to express grievances in formal employment, 
only 17 percent of micro-traders had participated in a strike/protest. Since our 
research establishes that problems relating to the work environment are substan-
tial, this finding suggests that protests may be an ineffective approach or that 
traders are employing other approaches to voice grievance. Other methods used 
to engage with the state include negotiation or soliciting help from political ac-
tors who perceive them as vote banks because of their large numbers. The main 
reason for engagement with the state is to improve their working conditions, as 
was noted in the following quote:
…we engage the County mostly on conditions of the market. Market must 
have shades and toilets. During rainy and sunny weather, traders need to 
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be protected from heat and rains. They also need to be provided with clean 
water because we cannot afford to buy water all the time. Regarding mobile 
traders, our Association has been negotiating for stoppage of harassment.
(KII, Nairobi)
Application of the power resource approach
This sub-section adopts the Power Resource Approach (PRA) as outlined in 
more detail in Chapter 1 of this book as a lens to identify power resources 
available to associations and how they are applied to achieve desired outcomes 
(Schmalz, Ludwig & Webster, 2018). Using the PRA lens, one can argue that 
micro-traders lack structural power which relates to the position of workers in 
the economic system. Structural power rests on the power to cause disruption 
(disruptive power) to such an extent that it interrupts productive use of capital. 
As mentioned, most association members (83 percent) have never participated 
in a strike or street blockage. This suggests that trader associations are not ade-
quately organized to capitalize on such power; otherwise, they would make use 
of their large numbers.
Umbrella associations command greater associational power than grassroot 
associations. This is influenced by large membership, better organization, and 
leadership structure which enable them to play the role of voice and representa-
tion more effectively. In contrast, grassroot associations are often small, and 
their basis for organizing revolves around welfare and business. They are of-
ten inward-looking with conditions which keep others from joining. This trait 
makes it difficult to network with other associations.
While umbrella associations are more inclined to command associational 
power, they are weakened by inactive participation of members which reduces 
their material resources necessary for collective engagement with other actors. 
However, resource barriers can be reduced by forming alliances with other actors 
as similar to KENASVIT which has established networks with IDS Nairobi and 
donors to access material and technical support. MSEL, although it has a strong 
financial base, is inward-looking because it is organized around the creation of 
assets for members with hardly any alliances with other trader associations.
With respect to institutional power, umbrella associations are more inclined 
to appropriate this power when they have strong associational and societal power. 
Institutional power relates to the ability to use institutions such as legislation to 
advance own interests. Kenyan legislation has recently created structures that 
provide a platform for IWs to participate in making decisions that affect micro- 
traders mentioned by the chair of KENASVIT, who is a member of the board 
of MSEA. He uses his position to advance the interests of micro-traders and 
informal workers in general.
Societal power refers to power arising from cooperation with other social 
groups and organizations. There are two sources of societal power: coalition 
power and discursive power. Coalition power refers to having networks with 
other social actors at one’s disposal and being able to activate these powers for 
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mobilization and campaigns, while discursive power is the ability to interpret or 
frame burning issues to achieve societal power. Umbrella associations possess 
more of coalition power (as opposed to discursive power), especially those with 
interaction with other actors including politicians. An example is KENAVIT 
which has made alliances with local actors, transnational trader organizations, 
donors, and the state. Through these networks, it has been able to influence pol-
icy and acquire the resources necessary for lobbying. Lindell (2010) points out 
that the alliance between KENASVIT and Kenya Land Alliance was formed to 
voice concern on access to land from which IWs derive their livelihoods.
Although relations with politicians may grant societal power to associations 
to advance own interests, this power resource is time-limited because it can only 
be tapped when politicians are in position of power (KII, Nairobi). Political alli-
ances potentially weaken group solidarity because of divergent voices within the 
group as is pointed out in following quote:
…every of our groups has a political friend. The unity that we once had 
has weakened. Politics has affected our membership. It has become a big 
problem.
(KII, Nairobi)
The above discussion shows that PRA is useful to understand how power is 
formed or utilized by associations in voice and representation. However, there is 
difficulty in extending the PRA framework to grassroot associations whose focus 
is more inward-looking on welfare and business issues. The following section 
discusses some of the challenges of trader associations.
Associations’ challenges
Trader associations face challenges of member participation which may limit 
their ability to deliver services to their members. Most associations have ‘inac-
tive’ members who do not submit regular contributions. Inactiveness is most 
pronounced among umbrella associations who have a broader mandate of ad-
vocacy and lobbying and who need resources to mobilize. Thus, when more 
members fail to contribute, it affects activities of the association unless there is 
external support from donors, as is illustrated in the following quote:
…the office was closed last year because of members were not remitting the 
subscription fees. We were unable to pay the rent.
(KII, Nairobi)
While there is power in collective engagement, sustaining solidarity between 
members or among groups is a challenge to some associations. One association 
noted that some members default on payment of loans. They choose to exit their 
association after receiving a loan (FGD, Kisumu). One informant confirmed 
that an association which he belonged to collapsed when two members took a 
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loan and disappeared (KII, Kisumu). While loan protection insurance exists – 
a type of insurance designed to cover loan repayment and protect the insured 
from default – one participant pointed out that available products in the market 
are not suited for workers in the informal economy (KII, Kisumu). The above 
discussions show that weaknesses within groups may affect the abilities of the 
groups to deliver services (including providing link to formal insurance) to their 




Most trader associations are guided by constitutions that allow them to achieve 
their objectives. Although trader associations tend to offer a wide scope of social 
protection services (compared to formal insurance schemes) that could improve 
the livelihoods and welfare of their members, Table 7.3 shows that most trader 
associations (65 percent) have rules or conditions that prevent others from be-
coming members of these associations. Membership or entry to these associ-
ations depended on the nature of work (56 percent), geographic location (19 
percent), gender (12 percent), social or family relations (5.8 percent), special 
conditions such as disability (2 percent), and others (5.9 percent).10
The findings were confirmed through observation and through discussion 
with association members and their leaders. Some associations comprised of 
women only while others were organized based on special needs, that is, persons 
with disabilities, persons suffering from HIV/AIDS, etc. Yet, others were based 
on the nature of work. Other than conditions, one can argue that member-
ship fees and regular contributions may hinder entry to associations especially if 
these are high and incomes uncertain. This lock-out because of criteria reduces 
chances of accessing social protection from associations and further exposes 
non-members to poverty and need for social assistance.
Comparison between members and non-members
This section looks at the extent to which association membership is associated 
with social protection. It uses the list of relevant variables shown in Table 7.1 
to compare association members with non-members with the object of iden-
tifying statistically significant differences between them. Table 7.4 shows that 
association members are significantly more likely to enrol or be covered by 
formal insurance schemes than non-members. As for gender, there is a higher 
share of men among non-members than among members suggesting that 
women are more likely to join associations. Association members tend to be 
older compared to non-members and are more likely to be married. In terms of 
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incomes, members of associations are more likely to have higher incomes com-
pared to non- members. This matches the finding that members are more likely 
to be micro-enterprise owners who have higher earnings, whereas non-members 
are dominantly wage-workers with lower earnings. In sum, the findings suggest 
that members of associations are more likely to be older married women who are 
micro- enterprise owners with higher earnings and more likely to enrol them-
selves and their families in formal insurance schemes.
The findings thus suggest that associations play a crucial role in the adoption of 
formal insurance among their members. Discussion with association members and 
their leaders confirms this finding. Some associations had indeed played a crucial 
role in registration of members to NHIF as evidenced in the following quote:
…All members of my group are registered for NHIF and are contributing 
KES 200 every month through the group. Every week, the group takes a 
sum of KES 7000 to the NHIF. if a member is unable to pay the KES 200 
the group takes the money from the members’ savings and pays for him or 
her. The member who is being paid for is considered to have a debt of the 
group which he or she must pay.
(FGD, Kisumu)
Table 7.4  Differences in key workers characteristics by association member status
Not Member Member Difference 
(N − U)
t-Value
Formal insurance enrolment 
(health/pension)
0.15 0.35 −0.20 −3.40***
Health Insurance coverage 0.23 0.49 −0.26 −4.05***
Nairobi 0.63 0.52 0.11 1.62
Kisumu 0.37 0.48 −0.11 −1.62
Gender (male = 1) 0.60 0.35 0.24 3.68***
Married 0.55 0.68 −0.13 −2.00**
Local 0.28 0.29 −0.01 −0.18
Age 33.16 38.88 −5.71 −3.94***
Mean daily earnings (current 
USD)
7.94 13.16 −5.21 −3.35***
Assets (house and/or land) 0.18 0.26 −0.08 −1.39
Primary incomplete 0.18 0.15 0.04 0.73
Primary complete 0.33 0.45 −0.12 −1.71*
Secondary or above 0.48 0.40 0.08 1.15
Training course 0.02 0.06 −0.04 −1.26
Training on job 0.22 0.19 0.03 0.49
Self-taught 0.76 0.75 0.01 0.15
Wageworker 0.14 0.00 0.14 4.64***
Own-account 0.84 0.79 0.05 0.96
Micro-business 0.02 0.21 −0.19 −4.14***
Observations 223
Source: Author’s elaboration based on project survey data.
Notes: *** <0.01, ** <0.05, * <0.1.
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The above quote not only shows how some associations encourage enrolment 
but also shows how a group can prevent default among their members. Apart 
from this example, there are no other cases of associations paying contributions 
for their members. Nairobi Informal Sector Confederation (NISCOF) which 
is an umbrella association made efforts to register their members in the NHIF 
scheme but experienced a challenge paying premium as a group and opted for 
each member to make their own payment.
Comparison between the enrolled and the non-enrolled  
members of formal insurance schemes
This section examines the differences between the enrolled and the non- 
enrolled members of formal SI schemes. In line with Table 7.4, Table 7.5 shows 
that there is a higher share of association members enrolled in formal insurance 
schemes compared to non-members. The formal insurance members are more 
likely to be married, of a higher age, and are more likely to belong to worker- 
related associations offering loans. They are also more likely to be better off 








Association member 0.54 0.79 −0.24 −3.40***
Sacco/vicoba/chama 0.40 0.43 −0.02 −0.34
Work related association 0.09 0.26 −0.18 −3.51***
Women/youth/religious 0.06 0.10 −0.04 −1.14
Work-related 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.25
Loans 0.44 0.67 −0.23 −3.08***
Voice and representation 0.01 0.02 −0.01 −0.72
Social cushioning 0.00 0.02 −0.02 −1.64
Nairobi 0.57 0.54 0.03 0.44
Kisumu 0.43 0.46 −0.03 −0.44
Male 0.42 0.52 −0.10 −1.40
Married 0.57 0.80 −0.24 −3.31***
Local 0.26 0.34 −0.09 −1.26
Age 35.54 39.59 −4.05 −2.50**
Mean daily earnings (current USD) 9.74 14.81 −5.07 −2.96***
Assets (house and/or land) 0.20 0.31 −0.11 −1.70*
Primary incomplete 0.19 0.10 0.09 1.57
Primary complete 0.42 0.36 0.06 0.80
Secondary or above 0.40 0.54 −0.15 −1.97**
Training course 0.04 0.07 −0.03 −0.92
Training on job 0.17 0.28 −0.11 −1.76*
Self-taught 0.79 0.66 0.13 2.09**
Wageworker 0.07 0.02 0.05 1.52
Own-account 0.84 0.72 0.12 2.00**
Micro-business 0.09 0.26 −0.17 −3.33***
Observations 223
Source: Author’s elaboration based on project survey data.
Notes: *** =0.01, ** =0.05, * =0.1.
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in terms of education, with higher incomes and assets compared to those not 
enrolled in formal insurance schemes. When it comes to employment status, 
formal insurance members are more likely to be micro-enterprise owners, while 
own-account are less likely to enrol in formal insurance schemes This is to be 
expected, as was noted earlier that micro-enterprise owners had higher mean 
daily earnings of USD 20 compared to own-account workers with a mean daily 
earning of USD 10.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the socio-economic characteristics of traders, the 
characteristics of associations including their challenges, and the extent to which 
they influence access to formal and informal social protection services. It has 
shown that many micro-traders still do not have access to health insurance and 
pensions offered by the state. It has also revealed that health cover is more im-
portant to traders than pension cover and that reasons for not signing up (or de-
faulting) are influenced by factors related to socio-economic characteristics such 
as low and irregular incomes and factors related to service provision such as cost 
of premium and cumbersome procedures. This suggests the need to redesign the 
NHIF scheme to make it attractive in terms of cost and to adjust the premium 
payment plan to the realities of informal work characterized by low and irregular 
incomes and long working hours.
The low uptake of formal insurance among IWs also begs the question of how 
non-enrolled members of formal insurance schemes cope without insurance and 
whether there are any other existing models for provision of social insurance 
to IWs. This chapter shows that trader associations have developed their own 
forms of social protection to support themselves, albeit not adequate in terms 
of meeting all needs. Using the Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler framework, this 
chapter has shown that social protection models of associations are designed to 
avert risks and shocks touching on associational life and livelihoods (preventive 
social protection), are useful in resource mobilization, as well as, in averting 
risks and shocks that threaten their livelihoods through voice and representa-
tion (transformative social protection) and through offering timely loans and 
training to members (promotive). However, these associations have weaknesses 
which affects the delivery of social protection. One main weakness of grassroot 
level associations is that most of them are small and are guided by regulations 
that restrict membership thus locking others out. Due to their small size, their 
resources are limited to meeting immediate needs.
This chapter has also shown that a higher share of association members enrols 
in formal insurance schemes than non-members. Indeed, there are some associ-
ations which enabled their members to access formal health insurance through 
provision of information and necessary support including making of regular 
payments.
Although the PRA framework reveals that there is strength in coming to-
gether to overcome challenges in the sector, this chapter has shown that most of 
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the existing grassroot associations are ‘inward-looking’ which limits them from 
forming alliances with other associations. Furthermore, umbrella associations 
are mainly driven to action in cases of conflicts between micro-traders and city 
authorities. A few cases of active engagement are made possible through support 
of external institutions and actors, including politicians who provide resources 
needed for collective organizing and technical support.
Notes
 1 Micro-trading here means activities of a person who owns or operates micro- 
enterprises with maximum employees and persons employed in such enterprises.
 2 The average USD to KES rate used throughout the chapter is KES 101.2, rate from 
June 2018 to December 2018.
 3 ‘Jua kali’ is a Swahili word meaning ‘hot sun’. The term reveals that informal activities 
are conducted in hot sun.
 4 In addition, the UAC Act establishes a Board to manage the affairs of cities and town.
 5 ‘Chama’ is Kiswahili for groups formed by individuals with common objectives pro-
viding services like loans and savings, including welfare services.
 6 This information is based on an interview with current KENASVIT Chairperson and 
with leader of Kisumu Informal Trader Economic Support (KITES).
 7 This information is derived from interview with a representative of the Association.
 8 SACCO activities are regulated under SACCO Societies Act, 2018.
 9 Information was obtained from the Chairperson of the group.
 10 On the second response, geographic location was the main condition (53.1 percent), 
followed by gender (37.1 percent), and others.
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8 Social protection and 
informal construction worker 
organizations in Tanzania
How informal worker 
organizations strive to provide 
social insurance to their members
Aloyce Gervas 
Introduction
Tanzania is on a path of moving from being a low-income to a middle-income 
country with industrialization as a key priority. During the last ten years, Tan-
zania has experienced relatively high economic growth, averaging 6–7 percent a 
year (World Bank, 2018). Among the contributors to growth, the construction 
sector has played a key role contributing 13.2 percent to GDP as of the first quar-
ter of 2019, making it the largest driver of GDP in the country (NBS, 2019). 
According to Mkenda and Aikaeli (2015), the growth of construction activities 
in Tanzania is a result of two factors, the increase of government budget allo-
cation to infrastructure development and the increase of private investors in the 
real estate business and cement production.
Most construction activities in Tanzania, as it is in other developing countries, 
remain labour-intensive requiring less technical skills, thus allowing unskilled 
and low-skilled labour to enter the sector (Wells & Jason, 2010). A substantial 
part of construction activities within the country is undertaken by informal mi-
cro and small private entrepreneurs (Wells & Jason, 2010; NBS, 2013), who are 
subcontracted to perform construction work by large contractors who bid and 
win the tenders. As a result, most workers in the construction sector in Tanzania 
are working informally on different projects from high-rise buildings to bunga-
lows, roads, and bridges, among others. Due to the nature of these activities, 
workers are subjected to various occupational risks and have very minimal or no 
social protection. As noted by Jason (2007), 95 percent of serious accidents in 
construction sites involve Informal Construction Workers (ICWs) who mostly 
perform the work without contracts or with temporary/verbal contracts, leaving 
the liability for ensuring health and safety on their shoulders.
The construction sector in Tanzania contributes to about 25–45 percent of 
all the occupational fatalities in the country (Mrema, Ngowi & Mamuya, 2015), 
and it is the leading sector in terms of fatalities with a rate of 23.7 percent. To en-
sure that workers are safe in construction sites, Tanzania has established various 
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institutional machineries that regulate the construction sector, register the con-
tractors, and provide different rules and regulations that govern construction 
activities in the country. These institutions include the Contractors Registration 
Board (CRB), the Occupational Safety and Health Agency (OSHA), and the 
Workers Compensation Fund (WCF) among others. These institutions are man-
dated to oversee the operations of different activities within the sector ensuring 
that policies, rules, and regulations are adequately followed; yet, many ICWs 
continue to operate without well-defined rights and in precarious environments 
without social protection measures (ILO, 2017).
The construction sector in Tanzania falls under the Tanzania Mines, Energy, 
Construction and Allied workers union (TAMICO) which deals with workers’ 
rights in the sector. The trade union currently serves only formal employees in 
the construction sector but is open to own-account or informal workers who 
contribute the union fees from time to time. However, TAMICO has shown 
a significant deficiency in dealing with workers in the informal sector (Jason, 
2007; Wells & Jason, 2010) since there are no employers for the informal sector 
workers and therefore making it difficult for collective bargaining. An estab-
lished construction sector union for informal workers (TAICO) was formed as 
part of a UNDP project implemented between 2002 and 2008, where a total of 
about 43 groups of informal workers joined and were expected to operate under 
the umbrella of TAMICO. However, the association collapsed after the UNDP 
funding was over, and TAMICO has not made efforts to revive the association 
(Jason, 2007).
This chapter analyzes how ICWs organize their associations, and how asso-
ciations facilitate the provision of social protection measures to their members. 
There is limited knowledge on ICWs associations, and this chapter aims at filling 
the gap as well as contributing to the body of knowledge on social protection.
Methodologically, the chapter draws on both quantitative and qualitative 
methods, and the respondents included in the study were both wage workers 
and own-account workers, employed directly by construction site managers or 
indirectly via intermediaries such as gang leaders working on large and medium 
building sites.1 The study focused on public and private buildings excluding 
residential housing sites. A total of 212 respondents across two regions (Dar es 
Salaam and Dodoma) were interviewed. However, after data cleaning, a sample 
of 205 respondents was used for analysis. As for the qualitative data, 14 key 
informants who are leaders of worker associations were interviewed, seven from 
Dar es Salaam, five from Dodoma, and two trade union leaders. In addition, 
four focus group discussions with members of worker associations involving six 
to eight people were conducted across the two regions.
Apart from this introductory part, Section two is key worker characteristics 
which provides a brief synopsis of key characteristics of respondents involved in 
the study highlighting their various characteristics such as education, age, and 
construction skills. Section three is association landscape for informal construc-
tion workers introduces the associational landscape followed by brief histories 
of associations in the study areas discussing reasons for formation, membership 
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criteria, and services offered. Section four is powers of informal construction 
workers associations that discusses various powers of associations such as asso-
ciational, institutional, societal, and structural powers. Section five is services 
offered by associations and it covers the various services offered by associations 
followed by a discussion in Section six titled access to associations where entry 
conditions, and barriers to entry are discusses. Section seven is access to formal 
social insurance and focuses on access to formal social insurance of informal 
workers, detailing those enrolled and the reasons for not enrolling followed by 
a conclusion.
Key worker characteristics
Table 8.1 presents some of the key characteristics of the 205 ICWs interviewed 
across the two geographical locations, 44 percent from Dar es Salaam and 56 per-
cent from Dodoma. Almost all workers (99 percent) were male with an average 
age of 36 years and 68 percent were married. In terms of education, 56 percent of 
the workers had completed primary education, while 23 percent had completed 
secondary education. In terms of training, 39 percent of the workers got the con-
struction skills through being self-taught, while 35 percent acquired the skills on 
the job and 26 percent attended a training course in construction skills.
Table 8.1  Key worker characteristics
All Dar Dodoma
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Member* 0.19 0.40 0.11 0.32 0.26 0.44
Social insurance enrolment 0.18 0.39 0.14 0.35 0.21 0.41
Health insurance coverage 0.17 0.38 0.12 0.33 0.21 0.41
Gender (male = 1) 0.99 0.10 0.99 0.11 0.99 0.09
Age 36.38 9.43 36.21 9.06 36.51 9.74
Married 0.68 0.47 0.63 0.48 0.72 0.45
Local born 0.40 0.49 0.26 0.44 0.52 0.50
Mean daily earnings (current 
USD)**
14.76 22.30 10.72 13.64 17.92 26.87
Assets (house and/or land) 0.50 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.57 0.50
Primary incomplete 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27
Primary complete 0.56 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.58 0.50
Secondary and above 0.37 0.48 0.40 0.49 0.34 0.48
Professional training course 0.26 0.44 0.23 0.43 0.28 0.45
Training on job 0.35 0.48 0.26 0.44 0.43 0.50
Self-taught 0.39 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.30 0.46
Wage-worker 0.32 0.47 0.40 0.49 0.26 0.44
Own-account 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50
Micro-business 0.18 0.38 0.09 0.29 0.24 0.43
Observations   205    90    115
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the project survey data.
Notes: * Based on the random sample consisting of 151 workers. ** The median wage is USD 9.0 
overall, USD 7.7 for Dar es Salaam, and USD 10.8 for Dodoma.
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Informal workers in the construction industry generally conceptualize them-
selves as both workers and businessmen, since once they are hired in big con-
struction projects, they work under an employer, but sometimes, they secure 
their own assignments and thus work as own-account. Often, employers do not 
really care about their identity but rather concentrate on their specific skills and 
how fast they can fulfil the assigned tasks. From the survey data, the majority of 
ICWs in Tanzania regard themselves as own-account workers (50 percent), while 
32 percent regard themselves as paid workers, and around 18 percent indicated 
that they were engaged in micro-business with some variations across the two 
locations.
The survey also revealed that, of all the respondents interviewed, only 19 
percent had enrolled in various forms of worker associations though this differed 
across locations with association membership being 26 percent in Dodoma and 
11 percent in Dar es Salaam. The percentile in Dodoma is higher because the 
majority are local born, and it is easier for them to organize unlike in Dar es 
Salaam where the majority have moved in to search for jobs. As for social in-
surance (SI), overall 18 percent of workers contributed to formal schemes, out 
of which 11.2 percent were contributing to a health insurance, 2.9 percent are 
contributing to a pension fund, and 3.9 percent to other kinds of insurances. In-
terestingly, the overall enrolment was higher in Dodoma at 21 percent compared 
with Dar es Salaam, where 14 percent of workers are enrolled. As discussed 
above, the difference between Dodoma and Dar es Salaam is related to place 
of domicile, as the majority of those who live in Dodoma are local born. This 
is most probably related to the existence of the Community Health Fund in 
Dodoma as discussed below. As for actual health insurance coverage, the figures 
are more or less in line with SI enrolment.
ICWs in Dar es Salaam and Dodoma have some distinctive differences. 
For instance, in terms of origin, 52 percent of the workers in Dodoma were 
local born, while in Dar es Salaam, it is lower at 26 percent. This could be 
due to rural–urban migration, where workers move from their home areas 
to the main city in search for jobs. Also, the mean income which is around 
15 USD is lower in Dar es Salaam compared to Dodoma because Dar es Sa-
laam has many construction workers competing for the same construction 
sites, and workers are willing to work on prices decided mostly by the site 
engineers and workers hardly negotiate the terms. Furthermore, the nature 
of the respondents interviewed in Dar es Salaam had more helpers who earn 
less than the masons who hire them while Dodoma had more masons who 
hire the helpers. It is also revealed that, in Dodoma, construction workers 
are few, and thus, they dominate the construction works available. Thus, the 
median wage is lower than the mean due to the right skew of the distribution 
with a few heavy earners at the top pulling up the mean. For this reason, the 
median is a more accurate measure of the general wage level. Finally, in terms 
of ownership of assets, 50 percent of the respondents had assets such as land 
or a house, slightly higher in Dodoma at 57 percent compared to 41 percent 
in Dar es Salaam.
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Associational landscape for informal construction 
workers in Tanzania
Informal construction workers (ICWs) as compared to informal workers in other 
sectors such as trade and transport in Tanzania have lower representation in as-
sociations. Data from other sectors reveal that, in trade, 34 percent are members 
of associations, while, in transport, it is 50 percent compared to 19 percent in 
construction. The notion of coming together and forming associations is some-
what a new phenomenon for the ICWs. This may partly explain the relatively low 
share of association members as revealed in the survey. Table 8.2 below provides 
insight into the types of associations ICWs belong to.
Table 8.2 shows that, in terms of association type, 22 percent of ICWs were 
in either Saccos/Vicoba or Chama, 76 percent were in worker associations, and 
2 percent in other associations such as religious, youth, and women, while, in 
benefit type, the study revealed that 54 percent were in specific work-related 
associations, for example, masonry, carpentry, or plumbers. In addition, 19 
percent receive social cushioning, and only 20 percent of the members have 
enrolled in social insurance which is average across all workers. Association 
members also receive loans, 27 percent, and 60 percent pay membership fees to 
associations.
The ICWs in Tanzania perform their construction activities very independently. 
Most workers meet at construction sites waiting to be hired independently by 
Table 8.2  Key worker characteristics, association members
All Dar Dodoma
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Social insurance 
enrolment
0.20 0.41 0.19 0.40 0.21 0.41
Health insurance 
coverage
0.22 0.41 0.22 0.42 0.21 0.41
Association type
Sacco/vicoba/chama 0.22 0.41 0.07 0.27 0.29 0.46
Worker association 0.76 0.43 0.89 0.32 0.70 0.46
Other association 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.19 0.02 0.13
Benefit type
Work-related 0.54 0.50 0.74 0.45 0.45 0.50
Social cushioning 0.19 0.40 0.07 0.27 0.25 0.44
Voice and 
representation
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Loans 0.27 0.44 0.19 0.40 0.30 0.46
Barriers 0.70 0.46 0.70 0.47 0.70 0.46
Fee 0.60 0.49 0.67 0.48 0.57 0.50
Observations    83    27    56
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the project survey data.
Informal construction workers in Tanzania 177
the site engineers. Associations in construction, therefore, have been lagging 
behind compared to other sectors.
Histories of informal construction workers associations2
To understand ICW associations, two association cases are presented to provide 
a holistic view of different types of organizations, their formation, and organ-
izing principle – including membership structure and contributions, how they 
have been able to support their initiatives, success stories or lack of, as well as the 
challenges they face. The associations are similar in some respects, but different 
along other dimensions such as how they are organized, services offered, chal-
lenges, as well as their potential for growth. In general, they are quite represent-
ative for the associations encountered in this study.
Upendo Group3
Upendo group (translated as Love group) is an association of informal construc-
tion workers which was established in 2015 in Dar es Salaam. It is an informal 
group, not yet registered but operating in the Pugu area with 42 members. 
During the research, they were in a process to apply for a license to register the 
association formally. The group was established with the intention of seeking 
job opportunities together, seeking recognition from the local authorities, and 
attracting employers such as engineers and house owners for job opportunities. 
The group has a hierarchical leadership structure, with a Chairman, Vice Chair-
man, Secretary, and Treasurer who are elected by the members every five years.
Membership to this group is open to all ICWs residing in Dar es Salaam. 
Requirements to become a member of this association include filling in the ap-
plication form and being interviewed by the Secretary and Chairman. According 
to the Chairman of the association, the group operates by the highest standards 
of Integrity, Discipline, Honesty, and Love.
Discussions revealed that the group had grown to perform various projects 
including building schools, hospitals, and dispensaries for the local government 
after getting the tender together with other informal construction workers. It 
was noted that it was the responsibility of the group members to seek for jobs 
and bring them to the group so that the group assigns workers to the different 
tasks. The Chairman revealed that other employers and site engineers approach 
the group and request for their labour.
The chairman further reported that it is the responsibility of the association 
to take care of the members when they fall into trouble. The association repre-
sents them to the authorities or when they are demanding their rights such as 
payments. Also, in case, a member is sick, or a close family member is, the group 
contributes to solve the challenge. A certain amount is drawn from the account 
depending on the balance while the remaining amount is contributed by the 
members. They do not have a limit. Cushioning mechanisms during difficult 
times is the most important achievement of the association and something that 
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the members did not think about when they first organized. Each member con-
tributes TZS 5,000 every month. Another source of income is generated from 
the work that is done; a certain percentage of the individual profit is deducted 
and retained by the association. For example, one association leader noted:
Understanding that there is potential risk of being injured while working, 
we have built a habit of putting some money as a reserve to take care of such 
situations. For example, when our fellow member suffers an injury while at 
work, we would be compelled to take care of him. So, to address that noble 
mission we decided every member to contribute TZS 10,000/= every month 
so that, when our fellow member feel unwell, we take him to the hospital 
and take care of his needs.
(KII respondent)
Although they have organized and made certain achievements, they feel that 
they are yet to be recognized properly, they cannot access external loans, per-
form larger jobs, nor have a strong voice because they are not formal.
Dodoma Construction Workers Association ‘Chama cha  
Mafundi Ujenzi Dodoma’4
This association was established in 2008 and has been operating in the Dodoma 
region for more than 11 years. Founded by four members and now with a total 
number of 11 members who are all ICWs. The association is not registered, and 
its operation relies on the availability of jobs. The association was established to 
secure jobs and work as a team to accomplish construction assignments. The as-
sociation has leaders who were appointed when it was formed, and to date, they 
have not done any election of new leaders.
Interested members pay a fee before joining, and they have a monthly contri-
bution of TZS 10,000. The association is open to all construction workers in 
Dodoma. There are no restrictions to join the association if one is a construc-
tion worker and able to perform their duties. The Chairman noted that it was 
difficult in the past to secure a job. Most workers were from different areas, and 
sometimes, the working environment was not harmonious once a job is secured. 
He further observed that the establishment of the association had improved the 
synergy of members, and there have been success stories of members working 
together, including jointly deciding how to perform the work activities and as-
sisting each other if need be.
According to the Chairman, the association represents the members towards 
the authorities when they face a challenge that requires support such as harass-
ment from the employers or authorities. They do also provide support services to 
members including loans when a member faces a challenge like a family member 
is sick or passes on.
He noted that they have been facing challenges of members moving to other 
towns and regions. This has been a reason for low membership and hindrance to 
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organizing, including inability to meet and conduct elections. The entrance fee and 
monthly contribution was also viewed by the Chairman to be a contributing factor 
to the exit of members. There are cases when construction workers do not get jobs 
at all and are unable to contribute. The association feels isolated due to informality, 
the workers are not recognized, and they feel that they do not have a place to air 
their issues to get attention. They also see opportunities to grow, but again, they do 
not have capital or capacity to borrow or buy work tools and equipment.
Overall, the association is not very active, and members are equally not active. 
It seemed that the leaders have not been very keen to attract more construction 
workers.
Powers of informal construction worker associations
The Power Resource Approach (PRA) as it has been used by researchers (Wright, 
2000; Silver, 2003; Schmalz, Ludwig & Webster, 2018) contends that, with dif-
ferent power resources (associational, structural, institutional, and societal pow-
ers), workers are able to collectively mobilize and advance their issues or interests. 
This section discusses how this framework applies in the context of ICWs.
Associational power
Associational Power entails workers in the informal sector coming together and 
forming collective organizations that address their common interests. The ICWs 
associations in Tanzania have demonstrated the presence of associational power 
in terms of coming together for common interests, infrastructural resources, 
member participation, and organizational efficiency. Although only 19 percent 
of ICWs are members of associations, during interviews, it was noted that the 
association have assisted the informal workers in various ways.
Associational power for construction associations differs a bit from the tradi-
tional understanding of associational power as discussed in the literature (e.g. 
Schmalz, Ludwig & Webster, 2018) where it is expected that the collectivizing 
of the workers would give them more bargaining power against the employers, 
for example, pressuring employers into providing social protection measures or 
salary increase. However, ICWs use association power more to tackle issues that 
directly affects them such as welfare issues and recognition by the authorities as 
well as for joint action to improve their job opportunities and increase efficiency 
and productivity.
An association such as Upendo Group has been recognized by the local gov-
ernment authorities to the extent of being awarded small government tenders 
such as building or renovation of hospitals, schools, and dispensaries. This is an 
example of organizational efficiency as shared by one of the leaders:
We were not recognized, and we got so many challenges in getting jobs, 
thus we organized with my fellows and we started a group so that it can be 
easy to be recognized and get jobs.
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The same was observed by Sinza Kijiweni Construction Group that came to-
gether and paid for an office space through a fee to the local government. Vari-
ous potential employers with construction projects come to their office location 
and hire construction workers.
The associations have also been able to facilitate various social welfare is-
sues affecting their members such as life tragedies as sickness, death, financial 
support/loans for schools’ fees. These are forms of informal social protection 
schemes that, through associational power, members have been able to access. 
They happily operate in their offices and are able to receive visitors as reflected 
in Photo 8.1 below.
Those who are operating solo in the sector must face life contingencies such 
as sickness, death, or financial difficulties by relying on other mechanisms. In a 
discussion with one leader of the Nkurabi Construction Association in Dodoma, 
the leader noted that a key strength for them was the responsibility of the asso-
ciation to stand for their members during such moments.
Representation and voice did not come out among the benefits in the survey 
for those who are members of associations. However, from some of the Focus 
Group Discussions and Key Informants, it was noted to be an important benefit. 
Some of the associations such as Keko Carpentry, Sinza Kijiweni construction 
association in Dar es Salaam through associational power, have managed to rep-
resent all the carpenters and masons among others to raise voices in demand for 
their rights including workspaces or against harassment by authorities. This is 
Photo 8.1  Members of Sinza Kijiweni Construction Group posing for the picture at their 
office location in Dar es Salaam.
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also evident in other groups, such as Msigani construction group and Mpun-
guzi construction group in Dodoma where they had both managed to represent 
members although in a very low scale such as demanding to be paid their money 
after they had worked for the local government.
Member participation has also been a key importance for the associations. It 
is evident where members have respected the association rules and regulations 
and participated in meetings organized by the leaders, such associations have 
proved to be progressive unlike those where members are not fully participating 
in the association issues. This is backed up by association leadership efficiency 
in organizing members. Examples could be drawn from Dodoma Construction 
workers, although present for over ten years, they still have few members, and 
low participation in association meetings. Upendo group on the contrary is only 
five years, but has attracted over 42 active members who are fully participating 
in association activities.
It was also interesting to note that, most of the older associations were not 
as strong as the younger associations in terms of organizing, but rather, they 
seemed to be dormant. This scenario could perhaps be associated with younger 
associations setting up with a specific purpose, whereas old ones, once the pur-
pose was met such as being known by the potential clients, the organizational 
power fizzled.
Institutional power
Institutional power is slowly coming out as an area among informal construction 
workers as some associations try to formalize the relations between the informal 
worker associations and the authorities through performing tendered govern-
ment projects. This was specific to one association (Upendo Group) where we 
see an association performing construction projects linked directly with the lo-
cal government authority. Local government authorities seem to appreciate the 
services offered by this construction association as noted by a KII:
After coming together at least we were recognized even local government 
offices recognized us. If the local government have any construction job 
such as building school, they call us, and we get paid by the government.
(KII, Dar es Salaam)
However, most of these associations are mainly for joint job seeking and welfare 
for the workers. The primary goal had not been to institutionalize their activities 
because that seems to be a dream for the future.
Structural power
For ICWs, structural power is not evident. Workers, due to the nature of their 
activities, are not able to bargain due to tightness of the labour market and qual-
ification demands of the employers prior to employment. This is also the case 
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when workers’ rights are infringed, there is little or no possibility for them to 
demand their rights. As a key informant in Dodoma explains:
Sometimes we enter into agreement with a company boss to perform a spe-
cific task, but at the end the employer decides not to pay you as agreed 
claiming that your work was substandard, sometimes you might not be paid 
at all. You decide to quit but others will continue working, we need the 
money for survival.
(KII, Dodoma)
The KII point was corroborated with the survey data. For example, when mem-
bers were asked if they had ever participated in blocking construction sites, strike 
or work stoppage, 91.6 percent said no and only 8.4 percent said yes. This sug-
gests that the associations are not yet strong in teaming up and demanding for 
their rights, although they may be using other negotiation tactics.
As noted from Keko Carpentry association and Dodoma Construction Work-
ers Association, members receive support from the groups to take care of their 
injuries after they have failed to secure their rights from the employers, instead of 
going to the employer and demanding for employment injury support.
Societal power
Regarding societal power, it is again not evident in Tanzania unlike in Kenya, 
for example, where construction associations have managed to work with NGOs 
and other international platforms. Most construction associations are inward 
looking, concentrating more on their immediate needs. Since the employment 
relation is not very transparent and the associations are not under any umbrella 
organization or trade union, they tend to take care of their issues within the 
associations.
The findings revealed that associational power seemed to be the dominant 
form of power amongst ICWs both in Dar es Salaam and Dodoma. For these 
workers, organizing meant coming together to search for jobs and cushioning 
themselves during depriving life situations.
Services offered by associations
The following section draws on the social protection framework by Devereux 
and Sabates- Wheeler (2004), as outlined in Chapter 1, focusing on preventive, 
promotive, and transformative measures.
Preventive measures
Preventive measures are a type of social protection as derived from the Sabates- 
Wheeler framework that includes formal social insurance for economically vul-
nerable groups for coverages such as health insurance and pension. This type 
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of social protection seems to be unavailable for informal construction workers 
due to the nature of their jobs. The construction sector is very hazardous, and 
workers are prone to accidents. On occupational health and safety, the findings 
from the survey revealed that at least 66.8 percent of the respondents had been 
injured or suffered an occupational illness.
Figure 8.1 shows that, of the injured workers, 69 percent had to pay for their 
medical bills, and only 14 percent of the bills were paid by an employer. There is a 
small percentage (4.4 percent) who used their insurances while others depended 
on relatives, work colleagues, and associations. Chances that the employer would 
take care of the injured person when the accident occurs to full recovery were 
very limited. This came out as a key concern of workers during the interviews. 
They noted that the employer would only give you first aid treatment or take 
part of the initial hospital bill and afterwards leave you to friends and relatives.
Safety for workers is guided by the Tanzania Occupational Safety and Health 
Act (OSHA) Number 5 of 2003 and other legal mandates such as Building and 
Construction Rules, 2015 among others. The findings from this study however 
reveal that workers are still complaining about issues regarding health and safety 
at work. The perception from workers is that most contractors (employers) are 
not concerned about their health and safety.
In terms of confinement to the law and regulations, OSHA’s definition of an 
employee, it is whoever works in the building whether on short- or long-term 
contract. OSHA, however, does not recognize people without contracts. Of 
those who perceived themselves to be paid workers, 39 percent had no contract, 
while 24 percent had informally agreed contracts, and 10 percent had contracts 
of more than six months. Those who perceived themselves to be own-account 
workers most likely offer their labour at their own risk in the construction sites 
(see Photo 8.2). The findings are also in line with a study done by Mkenda and 






Myself My insurance My employer Site manager/owner
Relative Work colleagues/gang I didn Worker Association
Figure 8.1 Responsibility of medical bills after injury.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on project survey data.
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formal firms use informal construction workers for all their projects and 76 per-
cent of all those surveyed did not sign any contracts.
All the associations covered in the research were very strong in the provision 
of preventive measures as an aspect of informal social insurance. It came out 
strongly that the associations have succeeded to cushion the members during 
difficult times, as observed by one member:
We have one hope only, and that is our associations. That is why we call our 
group, ‘Our Hope’. When we get jobs to perform, we inform our leader 
and then contribute to the association a certain percentage depending on 
the amount received but not less than TZS 5,000. This contribution is the 
one that would help me or others during difficult moments. That is how we 
assist each other.
(FGD, Dar es Salaam)
It was revealed during discussions that some members may not contribute will-
ingly to the association, but they could be the first ones to seek for help when 
in trouble. Therefore, all the associations have a mechanism in place to track the 
contributions of each member and how that member has socially engaged with 
others when they get problems. For example, Sinza construction group has a 
unique mechanism for tracking members’ contributions. Once a member gets 
a problem such as an accident resulting from work, sickness, or death of a fam-
ily member, a special book (Photo 8.3) is bought for that specific member. All 
members contribute, and their names and amount contributed are recorded in 
the book which acts as a receipt.
Photo 8.2  Dar es Salaam. A picture showing a group of informal construction workers 
working at height without any form of PPE while the site housekeeping is not 
well arranged.
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Other groups such as Ten brothers, Love group, Msigani group, and oth-
ers have one counter book, where members’ contributions are recorded. The 
amounts contributed vary from one group to another, for example, group 
members from the Nguvu Kazi and the Accident and Death Group noted the 
following:
If you have lost your beloved ones (wife, kids, father and mother) i.e. only 
these four categories of people, as a group we provide TZS 500,000 and 
every member contributes TZS 30,000 on top of that.
(FGD, Dar es Salaam)
Other associations have different mechanisms of support. It was noted that some 
associations could support any family member who has been living with a member 
for years in their household. This is different from formal SI measures which only 
Photo 8.3  Special textbook for contributing to members who got challenges from Sinza 
Construction Group, Dar es Salaam.
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apply to a certain number of named dependents. With this informal SI measure, 
the informal workers are not left to take care of life burdens individually.
It was also interesting to note that, once a member had an occupational ac-
cident and he cannot work for some time, some associations, in addition to 
covering the medical bills, would go on assisting the member by sending some 
monetary allowances every week until the member is able to resume work. This 
support is not a loan to be returned, but like a sick leave allowance as noted by 
one FGD participant (Photo 8.4):
I got an accident when I was working at height in a construction site and 
I broke my leg after falling from a scaffold, my employer never supported 
me and thus my association took the liberty of taking care of me. After I 
was released from hospital, my association continued to support me. Every 
Sunday they bring TZS 30,000 for me and my family, it is now six months.
(FGD Respondent)
However, it was noted that the ICWs associations had not been active in terms 
of facilitating members to join the formal insurance schemes. Among others, 
members noted the reasons for being in the infant stages of formation of the 
Photo 8.4  An informal construction worker who broke his hip after a work accident using 
a self-bought crutch to walk six months after he got the accident.
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associations, the associations were struggling to grow first, before they could 
embark on facilitation of such services to the members.
Promotive measures
These are measures that aim to enhance the livelihood of workers through, for 
instance, income stabilization, thus including access to micro-credits/loans/sav-
ing and opportunities for training.
Informal construction workers associations both in Dar es Salaam and 
Dodoma have been trying to implement promotive measures in a small scale. As 
presented in Figure 8.2 below, when association members were asked what they 
considered to be the most important benefit of being a member of an associa-
tion, 26.5 percent considered the opportunity to save and receive loans as the 
most important benefit of being a member of an association, while 18.1 percent 
mentioned social/financial support such as school fees, weddings, funerals, and 
sickness, and 10.8 percent each mentioned enhanced information on new jobs 
and higher income. The data indicates that quite some associations engage in 
savings, loans, and financial support and that this is considered key benefits by 
many. Since most of the construction associations are considerably young, some 
forms of promotive measures such as facilitating access to micro-credits were the 
future wishes of many of the associations.
Respondents from KIIs and FGDs considered the associations to be of benefit 
when in life emergencies. Most of the associations have saving mechanisms and 
provision of small loans with very minimal interest for the members. For exam-
ple, when in a focus group discussion, one participant responded:
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
A more secure job contract
Higher income
More stable income
Enhanced information that helps me earn more in 
the job
More safety at the workplace
Access to health and pension
Better information about alternative job offers











Figure 8.2 The most important benefit of being a member of an association.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on project survey data.
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This is very important for us, myself before coming here I came from col-
lecting a TZS 25,000 from my association because I had a family emer-
gency, and I will pay TZS 30,000 so the interest is TZS 5,000 only.
(FGD participant)
For the informal construction workers, these associations act as a very fast 
and very reliable source through which one gets financial assistance urgently. 
It was also revealed from one strong group that workers could approach the 
group and take a loan to buy properties such as land, if a member is trust-
worthy, the group provides them with a loan, and they repay with interest as 
noted below:
For example, the past six months one member asked for a loan to buy a 
piece of land, we sat and agreed on how he will repay and was given the 
money and he bought the land. That is in our constitution to help our 
members.
(KII)
Since most of informal construction workers do not get jobs every day, as con-
struction work is mostly irregular, the presence of associations makes their lives 
a bit more secure. Work in the construction sector does not necessarily require 
expert skills; thus, there are many people joining the industry to search for jobs. 
When these kinds of people join the association, they are informally trained (on 
the job training) by those who have been in the industry for years. The majority 
of these enter the construction sector as ‘helpers’, and with time, they become 
experts themselves. However, one association in Dar es Salaam that has been 
in existence for ten years would like to facilitate their members to go for for-
mal training. They believe that the construction industry is changing, and the 
younger generation (who are their members) need training in new skills so that 
they can help others.
Yes, for example, currently during the last meeting we agreed that after 
every three months one member within our group will be supported to go 
for further training at Vocational Education Training Center (VETA) or 
any other place just to increase their skills in the areas of their choice.
(KII)
Transformative measures
According to the Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) framework, transforma-
tive measures seek to address concerns of social equity and exclusion, and this in-
cludes collective action for workers’ rights among others. For the purpose of this 
research, transformative measures include voice, representation, and advocacy.
Discussions in FGDs that had a representation from many different associa-
tions as well as the KIIs showed some aspects of voice and representation. These 
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transformative measures appear not to be the most important organiz-
ing factor, perhaps because the associations are young, sector-specific and 
mostly not registered. From KIIs and FGDs, we see association leaders rep-
resenting their members in various meetings regarding tenders and other in-
frastructural development projects that are tendered by the local government 
leaders but few representations when a member faces a challenge like be-
ing in police custody or in employment negotiations. This is seen as a more 
personal issue that the associations should not be involved with. Association 
leaders agreed that it was only when the matter involved the association di-
rectly that it is taken on board. There have also been circumstances when 
the association gets a construction assignment and payments become a prob-
lem; in such cases, we see association leaders taking charge to follow up as 
narrated by one KII:
There was a manager who gave us a job but at the end he didn’t pay us when 
we completed the job, we then had to appoint representatives amongst us 
who went to the local government leaders to report so that we can be paid 
our money. It also happened once, a member of our group disappeared with 
our working tools, we also had to report to the authorities, and we got the 
support and our tools were returned. In all the situations, the authorities 
stood for us and we gained our rights.
(KII)
Access to associations
Worker characteristics by association membership
Membership to associations is commonly open to only people within the sec-
tor, as confirmed by 76 percent of the respondents who noted that, for one to 
join the association, he/she must be a construction worker. Findings regard-
ing various characteristics by association member status are presented in Table 
8.3 below which shows the comparison between members of associations and 
non-members. Discussing the key characteristics such as formal social insurance 
enrolment reveals that there is no statistical significance between being a mem-
ber or a non-member. Thus, although the incidence is higher for association 
members, membership does not seem to be a key factor for one to receive social 
insurance among ICWs. There was, however, a statistical significance in mem-
bership to association for those who lived in Dodoma as compared to Dar es 
Salaam, with only 33 percent of the members living in Dar es Salaam, compared 
with 67 percent earlier in Dodoma. The findings reflect the reality comparing 
the two locations. As seen in Table 8.1, most of the people living in Dar es Sa-
laam have migrated to Dar es Salaam from other regions, whereas Dodoma is 
still a region dominated by locally born workers. Hence, it can be that being a 
local born in a somewhat semi-urban region means that people are more likely 
to join associations.
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Membership to associations is also statistically significantly correlated with 
the age of the worker as members of associations have a slightly higher mean age 
(39 years) compared to those who are not members of associations (35 years). 
The results signify that, perhaps as one grows older, the need for associations 
becomes a crucial factor due to different factors such as family responsibilities, 
saving, and access to micro-loans which are not the most crucial needs for the 
younger people in the sector.
Furthermore, and interestingly, in terms of mean wage, those who are not 
members of association have a higher mean wage (USD 17) as compared to 
those who are members (USD 11). The reason could be that non-members are 
likely to be experienced workers working as gang leader fundi mkuu who have 
been in the job for long time or have established many connections with employ-
ers while association members are coming together forming association to search 
for jobs. This can also be explained by possession of assets, where members 
of associations are more likely to own a house and/or land compared to non- 
members. This is because members of associations have less worry on spending 
money on medical bills and other contingencies since they have opportunity for 
cushioning and loans.
Findings also shows that wage workers are more likely not to be members 
of associations, whilst own-account workers are more likely to be members, 
possibly related to the higher income earned by the latter compared with the 




Social protection enrolment 0.20 0.16 0.04 0.74
Health insurance coverage 0.22 0.14 0.08 1.45
Dodoma 0.67 0.48 0.19 2.74***
Dar 0.33 0.52 −0.19 −2.74***
Gender (male = 1) 0.98 1.00 −0.02 −1.73*
Married 0.67 0.69 −0.01 −0.21
Local 0.46 0.37 0.09 1.27
Age 39.07 34.55 4.52 3.46***
Mean daily earnings (current 
USD)*
11.22 17.17 −5.95 −1.89*
Assets (house and/or land) 0.60 0.43 0.18 2.50**
Primary incomplete 0.06 0.08 −0.02 −0.58
Primary complete 0.58 0.55 0.03 0.41
Secondary or above 0.36 0.37 −0.01 −0.11
Training course 0.31 0.22 0.09 1.48
Training on job 0.35 0.35 0.00 −0.04
Self-taught 0.34 0.43 −0.09 −1.28
Wage-worker 0.20 0.40 −0.20 −3.01***
Own-account 0.60 0.43 0.17 2.38**
Micro-business 0.19 0.16 0.03 0.53
Observations   205
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the project survey data.
Notes: <0.01***, <0.05**, <0.1*.
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former worker type. Although the distinction might not always be clear-cut, 
observation done by the researcher during the study noted that, for those who 
had worked in large construction sites (above 10 storey), the majority regarded 
themselves as wage-workers. While those members and non-members who have 
worked on medium construction sites (3 storey to 6) considered themselves to be 
own-account. The latter group of workers go to the construction sites with their 
own tools sometimes and thus feel that they are more own-account, offering 
their labour to the contractors and site engineers.
Entry conditions, engagement, and trust
As already explained, every association has different conditions to be fulfilled be-
fore being accepted as a member. For informal construction workers, the demon-
stration of commitment to membership and being active is through contribution 
to welfare funds; in some associations, this is independent from the monthly 
contributions. Some associations due to provision of micro-loans to members are 
constrained with resources when a member needs immediate financial assistance. 
In such cases, members are required to contribute from their pockets to subsi-
dize the contribution that could be provided by the association.
Honesty and good character are also among the top qualities for being ac-
cepted to be a member because associations operate on goodwill. They are yet to 
have formal mechanisms of handling issues such as having formal bank accounts. 
In some groups, one member is trusted and elected to be a treasurer and thus en-
trusted with all group finances. Such members are trusted, and that is why, it is 
a requirement of all the associations that, before being invited, a member should 
be introduced by an older member who knows them well. Other characteristics 
such as participation in groups’ activities as they arise, following the rules and 
regulations stipulated by the group or group’s constitution were also important 
factors because members consider togetherness as the key strength of their asso-
ciations. Hence, one exclusion criteria is deviation from rules as members can be 
expelled from the association if they are considered not serious.
Access to formal social insurance
Different institutional arrangements have been made available for workers in the 
informal sector to enrol in formal social insurance schemes voluntarily. How-
ever, it is evident that construction associations are not primarily geared towards 
issues regarding facilitating access to these schemes. As seen in Table 8.1, the 
survey indicated a very low enrolment rate to formal social insurances of only 18 
percent, yet with some variation by location. When looking at which parameters 
differentiate SI contributors from non-contributors, Table 8.4 reveals that those 
receiving SI are more likely to be married, locally born, have higher earnings 
and assets, and be a micro-business. Married workers have more family respon-
sibilities that might demand them to have a means of cushioning when faced by 
life challenges.
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Due to the risky nature of construction activities, one would think that most 
workers would be tempted to enrol in formal insurance schemes, or the association 
could facilitate the move to join the schemes. When asked why they do not contrib-
ute to an insurance scheme, at least 25.4 percent said that it was too expensive, while 
20.5 percent said that they had no knowledge of insurance. Others noted that the 
services were poor (11.7 percent), while about 9.3 percent said that they have never 
given National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) registration attention. There was 
also a small percentage (2.9 percent) of people who preferred to save by themselves, 
among other reasons, as reflected in Figure 8.3.
However, findings from KIs and FGDs suggest that, although workers are 
aware of the presence of these social insurance schemes and consider it to be 
important, most respondents point to the issue of irregular incomes and how to 
manage the same as a key hindrance. They also noted financial management illit-
eracy as one of the reasons for not contributing to these schemes. They therefore 






Association member 0.46 0.39 0.07 0.74
Sacco/vicoba/chama 0.05 0.10 −0.04 −0.80
Work-related association 0.41 0.29 0.12 1.43
Women/youth/religious 0.00 0.01 −0.01 −0.66
Work-related 0.30 0.20 0.09 1.26
Loans 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.02
Voice and representation 0.00 0.00 0.00
Social cushioning 0.05 0.08 −0.03 −0.60
Dodoma 0.65 0.54 0.11 1.19
Dar 0.35 0.46 −0.11 −1.19
Gender (male = 1) 1.00 0.99 0.01 0.66
Married 0.81 0.65 0.16 1.85*
Local 0.57 0.37 0.20 2.24**
Age 37.51 36.13 1.38 0.81
Mean daily earnings 
(current USD)
20.71 13.45 7.27 1.80*
Assets (house and/or 
land)
0.62 0.47 0.15 1.67*
Primary incomplete 0.00 0.09 −0.09 −1.90*
Primary complete 0.57 0.56 0.01 0.09
Secondary or above 0.43 0.35 0.08 0.93
Training course 0.27 0.26 0.01 0.18
Training on job 0.24 0.38 −0.13 −1.52
Self-taught 0.49 0.37 0.12 1.32
Wage-worker 0.32 0.32 0.00 0.03
Own-account 0.41 0.52 −0.12 −1.30
Micro-business 0.27 0.15 0.12 1.67*
Observations   205
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the project survey data.
Notes: <0.01***, <0.05**, <0.1*.
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It is too expensive
I prefer to save up myself
I am healthy/have no specific health problems
Low quality of the social insurance service
Procedures too complicated
Benefit from spouse insurance
No knowledge about insurance
No time / never given NHIF registration attention
In the process of the registering
Figure 8.3 Reasons for not contributing to an insurance.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on project survey data.
have mixed feelings as to why it is important to enrol in an insurance scheme as 
noted in in one FGD:
…The issue of insurance especially health insurance is very important, but 
we have not been educated on its importance. I think we need more educa-
tion on how we can manage our little incomes and be able to contribute. I 
think every ‘fundi’ can manage but there is little awareness of its importance.
(FGD, Dar es Salaam)
The FGD revealed the high premium costs as a key reason why workers do not 
enrol. Due to the irregularity of construction activities, workers are not sure on 
the availability of jobs and therefore scared to commit resources to insurance 
contribution as highlighted below:
For example, our incomes are not secured, you can have money today but 
stay for a month without a job, how do we manage this…
(FGD, Dar es Salaam)
However, there is also among some a very positive view on the importance of 
insurance, especially health insurance which is seen as very important. Workers 
acknowledged that when one has a health insurance for themselves and their 
families, people are able to manage their incomes to run other family needs in-
stead of spending it in hospitals.
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There is a widespread feeling that informal construction workers cannot ben-
efit from pension schemes because the schemes were designed to benefit workers 
from the formal sector only. They feel that it would be difficult for a worker in 
the informal sector to contribute to a pension fund waiting for retirement, as it 
is noted in a focus group discussion.
Pension issue is very difficult because it is mainly in companies or institu-
tions which are formal and we are informal, so it’s impossible to have it as it 
was designed and created for formal sectors.
(FGD, Dodoma)
This suggests that more intervention is needed in addressing the inadequacy 
of the schemes, but also educating the informal construction workers on how 
they can benefit by being part of the schemes. For example, when workers were 
asked to respond to how they came to know about NHIF, 48 percent responded 
through media, 19.5 percent through relatives and friends, while 12.7 percent 
responded it was through NHIF officials. The latter source is a considerably low 
percentile since the locations of the informal construction workers are known, 
and the officials could locate them easily or organize a workshop and invite them.
Conclusion
Formal social insurance interventions are an important factor that enables 
individuals to deal with life vulnerabilities around the world. Evidence from 
this study has revealed that informal construction workers in Tanzania are lag-
ging behind in accessing formal social insurance measures. There is a need for 
more comprehensive and inclusive mechanisms of enrolling ICWs in insurance 
schemes in order to address the challenges they face. Findings from this study 
have shown a considerable level of awareness of the presence of formal social in-
surance, which could be a significant entry in designing a more focused scheme 
that allows workers with unpredictable and irregular incomes to enrol and bene-
fit. Additionally, it could be a point for the officials to provide critical education 
on the benefits of social protection measures.
Informal construction workers seem to have an alternative to formal social 
insurance interventions. Some of the associations provide a strong cushioning 
mechanism which is flexible and seems to fit well with workers’ needs. This 
could explain, to some extent, the low enrolment into formal schemes. As noted, 
worker associations appreciate the availability of formal social insurances such as 
the health insurance and pension. However, there is a need for capacity building 
to association leaders to be able to formally register the associations, link up with 
the formal systems, and create favourable mechanisms that would suit the needs 
of the informal construction workers and their associations.
Informal construction workers are not able to demand rights when working 
on construction sites. Partly because of the large pool of people with the same 
skills – thus, if you are not able to work, you can easily be replaced. Serious 
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injuries and other occupational accidents have been prevalent in the sector, but 
still findings show that it is rare that the contractor, client, or site engineer takes 
full responsibility of the injured person. There has been evidence where the site 
engineer/owner/contractor have taken the initial steps such as first aid and in-
itial hospital costs, but, thereafter, it is relatives, friends, and associations that 
take the responsibility. The lack of contracts and formal agreements to hire la-
bour is also a contributory factor. Due to lack of contracts, liability is to a great 
extent removed from the hands of the so-called employers.
Associations are generally very informal, not registered, and thus lack the 
power to represent their members fully. They are organized mostly to deal with 
welfare issues such as occupational injuries and accidents, funerals, and assisting 
members on other social welfare issues as well as getting jobs. They therefore 
lack the potential power to influence decisions that would benefit or otherwise 
affect them such as being able to have a representation in the decision-making 
bodies. Moreover, the trade union (TAMICO) has not prioritized the issues of 
informal construction workers and their associations.
The government of Tanzania, through the current pension fund (NSSF), has 
established a voluntary scheme that members of the informal sector, including 
construction workers, could join, but workers in the informal sector are not en-
rolling in the scheme. The current study revealed that access to formal SI schemes 
is tedious to members. The lump-sum premium is expensive, and workers have no 
education on what the benefits are; however, there was indication that if given ed-
ucation they could join. An easier set mechanism could assist in the promotion of 
awareness, registration, and follow up of how workers in the construction sector 
could directly benefit through the established voluntary schemes.
Notes
 1 For more detail on the overall methodology, refer to Chapter 1 and Chapter 3 
appendix.
 2 There were no variations in terms of association services and activities across Dar es 
salaam and Dodoma.
 3 Based on interview with the Chairman.
 4 Based on interview with the Chairman.
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9 Construction workers in 
Kenya
Straddling with formal and 
informal social protection models
Winnie Mitullah
Introduction
The construction industry in Kenya is multi-layered with most workers working 
under sub-contractors, contractors, and clients, who are also mostly informal 
and not registered with authorities. This makes it difficult to monitor and en-
force labour laws, regulations, and standards in the sector. The workers have nei-
ther an employer who can share the cost burden that Social protection measures 
entail nor do they have rights as required by government policies, regulations, 
and standards. Most workers are hired on a short-term basis ranging from daily, a 
few days, weekly, and monthly with very few having steady employment with one 
employer for more than six months. This makes them not qualify for any worker 
benefits since they are considered casual workers. In a few cases, employers cater 
for some aspects of their social protection but without full commitment, leaving 
workers straddling between formal and informal social protection models.
Chapter 4 (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution of Kenya (ROK, 2010) guar-
antees all Kenyans’ social, economic, and cultural rights. It calls upon the state 
to provide appropriate social security to persons unable to support themselves 
and their dependents which is closely linked to other rights including the right 
to health, human dignity, reasonable working conditions, and access to justice. 
The Kenya Vision 2030 complements the Constitution with its three key pillars 
of economic, social, and political aspects (ROK, 2007). The objective of the 
social pillar is investing in the people of Kenya in order to improve the quality of 
life for all. A goal guided by the National Social Protection (NSP) policy, which 
identifies three aspects of social protection which are geared towards improv-
ing human capability, that is, social assistance (e.g. cash transfer programmes), 
and social security consisting of pensions and health insurance. These three so-
cial protection measures fall under what in the Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 
(2004) framework is called preventive and protective measures. In addition, this 
framework also includes promotive and transformative measures as discussed in 
Chapter 1 of this edited volume.
Social protection is a safety net mechanism which is crucial in building the 
human, financial, natural, and physical assets of poor people enabling them 
to grow out of poverty (Shepherd, Marcus & Barrientos, 2004). The informal 
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construction sector has many poor workers who are not entitled to most la-
bour rights provided by Kenya laws and regulations such as the Kenya Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 2007 and the Work Injury Benefit 
Act (WIBA) of 2007. The latter provides for compensation to employees for 
work-related injuries and diseases contracted in the course of employment. Un-
der WIBA, every employer is expected to compensate employees for any death 
or injury while on duty and cater for medical expenses and funeral costs. WIBA 
only insures permanent workers; yet, over 80 percent of construction workers are 
informal and are therefore not entitled to insurance.
Labour regulations, including Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) rules 
governing construction workers, have increasingly been flouted in many parts 
of the world, as formal enterprises employ casual labour or outsource their 
labour in order to avoid the costs associated with employment (Mitullah & 
Wachira, 2003; Wells, 2007). The Indian Code of Social Security, 2020 provides a 
2-percent construction levy collected by Local Authorities and credited to the 
Building and other Construction Workers Welfare Fund (COSS, 2020). This is 
aimed at cushioning any construction worker who works continually for three 
months so long as they are registered with the Construction Workers Welfare 
Board provided by the Code. By levying a fee on construction industry, social 
protection schemes can be designed to reach specific occupational groups in the 
informal sector. While these are good proposals, realizing them is a challenge 
considering that many workers are informally employed by informal labour con-
tractors and have weak agency and organizational power, as discussed in this 
chapter. The Indian Code acknowledges this and provides for portability across 
states, those who work continually for three months, and social protection after 
leaving work so long as one has been in employment for three years.
The chapter explores how construction workers are organized, how worker 
associations contribute to labour agency and social protection, and the role 
played by formal institutions and institutional structures in strengthening or 
undermining workers organizing. First, the chapter outlines the characteristics 
of construction workers and examines the associational landscape using selected 
associations. An analysis of how the power resource approach (PRA; Schmalz, 
Ludwig & Webster, 2018) applies to the sector and how preventive, promotive, 
and transformative services are offered by workers’ associations follows. These 
subsections set the ground for a discussion on access to associations highlighting 
entry requirements, comparison of association member status, access to social 
protection, and finally, a conclusion.
The chapter is informed by data drawn from a larger study of informal econ-
omy worker organizations and social protection covering Kenya and Tanzania 
(see Chapter 1 of this edited volume for details). In this chapter, the cities 
of Nairobi and Kisumu in Kenya are used as case studies. A combination of 
quantitative and qualitative research methods was used to gather information 
from construction workers and their associations. A partly random survey of 
221 construction workers in the two sites was carried out between June and 
December 2018. This included workers sampled using geographical location 
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(75 percent) and membership in associations (25 percent). In Nairobi, a geo-
graphical (random) sample of 94 workers and 29 from associations yielded a to-
tal sample of 123 workers (55.7 percent). In Kisumu, a geographical (random) 
sample of 76 and association membership of 22 provided a total sample of 98 
(44.3 percent) workers (Table 9.1). In order to achieve the geographical sample, 
constituencies and wards in each of the two cities were mapped to identify the 
ongoing construction work in commercial buildings. In addition, Focus Group 
Discussions (FGDs) and Key Informant Interviews (KII) were used to gather 
information.
Characteristics of construction workers
The summary of key worker statistics (Table 9.1) reveals that the construction 
sector is dominated by married (79 percent), male (90 percent), and wage work-
ers (95 percent) with a mean age of 36 years. The majority of workers had com-
pleted secondary education, had different forms of training which included a 
high percentage of training on the job (48 percent), professional training (28 
percent), and self-taught (17 percent). The sector is not strong in associational 
life based on random sample showing 33 percent compared to trade and trans-
port sector which had 47 percent and 57 percent, respectively.
Table 9.1  Key worker characteristics
All Nairobi Kisumu
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Member* 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47
Formal social insurance enrolment 
(health/pension)
0.30 0.46 0.33 0.47 0.26 0.44
Health Insurance coverage 0.35 0.48 0.37 0.48 0.34 0.48
Gender (male = 1) 0.90 0.29 0.91 0.29 0.90 0.30
Age 35.77 9.42 35.89 10.20 35.63 8.39
Married 0.79 0.41 0.78 0.42 0.80 0.41
Local born 0.22 0.42 0.11 0.31 0.37 0.48
Mean daily earnings (current USD)** 10.81 8.70 11.70 8.27 9.70 9.13
Assets (house and/or land) 0.29 0.46 0.31 0.46 0.28 0.45
Primary incomplete 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.28
Primary complete 0.39 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.37 0.48
Secondary and above 0.54 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.55 0.50
Professional training course 0.35 0.48 0.34 0.48 0.36 0.48
Training on job 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50
Self-taught 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.38 0.16 0.37
Wage-worker 0.95 0.23 0.93 0.25 0.96 0.20
Own-account 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.14
Micro-business 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.14
Observations 221 123 98
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the project survey data.
Notes: * Based on the random sample consisting of 170 workers. ** The median wage is USD 9.4 
cent overall, USD 9.9 for Nairobi and USD 8.7 for Kisumu.
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Around a third (30 percent) are enrolled in formal social insurance (SI), which 
could be the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) or the National Social 
Security Fund (NSSF) or both, with the majority (18 percent) referring to the 
former. The median wage is USD 9.41 which is lower than the mean due to 
income disparities among construction workers with a few heavy earners at the 
top pulling up the mean. The income of those who are members of associations 
is higher (Table 9.2) which partly demonstrates that membership to associations 
is beneficial. Associations assist members to find jobs, cushion members during 
difficult times such as bereavement, and also give loans, some of which are used 
for boosting income. These issues were largely similar in Kisumu and Nairobi 
except for SI enrolment which is higher in Nairobi and local born which is higher 
in Kisumu, while wage is lower. Most Kisumu workers are born within the re-
gion and are likely to have additional social cushioning from their communities, 
a provision which is not available to Nairobi construction workers who come 
from across Kenya.
Working in the construction sector has challenges and threats, which are 
largely related to informality manifested in the lack of legal contracts. Survey re-
sponses on whether workers prefer contracts specifying pay and benefits yielded 
mixed responses, with many noting that availability of contracts would protect 
them from non-payment of dues, while a few others prefer being their own 
bosses with daily payment. Overall, the majority want job security and assurance 
of benefits, while others prefer working without a contract for flexibility. These 
findings were further corroborated in FGDs with some workers noting that, 
if given a chance, they would advance their work, earn more income, and buy 
assets.
Associational landscape
This sub-section provides an overview of construction workers’ associations 
including a brief on selected associations highlighting the different forms of 
associations, how associations are organized, and the services provided to mem-
bers. This is followed by reflections on how the PRA applies to the construction 
sector.
Overview of associations
Construction associations provide several benefits to members of which oppor-
tunity to save and receive loans (39 percent) and work-related (50 percent), in-
cluding information on employment opportunities (31 percent) (Table 9.2), are 
the main attractions for joining associations. They play a central role in pro-
viding opportunity to save and receive loans, linking members to employment 
opportunities and contacts for jobs as elaborated by a key informant from the 
Labour Link association (Box 9.1).
Other benefits of being a member of a worker association such as safety at 
workplace, stable income, and protection against harassment are secondary. The 
Informal construction workers in Kenya 201
findings reveal that associations are very good at supporting members in getting 
jobs but generally weak in aspects such as ensuring secure contracts, access to 
health and pension, and higher incomes. As seen earlier, based on the random 
sample, only 33 percent of construction workers belong to associations, which 
are largely work-related associations.
An examination of workers who are association members revealed that 53, 
40, and 7 percent, respectively, belonged to work-related associations, SAC-
COs, and other associations (Table 9.2). Thirty-six percent were registered in 
SI schemes showing a higher incidence of SI among members of associations 
Box 9.1 Associations as a link to employment
We can be contracted by clients as far as Nairobi. I always try to convince 
the client that I am a painter. We do not strain ourselves looking for cli-
ents. Within the Labour Link Network, we have worked for big hotels 
such as Acacia, United Mall, and Sunset. When our clients have work, 
I am the one who does it … we have bought tools, we do not hire tools 
anymore. We sit down and agree what percentage of the money we receive 
from contracts done will go to buying tools – we are like a family, we sup-
port one another. Once we get a contract, we get our people, and if they 
are not enough, we hire others in the places where we have gotten the job 
(KII, Kisumu).
Table 9.2  Key worker characteristics, association members
All Nairobi Kisumu
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Formal social insurance enrolment 
(health/pension)
0.36 0.48 0.37 0.49 0.34 0.48
Health insurance coverage 0.39 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.38 0.49
Association type
Sacco/vicoba/chama 0.40 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.43 0.50
Work-related association 0.53 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.51 0.51
Other association 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.25
Benefit type
Work-related 0.50 0.50 0.63 0.49 0.32 0.47
Social cushioning 0.10 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.43
Voice and representation 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.00
Loans 0.39 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.45 0.50
Barriers 0.64 0.48 0.60 0.49 0.70 0.46
Fee 0.73 0.45 0.58 0.50 0.91 0.28
Observations 107 60 47
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the project survey data.
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compared with the full sample of construction workers. The association mem-
bers had a health insurance coverage of (39 percent), with a standard deviation 
of 0.49. Voice and representation which falls under transformative social pro-
tection was hardly visible in the survey and hardly mentioned in FGDs and KII 
discussions.
Highlights of selected associations
Associations in the construction sector take different forms which include reg-
istered associations, loose2 unregistered networks, cooperative societies, and 
companies. These associations have rules for entry including subscription re-
quirement and support construction workers in looking for employment oppor-
tunities and welfare needs as discussed below.
Labour Link, established in 2012, is a loose group based in Kisumu. It is 
composed of five core leaders, each with specific construction sector skill sets 
who rally individuals with similar skill sets to form work cohorts. Formation of 
these cohorts enables the group to easily interact, call each other when there is 
work, and compete for jobs. The group has 20 members who take piecework 
assignments moving from one assignment to another, and in cases of more jobs, 
they invite others. The five leaders come from one village, but those operating 
under their clusters do not necessarily come from their respective villages.
The network has assisted members to buy tools and develop their skills, as 
noted by one of the group leaders, “we can do paper walling in a professional 
manner and we get called for jobs in big commercial projects”. They listed sev-
eral well-known commercial buildings in Kisumu, in which they have been em-
ployed to handle different aspects such as painting and fittings. Whenever they 
get a contract, they agree on the percentage to be deducted and invested in 
buying tools for the group.
Despite the activeness of the group, it is not registered, and there is no mem-
bership fee. There was an attempt to register the group, but it did not work, 
largely because of loan repayment defaulters. The group was running a SACCO 
with members taking loans and not paying back. The poor experience with loan 
repayment resulted in the decision of the group to remain informal and only 
assist each other in social needs and in getting jobs.
Migosi Friendly Workers Group in Kisumu, established in 1994, has an 
investment arm called Migosi Builders, established in 2008. In both FGDs and 
in KII with the chairman, it was noted that the association is very useful in as-
sisting members to get jobs, certification, and negotiation with employers. The 
friendly group has 140 members, while the builders have 42 members, 4 are 
women. The workers’ group which is largely composed of masons and three 
certified electricians is registered with the Department for Social Services. The 
membership has kept increasing since it is difficult to get a job in the construc-
tion sector when one is not in a group. The group is well organized with clear 
procedures of rotational recruitment and governance, although the incumbent 
leaders had been re-elected four times.
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The group enrols new members including standard eight primary school 
drop-outs. They join as helpers and progress to become masons. Members pay a 
registration of KES 200, and once registered, members pay weekly share contri-
butions of KES 500, while those in the investment arm register with KES 2000 
and pay monthly fees of KES 800. Membership is open to any construction 
worker referred by a member. A copy of national identification card, physical 
contact, and name of area chief is mandatory. It was emphasized by an official 
of the association that these requirements are necessary as a point of reference 
since not all individuals have a good reputation. The association provides a con-
tact point for professional construction workers, upcoming workers, and young 
school leavers willing to work in the industry. The association also gives workers 
opportunity to operate, assists members to acquire certification, in negotiation, 
including intervening when disagreement occurs or contracts are breached by 
clients. In cases where negotiation has failed, one is free to go to the government 
authorities.
The association applies group dynamics to access rights. An example was given 
in which group members teamed up to demand payment for unpaid dues of 
workers, to quote a respondent, “one day, I found a gang baying for the cli-
ent’s blood with pangas (machetes) because some team members had not been 
paid”. A probe into payment modes and challenges revealed that, in some cases, 
contractors are not paid by their clients, in particular, government who takes 
long to pay. In such cases, associations intervene through the leadership, which 
encourage members of the group to report to the leadership whenever there are 
conflicts, including non-payment of dues, instead of taking punitive measures on 
the contractors and clients.
Chama Cha Mafundi is a semi-structured non-registered loose network of 
68 members established in 2003 whose contact (waiting point) designated loca-
tion is on a street in Nairobi – Moi Avenue within the Central Business District 
(CBD). At the time of research, only 20 members were active. The group reports 
to the open space every day, and clients come and procure their labour. The 
network has a constitution specifying rules and regulations for members. Each 
member deposits KES 200 (USD 2) to the association whenever they secure a 
job. Group members know each other well, and each person is obliged to be hon-
est and contribute to the group kitty which is mainly used for welfare. Members 
are free to borrow from the kitty in case of serious needs.
Membership fee is KES 1,000 (USD 10), and new members must be intro-
duced, and if they do not have the amount, the one introducing them can pay 
on their behalf. Membership is open to all in the construction sector. The asso-
ciation puts emphasis on integrity and does not entertain dishonesty in construc-
tion sites or off-site. An official of the association noted that this is stipulated 
in the constitution which guides members on their daily operations. Members 
engage in building, renovation, and repair work and are willing to take jobs an-
ywhere within and outside the city of Nairobi.
There are many benefits of being a member, with welfare being the major 
one. They support each other in sickness and undertake fund-raising for school 
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fees and to pay fines when a member is arrested for what they consider to be 
unavoidable such as working on unlicensed sites. They also advise members to 
ensure that clients have a license for construction, especially within the CBD and 
commercial areas to avoid problems with the city authority. However, the group 
seemed more relaxed with individual clients as opposed to corporate clients. The 
group also provides a link to employers and advises members on what to demand 
from clients, for example, toilet facilities if work lasts more than three weeks.
The association was previously giving loans to members, but the activity col-
lapsed when the group had raised capital amounting to KES 680,000. Some 
members borrowed but never paid. In 2018, the group decided to stop the sav-
ings scheme and share the money among members in line with their shares. 
The group was considering rallying members once again to get back to saving, 
but were concerned about some conservative members, especially old guards – 
largely painters who were the founders of the association. They were noted to 
lack innovation and not interested in advancing associational activities such as 
development of SACCOs.
The group members are supportive of each other, occasionally assist members 
to negotiate with clients. Their meetings every two weeks revolve around issues 
of relationship with their clients and employers. Welfare is hardly discussed but 
handled on case-by-case basis, and members are largely ignorant of the impor-
tance of associations, to quote, “members want jobs and that is all, and not 
discussion of associational issues”. This had also contributed to poor attendance 
of association meetings, which hardly attract half of the membership, and the 
association has not recorded any significant changes in 14 years of operation. 
The meeting and recruitment base have been operational for over 30 years and 
had the potential of developing a strong network of construction workers, but 
remain fragile and not effective in addressing labour rights issues.
Three active members of Chama Cha Mafundi had established and registered 
a company with the National Construction Authority (NCA). The three decided 
to go a notch higher to promote their construction work. The establishment of 
the company was driven by the challenges of getting jobs as individuals. One of 
the proprietors had left the association for work with a company, came back, re-
joined the group, and established a company. This shows the synergy between 
informal and formal work and the influence interaction with one sector has on 
the other. However, this synergy has not directly benefited the association but 
only a few individuals. This could probably be explained by the laid-back nature 
of the association and its inability to advance the interests of members. This not-
withstanding, entrepreneurial individuals can leverage associational platforms to 
advance their opportunities as done by these three members.
FundiTech Services Cooperative Society in Nairobi was registered in 2017 
with a vision of being a leading workers’ cooperative for professional techni-
cal services in Kenya. The cooperative originally began in 2007 as a welfare 
group under the name Mafundi wa Kenya (MWAKA) association with a main 
goal of providing work-related information for fundis (masons) and technicians. 
Many approached the association for information but were not willing to join 
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the group. This triggered the group to think of how to attract membership by 
undertaking activities that benefit the members. A meeting with USAID advised 
the group to convert the association into a cooperative, opening the pathway for 
the group.
The cooperative has a total of 107 members, of which 15 are women, about 30 
percent of these members are formally trained while 70 percent are not formally 
trained. Members have varied skills, including masonry, electrical, welding and 
fabrication, tile fixing, steel fixing, plumbing, and painting. Discussions with the 
secretariat of the cooperative revealed that skills are wanting even for those who 
are formally trained. Membership requirements include being a technician and a 
certificate holder who is trained with skills and specialization in the building and 
construction industry. Members should be 18 years and above, not in any other 
cooperative society carrying the same activity and be able to pay registration fees 
of KES 3,000 (USD 30) and a minimum share capital after a three-month pro-
bation period. Forty members have bought shares, of which three are women. 
The probation is a learning period which also gives the cooperative society a 
chance to know the member. Members are ranked as bronze, silver, and gold. 
These ranks are skill-based and do not depend on share-holding. The coopera-
tive has a secretariat that coordinates all the services provided.
The cooperative has several benefits and obligations to members, a major one 
being growing a team of qualified construction sector workers, training mem-
bers, and producing quality work. It is a labour sub-contractor with FundiTech 
getting contracts and doing supervision and management of labour while mem-
bers provide labour. The cooperative has designed a formula of compensating 
members and ensuring quality work, with no fundi being paid less than KES 
1,000 (USD 10) per day. The association has a ‘daily must’, specifying amount 
of work each skill must produce, for example, how much painting or building 
must be done in a day. Although the cooperative collaborates with other stake-
holders majorly for advocacy, they have prioritized institution building, to quote 
an official of the cooperative, “we are not networking, we have discouraged peo-
ple from coming to us … construction is very dynamic, the fundi want to hear 
one word, their money”.
The overview of the above construction workers’ associations reveals that asso-
ciations are diverse in structure and with different strengths, although assisting 
members to find jobs and cushioning members during sickness, bereavement, 
and other welfare-related issues cuts across all associations. The established and 
structured associations such as Migosi builders and FundiTech Cooperative per-
form better in supporting members compared to associations with loose net-
works such as Labour Link and Chama Cha Mafundi. While the workers tend 
to have foresight on their ability to work and improve their status, including 
collectively buying equipment as was noted by a Key Informant from Labour 
Link (see Box 9.1), they tend to have weak organizations which undermine their 
agency in voice and representation.
Associations such as Chama Cha Mafundi have operated for many years and 
remained a loose organization with a collapsed SACCO due to poor commitment 
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of members. Members compete between themselves and lack trust, largely due 
to scarcity of employment opportunities, which contributes to members of asso-
ciations flouting labour fees set by some associations. An interview with Migosi 
Builders association elaborated this point noting that, “somebody will bid very 
low to land a job, while some members hide to take such jobs due to despera-
tion”. The mistrust is intensified by failure by many members to pay their as-
sociation’s subscriptions and loans. Associations such as Labour Link resolved 
not to pool resources in the form of savings due to lack of repayment of loans. 
The SACCO of the Chama Cha Mafundi association also collapsed due to non- 
payment of loans.
Several of the activities being undertaken on behalf of the membership of 
associations can be understood using a PRA advanced by Wright (2000), Sil-
ver (2003) and other authors as discussed in Chapter 1 of this edited volume. 
The sub-section below assesses the applicability of the PRA on the construction 
associations.
The power resources of associations
The PRA which includes structural, associational, institutional, and societal 
power with its coalition and discursive tenets can be used to analyze operations 
of construction workers, since one third of the workers were members of asso-
ciations. Authors (Wright, 2000; Silver, 2003; Schmalz, Ludwig & Webster, 
2018) who use the PRA argue that workers can collectively mobilize different 
power resources to advance their interests and concerns. Analysis of construction 
workers’ associations reveals that the workers mainly use associations to search 
for jobs, negotiate for terms of employment, and to informally intervene when 
disagreements occur between the workers and employers. This role of associa-
tions somehow mirrors what unions do in a formal context using a combination 
of associational and institutional power.
The findings reveal that a higher number of those who belong to associations 
are registered in SI schemes (see Table 9.3) and are able to secure their health and 
pension which are pillars for empowerment. However, the associational power 
of associations is weakened due to challenges such as members not paying as-
sociation dues and participating in scheduled meetings. The inability to attend 
meetings and pay dues can be explained partly by governance challenges and the 
nature of construction work which involve long hours of work and movement 
to different sites, including relocating for some period for work outside cities of 
residence. This undermines associations’ potential to leverage all associational 
power resources and is partly explained by the non-transparent, informal, and 
casual nature of the employment relations.
The construction associations are not able to use institutional power, although 
they are aware of the laws, regulations, and procedures, largely due to lack of 
formal contracts, time, and resources involved in legal processes, and for fear of 
losing employment opportunities. Associations such as Migosi Friendly Work-
ers occasionally use associational power to team up and apply disruptive power 
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(a form of structural workplace bargaining power) – storming work sites to de-
mand payment from clients and contractors. Such storming would not be as 
necessary if the association had institutional power and operated as registered 
companies with legal contracts. Findings revealed that the contractors are hes-
itant to take legal action when the client is the national or county government 
when payments are not honoured. This is due to fear that the system might not 
favour them or that they might be blacklisted from getting future contracts/
jobs. The fact that contractors also compete for jobs individually also weakens 
their ability for collective negotiation and redress.
The contractors and sub-contractors who employ workers operate in a quasi- 
formal manner having formal contracts with clients but hiring workers infor-
mally without contracts. Due to the weak structural and institutional power of 
the workers’ associations, they are not able to argue their case and demand their 
rights from the contractors and subcontractors who employ them informally. In 
a few cases where workers’ associations are collaborating with NGOs and other 
private firms, there are signs of societal power through coalition building and 
discursive power beginning to manifest.
Societal power was more visible in Fundi Online Platform which has nurtured 
relations with a university, a technical training institution, local companies, and 
an international NGO to realize its goal of being an online platform for work-
ers. The Cooperative Society had also been assisted by USAID to advance its 
mandate, and a sign of agency and tapping of different sources of power were 
latent. The cooperative is ensuring compliance with laws and regulations and is 
able to protect the workers, albeit with financial and membership commitment 
challenges. The cooperative had prioritized institution building and was, in 
the meantime, not interested in nurturing too many external networks – which 
seemed a good strategy for consolidating the cooperative before venturing into 
the outside world.
There was no evidence of workers’ associations nurturing relations with peo-
ple in positions of power such as elected leaders, government, chamber of com-
merce, or trade unions to address issues facing them. The only link was through 
training offered by government agencies such as National Industrial Training 
Authority (NITA), NCA, National Youth Service (NYS), and private cement 
and paint firms. Some of the trainings were supported by private companies 
and facilitated by NCA as revealed in discussions with Kaberia Jua Kali Associa-
tion which benefited from training by a Qatar-based company. The workers are 
largely inward-looking with many belonging to loose unregistered horizontal 
networks which connect them to employment opportunities. Associations such 
as Labour Link, Chama Cha Mafundi, and others that participated in FGDs be-
long to this group. Labour Link was investing in buying tools but was very poor 
in associational life with hardly any meetings taking place.
The few associations organized as cooperatives and companies engage all forms 
of power except disruptive power. A small company, an outshoot of Chama Cha 
Mafundi, has managed to register with NCA and to collaborate with formal con-
struction industries and workers. The leader of this company had a short stint in 
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the formal sector as a member of the group. This is a good demonstration of how 
institutional power assisted the construction worker to turn into an entrepreneur 
owning a company and still belonging to an association which had largely re-
mained static. Such power tends to be limited among construction workers, and 
the question remains why the progressive entrepreneur was not able to influence 
the association to tap into institutional power such as registration with NCA and 
interaction with formal construction firms to advance associational power and 
workers status.
Services offered by construction associations
Construction associations offer mainly two services, informal social protection 
as well as assisting in search and link to employment opportunities. The so-
cial protection services offered to members can be assessed using Devereux and 
Sabates- Wheeler’s (2004) classification of social protection measures grouped 
into four categories: Preventive, Protective, Promotive, and Transformative, 
three of which are discussed below.
Preventive
Legal provisions in Kenya require employers to ensure OHS of workers, subscrip-
tion to the NHIF, and NSSF. However, findings reveal that the majority (70 
percent) of construction workers do not subscribe to any SI schemes. The workers 
largely rely on informal SI strategies accessed through associations, family, rel-
atives, friends, and good Samaritans. Association members collectively support 
their members in cases of accidents on-site as well as health issues and death in 
their homes. Some associations limit support for sickness to in-patient with cover 
limited to a member, their spouse, children, and parents. However, dependent 
beneficiaries only get about half the cover, while death of a member is treated in a 
limited manner, which requires additional fund-raising for attending funerals and 
taking extra responsibilities such as buying a coffin and transporting the body.
Associations also have ad-hoc informal SI support, in which there is no speci-
fied amount, but decisions are made by members when a member is confronted 
by a social issue which the group considers to require support. These range from 
sickness, death, school fees, weddings to paying local authority and government 
fines. The study revealed that even loose workers’ associations like Chama Cha 
Mafundi are very good at rallying members to undertake fund-raising for sick-
ness, school fees, and to pay fines.
Labour rights, such as safety at work in the sector, are handled in a multi- 
layered manner and are not solely the responsibility of the employer. In cases 
of injury, medical expenses are paid either by the employer and workers, with 
each scoring 38 percent in the survey. Other cases are handled by the site man-
ager or owner of construction, relatives, and work colleagues. This implies that 
workers through their associations are largely paying for medical expenses with 
the support of others. A further probe in FGDs and with KIIs revealed that 
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workers and associations do not use institutional power to address labour issues, 
but rely on associational collective power to support members. They view safety 
and accidents largely as bad luck and workers’ personal issues as opposed to an 
employment problem as observed by a key informant in Kisumu (Box 9.2).
The voice in Box 9.2 reveals powerlessness and inability to address labour 
contractual issues which should be covered by WIBA. Instead, associations and 
social networks fill such deficits as noted by a sub-contractor “if they do not 
report to work, they do not get pay, if you are sick today, you will have no pay, 
but if you get better you will get back to work” (KII: Sub-contractor, Kisumu). 
Further discussions in FGDs and KIIs highlighted the support injured members 
get from associations and the need for members to take care of their safety as 
noted by the KII sub-contractor, “it is a must to contribute”. The KII noted 
that he was responsible for the workers, and if injured, he ensures that they are 
taken to hospital. He further observed that the client is not responsible for those 
who get injured; in most cases, the clients are not present when accidents occur. 
Overall, the WIBA provisions were minimally applied, although most workers 
and employers knew the provisions.
Promotive
Construction associations are anchored on providing promotive services such as 
micro-credit, loans, savings, and training which they sometimes do in collabora-
tion with other partners and agencies. As reflected in Figure 9.1, they put a high 
premium on savings and receiving loans, which are promotive aspects of social 
protection. Considering the precarious nature of their work, savings and loans 
are what cushion them by supplementing their irregular incomes and sustaining 
their livelihoods.
In the survey sample, the opportunity to save and receive loans (39 percent) and 
information on employment opportunities (31 percent) were the most important 
benefits of being member of a worker association, as reflected in Figure 9.1.
Micro-credit leveraged through associations sustains most of the workers, espe-
cially during periods when they are not able to get jobs. For example, Chama Cha 
Box 9.2 Perception on safety of workers
Safety is more personal … the worker must ensure his or her safety at 
work. Many contractors do not care about safety. Sometimes, the client 
forces contractors to enforce safety. In one incident, I was hanging on the 
fourth floor, and the client forced the contractor to provide a scaffold be-
fore anything could proceed. Safety is not a priority to clients, and workers 
cannot insist on safety gears, and if they do, they lose the job … some con-
tractors tell workers who ask for safety gears, ‘choose whether you want a 
job or gears’ (KII, Sub-contractor, Kisumu).
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Mafundi requires members to deposit KES 200 (USD 2) whenever they get a job. 
This amount is saved by the association and may be borrowed by a member when 
in social need. Some associations share the contributions weekly or monthly and 
also support members when welfare issues like sickness and death arise.
Training through apprenticeship is an important promotive service. Some 
individuals from formal construction firms and training institutions get into 
the industry as workers with skills and knowledge of the sector and become 
employers by sub-contracting labour, either as contractors or sub-contractors. 
Those from the unemployed pool get into the industry as novices, often taken 
care of by associations aligning the novices with experts. They begin as helpers 
taking any instructions, learning on the job, and if successful, advance into being 
semi-skilled workers with the potential of working alone and supporting other 
novices.
The dominant areas of training include building and construction, masonry, 
plumbing, electrical installation, and carpentry. Discussions with key informants 
revealed that electrical installation and, to some extent, plumbing are done in 
formal training institutions, while the other trades are largely learnt on the job 
and through apprenticeship. In FGDs, in Kisumu and Nairobi, it was noted 
that some contractors and sub-contractors provide mentoring job training pro-
grammes for different skill sets, as elaborated by a contractor, “I have done this 
for a long time since I started as a contractor … some even coming from poly-
technics. Some are contractors, others are fundis”. Further probe revealed that 
such contractors work very closely with polytechnics and often get students at-
tached to their firms on a regular basis. Several of such students continue to 
work with contractors after attachment, moving from one contractor or sub- 
contractor to another until they become independent construction workers, 
managers, and firm owners.
Associations rely on collaboration with other groups such as KCB, NYS, 
NITA, for free training, and legal advice. Some of the programmes done in 
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Figure 9.1 Most important benefits of being a member of the worker association.
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and contractors to get trainees. The programmes are free and largely flexible 
which allow construction workers to continue working. Labour Link appreci-
ated how the network had enabled the group to acquire new skills, as noted by 
a Key Informant and member of Labour Link in Kisumu, “…we have added to 
our skill set. We can do paper walling in a professional manner”.
Transformative
Informal construction workers’ associations in their ideal nature should provide 
agency for the workers through voice and representation. However, the findings 
reveal that transformative issues of rights, including negotiation for benefits such 
as health, pension, higher and stable income, protection against harassment, and 
negotiation of contracts, are not given high priority. The unpredictable work en-
vironment makes them largely concentrate on daily income, with low premium 
on issues of voice and representation that have potential of advancing their inter-
est and transforming their work environment.
Having voice and effective representation requires active members of asso-
ciations who participate and raise issues of concern such as lack of contracts 
and poor work environments. These are aspects which are generally not being 
actively negotiated, as noted by one of the sub-contractors in Nairobi “if you fail 
to complete the job because your client has not paid you, they will hire others to 
complete your job”. This is partly due to lack of written contracts and lack of reg-
istration of workers and firms, which is exploited by contractors and clients who 
lack integrity. Unfortunately, having formal contracts does not prevent exploita-
tion of workers. For fear of losing contracts, several workers and sub- contractors 
are not using the legal advice offered by KCB, to quote a sub- contractor in 
Kisumu, “when we get jobs we do not go for legal advice since clients do not like 
the legal way”. One site manager pointed out that even the Chinese who have big 
projects do not give contracts. They rely on verbal contracts; “they do not hire 
labour but sub-contract to get labour” (KII: Site Manager, Kisumu). In this pro-
cess, the written contract, if any, remains between the individual and the main 
contractor, while the workers rely on verbal agreement. This challenge is also 
linked to the Ministry of Labour’s inability to enforce labour laws, especially in 
formal construction sites, and difficult judicial process.
In isolated cases, being in associations has encouraged a few workers to report 
to the leadership issues relating to non-payment and respect for agreements. 
Associations such as Migosi Builders undertake this task by negotiating with cli-
ents, and if not successful, the cases are referred to government authorities. The 
chairman of the association noted that most cases are resolved through negotia-
tion by association, to quote, “it is good, because majority of cases are resolved … 
It is because of being in a group”. This infers that, although the findings show 
minimal use of transformative power, opportunity exists for use of voice and rep-
resentation to improve the working environment of construction workers. Many 
workers do not bother to use such opportunities, and there is need for training 
and advocacy on the use of associations for leveraging transformative power.
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Discussion
The associational life of construction workers is mainly centred on assisting 
workers to get employment opportunities and cushioning members by providing 
informal preventive and promotive social protection measures. Transformative 
social protection which entails engaging structures and institutions of power for 
changing their situation is marginally applied at case-by-case level; and not at a 
broader advocacy level directed at general conditions or the lack of enforcement 
of government rules. This is largely attributed to their weak organizational ca-
pacity which limits their ability to pool resources together to address structural, 
institutional, and societal issues facing the sector. This section discusses access to 
associations, highlighting entry requirements, comparing association member-
ship status, and assessing access to formal social protection.
Access to associations
Workers’ associations are powerful in assisting members to find job opportunities 
and supporting welfare needs, which makes them attractive to construction workers. 
This notwithstanding, only 33 percent are members of associations (Table 9.1).
Entry requirements
A large percentage of the associations restrict membership to individuals in the 
construction sector. Type of work is the dominant entry requirement followed 
by minor share for geographical location.
Discussion in FGDs and with KIIs in Nairobi and Kisumu confirmed the 
survey findings that membership is often based on working in the building and 
construction industry. A few associations like Migosi Builders admit those who 
do not work in the sector and also have no qualification for the industry but are 
keen on being nurtured into the sector. The associations also require potential 
members to be introduced by a member, in addition to availing Identification 
Card (ID), providing an address and name of their local administrator or chief. 
These requirements are aimed at providing points of reference for associations 
and ease traceability in cases of disappearance of workers and ensuring integrity 
and accountability of members. This is because the work environment is full of 
client assets which have to be protected and accounted for.
A mandatory membership payment is a requirement which cuts across all as-
sociations. In some associations, a requirement for a specified share contribution 
is embedded in the membership fee, whereas, in high level associations, such as 
the FundiTech Services Cooperative Society, there are higher requirements. Po-
tential members have to be technicians, and certificate holders trained in specific 
skills and specializations in the building and construction industry. The cooper-
ative requires potential members not to belong to any other cooperative society 
carrying out the same activity, members must buy some share capital, and have a 
three-month probation period. The latter is used to assess a member’s character 
and performance.
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Although most associations require members to be 18 years and above, one 
group, Dunga Builders association, requires members to be mature, with em-
phasis on marital status as a show of maturity – this was partly problematic to 
single mothers. A probe on this requirement revealed that it was aimed at pro-
tecting the group from those who exit after having a lump-sum payment before 
a full circle of savings benefits go to all members. It seems the requirements for 
access are generally simple, except for the service cooperative association which is 
targeting professionals in the sector. Other associations welcome both qualified 
and non-qualified workers. The other attributes of ethnic and religious back-
grounds and being known to group members are not major requirements, but 
largely provide connection to associations through introduction.
Comparison of association membership status
Associations provide access to collective goods and are known to be of great im-
portance to informal workers. McCormick, Mitullah, and Kinyanjui (2003), in a 
study of micro and small-scale enterprises (SMEs) in Kenya, observed that SMEs 
can collaborate and achieve what they cannot do alone (see also Haan, 1995). 
Members of associations are significantly more likely to be enrolled in formal 
SI schemes (Table 9.3) with over one third (36 percent) of association members 
having SI as compared to 25 percent of non-members.
Table 9.3  Differences in key workers characteristics by association member status
Member Not member Difference t-Value
Formal social insurance 
enrolment
0.36 0.25 0.11 1.78*
Health insurance coverage 0.39 0.32 0.08 1.19
Nairobi 0.56 0.55 0.01 0.12
Kisumu 0.44 0.45 −0.01 −0.12
Gender (male = 1) 0.93 0.88 0.06 1.45
Married 0.87 0.71 0.16 2.92***
Local 0.31 0.14 0.17 3.06***
Age 35.79 35.75 0.04 0.03
Mean daily earnings (current 
USD)
11.58 10.10 1.48 1.26
Assets (house and/or land) 0.28 0.31 −0.03 −0.43
Primary incomplete 0.06 0.09 −0.03 −0.90
Primary complete 0.43 0.35 0.08 1.20
Secondary or above 0.51 0.56 −0.05 −0.70
Training course 0.39 0.31 0.09 1.33
Training on job 0.50 0.46 0.03 0.45
Self-taught 0.11 0.23 −0.12 −2.30**
Wage-worker 0.97 0.92 0.05 1.67*
Own-account 0.02 0.04 −0.02 −0.75
Micro-business 0.01 0.04 −0.03 −1.58
Observations 221
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the survey data.
Note: <0.01***, <0.05**, <0.1*.
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Association members are also more likely to be married and locally born. 
None of the education and training variables differ by association membership 
status, apart from self-taught workers being more likely not to be in an associa-
tion. Non-members usually begin as helpers working with those registered with 
associations, learn the trade, join associations, and scale up to take professional 
positions in the industry. By contrast, wage workers are more likely to be in as-
sociations and are comparatively established.
Access to formal social protection
As also shown in Table 9.4, association membership plays a role in access to for-
mal SI schemes since, out of those that have SI, 58 percent are association mem-
bers, compared to only 45 percent of those that do not have SI. In addition, the 
table reveals that those workers more likely to be enrolled in social protection are 
male, married, have access to loans, have higher mean income and assets, and are 
more likely to have completed secondary school. Being an own-account worker 






Association member 0.58 0.45 0.13 1.78*
Sacco/vicoba/chama 0.24 0.17 0.07 1.17
Work related association 0.29 0.25 0.04 0.66
Women/youth/religious 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.76
Work-related 0.24 0.25 −0.01 −0.04
Loans 0.29 0.15 0.14 −2.44**
Voice and representation 0.02 0.00 0.02 −1.54
Social cushioning 0.05 0.05 −0.01 −0.19
Nairobi 0.62 0.53 0.09 1.26
Kisumu 0.38 0.47 −0.09 −1.26
Male 0.97 0.88 0.09 2.15**
Married 0.86 0.75 0.11 1.81*
Local 0.18 0.24 −0.06 −0.93
Age 36.55 35.45 1.10 0.79
Mean daily earnings (current 
USD)
12.60 10.05 2.54 2.00**
Assets (house and/or land) 0.39 0.25 0.14 2.14**
Primary incomplete 0.05 0.08 −0.04 −1.01
Primary complete 0.30 0.43 −0.12 −1.72*
Secondary or above 0.65 0.49 0.16 2.21**
Training course 0.50 0.28 0.22 3.14
Training on job 0.36 0.53 −0.17 −2.27**
Self-taught 0.14 0.19 −0.05 −0.91
Wage-worker 0.92 0.95 −0.03 −0.92
Own-account 0.05 0.02 0.03 1.09
Micro-business 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.19
Observations 221
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the survey data.
Note: <0.01***, <0.05**, <0.1*.
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or working in cities where one is born does not make a significant difference in 
terms of social protection enrolment.
Higher mean income indicates that members of associations are comparatively 
better able to pay for and access formal social protection schemes. Several as-
sociations were noted to encourage members to register for NHIF, with some 
arguing that it relieves the association of the burden of taking care of members 
when they are sick.
Most of those registered with formal schemes were married with some being 
registered through a spouse. The survey findings indicate that cost, time, and 
inability to give the scheme attention are the main obstacles to enrolment with 
formal SI programmes (Figure 9.2).
A probe through FGDs and KIIs in Kisumu and Nairobi for reasons for not 
subscribing to formal SI schemes confirmed the survey findings. Most work-
ers consider the KES 500 payments per month expensive, especially when they 
consider that, in many cases, they are healthy and do not use the service. The 
bureaucratic processes including restriction of outpatients to one hospital are 
further drawbacks to construction workers who are constantly moving in search 
of employment. Thus, the study revealed a remarkable deficit in formal SI among 
informal construction workers.
A further probe showed that 14 percent of workers who previously subscribed 
to NHIF stopped due to mixed reasons dominated by too expensive, followed by 
leaving previous job, school, college or divorce, not having made use of the scheme, 
lack of stable job and remittances, and procedures too complicated (Figure 9.3).
The SI deficit in the sector is explained by informality and the fragile nature 
of work, in which there is no specific person or employer to take responsibility 
for workers. Furthermore, both workers and contractors do not take insurance 
seriously, as highlighted by a KII Contractor (Box 9.3) and other voices of con-
struction workers drawn from FGDs in Nairobi and Kisumu.
The quote from the constructor reveals that accidents are treated as bad luck. 
A probe through FGDs and KIIs in Nairobi and Kisumu on the issue indicated 
that liability should be shared between the contractor and the client, but often, 
the two do not take full responsibility for workers. In most cases, they take the 
injured to hospital, make a one-off payment, and leave the employee in the hands 
Why don't you contribute to social protection (NHIF, pensions etc)?
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
It is too expensive
In the process of the registering
Procedures too complicated
No particular reason
I am healthy/have no specific health problems
I have coverage through an association/Welfare group
I (or my family) can cope with any unexpected spending due t
Low quality of the social insurance service
Percentage of Cases No of Responses
Figure 9.2 Reasons for not contributing to SI.
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It was too expensive
Left previous Job/school/college/Divorced
I did not make use of it (have no specific
 health problems)
Lack of a stable job/Remittance
Procedures too complicated
Disappointed with the scheme/coverage
Low quality of Social Insurance service
Other
Why did you leave NHIF?
Percentage of Cases No of Responses
Figure 9.3 Reason for leaving NHIF.
Box 9.3  Contractor’s view and other voices of workers on social 
protection
Contractors take insurance for granted except in isolated cases where they 
work for government or big jobs, but for small contract that last for two 
weeks, three weeks, and you will not be with them for long, we do not 
insure them … but we pray to God so that a bad incident does not occur 
… that is what we pray for … if accidents happen then God may have 
planned that you die like that or get hurt like that. Most contracts have 
been completed without a hitch, including the ones in which workers were 
insured. There is a job we did in Milimani area in Kisumu, and we secured 
insurance for all workers and concluded it well without any incidents (KII, 
Contractor, Kisumu).
I had initially enrolled for NHIF and paid for three years without fall-
ing sick. I did not see the need as I felt that the money was not helpful. 
After some time, I got married and I have not had any case of sickness so 
I stopped contributing. I joined M-TIBA which has a minimum of KES 
100 (USD 10) monthly, and I find it a better option (FGD Participant, 
Nairobi).
We formed a group to take care of health insurance especially sickness. 
I have seen my friends being fined for default and I have lost hope in the 
cover. I now go to mission hospital. As a group, we have emergency fee 
for accidents occurring on-site. Our Constitution clearly states that the 
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of relatives, colleagues, and friends. Some of the contractors and clients also 
assume that the responsibility of having the right gears and being safe totally lie 
on the employee, which goes against the WIBA requirements.
The deficit in formal SI schemes is filled by informal insurance provided 
through associations, relatives, colleagues, and friends, which are bottom-up 
loose strategies suitable to the workers. Almost all associations had an SI welfare 
component, ranging from an informally defined contribution to ad-hoc contri-
butions when needs arise. In the former, members contribute a specific amount 
of money per month with a percentage dedicated for SI. They also run savings 
and credit schemes which allow members to get back some portion of their shares 
through revolving saving and credit schemes enabling easy borrowing. This as-
pect and informal models of SI are very attractive to construction workers.
Both the defined and ad-hoc contributions allow members to save and accu-
mulate money for SI, largely assigned to sickness and death. These models are 
preferred compared to subscription to formal SI schemes, which are viewed as 
complex and bureaucratic. Some of the workers were paying more money in their 
associations, compared to what they would pay for formal SI. The association 
payments take part of the income which would otherwise pay for formal social 
protection because the workers trust associations compared to public schemes. 
There is therefore a need to address the work environment, bureaucratic, and 
technical procedures that keep informal construction workers from subscribing 
to formal public SI schemes.
Conclusion
Informal construction workers are weak in associational life and have not man-
aged to fully leverage the various powers latent in existing associations. Most 
of their operations are horizontal, engaging with membership, and other con-
struction workers outside their associations largely in search of employment op-
portunities. Although they are interacting with public and private agencies who 
provide training, this interaction is limited to one-off training without exploiting 
nuclear family will be covered in case of sickness and death, we are build-
ing our own insurance … we assist members until they get well (FGD 
Participant, Nairobi).
… I can go for a week without a job. It becomes hard for me to accu-
mulate KES 500 (USD 5) at the end of the month. It is easier for the 
formal workers because theirs is deducted from monthly salary (FGD, 
Nairobi).
Notes: The M-tiba is an e-Wallet. If one seeks health services, they are 
covered only for the contributed amount, and any balance would be paid 
out of pocket.
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other potential powers which such interaction can leverage. This is largely due to 
weak organizational capacity of associations and the construction workers’ work 
environment which does not leave adequate time for engaging in associational 
life and tapping other powers for formal social protection.
Most associations in collaboration with family members, relatives, colleagues, 
and friends take care of construction workers’ social protection needs such as 
sickness, death, and other social livelihood needs. Cases of OHS are handled 
in a haphazard manner with many workers left on their own once admitted to 
hospital or given the first treatment after injury on-site. Many workers do not 
perceive SI as a right in spite of existing institutional measures that have been put 
in place by the state. Their informality is also exploited by employers, including 
formal firms that should hire workers under contracts and ensure decent work. 
This problem is further intensified by poor state governance and enforcement, 
which include a lack of resources that prevents government labour office inspec-
tors from undertaking inspections on construction sites.
The associations which are supposed to provide agency for claiming SI rights 
and protecting workers are equally weak and require capacity-building and expo-
sure on how SI, including NHIF and OHS operate. Basic facts on how insurance 
operates are not well known to the workers and partly contribute to their think-
ing that one must use the service for the scheme to be meaningful.
Addressing these deficits requires going beyond associational power to using 
structural, institutional, and societal powers to negotiate the work terrain and 
related issues. Associations largely concentrate on preventive and promotive so-
cial protection measures, focusing largely on welfare issues, savings and credit, 
and providing information on job opportunities but hardly address work envi-
ronments in the sector. Cases of accidents on-site are handled by foremen, col-
leagues, and relatives as opposed to using legal workplace protective measures. 
The deficits in SI measures are not viewed as the responsibility of clients and 
contractors, but that of workers.
The work environment, associational weaknesses, and technical bureaucratic 
issues undermine formal SI programmes targeting construction workers. The 
majority of workers do not access the schemes due to cost and poor design, 
including requirement for payment within a specific time, default attracting pen-
alty fees – which workers find punitive – and inability to access contributions in 
form of savings. These challenges push workers to opt for associational life and 
its informal models of SI which provide inadequate cover, albeit easily accessible. 
The associations might be persuaded to divert some of the savings they share 
in their groups to formal SI which has more comprehensive cover compared to 
informal models. This should be complemented with other products designed 
for informal workers such as M-TIBA and Mbao pension schemes, which seem to 
be more acceptable to the informal workers, and also provide an opportunity to 
rethink how the informal workers can be brought under the umbrella of public 
SI schemes.
Overall, most challenges faced by construction workers are shrouded in infor-
mality, and yet, the literature points out that the formal and informal sector have 
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synergy and should be addressed as a continuum as opposed to a silo approach 
that dismisses one sector and upholds the other. Application of a two-model 
social protection approach which uses both bottom-up efforts of construction 
workers and top-down public formal models is likely to advance the situation of 
informal construction workers. This should entail taking into consideration the 
nature of construction industry including its unique irregular operations, multi- 
layered nature, and the lack of legal contracts. The latter seems to be a major 
problem, exploited by clients and contractors, a challenge that can be addressed 
through strong associations with the ability to leverage all sources of power for 
the development of effective social protection measures and overall development 
of the sector.
Notes
 1 Unless otherwise noted, the average USD rate from June 2018 to December 2018 
(USD 1 for KES 101.2) is used throughout the chapter.
 2 Loose networks and associations are not formally registered, members do not pay 
registration fees, and meetings are ad hoc and largely driven by availability of work or 
connections for work.
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Introduction
The literature on the informal economy tends to make generalizations across 
sectors and countries. While this is true to some extent, the comparison between 
Kenya and Tanzania reveals both convergence and divergence depending on the 
issue of investigation. The two countries have different historical development 
trajectories, which are also reflected in the development of the different indus-
trial sectors and in associational life. On the other hand, Kenya embraced the 
spirit of harambee (pulling together) right at independence, an approach which 
enabled many workers and families to cushion themselves in a capitalist liberal 
economy which was less concerned about those who could not fend for them-
selves. On the other hand, Tanzania had the Ujamaa modelled on an African 
collective approach but steered by the state that ensured that basic services were 
available to citizens, albeit in a limited manner.
These differences have had an effect on growth and development of the two 
countries, including the development of the informal sector. The capitalist state 
in Kenya nurtured a society of gross inequalities with a large informal sector, 
while the Tanzanian state had comparatively fewer inequalities and a compara-
tively smaller informal sector. Consequently, Kenya has had a longer experience 
handling informality, dating back to the famous 1972 ILO report (ILO, 1972) 
focusing on employment, incomes, and inequalities in Kenya. This long experi-
ence is demonstrated by transport SACCOs which are operating as quasi-legal 
entities working closely with the government in governance of the sector, while 
in the Tanzanian transport sector, cooperation is informal. The trade sector in 
Kenya is following a similar pattern to the transport sector with representation 
of informal traders in the Micro and Small Enterprises Authority (MSEA). Tan-
zania does not have such formal institutional linkages between informal workers 
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and the government, although intermittent support for the informal sector and 
ad-hoc coordination and consultation does exist.
One aspect which cuts across the three sectors covered in this study and across 
countries is the work environment. Informal workers operate under difficult and 
precarious working conditions often without contracts, social protection, and 
labour rights. Of particular concern is the lack of contracts among workers who 
work in an identifiable employment relationship, in particular, the transport and 
construction workers. This undermines their chances of accessing labour rights as 
provided in both Kenya’s and Tanzania’s policies and regulations. Although the 
majority, especially the micro-traders, operate as own-account workers, even in 
cases where workers are employed by firms such as in the construction sector, the 
multi-layered nature of employment subjects workers to sub-contracting without 
individual contracts and security. The situation is not different in the transport 
sectors. In Kenya, the formation of transport SACCOs and franchises has not 
resolved the issue of contracts, and – where they have contracts – they are not 
enforced, resulting in an inability to claim and access labour rights (Table 10.1).
Another aspect which cuts across is a rich associational life, where workers’ col-
lective associations provide a range of services to their members, many of which 
can be considered informal social protection measures. As seen throughout this 
volume, the services provided by associations differ markedly across sectors (and 
by country), which testifies to the importance of sector-specific insights. Yet, 
common across sectors in both countries is that entry into associations requires 
payment of fees and adherence to group constitutions or regulations.
In order to compare and analyze sectors across countries, four major issues 
are discussed in this chapter: (i) How key worker characteristics relate to work-
ers’ access to formal and informal insurance by country and sector, (ii) How 
governance frameworks across countries and sectors function, including asso-
ciational differences and power resources available to associations, (iii) Whether 
unions facilitate representation of informal workers, and (iv) How associations 
provide preventive, promotive, and transformative social protection measures to 
their members in line with the framework developed by Devereux and Sabates- 
Wheeler (2004). Each of the corresponding sub-sections teases out convergences 
across the sectors in Kenya and Tanzania, whilst bringing out unique aspects 
pertaining to each sector in each country. Last, the conclusion pulls out the key 
findings, noting the difference and similarities between the countries and the 
sectors.
Table 10.1  Formal social insurance coverage (percent)
Construction Trade Transport Overall
Kenya 35 39 50 41
Tanzania 17 22 16 19
Source: Author’s elaboration.
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Who are the informal workers?
On a global scale, the rate of informality is higher among men than among 
women; yet, in low‑ and lower‑middle‑income countries, women are more likely 
than men to be in informal employment (ILO, 2019). For instance, in Africa, 
90 percent of employed women are in informal employment in contrast to 83 
percent of men (ibid.). In the project on which this volume is based, a higher 
share of women informal workers is found among the micro‑traders in both 
Kenya and Tanzania, whereas the construction and transport sectors are dom‑
inated by young male workers. In the Kenyan construction industry, however, 
the male–female ratio seems to be changing slowly, as women are increasingly 
taking on special skills such as painting, electrical works, and masonry. Likewise, 
in transport, women are also gradually entering the sector, working mainly as 
conductors, yet almost absent among the motorcyclists.
Across the three sectors, we find that several worker characteristics differ along 
the gender dimension, although with some variation between Kenya and Tan‑
zania. For instance, in Tanzania, women are more likely to contribute to formal 
social insurance, whilst in Kenya, they are less likely, and when it comes to as‑
sociation membership, this is more common among women in both countries. 
Women have a history of having barriers to formal credit facilities, and asso‑
ciations have always been their source of support and access to credit. In line 
with the general wage gap literature, male workers have higher average earnings, 
although the difference is more pronounced in Tanzania where women are more 
likely to possess assets. Across both countries, men are more highly educated 
and also more likely to attend training courses, whilst women are generally self‑
taught. Regarding worker types, in both countries, men dominate amongst 
wage‑workers whilst women tend to be own‑account, and in Tanzania, women 
are also more likely to be micro‑firm owners. In Kenya, there is a variation 
in the transport sector where both men and women are wage‑workers. Own‑ 
account operators are few, and when women join the sector, they work mainly as 
conductors while men occupy the better‑paying jobs of drivers. These gender‑ 
divisions point to women having to combine reproductive work with their 
income‑ generating activities, and in the case of the transport sector in Kenya, it 
is also due to late entry of women in the sector, mainly considered to be men’s 
work and a risky occupation. Interestingly, when looking at the challenges men‑
tioned by informal workers, there are no major differences by gender; yet, Kenyan 
women workers mention working conditions and safety issues as more pressing, 
whilst Tanzanian women cite payment delays and few clients and/or competi‑
tion as main concerns. For men, issues related to harassment/arrest/police cut 
across the countries, as do payment delays, and common to all workers across 
the countries are credit concerns. Finally, in terms of the benefits of association 
membership in both countries, women and men equally cite financial and social 
support as the most important which is in line with the credit challenge they face.
Apart from the gender dimension, workers in the informal economy differ 
widely along a number of other characteristics including education level, income, 
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associational belonging, and social protection, and such differences are also re-
flected in our survey data. In terms of education, across the sectors, Tanzania has 
a much lower share of workers with completed secondary education (29 percent) 
compared with the share of workers that have primary education (62 percent). By 
contrast, in Kenya, the incidence of completed secondary education (and above) 
is at 47 percent, slightly higher than the share of workers with completed pri-
mary education (42 percent). As expected, our figures are lower than official 
secondary education enrolment figures for the entire population, which are 71 
percent in Kenya (ROK, 2019a) and 32 percent in Tanzania (URT, 2019, p. 
255). Finally, as also seen in Chapter 3, participation in formal social insurance 
is much more likely for workers with secondary education and above, whilst ed-
ucation level is not a determinant of association membership.
Regarding income, we also find variation between the two countries and 
across sectors. As expected, given the general difference in wages and living 
standards between the two countries, median daily earnings are higher in Kenya 
compared with Tanzania among both traders and transport workers (see sector- 
specific chapters for further detail). However, when it comes to construction, 
Tanzanian construction workers have median daily earnings that are almost on 
par with Kenyan workers, which, to a large extent, can be explained by the types 
of workers interviewed. For instance, in Tanzania, the construction workers in-
cluded a higher share of masons, whilst, in Kenya, the majority sampled were 
helpers who are lower on the earnings hierarchy compared with masons who are 
the ones negotiating for jobs with sub-contractors, contractors, and clients and 
hiring helpers to assist. Relatedly, the informal worker earnings observed in Tan-
zania are comparable to those of formal sector workers, whilst, in Kenya, official 
monthly earnings are substantially above the informal earnings reported. When 
it comes to participation in formal social insurance, unlike education, this is not 
determined by earnings. However, in Kenya, association members have higher 
average earnings than non-members, whereas, in Tanzania, the opposite is the 
case (see Chapter 3 for more detail).
Finally, in terms of key informal worker challenges and benefits of associa-
tions, there are no major differences by income level, except that, in Tanzania, 
those mentioning the opportunity to save as a top benefit also have lower average 
earnings, which seem logical. In accordance with the general literature, we find 
that earnings increase with age (up until a certain point) as it is a measure of 
experience/seniority. Moreover, across sectors and all things being equal, worker 
age is correlated with an increased likelihood of listing health benefits (over 
voice and representation, work-related issues, and loans), whereas more educated 
workers list voice and representation over health as a main association benefit.
In terms of geography, construction workers in Tanzania have a higher per-
centage of workers operating in cities where they were born compared to Kenyan 
workers who were largely moving in search for jobs. This is partly explained by 
the higher (37 percent) level of urbanization in Tanzania (UN, 2019) compared 
to Kenya (28 percent) (ROK, 2019b). Furthermore, since most Tanzanian work-
ers work in towns where they were born, they have higher chances of owning 
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property either by inheritance or buying land which is cheaper in Tanzania 
compared to Kenya. This difference is reflected in the data where 43 percent of 
Tanzanian workers own assets compared with 27 percent of Kenyans. Overall, 
association members have more assets than non-members, which could be either 
a reflection of more wealthy workers selecting to be in associations or the latter 
facilitating and/or providing financial support to their members.
In addition to the trends in gender, education, income, and worker-type char-
acteristics, workers in the informal economy differ substantially in terms of their 
associational belonging, as seen throughout this volume, and discussed further 
in this chapter. However, on this dimension, one aspect that cuts across coun-
tries and sectors is the important role played by different workers’ associations 
in filling the substantial formal social insurance gap by assisting members in 
accessing employment opportunities and cushioning members during difficult 
times such as sickness, death, and social welfare needs.
Institutional and governance framework
The deficits in contracting and social protection among informal workers pre-
vail despite the varied sectoral institutional and governance frameworks that 
exist in each of the countries, albeit with marginal differences. Kenya is com-
paratively more advanced in putting in place institutions to govern the transport 
and trade sectors, while both countries are on par in respect to the construction 
sector. While having formal state institutions is expected to improve the general 
work environment, some of the institutions are largely not in harmony with the 
informal working environment and institutions of workers such as associations 
and networks which drive workers’ operations on a daily basis. This is glaring in 
the area of social protection where many workers do not enrol in formal social 
insurance (SI) schemes due to complex bureaucratic procedures for accessing 
services and irregular incomes. Instead, they largely rely on associations for 
social protection due to the close reach and flexible non-bureaucratic processes. 
Thus, this section examines the formal governance institutions for the three 
sub-sectors across countries, and power resources and related applicability to 
formal workers.
Formal institutions
An examination of the three sectors reveals deficits in application of public pol-
icies, regulations, and standards. All informal workers can, privately or through 
registered associations, enrol voluntarily in the National Hospital Insurance 
Fund (NHIF) in both Kenya and Tanzania, and in Tanzania, the same arrange-
ment is also available through the community health fund (CHF) under the 
NHIF. The KIKOA scheme which previously provided for group registration 
of informal workers through their associations in Tanzania had potential as it 
attracted considerable interest from informal workers’ associations, but it did not 
survive partly due to adverse selection problems.
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Although recent years have seen an expansion in informal membership rates in 
public schemes (see Chapter 2), overall, the latter seem not to work well for in-
formal workers, as shown in the relatively low enrolment of workers participating 
in formal social insurance (health or pension). For the vast majority of workers 
in both countries, formal social insurance refers specifically to health insurance, 
and in both countries, individual NHIF enrolment also covers immediate family 
members. Thus, the measure of health insurance coverage provides a more ac-
curate depiction of actual coverage, and according to our data, this is 41 percent 
for Kenya compared with 19 percent for Tanzania. These figures are in line with 
the official coverage rates which are around 39 percent for Kenya (KNBS, 2019) 
and 22 percent for Tanzania (Jacob & Pedersen, 2018). The general picture of a 
much higher formal social insurance coverage among informal sector workers in 
Kenya is reflected at the sectoral level; yet, the difference is particularly stark in 
the transport sector, where 50 percent of Kenyan workers have health insurance 
coverage compared to only 16 percent in Tanzania, as seen in Table 10.1.
This difference in the transport sector is due to the specific set-up for infor-
mal transport workers in Kenya, whereby some bus companies/franchises or 
SACCOS commission certain savings to pay for the workers’ NHIF (and NSSF) 
coverage. However, even in this case, membership remains largely voluntary. 
Additionally, for Kenya, the introduction of UHC in pilot counties – including 
Kisumu, one of the volume case studies – and intensified recruitment-drive by 
NHIF, could account for the higher Kenya figures. Further examination of the 
three sub-sectors shows convergence and divergence, as examined below.
In the construction sector, legislation such as Work Injury Benefit Act 
(WIBA), Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), and Occupational 
Health and Safety (OHS) rules in Kenya and Workers Compensation Fund 
(WCF) in Tanzania are not being complied with. These institutions largely work 
for those formally employed, and yet, the majority of construction workers are 
operating informally. This has exposed the workers in both countries to ex-
ploitation by the industry, with formal enterprises employing workers on casual 
basis to avoid costs associated with employment. This leaves the workers with 
informal social protection schemes based on associations, relatives, friends, and 
good Samaritans as the only fall-back.
In the micro-trade sector, both countries, during the last few years, have 
seen less confrontations and conflicts between micro-traders and authorities, 
particularly in Kenya. The 2010 Kenya Constitution (ROK, 2010) takes a rights 
perspective, highlighting rights to social security, protection for marginalized 
groups, and participatory governance. One outcome of this has been the Mi-
cro and Small Enterprises (MSE) Act of 2012 which provides representation 
of micro-enterprises including micro-traders (see Chapter 7). In Tanzania, the 
change seems to be mainly due to the more positive attitude of the late president 
Pombe Magufuli (see Chapter 6). In comparison, the changes in Kenya are in-
stitutionalized in the legislation, whereas in Tanzania it is not and hence rather 
dependent on politics of the day and the approach of a particular politician at a 
given time.
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The transport sector, with its many actors and institutions, poses a challenge 
in respect to organization for social protection. The presence of a large informal 
workforce makes it difficult for the Tanzanian and Kenyan governments to reg-
ulate the sector, even though there are efforts – mainly in Kenya – to organize 
the sector through SACCOs and franchises. For instance, since 2010, it is a legal 
requirement for Kenyan matatu (PSV) workers to belong to a SACCO or a trans-
port management company. The workers, however, remain informal and have 
daily remittance targets (Spooner & Manga, 2019) that force them to work for 
long hours, to aggressively compete for passengers, and drive recklessly in order 
to increase the number of trips made per day, hence compromising on safety. In 
Tanzania, local authorities encourage the formation of associations in the trans-
port sector for easier coordination, and rule-bound cooperation does exist, even 
if it is not institutionalized.
In sum, across sectors, the formal social insurance coverage gap in both 
countries is partly due to a lack of understanding of the importance of social 
insurance, coupled with meagre irregular earnings, the bureaucratic processes 
involved, and the structure of the schemes. In Kenya, this is also attributed to 
the government’s failure to enforce regulations requiring transport workers to 
have social protection. Furthermore, formal social insurance schemes are mostly 
and historically designated to deal with the formal sector, thus lack capacity to 
deal with a more challenging but expanding informal sector. In the following 
sub-section, we discuss the power resources used by associations, and in the 
section thereafter, we provide examples of different types of informal social pro-
tection measures/services that associations offer their members.
Associational power resources and the applicability to  
informal workers
Informal workers and their associations in both countries wield associational, 
institutional, structural, and societal powers which they use to negotiate their 
work environment and livelihoods. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 1 of 
this edited volume, the PRA starts from the basic premise that, if organized, 
labour can successfully defend its interests by collectively mobilizing different 
power resources (Schmalz, Ludwig & Webster, 2018). The approach was how-
ever developed to analyze the power resources available to trade unions – not 
informal workers. This begs the question of how useful the power resource ap-
proach is to cast light on informal worker associations. We argue that, if modified 
and employed with caution, the analytical typology still has explanatory power, 
particularly in highlighting how sector- and country-specific groups of informal 
workers have differing power resources available – specifically with regards to 
the transformative social protection measure of voice and representation – as dis-
cussed below. The applicability of the approach and the implications of applying 
it to informal workers will be discussed in more detail in the concluding chapter 
of this volume.
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Associational power
Associational power is derived from the formation of collective organizations of 
workers and, as mentioned, can lead to transformative social protection measures 
in the form of voice and representation. Given the context of informal workers, 
we included all the different types of collective associations created or engaged 
in by informal workers to advance their own interests and conditions. It is an 
open empirical question who might form relevant counterparts with regards to 
representation, as the case studies revealed instances of representation towards 
employers (in transport and construction), the police (transport and trade), as 
well as municipal and national level authorities (all sectors). Associational power 
understood in this broad manner is potentially of immense importance for in-
formal workers. Other than numbers, the strength of associational power is 
associated with a number of factors such as effective organizational structure, 
member willingness to take action such as participating in campaigns, willing-
ness to pay dues, and a strong collective identity. It is hard though to generalize 
about informal worker associations since, as illustrated throughout this book, 
they differ significantly in particular in the following parameters: resources, rep-
resentational power, and key purpose of associations. Moreover, as seen in Table 
10.2, our survey data shows that the incidence of association membership varies 
substantially across the three sectors and between countries.
Overall, a higher percentage of informal workers are enrolled in associations in 
Kenya compared with Tanzania, and informal transport workers have a stronger 
associational life compared to informal traders and, in particular, compared to 
construction workers in both Kenya and in Tanzania. Hence, based on numbers, 
associational power differs substantially between sectors, and in general, Kenyan 
associations were often found to be more resourceful.
Nonetheless, there are more similarities in associations than differences when 
comparing the same sectors across countries. Workers’ associations are struc-
tured to perform functions required by members, which are mainly assisting 
to find jobs and cushioning members during difficult times for construction 
workers in both countries; welfare and protecting trading sites for traders in 
both countries; government requirement for business, welfare, and negotiation 
for Kenya transport workers; and welfare and negotiation for transport workers 
in Tanzania. Interestingly, as the analysis in Chapter 3 shows, there is a signifi-
cant correlation between informal association membership and access to formal 
Table 10.2  Informal association membership shares (percent)
Construction Trade Transport Overall
Kenya 33 47 57 48
Tanzania 19 34 50 34
Source: Author’s elaboration.
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social insurance, which holds across sectors and when other factors like earnings, 
education level, and location are taken into account. This relationship is stronger 
in Kenya where the share of association members that are enrolled in formal 
schemes is double at 40 percent compared with 21 percent in Tanzania; yet, 
further analysis reveals that the correlation between informal association mem-
bership and access to formal social insurance is mostly seen among transport 
workers in both Kenya and Tanzania.
In both the survey data and interviews, large sectoral differences were revealed 
with regards to representation and the key purpose of the associations. In terms 
of key benefits of associations, at a general level, the survey data reveal that, con-
trolling for key worker characteristics, trade and transport workers list voice and 
loans as more important (compared with health benefits) relative to construction 
workers (i.e. the latter are relatively more likely to list health benefits as key as-
sociation functions).
Most associations encountered in the construction sector were created to fa-
cilitate job-seeking while also providing cushioning for members and only a few 
worker associations were engaged in bargaining with employers. More specifi-
cally, a few associations in Kenya were found to represent members to raise voice 
and demand their rights, including demands for work-space, fighting harass-
ment by local authorities, and demanding payment for workers’ dues from sub- 
contractors, contractors, and clients. In the survey, issues like wage delays and 
short contracts were listed as relatively more important challenges for construc-
tion workers, all things being equal. The construction sectors in the two coun-
tries differ slightly. In Tanzania, where members are actively participating in 
association meetings and contributing, associations are stronger. Old associa-
tions tend to be dormant while younger ones are more active. This can be partly 
explained by the fact that old associations may have achieved their intended 
goals. Furthermore, Tanzania associations do not have umbrella associations, 
while Kenya has umbrella associations, but very few workers belong to such asso-
ciations. No informal construction workers were found to belong to unions, al-
though there were earlier attempts in Tanzania to organize workers to join trade 
unions through the support of development partners, but this was not sustained. 
This is despite the existence of such associations, as evidenced in the study.
In transport, in general, workers are mainly organized around work-related 
challenges, particularly problems in dealing with authorities or employers while 
some associations are also created for the purposes of social welfare and protec-
tion. Correspondingly, the survey data shows that, for transport workers, key 
challenges include dealing with the police/authorities, client conflicts, and poor 
infrastructure. Transport associations in both countries present a fragmented 
patchwork often including break-away associations counting amongst them a 
range of transport unions. In Kenya, as mentioned earlier, legislative provisions 
have made the associational landscape quite particular for the matatu sub-sector.
A key directive of the legally mandated SACCOs and transport companies is 
to negotiate with authorities on issues affecting the sector. These include fleet 
operations, management, and responding to government directives. However, 
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the issues addressed are mainly related to factors which might impede a smooth 
operation of the fleet and are not as such related to working conditions or rights 
to social protection. Hence, these associations mostly favour the interests of 
SACCOs and vehicle owners while paying little attention to the issues affecting 
workers. Therefore, they cannot really be considered vehicles for workers’ associ-
ational power which would allow them to voice their concerns or to demand for 
better working conditions. Nonetheless, along with some of the well- functioning 
associations, some SACCOs and companies invest in workers’ capacity-building 
by organizing training on a range of issues that include road safety, financial 
literacy, and investing in social protection among others.
It is in the micro-trade sector that we probably find the largest variety of 
associations varying from groups working in designated areas who organize ac-
cess to work-space and market-level representation, over welfare groups, to larger 
and more robust umbrella structures organizing many different kinds of traders. 
With regards to associational power, what stood out from the research, par-
ticularly on traders, was whether the association belonged to a larger umbrella 
structure (e.g. VIBINDO in Tanzania and KENASVIT in Kenya). In general, 
associations linked to umbrella associations were able to offer different kinds of 
support to their affiliated groups, such as access to training and infrastructure 
to take up issues with regards to representation. By contrast, smaller stand-alone 
associations would often be more inward-looking. The larger and more robust 
umbrella associations were generally also the ones which would engage in voice 
and representation. In Tanzania, this included a trade union which is discussed 
in more detail in the last part of this chapter.
Institutional power
Institutional power is derived from laws, regulations, procedures, and practices 
that regulate the relationship between worker associations and employers as well 
as authorities. In the context of informal workers, sources of institutional power 
in our cases stem mainly from either specific provisions in the legal system or 
affiliation to trade unions, and we will discuss these in turn.
As already mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, Kenya has taken 
steps (albeit small) towards a more inclusive and participatory institutional set-up 
with the new constitution and particularly with the Micro and Small Enterprises 
(MSE) Act of 2012 which provides for representation of informal traders (repre-
sented via KENASVIT) amongst other groups. This means that, at least for the 
micro-trade sector, some form of representation is institutionalized.
In Tanzania, the change seems to have gone in the opposite direction with 
moves towards centralization and shrinking of civil society space more generally. 
As described in Chapter 7, a seat was given to a representative of an informal as-
sociation on the National Employment Advisory Committee in 1999, but there 
is little evidence of the committee currently being active on informal sector mat-
ters. Hence, even though some groups of traders were able to use the established 
name and personal contacts of the leader of the umbrella association VIBINDO 
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to access official structures, this has been in an ad-hoc manner with no institu-
tional guarantee for consultation or representation.
The case of micro-traders further illustrates how access to trading space – 
whether illegal, legal, or simply tolerated – is sometimes the context on which 
institutional power depends. Hence, a low-level form of institutional power is 
available to associations of members who trade in a local government-sanctioned 
place. Such groups often have a form of representation in a market council, and 
through this, they have some access to negotiate with local authorities on behalf 
of their members.
In the case of informal transport workers in Kenya, we see another form of 
institutional influence in that the legal framework in place for matatu transport 
is very influential in regulating the relationship between the transport workers 
and the owners of the vehicles although not always in ways intended. Hence, 
while the workers require SACCOs’ clearance in order to get the mandatory 
road service license and badges to operate in the sector, the SACCOS mostly 
favour the interests of vehicle owners in terms of securing the smooth operation 
of their vehicles rather than guaranteeing that workers’ rights are respected or 
their opinions voiced.
For informal construction workers, the relationship between informal worker 
associations and employers (which are sometimes public entities) is at times in-
stitutionalized in that some of the better organized and resourced associations 
are able to bid for tenders and win formal contracts. This was visible in the case 
of FundiTech service cooperative in Kenya and Sinza Kijiweni Construction in 
Tanzania which were collaborating with local authorities for contracts. Labour 
Link in Kenya, a loose network of construction workers, had also nurtured rela-
tions with private firms and was able to get contracts.
In the transport sector in both countries and in the micro-trade sector in 
Tanzania, we saw informal workers tapping into established tripartite structures 
via affiliation with newly formed or established trade unions. In Kenya, the es-
tablished transport sector union (TAWU) began to recruit amongst informal 
workers only in 2018, but, according to the secretary general, they had recruited 
around 1,000 matatu workers from five SACCOs and negotiated a collective bar-
gaining agreement with one of them. They have been in the process of changing 
the constitution to better accommodate informal workers; yet, it remains unclear 
what rights were to be awarded to informal members internally in the union (Ri-
isgaard, 2021). In addition, Kenya Matatu Workers Union (MWU), registered 
in 2013, organizes around 1,000 informal matatu workers. The key service they 
provide to members is to represent them when problems occur – for example, 
delayed payment from the employer or issues involving the police, but unlike 
the more established unions, MWU still does not have the capacity to represent 
members in the court system (ibid.). Further, the Public Transport Operators 
Union (PUTON) in Kenya represents workers in transport-oriented businesses, 
including the digital platform workers. In general, however, informal transport 
workers were found either not interested in joining the available unions or fear-
ing victimization by employers, including SACCOs in Kenya.
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In Tanzania, three different unions are of relevance to daladala and bod-
aboda riders. COTWU-T is the established trade union which – similarly to 
Kenya – has been weakened by breakaway unions. At the time of the interviews, 
COTWU-T had active engagement with three informal worker associations of 
which one consisted of clerks at a bus terminal while another one consisted of 
bodaboda riders. The last was a group of women fast food providers working at 
a bus terminal.
The informal associations are incorporated as branches, and the paying infor-
mal members are awarded the same rights within the union as formal members. 
COTWU-T also used to organize a larger group of daladala workers, but they 
have since broken out and registered their own union TAROTWU. Another 
new union is Tanzania Association of Drivers Union (TADU) that represents 
bodaboda workers and those that operate smaller vehicles like bajaji. The latter 
two unions, in cooperation with a union for long distance bus drivers, are at-
tempting to form a federation of informal transportation workers’ unions with 
the aim of representing informal transport workers as a distinct voice in tripar-
tite forums. However, that kind of representation is currently limited to affiliates 
to the established federation TUCTA.
In Tanzania, some informal associations – primarily working in markets – 
have during the last decade or so been incorporated into the established trade 
union TUICO as affiliate unions. A newer initiative from TUICO, originating 
in an externally funded programme with StreetNet International, has estab-
lished a bargaining committee with two members from each of the market-based 
branches with the aim of providing a bridge between the municipal authorities 
and traders. The increasing (although still very limited) incorporation of in-
formal trader associations into trade unions has to some degree opened up an 
institutionalized space for representation and voice for informal traders, albeit 
as part of the trade union movement in the established institutional model and 
in addition through this innovative bargaining committee, although further re-
search is needed to assess its current functionality.
In summary, very few informal workers are yet organized into trade unions. 
Most successful so far has been the transport sector where both new and es-
tablished unions are involved, however in a very fragmented and competitive 
manner. In general, the recent opening towards informal workers poses a very 
difficult and politicized challenge for the established unions, as discussed in 
more detail by Riisgaard (2021). Notwithstanding the difficulties, inclusion pro-
vides an interesting potential for increasing institutional power by tapping into 
established institutional setups. In the conclusion, we discuss this in relation to 
different representational models and in comparison with the informal workers’ 
grassroots associations.
Structural power
In line with Silver (2003), structural power can be divided into workplace bar-
gaining power (the power that can be utilized from the strategic location of a 
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certain group of workers in a key sector) and marketplace power (relating to the 
tightness of the labour market). Activities in the informal economy are most 
often characterized by low entry barriers, and since the availability of labour 
is vast, informal workers will, in general, command weak marketplace power. 
Nonetheless, strategic disruption abilities exist, although they differ greatly by 
sector. This is of key importance for informal transport workers who, if coor-
dinated, can bring the city circulation to a chaotic halt. Even though transport 
worker associations are fragmented in both countries, their existence and the 
fact that they could create considerable disturbance if provoked is acknowledged 
by public officials.
The potential for workers to disrupt transport operations and hence the cir-
culation of people and goods in the cities is real and has been witnessed in both 
countries, for instance, to demand for improvement of road infrastructure or 
protesting police harassment and crackdowns. Another example is provided by 
the motorcyclists whose approach is often to block streets en masse, to demand 
for workers’ rights to urban spaces. For informal construction workers, the dis-
ruption potential is limited to specific construction sites. In Kenya, a few cases 
were reported where associations had used disruptive power to storm work sites 
to be heard as they demanded their rights, in particular, regarding payment 
owed; yet, these were isolated cases with the ability to disrupt limited to particu-
lar building sites. For informal micro-traders, disruptive power is of less potential 
save from the latent ability to physically block certain areas via demonstrations.
Regime-disruptive power – the ability “to cause disruption to, and on that basis 
extract concessions from, political elites interested in regime-survival” (Marslev, 
2019, p. 18) – is a potentially potent source of power for informal economy 
workers as an overall group due to their vast numbers and strategic importance, 
especially as ‘vote-banks’ during election times. In particular, the fast-growing 
group of bodaboda riders has become increasingly important in political cam-
paigns, for example, in Tanzania, where the opposition leader would pose with 
bodaboda riders in the run up to the local elections in 2019. Bodaboda riders 
are also used strategically in the protests of other groups as, in Kenya, it is now 
common practice to hire bodabodas to boost street protests regardless of the 
topic of protest.
However, the common occurrence of splinter-groups and the lack of any 
consolidated sector wide organizations amongst bodaboda riders and transport 
workers more generally in both Kenya and Tanzania means that, so far, their po-
tential for exercising regime disruptive power is limited. This notwithstanding, 
in Kenya, there is a budding national umbrella organization (BAK) of bodaboda 
riders, which, if well nurtured by members, could provide a platform for negoti-
ation and engagement with authorities. The matatu sector has also occasionally 
succeeded in mobilizing regime-disruptive power to gain concessions. A simi-
lar potential exists in the micro-trade sector due to the vast number of people 
working in the sector. Nonetheless, even the largest umbrella associations still 
organize only a fraction of the actual micro-trader populations and hence also in 
this sector, regime disruptive power so far remain largely as potential.
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Societal power
Societal power arises from cooperation with other social groups and society’s 
support for worker demands (coalitional power and discursive power). In the 
context of informal workers, this relates to coalition making with other infor-
mal associations, with formal worker associations, and with broader civil society 
organizations.
In construction, coalitional power, in general, is absent in Tanzania but evi-
dent in Kenya where associations are working with Non-Governmental Organ-
izations (NGOs) and development partners which provide linkages to services 
and resources. Tanzanian associations are noted to be inward-looking, concen-
trating on immediate needs without umbrella associations, while, in Kenya, um-
brella association exist, although many construction associations and workers 
are not (yet) members.
Although the micro-trade sector is poorly coordinated, the findings do show 
potential in greater coordination to enhance associational power as umbrella 
associations were found to be more robust and able to represent members and fa-
cilitate access to services such as loans, training, or health insurance. In addition, 
a few recent attempts at broader coalitions and cooperation between different 
types of associations have taken place in Tanzania, perhaps pointing towards 
a future strengthening of societal power. In addition, support from external 
organizations such as, for example, foreign NGOs and connections to people 
in power also figured prominently in some of the cases explored in this book. 
Hence, in both countries, the two largest and most established umbrella associ-
ations (KENASVIT and VIBINDO) had been, and are, receiving support from 
external organizations such as foreign NGOs and private actors. Finally, favoura-
ble statements made by the late president Magufuli in a top-down manner shape 
public discourses towards a more favourable view on micro-traders which could 
potentially be harnessed by associations to achieve increased societal power.
Associations in the transport sector, as mentioned, are very fragmented and 
competitive. Nonetheless, external coordination – like when the International 
Transport Federation calls for cooperation around campaigns related to the 
planned implementation of a Bus Rapid Transit system in Kenya – can trigger 
coalitional power on a case-by-case basis. As mentioned, the nascent affiliation 
of informal transport associations to established unions is also an example of 
coalitional power, with potential to spill over into discursive power, like when a 
group of Bodaboda and COTWU-T marched together on May Day in 2019 in 
Dar es Salaam with banners that read: “A Boda-boda job is like any other job”. 
The event was reported positively by the media with citizens giving testimony 
on how much they relied on Bodaboda. This also got the attention of the Dar es 
Salaam Regional Commissioner and the Mayor of the city, and hence bodaboda 
representatives were invited to their respective offices for consultation regarding 
their work.
In summary, as also highlighted in the literature on PRA, we see differ-
ent power resources reinforcing each other but also observe how most power 
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resources in the informal economy remain underexploited due to fragmentation, 
lack of resources, and, in general, weak structural bargaining power.
Services provided by associations
Although associations have different frameworks for offering informal social 
protection, in general, associations remain the bedrock of informal workers’ so-
cial protection in both countries. While the associations do not use conventional 
formal social protection concepts such as social assistance, social security, and 
health insurance, much of the welfare cushioning they provide for workers falls 
within these social protection categories. It largely falls on preventive social in-
surance ranging from one-off responses to specific problems to more specific 
insurance schemes. Almost all associations support members during sickness and 
death, with a few others intermittently supporting maternity and unemploy-
ment. These kinds of support are not comprehensive and vary across sectors, 
countries, and associations, and some of the main differences emerging across 
sectors and types of social protection are discussed below.
The following discussion of the specific services offered by associations uses 
a typology of social protection elaborated by Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 
(2004). They distinguish between four main social protection types: protec-
tive, preventative, promotive, and transformative. Protective measures largely 
overlap with social assistance and, as mentioned, are not covered by our project. 
Preventive measures include both formal social insurance programmes – such 
as pensions, health insurance, and maternity leave – and informal insurance. 
Promotive measures function to enhance or stabilize income, consumption, and 
capabilities and include access to finance or training, while transformative meas-
ures address social equity and exclusion, for example, through collective action 
and representation. As the latter has been dealt with in detail using the PRA, 
below, we focus on preventive and promotive measures.
Preventive
When it comes to leveraging associations for accessing (preventive) formal social 
protection in the construction sector, both countries do not perform well as 
indicated by the relatively low share of members that have formal health and 
pension cover (see Table 10.1). As a result, in both Tanzania and Kenya, con-
struction workers exposed to hazardous working environments have created 
self-cushioning informal mechanisms, although these schemes only provide par-
tial coverage to workers. In most cases, workers have to pay for themselves since 
they have neither formal social protection cover nor any collateral and insurance 
to cushion them from life challenges.
Across the two countries, construction associations ensure that injured col-
leagues are taken to hospital, with some Tanzania associations supporting col-
leagues even after being discharged from hospital and while on sick leave. In both 
countries, employers hardly fully take care of the injured, some make one-off 
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payments. Further, in both countries, some associations had dedicated specific 
funds to welfare, with one Kenyan association noting that, “we are building our 
own insurance, having emergency fee for accidents occurring on site”. Further-
more, in both countries, construction workers complement group contributions 
with additional one-off contributions depending on the welfare needs of mem-
bers at a given time. This is done by mobilizing resources among members as an 
additional cushioning measure to any member with a critical welfare issue such 
as admission to hospital or death.
In the transport sector, workers are more likely to access formal insurance 
measures, especially in Kenya due to the SACCOs paying for the workers’ 
NHIF and NSSF coverage. Moreover, for those who are employed by bus com-
panies, the company makes regular contributions to the NHIF to cover the 
enrolled members. However, as in construction, workers are exposed to occupa-
tion health and safety issue and prone to accidents and rely on associations and 
SACCOs for insurance. The Tanzania associations tend to be stronger in pro-
viding informal social insurance with some having different levels, for example, 
support for death in the immediate family and upon death, survivor’s cushion-
ing which is similar to formal survivors’ pension, although the social insurance 
may not be as comprehensive and long term. In cases where associations are not 
strong, members spontaneously help colleagues who require assistance through 
informal fund-raising and leveraging of funds. In the Kenyan transport sector, 
there is more of a mix of formal and informal insurance leveraged through 
associations. In the latter case, workers’ groups sometimes form sub-groups 
for savings and credit. It seems that many transport workers are reluctant to 
join formal schemes which partly explain why there are sub-groups to provide 
informal insurance when SACCOs are encouraging workers to join the formal 
schemes.
Some associations, in particular, in the trade sector, provide for social in-
surance in their constitutions, specifying the structure of support, rules, and 
social funds. This structured approach was more latent in Kenya compared to 
Tanzania, with one association having an emergency fund to which members 
contribute KES 50 (USD 0.05) daily. In such schemes in both countries across 
sectors, a member is the point of reference, but other family members, in par-
ticular, spouse and children, are largely covered. Other associations extend sup-
port to parents and relatives who are part of a members’ household. However, 
support is provided on a reduced level for non-members and mainly includes 
sickness, in particular, admission to hospital, and death. Other areas which are 
supported but often on an ad-hoc basis or through loans are school fees, unem-
ployment, funerals, and weddings. As the trade sector is dominated by women, 
women are, in some cases, also supported during maternity. In Kenya, some 
associations exempt nursing mothers from attending association meetings and 
assist women to manage their businesses while on maternity to ensure income 
for paying association contributions and for survival, while others contribute 
a given amount to take care of the expenses of nursing mothers. In Tanzania, 
some associations support women when hospitalized during delivery. Contrary 
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to the Kenya situation, some groups in Tanzania give three months’ maternity 
leave from group responsibilities and subscription fees.
Promotive
Associations in both countries are active in various promotive roles, in particu-
lar, supporting members to save and access credit as well as training in sector 
skills. In the construction sector across both countries, the promotive role of 
associations is very vibrant in terms of providing loans. These benefits are almost 
equal in both countries with very marginal differences. For example, in Tanzania 
and Kenya, 20 and 18 percent of members had received loans, respectively. This 
notwithstanding, the associations in Tanzania which were generally young, were 
wishing for expanded access to micro-credit, which implies that they have not 
accumulated enough savings through their associations.
Training through construction associations was more active in Kenya than 
Tanzania, with associations in Kenya partnering with government agencies and 
other actors in training, which was offered for free. Furthermore, the Kenya 
associations were working closely with polytechnics, partnering with them in 
training graduates in construction skills. These aspects were not manifest in 
Tanzania although associations had plans to take members for formal training. 
In isolated cases, some associations in both countries were also supporting mem-
bers to purchase assets, including land, through loans.
Compared to Kenyan workers, a significant number of transport workers in 
Tanzania rely on associations for access to loans. In Tanzania, SACCOs are pri-
mary sources of savings and loans, while for Kenya, there are various types of 
associations that includes transportation SACCOs mandated by law as well as 
other SACCOs. In Kenya, associations promote investments through savings, 
share-holding, or making contributions to purchase SACCO or company vehi-
cles, individual, and association motor vehicles. In Tanzania, associations have 
encouraged companies to establish lease and buy agreements with members, a 
few have obtained loans to purchase buses, and for buying motorcycles through 
loans, while others have approached banks on behalf of their members for loans.
In both countries, associations also facilitate training of members, although 
Kenya is more vibrant with formal training of members. In Kenya, formal train-
ing covers financial literacy, road safety, investment, and exchange visits, while, 
in Tanzania, informal on-job training was dominant, mainly for motorcyclists, 
who learn through riding other members’ motorcycles.
The trade sector is equally active in facilitating members to access loans from 
associations and private financial institutions. Savings and loans compliment in-
come and cover life contingencies of association members. In both countries, 
loans are largely from the pooled monthly membership contributions which at-
tract lower rates of interest compared to other financial institutions. Such loans 
have flexible payment plans, although not infrequently, funds available are not 
adequate to meet members’ demands. In both Tanzania and Kenya, training 
facilitated by associations focusing on business skills and entrepreneurship was 
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provided by some of the better organized associations. In Tanzania, in some 
cases, such training resulted in income generating activities and bulk buying for 
advancement of association members.
Key findings
As discussed in this edited volume, informal workers across different sectors in 
Kenya and Tanzania share many attributes, including the fact that a significant 
percentage of workers operate in a fragile environment without adequate social 
protection. This chapter’s comparative analysis of the construction, transport, 
and trade sectors across the two countries shows many synergies in respect to the 
working environment and the importance of associations, especially in respect 
to cushioning workers on welfare issues. Major differences between the sectors 
relate to the nature of organization, in which the trade and transport sectors 
manifest a higher level of organization compared to construction sector. The 
two former sectors have well-established grassroots and umbrella associations, 
and there are signs of them beginning to join unions for better representation 
and voice. Apart from these overarching findings, the sector and country com-
parisons bring out several other key findings as highlighted below.
A higher percentage of workers are enrolled in associations in Kenya than in 
Tanzania, and Kenya associations tend to overall be more resourceful than Tan-
zanian associations. In Kenya, workers have higher level of institutional power, 
especially in the transport and trade sectors, while Tanzania has made some ad-
hoc interventions in both sectors which are not institutionalized.
In respect to services, Tanzanian traders are more engaged in social cushioning- 
type associations, while Kenya traders primarily belong to loan-related associa-
tions. In both countries, traders’ associations, especially those located in markets, 
negotiate with local government authorities for trading spaces and infrastructure 
with different levels of success. In Tanzania, there is nascent trade union involve-
ment with micro-traders, an aspect which has potential for improving the situa-
tion of traders. Larger umbrella associations in both countries were found to offer 
higher levels of support to members, including access to training, infrastructure, 
and representation. In a way, these umbrella associations play a role similar to 
unions, and it might be useful for future research to examine this relationship. 
Although the majority of workers are not in umbrella associations and unions, 
there are signs, especially in Tanzania, of unions attempting to design appropriate 
models to accommodate the unique characteristics of informal work.
In the transport sector, there is a remarkable difference between Tanzania and 
Kenya associations, although, in both countries, workers operate under loose 
agreement with vehicle owners. Kenya associations operate within a quasi-legal 
environment – an aspect which should be empowering but it is not, as SACCOs 
are skewed towards vehicle owners, with minimal benefit to workers. However, 
well-functioning associations, SACCOS, and companies invest in workers’ capacity- 
building, organize trainings on road safety and financial literacy, and also in-
vest in social protection. In comparison to Kenya, Tanzanian transport workers 
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operate more informally, and the sector is dominated by fragmentation and dis-
integration of associations, although some Regional Commissioners encourage 
route associations to form larger umbrella associations for ease of coordination 
and governance. While this seems to be an advantage to government, associ-
ations can exploit such formations to their own advantage in advancing their 
transformative power.
Construction workers lag behind in organizing in both countries. Tanzania 
has young associations compared to Kenya, but associational performance levels 
in both countries are almost similar, except for the ability of Kenya construction 
associations to use promotive power. They leverage partnerships both at the local 
and international level to advance the skills of workers.
There are signs of associations exerting different forms of power across the 
two countries, with associational power being the most vibrant. Through asso-
ciational power, associations support workers to access preventive, promotive, 
and minimal transformative services. Structural power is limited in all sectors, 
although both transport and construction sectors have the potential to disrupt 
cities and sites of operation to demand rights. In both countries, this power is 
limited among traders and only used occasionally by construction workers in 
specific work sites. Societal and institutional power is also present, but more 
visible in Kenya. In respect to societal power, construction workers in Tanzania 
are inward-looking, limitedly leveraging support from NGOs, people in power, 
and private actors. Although the transport sector in both countries is poorly 
coordinated, on-going external support and coordination has the potential of 
triggering coalition power for driving the sector needs. On-going external sup-
port also features prominently in the trade sector amongst the larger umbrella 
associations.
In sum, whether in terms of power resources, worker challenges, or associ-
ational benefits, most of the differentiation manifests itself on a sectoral basis, 
in turn, underscoring the importance of adopting a sector-specific lens when 
analyzing the realities of informal workers.
References
Devereux, S. & Sabates-Wheeler, R. (2004) Transformative social protection. IDS Work-
ing Paper 232. Brighton, Institute of Development Studies.
ILO (1972) Employment, incomes and equity: A strategy of increasing productive employ-
ment in Kenya. Geneva, International Labour Office.
ILO (2019) World employment and social outlook: Trends 2019. Geneva, International 
Labour Office.
Jacob, T. & Pedersen, R.H. (2018) Social protection in an electorally competitive envi-
ronment (2): The politics of health insurance in Tanzania: ESID Working Paper 110. 
Manchester, The Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) Research Centre.
KNBS (2019) Economic survey 2019. Nairobi, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics.
Marslev, K. (2019) The political economy of social upgrading. A class-relational analysis 
of social and economic trajectories of the garment industries of Cambodia and Vietnam. 
PhD thesis. Roskilde University.
Sectoral and country comparisons 239
Riisgaard, L. (2021) Organizing the informal economy as part of the trade union move-
ment in Kenya and Tanzania. CAE Working Paper No. 1, 2021. Roskilde, Roskilde 
Universitet.
ROK (2010) Constitution of Kenya. Republic of Kenya. Nairobi, Government Printer.
ROK (2019a) Basic education statistical booklet. Nairobi, Ministry of Education, Repub-
lic of Kenya.
ROK (2019b) Kenya population census. Nairobi, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 
(KNBS).
Schmalz, S., Ludwig, C. & Webster, E. (2018) The power resources approach: Develop-
ments and challenges. Global Labour Journal. 9 (2), 113–134.
Silver, B.J. (2003) Forces of labor: Workers’ movements and globalization since 1870. Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press.
Spooner, D. & Manga, E. (2019) Nairobi bus rapid transit: Labour impact assessment 
research report. Manchester, Global Labour Institute.
UN (2019) World population prospects 2019. Department of Economics and Social Af-
fairs, United Nations (UN-DESA). New York, UN-DESA.
URT (2019) Pre-primary, primary, secondary, adult and non-formal education sta-




Lone Riisgaard, Winnie Mitullah and Nina Torm
As outlined in the introduction to this edited volume, collective informal 
 bottom-up forms of social protection, while essential in the lives of many in-
formal workers, are notably absent from social protection discussions, and little 
is known about the extent or the format of these informal social protection 
mechanisms. In addition, we also noted a gap in analyzing how formal social 
protection schemes interact with the realities and needs of particular groups of 
informal workers. With this edited book, we have started to address these gaps.
Recognizing the very heterogeneous and sector-specific nature of the informal 
economy, we have, throughout the 10 preceding chapters, explored the collec-
tive associations that informal workers engage in, the transport, construction, 
and micro-trade sectors in urban areas of Kenya and Tanzania (in each country, 
the focus is on the main city and another smaller city). We have analyzed the 
potential of these associations for providing or enabling access to both formal 
and informal social protection measures. While Chapter 10 drew out key find-
ings in a comparative perspective related to differences and similarities between 
countries and sectors, this concluding chapter offers overall reflections on our 
three specific research questions:
a Do informal workers, associations offer any kind of informal social protec-
tion, and if so, what characterizes the format of these services, who benefits 
from them, and how do they compare to formal social protection measures?
b In the formal social protection schemes, how are social protection needs, 
delivery, and beneficiaries qualified, and to what extent do they cater for 
informal workers? What, if any, is the role of informal associations in pro-
viding access to formal social protection schemes?
c To which extent is representation of informal workers’ viewpoints and real-
ities institutionalized?
In answering these questions, we also highlight our contributions to the litera-
ture and discussions around social protection and informal workers. The chapter 
starts by teasing out our key findings emerging from the comparison between 
the social protection models conceptualized and implemented ‘from above’ by 
public authorities with the models implemented ‘from below’ by workers’ own 
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collective associations. This is followed by reflections on the power resources 
available to informal workers’ associations and, in particular, their role in filling 
the representational gap of informal workers – reflections which include assess-
ing the actual and potential role of trade unions in this. Finally, we reflect on 
how the findings of this book point to a need for expanding the social protection 
agenda in several ways.
Top-down versus bottom-up forms of social protection
In order to understand and conceptualize the informal bottom-up protection 
models and how these differ from the formal social protection models, we have 
analyzed how social protection needs, delivery, and beneficiaries are qualified in 
the different models. In particular, we have asked of the top-down models, what 
type of social protection is seen as relevant for informal workers? How are social 
protection beneficiaries perceived? And what format of social protection delivery 
is envisioned? Of the bottom-up models, we have analyzed what type of social 
protection is commonly provided, who has access to it, and what characterizes 
the format of these services?
Top-down social protection models
Looking at a wider historical context, the perception of social protection can be 
seen to have travelled from universalism (in Tanzania under Nyerere) to safety 
nets (in both Kenya and Tanzania under neoliberal restructuring) and, in recent 
years, towards a more universal discourse. The recent implementation of a uni-
versal old age pension in Kenya (and in Zanzibar but not in mainland Tanzania) 
attests to this. Nonetheless, when it comes to health care (and pensions in main-
land Tanzania), current measures implemented and available to informal workers 
consist of the option to individually contribute to health insurance. Both coun-
tries have plans to roll out self-contributory universal minimum health insur-
ance schemes which will be subsidized only for very poor households, identified 
through means testing (as outlined in Chapter 2).
When it comes to employment-related social protection, systems exist in both 
countries which guarantee employer-linked pension and health insurance cover-
age for formal workers, along with other employment-related protections such as 
maternity leave, severance pay, unemployment benefit, and work-injury compen-
sation. Leaving aside for a moment the issue of health and pensions, our findings 
strongly suggest the need to rethink the design of employment-related protection. 
First of all, the current model effectively excludes people working informally from 
social protection while awaiting the prospect of formalizing their employment 
relation – something which for the majority is unlikely to occur anytime in the 
foreseeable future. Second, most people working informally are not in a standard 
employment relationship with an identifiable employer with whom they could rely 
on employment-related protection even if formalization was to materialize. This 
context calls for a conceptual re-thinking of employment-related protection which 
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effectively de-couples it not only from the restrictive formal/informal dichotomy 
but also from its basis in a standard employment relation which – it is becoming 
increasingly clear – turned out to be a geographical and historical exception.
With regard to health insurance and old age pensions, there is, as mentioned, 
an opening towards enabling inclusion of the informal economy through con-
tributory schemes. Our research, however, illustrates how the public schemes 
seem to not work well for informal workers, as shown in the relatively low enrol-
ment rates. Whereas pension coverage was almost non-existent, health insurance 
coverage was found to be 41 percent for Kenya compared with 19 percent for 
Tanzania in accordance with the national averages reported elsewhere (Jacob & 
Pedersen, 2018; KNBS, 2019). Interestingly, a significant correlation was found 
between informal association membership and access to formal social insurance, 
the implications of which we will discuss below. Education levels were also found 
to be positively correlated with enrolment indicating that coverage is biased to-
wards the better educated. This corresponds well with our findings of a generally 
low level of knowledge of how formal insurance schemes work, sometimes cou-
pled with beliefs of insurance as bad omen.
Our findings, in addition, show that most informal workers find it difficult 
to pay the relatively high monthly premiums because of irregular, low incomes. 
In addition, procedures are considered to be too complicated and the services 
received inadequate (in relation to the cost). Hence, while formal insurance 
schemes are now open for informal workers, they remain modelled on the needs 
and abilities of formal workers and hence require beneficiaries that have the ca-
pacity to consistently provide contributions over relatively long-time horizons 
with a perspective on possible future needs. In other words, the existing formal 
schemes are not designed to fit the reality of most persons working in the in-
formal economy, indicating the need to redesign schemes. This could include 
more flexible payment methods and possibly some ability to access unused con-
tributions in the form of loans in order to make the schemes more attractive in 
addressing short-term needs. In addition, cooperation with workers’ own associ-
ations also seem to hold potential as discussed below.
Bottom-up social protection models
Although heterogeneity characterizes the informal workers in our research, one 
aspect that cuts across countries and sectors is the important role played by dif-
ferent workers’ associations in filling the substantial formal social insurance gap 
by cushioning members during difficult times such as sickness, death, and social 
welfare needs.
While the associations do not use conventional social protection concepts such 
as social insurance, many of the services they provide for workers fall within so-
cial protection if viewed in a comprehensive manner as we have done in this ed-
ited book. While what exactly is offered differs widely between groups, it is clear 
from the data presented and discussed in this volume that informal workers’ own 
associations offer a wider assortment of social protection than public schemes, 
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focusing on preventive and promotive measures and, to a lesser degree, also trans-
formative measures of voice and representation. Associations, however, do not 
generally offer protective social protection; thus, social assistance in the form of 
conditional and unconditional cash transfers remains an important prerogative of 
formal social protection.
Comparing the services delivered by the associations to formal public or pri-
vate service providers, for example, loans or social insurances, some differences 
stand out, which speaks to the attractiveness of informal social protection meas-
ures, while simultaneously pointing to some of the shortcomings.
Most associations offer preventive measures ranging from ad-hoc contribu-
tions when needs arise to more specific insurance schemes, and many also offer 
promotive measures in the form of savings and loans enabling easy borrowing, 
but also vocational training, job facilitation, and, to a lesser degree, joint business 
activities. In addition, some associations play a role in facilitating access to formal 
services such as loans and health insurance – as mentioned, we found a significant 
correlation between informal association membership and access to formal social 
insurance (see Chapter 3 for more detail). Hence, some associations play a crucial 
role in either registration of members to a formal health insurance scheme or 
by directly handling members’ premium payments via their savings. Although 
this was by no means common practice, the existence of such facilitation points 
towards the potential role that some associations might play in encouraging en-
rolment but also how a group can help prevent default among their members by 
handling the premium contributions. A particularly interesting example is the 
KIKOA scheme in Tanzania which was tailored to work through the informal 
workers’ own associations. The scheme attracted considerable interest but alas 
did not survive, partly due to adverse selection problems (see Chapters 2 and 6).
The informal social protection provided by associations is based on reciprocity 
and characterized by being personalized, trust-based, and timely so long as a 
worker is a member and paying dues; while formal insurance schemes procedures 
for insurance pay-outs can be bureaucratic and time consuming, the micro- 
insurances were generally described as more timely, flexible, and based on per-
sonal trust.
On the downside, cushioning in relation to life contingencies, such as health- 
related problems, is mainly provided as a one-off pay-out and normally only 
covers a limited amount. Likewise, while many associations provide some form 
of savings and loan function which can be essential in smoothening out irreg-
ular incomes and addressing life contingencies, they are nonetheless considered 
insufficient to meet needs. In addition, the limited size and financial resources 
of most informal associations means that they are vulnerable towards disruptions 
such as members defaulting or mismanagement of funds by association leaders. 
Nonetheless, while providing only limited coverage, they do provide social pro-
tection services which are for most people in the informal economy difficult or 
impossible to access elsewhere.
In summary, compared to the top-down formal social protection models, the 
bottom-up models employed by informal workers’ own associations are based on 
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trust and reciprocity and offer flexible but also limited cushioning against more 
immediate and short-term needs. While this is a better fit with the realities of 
most informal workers, access to the bottom-up model is often also exclusionary 
as many well-functioning groups have entry barriers which are likely to take them 
out of reach for many informal workers. Recalling that, in our study, only 34 
percent in Tanzania and 48 percent in Kenya belonged to an association, exclu-
sion, particularly of poorer segments of informal workers, needs to be thought 
of when considering the possibility of designing social protection measures 
where access is facilitated through associations. As explored in more detail in 
Chapter 10, differences between association focus and between members and 
non- members varied across countries, sectors, and worker-types. However, we 
did find that in general, and when controlling for other factors, members have 
higher average earnings compared to non-members suggesting an associational 
bias towards the slightly better off, although we cannot say with certainty in 
which direction the causality runs (see Chapter 3 and Torm, 2020 for more 
detail). Sectoral differences were identified in what was perceived to be the most 
important benefit of association membership. Hence, controlling for key worker 
characteristics, trade and transport workers list voice and loans as more impor-
tant (compared with health benefits), whereas construction workers are relatively 
more likely to list health benefits as key association functions. Apart from sec-
toral differences, across sectors and all other things being equal, worker age is 
correlated with an increased likelihood of listing health benefits over other ben-
efits, whereas women were more commonly own-account and more likely to join 
associations compared to men. These research findings clearly illustrate the need 
to consider  sector- and worker-specific contexts when discussing social protec-
tion. In addition, and in summary, our analysis comparing bottom-up informal 
social protection with top-down formal models highlight the need to unravel the 
implicit formal–informal dichotomy and resulting bias inherent not only in for-
mal schemes but also in the social protection agenda and literature more broadly.
The issue of representation
A particular social protection gap identified is that of representation, and again, 
this is linked to the dichotomy and bias mentioned earlier. Looking at public 
understandings of, and policies on, social protection, transformative measures, 
and the issue of representation and voice, in particular, are notably absent. While 
not framed as social protection but as related to civil rights, Kenya has in, re-
cent years, made moves towards more decentralized and inclusive representa-
tion of informal workers, most prominently illustrated in the Micro and Small 
Enterprises Authority (MSEA) where informal traders are represented amongst 
other groups. Tanzania does not have such formal institutionalized structures 
although intermittent support for the informal sector and ad-hoc coordination 
and consultation does exist.
The overall deficit in formal and institutionalized representational structures 
relates to the common understanding of informality as a transitionary state on 
the way to formalization which results in a lack of recognition of people in the 
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informal economy as collective political actors who should have access to repre-
sent themselves in their own right in matters which concern them such as in the 
use of public space or in social protection policies and regulation.
Representation is of absolute key importance if the general wellbeing and resil-
ience of informal workers is to be advanced. As an example illustrated through-
out this book, many policies and regulations which govern the workplaces and 
conditions of informal workers operating in urban space are either ineffective or 
actually undermine their ability to earn an income and guard their health. Hence, 
effective representation in matters which affect their work lives is a key necessity. 
Likewise, it is not just exclusionary but also counter-productive that informal 
workers – constituting 84 percent and 69 percent of total (non- agricultural) 
employment in Kenya and Tanzania, respectively (ILO, 2018; KNBS, 2019) – 
are not directly represented in national-level institutions where issues such as 
those related to work and social protection are discussed and negotiated. Hence, 
in terms of representation and voice, the associations which do engage in such 
activities contribute to filling a large and important social protection gap for 
informal workers. Institutional linkages and representational capacities have 
throughout this book been discussed using the PRA, to which we now turn.
The potential of associations – and the power resource approach
Chapter 10 of this book contains a comparative analysis of the power resources 
available to associations, and hence, here, we focus on the broader implications 
of our findings. The PRA was developed to analyze the power resources available 
to trade unions – not informal workers. As such, there are several difficulties in 
transferring this typology to informal economy workers as we identify below. 
Below, we go through the concepts of structural and associational power in 
turn, discussing potential and limitations based on our research findings and 
including institutional and societal power where relevant.
Structural power
Informal workers, in general, suffer from very low marketplace bargaining power 
as most occupations have low entry barriers, and there is a large pool of available 
labour. Workers with slightly more but still limited bargaining power include 
matatu/daladala drivers and skilled construction workers. With regard to work-
place bargaining power, this was shown to differ greatly by sector as strategic 
disruption abilities are of key importance for informal transport workers. The 
potential for transport workers to disrupt operations and hence the circulation of 
people and goods in the cities is real and acknowledged as such by public officials 
as a latent threat. This at least partly explains why we see greater efforts at for-
mally regulating this sector – most pronounced so far in Kenya but as discussed 
with limited results for workers.
Strategic disruption abilities can, if coordinated and scaled, pose a real threat 
to regime-survival and hence transform into regime-disruptive power which, 
in turn, can be used to “extract concessions from political elites interested in 
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regime-survival” (Marslev, 2019, p. 18). This is potentially a very potent source 
of power, in particular, for transport workers, but also for informal economy 
workers as an overall group due to their vast numbers and strategic importance 
as ‘vote-banks’ during election times. Currently, as informal worker associations 
are fragmented in both countries, this remains mostly latent, but the potential is 
nonetheless real, whether advanced through sector specific coalitions, via coop-
eration, or even incorporation into established trade unions as discussed below.
Associational power
While associational power, as evidenced throughout this volume, is of immense 
importance in covering social protection deficits for members, this is nonetheless 
also where we find the largest conceptual challenges of employing the PRA.
The conceptualization of associational power, as derived from the formation 
of collective organizations of workers, seems to rest on the assumption that the 
main purpose of collective organizing is representation – a form of transforma-
tive social protection. Nevertheless, as we have shown in the contributions to this 
book, many informal workers form collectives for other purposes, for example, 
to find work or to perform preventive and promotive informal bottom-up so-
cial protection measures. This was particularly the case with smaller stand-alone 
grassroots associations which constituted the majority of associations, while it 
was the larger umbrella associations which tended to engage in representation. 
We therefore note a general challenge in conceptualizing the capabilities of asso-
ciations in providing other forms of social protection and hence in extending the 
PRA framework to grassroots associations.
We note though the considerable latent potential in building stronger and 
larger networks of associations, particularly with regard to voice and representa-
tion, but also to boost infrastructural resources and organizational capacities to 
leverage preventive and promotive forms of social protection. As of now, even for 
umbrella associations, representation is most often marginally applied at case by 
case level and not as broader advocacy directed at general working conditions, 
at formal social protection policies, or the misfit or lack of enforcement of gov-
ernment rules.
Other factors specific to the informal economy include the multitude of dif-
ferent work and employment constellations – own-account, commission work, 
wage-worker (without contract), unpaid help, casual work, micro-entrepreneur 
with a helper, etc. – as well as the often ambiguous nature of employment re-
lations where such exist. In addition, there are often quite distinct power hier-
archies between workers within specific sectors such as, for example, between a 
mason and his helper – something which, in the case of transport workers, has 
been framed as different ‘classes of labour’ by Rizzo (2017).
The often unclear nature of employment relations means that there is not 
always a ‘natural’ employer to be targeted or engaged with in negotiations, and 
hence in this book, we left it an open empirical question who formed the relevant 
object of workers’ strategies and possible counterpart in negotiations. Our case 
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studies revealed instances of representation towards employers (in transport and 
construction), the police (transport and trade), as well as other municipal and 
national-level authorities (all sectors).
More complicated is the notion of different ‘classes of labour’ which means 
that one should not assume automatic solidarity within a collective of workers 
in a sector, sub-sector, or workplace. This also relates to what we consider to be 
another challenge of the PRA, namely that it leaves the internal power dynamics 
of workers’ organizations as a black box. In this book, we can therefore be said 
to suffer from a similar bias as we have focused on social protection services and 
only to a very limited extent on internal associational power dynamics. Hence, 
we argue that, while our findings underline the important role played by infor-
mal workers’ own associations in providing informal social protection, future 
efforts to rethink formal social protection efforts to work through informal as-
sociations would necessitate research on internal associational dynamics which 
most likely in very real ways restrict access for some members.
The conceptualization of power resources, as developed from the perspective 
of trade unions, also omits sources of power, which we have found to be of rele-
vance to informal workers’ associations. For example, controlling access to space 
(what could perhaps be called territorial power) which is of key importance to 
transport workers associations and some micro-trader associations or personal-
ized ties with more powerful actors (a form of societal power) which is important 
amongst associations in all the sectors studied.
Another strategy to enhance societal power that has been followed by some 
associations in order to address both resource and representational deficits has 
been to employ coalition-making in the form of cooperation with external or-
ganizations such as foreign NGOs.
Thus, as also highlighted in the literature on PRA, we see different power 
resources reinforcing each other but we also observe how most power resources 
in the informal economy remain underexploited due to fragmentation, lack of 
resources, and, in general, weak structural and institutional bargaining power.
Overall, though associations have in this edited book been viewed as impor-
tant sources of power which can be leveraged by informal workers to access 
various social protection services, though with important differences between 
countries and sectors. Generally, a higher percentage of workers are enrolled 
in associations in Kenya than in Tanzania, and Kenyan associations tend to be 
more resourceful. There is a stronger associational life among informal transport 
workers compared to informal traders and construction workers in both Kenya 
and Tanzania. In Kenya, workers have some formalized institutional power 
in the transport and trade sectors, while Tanzania has made some ad-hoc or 
non-institutionalized rule-bound interventions in these sectors. With regard to 
addressing the general deficit in institutional power, an innovative strategy that 
has recently been employed by some associations has been to cooperate with, 
associate to, or even form new trade unions altogether.
In sum, with regard to the PRA, we have made a conceptual contribution 
first by identifying some limitations when transferring this typology to informal 
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economy workers. Second, we have shown how the framework, when modified 
to fit the informal economy and combined with the preventive, promotive, and 
transformative social protection frame, is useful in highlighting how sector- and 
country- specific groups of informal workers possess different power resources. 
Hence it has proved useful in identifying specific challenges as well as existing 
and potential leverage points, in particular, with regard to issues of transforma-
tive social protection in the form of representation and voice.
Tapping into the institutional power of trade unions
The research discussed in this volume reveals that, while most workers belong 
to associations, very few belong to unions which negotiate, lobby, and advocate 
for workers’ rights. Nonetheless, there has recently been an opening towards in-
formal workers by the dominant union federations and some individual unions. 
Although still in its infancy this is a significant development. Informal workers 
can potentially tap into the institutional power of trade unions, while trade un-
ions potentially stand to gain enormously in numerical strength. It is, however, 
also clear that the recent opening poses a very difficult and politicized challenge 
for the established unions (for a discussion of this see Riisgaard, 2021). At the 
same time, not all attempts at cooperation or inclusion of informal workers have 
been successful as seen in the transport industry where informal workers have 
largely opted to create new independent unions rather than join established ones.
Most advanced so far has been the transport sectors in both countries where 
both new and established unions are involved in representing informal workers, 
albeit in a very fragmented and competitive manner as well as the micro-trade 
sector in Tanzania where one particular trade union (TUICO) has been active. 
Below, we discuss the potential of unions for informal workers by comparing 
them with informal workers’ own associations.
Associations or unions – or associations and unions?
Our research provides fertile ground for a comparison between informal workers’ 
own associations and trade unions – an exercise which remains oddly underex-
plored in existing literature on informal workers (for more detail, see Riisgaard, 
2021). Kabeer, Sudarshan, and Millward (2013), based on their study of infor-
mal women workers’ organizations (primarily incentivized by NGOs) in different 
countries, argue that collective action in the associations they studied was built 
around a recognition that livelihood concerns were key and only in addition to this 
did they focus on a shared identity as workers. The associations we studied were 
more varied than the ones included by Kabeer, Sudarshan, and Millward (2013) 
and included associations, particularly, in transport and construction, which were 
established primarily around occupational concerns. Based on our findings, we 
would thus come with a more tentative statement recognizing the large variety of 
associations and argue that, in general, most informal worker associations address 
broader livelihood concerns often in addition to work-related issues.
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Kabeer, Sudarshan, and Millward (2013), furthermore, conclude that a critical 
lesson deriving from their cases is the need to start with the experiences and re-
alities of the informal workers themselves and that this stands in contrast to the 
politics of representation traditionally practiced by the trade union movements 
which generally work through a common set of strategies around a predefined 
agenda largely based on economic demands and a shared identity as workers.
Looking at trade union engagement with informal workers in Kenya and 
Tanzania, we do see some trade unions like, for example, KUBHAWO (Kenya 
Union of Hair and Beauty Workers) in Kenya offering services that go beyond 
workplace challenges by providing saving and loans services, while other ex-
amples include trade unions seeking to engage informal workers via events on 
general health-related issues such as HIV or Tuberculosis. In general, though, 
the trade unions tend to focus on work-related issues in their engagement with 
the informal economy.
It is also clear that even though the unions seek to be innovative in their 
engagement with informal workers in different ways, they nonetheless follow a 
more predefined track which is also shaped by the established tripartite institu-
tional frame. This has the advantage of offering access to and experiences with 
representation – something which is often lacking but greatly needed for infor-
mal workers. Unions have national-level institutional representation in different 
forums including ones related to social protection. On the other hand, unions’ 
experience with representation is largely restricted to negotiations with employ-
ers and legal representation of workers via the labour court systems. Hence, if 
unions are to succeed in transforming into representational structures capable 
of addressing the representational gap of informal workers, then innovation is 
needed, particularly with regard to informal workers who do not have an iden-
tifiable employer whom to target for negotiations. An interesting approach has 
been piloted by TUICO (Tanzania Union of Industrial and Commercial Work-
ers) in Tanzania (see Chapter 6) in their attempt to represent micro-traders as 
they have sought to establish a bargaining committee where different market 
traders come together at municipal level for negotiation with authorities. Al-
though mixed results were reported by the participating trader associations, this 
nonetheless provides an example of some of the innovation needed.
Interestingly, we found that trade union engagement in Kenya and Tanza-
nia works primarily through the informal workers’ own associations. Hence, we 
would argue that this does not have to be a question of choosing one organi-
zational form over another but rather an option of choosing trade union rep-
resentation in addition to the grassroots associations. By implication, this could 
mean a differentiated set of benefits where unions, for example, provide the 
transformative measure of institutional representation and lobby for extension 
of formal social protection schemes and where associations offer the network 
and social cushioning for short-term needs (preventive and promotive social pro-
tection). This, however, would also mean that challenges of entry barriers to 
informal workers associations are likely to become duplicated as entry barriers to 
trade union representation.
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An important question arises though as to whom unions seek to represent 
and how that corresponds with the realities and the self-understanding of infor-
mal workers? Importantly, many informal workers do not perceive themselves as 
workers but rather as small businesspeople with small businesses. In addition, 
some of the services provided by workers’ own associations are services one 
would rather expect from a business association than a trade union – for exam-
ple, opportunities to network and share information, and resources useful for 
their businesses activities such as access to credit. Nonetheless, unlike within 
the trade union movement where inclusion of informal workers is a prominent 
although highly disputed topic, we did not encounter similar efforts or agendas 
from the established business associations which cater for formal business (al-
though we did not investigate this specifically). Nonetheless, one could argue 
for a need to differentiate between people in the informal economy on the 
basis of their identification (or characteristics) as a worker in an employment 
relation or as a businessperson with a small business. While there is a need to 
differentiate, the endeavour is complicated by the multitude of existing work 
and (often hidden) employment relations as showcased in this edited book. In 
addition, such differentiations should also be carefully considered, as different 
representational models have different implications for social protection as dis-
cussed below (see also Riisgaard, 2021).
The representational models
As outlined in the introduction, a particular representational model is promoted 
by the ILO and generally favoured by trade unions. This model posits that exist-
ing employers’ and workers’ organizations should extend membership to work-
ers and economic units in the informal economy, so that they can be represented 
and participate in social dialogue with a particular focus on transitioning into 
formality. The social protection implications of this model are largely compatible 
with the existing formal social protection schemes, where most employment- 
related social protection will accrue to workers only when they formalize, and 
where social insurance is accessed through self-contributions.
Another representational model would be to seek to transform the existing 
tripartite structure to a 3 + 1 model in order to enable informal operators – 
whether as workers or businesses – to represent themselves on an equal footing 
with formal enterprises and workers, but as separate from either of these. This is 
generally the agenda, which is being pushed by transnational advocacy groups 
like WIEGO (see e.g. Alfers & Moussié, 2019). Within this model, it is ques-
tioned whether the vision of full formalization is possible, and emphasis is on ap-
proaches which allow for participation of informal workers (in their own right) in 
policy design and implementation. The Kenyan Micro and Small Enterprises Au-
thority (MSEA) could be seen as a small step in this direction. The implications 
for social protection of this model are likely to be a more universal and rights-
based approach, either through an expansion of ‘workers’ rights to include all 
workers or through citizenship claims on the state to guarantee certain welfare 
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rights such as, for example, health care, pensions, and other social security bene-
fits (as has, e.g., been the case with some informal workers’ movements in India – 
see Agarwala, 2013). Amongst the associations participating in our research, 
such overall claims were largely absent, and focus was on a more immediate level 
of case by case dealing with challenges faced by members. Nonetheless, we did, 
in both countries, see examples of informal micro-traders’ associations seeking 
representation alongside business associations and informal transport workers 
forming their own unions outside the established national federations.
Key implications and further research needs
It is clear from the discussions above that there is no one size fits all solution, 
and that challenges and needs should be understood in the context of sector 
and status of work along with associational belonging and other differentiators 
like gender, age, income, and assets. Nonetheless, in an overall conclusion, we 
endeavour to tease out the following implications of our research:
There is a need to conceptually re-think and broaden both academic and pol-
icy discussions on social protection in order to recognize and address the restric-
tive formal/informal dichotomy and one-sided focus on formalization as this 
bias renders most existing formal social protection measures starkly inappropri-
ate and inadequate for the majority of the working populations.
Of particular importance is the representational deficit. Representation should 
be included in social protection discourses as it is of key importance in terms of 
ensuring that informal workers have a say in the elaboration of social protection 
policies and more generally in issues affecting their work and living conditions.
The immense importance of informal workers’ own associations in meeting 
(even if inadequately) the social protection needs of their members needs to not 
only be recognized but also help inform efforts to reframe national social pro-
tection policies and systems.
This edited volume has reported findings from three specific sectors in two 
specific countries. In other sectors, other sector-specific features will prevail, 
but the importance of associations in delivering social protection is likely to cut 
across. While we cannot generalize, it is nonetheless also likely that informal 
social protection through associations is of great importance in other African 
countries characterized by a large informal economy and low coverage by for-
mal social protection schemes. On the other hand, we would be cautious in 
generalizing the specific characteristics of the bottom-up and, in particular, the 
top-down model of social protection to other contexts, but highly encourage fu-
ture research in this area. Additionally, our research points towards several other 
areas in need of further research:
As mentioned, understanding the internal power dynamics of associations and 
how they might affect members differently would provide much-needed insights 
to associations’ potential as vehicles for representation and for developing stronger 
coalitions amongst associations as well as in relation to future efforts to enhance 
informal social protection and possibly link it to formal social protection.
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In light of severe disruptions like the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic which 
has further undermined the formal social protection system and forced reliance 
on informal cushioning, there is an important need to gain a better understand-
ing of how different types of associations fare during a crisis.
In this edited volume, we have addressed formal social protection measures 
that have already been implemented, but as also noted, discussions about how to 
achieve broader inclusion are ongoing, and policies are continually being drafted 
and pilot schemes launched, as elaborated in Chapter 2. Such innovations and 
policy proposals need to be assessed for their compatibility with the needs and 
challenges of particular groups of informal workers. This endeavour should in-
clude assessments of innovative solutions implemented in other countries which 
might serve as inspiration.
Finally, there is a need to further investigate the potential of recent instances 
of representation of informal workers through formal institutions as demon-
strated in the Kenyan case of MSEA and in the case of informal workers’ asso-
ciations joining or forming trade unions. Both hold potential for diminishing 
the representational gap of informal workers but are hardly explored in existing 
literature.
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